the Universe, there are other incorporeal Substances befides God. For nothing from the Thing itself, as has been made to appear, hinders the Sovereign and All-powerful Being from creating these incorporeal Natures when he created the Universe, and without them the Workmanship of it had been in a Manner imperfect, and maimed in its nobleft Part. If any one should build a magnificent House; and when he came to adorn and furnish it, should fupply it with no costly Furniture, but only with earthen or wooden Ware, or Utenfils of fome more ignoble Matter, to the Neglect of every fumptuous, every gallant Ornament; you would be apt to fay, that Man, or that Master, was either diforder'd in his Understanding, or exhausted by his Expence, or very miferably covetous. So if the Creator of all Things in compleating and adorning his Work, had omitted the most excellent Ornaments, incorporeal Natures, one would have been apt and ready to fay, that he had been either by Envy or Impotence depriv'd of the Will, or of the Ability to finish and accomplish his Work. How great and how frightful a Chafm had there been? how vaft a Vacuity in the Nature of Things, if there had been nothing between the highest and the lowest Nature, between God and Matter? In that immenfe Interval, there is Room for numberlefs Orders of Beings, and Beings of the nobleft Kind; which, if God had either not

created,

created, or had afterwards fupprefs'd, he had been neither mindful of his own Majefty, nor the Dignity of his Undertaking. Lastly, in the Nature of Things there are very many Phænomenas, which can neither juftly be referr'd to Matter, nor immediately to God: Thefe Appearances require intermediate Natures, and fecondary Causes from God, fuperior to the utmoft Power of Matter: But there is here no Room to dwell any longer upon these.

THE Way being thus prepar'd, and, as it were, levell'd, we come at length to the very Conclufion in which the Argument terminates, viz. that among these incorporeal Substances the human Scul has a Place, or that 'tis one of their Number. The whole Point in Debate, 'tis plain, turns upon this, viz. to what Clafs and Order of Things, corporeal or incorporeal, the human Soul belongs?* But fince the Effences of Things in a great Measure lie hid from us, and we have hardly

* That this may more clearly and diftinctly appear, let us diligently examine, and, as it were, look into ourfelves, that we may fee what we are, and what Value we ought to fet on ourselves. Every Man is conscious of himself and his own Existence. If any one shall happen to doubt of this, he must be convinc'd by that very Doubt, and confefs that he exifts. But what fort of Beings we are, who doubt, who will, who will not, who rejoice, who grieve, and who think a thousand different Ways; here, I fay, lies the great Queftion, what we are who act, and who fuffer thefe Things. In the firft

Place,

hardly any other Way to discover the Differences between them, than by their Proprieties and their Effects. It will not be foreign to our Purpose to compare, in the first Place, the Qualities and Effects of each Nature, the corporeal and the incorporeal, or of our Souls and our Bodies; that we may learn from thence, whether they are different, or are one and the fame; and if they are different, in what Manner they differ, or are oppos'd to each other.

WE

Place, I perceive that I am a Being diftinct from all other Be ings. Nor does any other feel the Grief or the Pain that I do, nor I what another feels; and fo for Pleasure, and the reft of the Affections. Befides, I understand either more or less than others; and as every one has the Freedom of his own Will, I have that of mine. I am fick, am in Health, I hunger, I fleep, for myself only; and laftly, I live, or I die for myfelf alone.

By reafon of this Confciousness of Actions and Paffions proper and peculiar to me, and incommunicable to any Thing elfe, I call myself a certain Individual, divided and diftinct from every other Being; diftinct from God, as I am an imperfect Being, obnoxious to the Errors, both of my Understanding and Will; diftin&t likewife from every other Being, fince they neither perceive my Thoughts, nor Senfations, nor have I any Senfe of theirs. In the mean while, thofe Actions or Paffions, of which I alone am confcious, muft neceffarily belong to fome Subftance, as the Properties and Faculties of that Subftance: To God they cannot belong, as we have fhewn above, and will be ftill more clear below; they must belong then to fome created Substance, corporeal or incorporeal.

THESE Things being premis'd, you fee very clearly that the whole Point in Debate turns upon this, viz. to what Clafs of created Beings, corporeal or incorporeal, the human Seul belongs?

WE have seen above, that Thought not included the Idea of corporeal Nature, or that on the other Side, any of the Proprieties of Body are included in Thought; and therefore the Author of Nature has deceiv'd us both Ways, if Thought belongs to Matter; and therefore unless we pretend to understand beyond the Reach of our Faculties, or befide them, or against them, no Motive or Handle can fpring from our Ideas that may occafion our uniting and confounding Thought with corporeal Nature.

BUT you will fay, perhaps, that we sometimes learn thofe Things by Experience, which we could never have deduc'd from our Ideas alone. If we should grant it, yet never has it been found by any Experience, that the Mind either acts or fuffers after the Manner of Matter; or that Matter either acts or fuffers the fame Way that the Mind does, that is, by the Power and Force of its own Thought. We all know very well, that Matter either acts or fuffers by Motion, Touch, or Impulse; but never has it yet been made to appear, that the Mind either acts or fuffers by Touch, or by Impulfe, or by any of the Motions which they excite. For Example; when I move by a voluntary Motion either my Tongue or my Finger, or any other Part of my Body, I am confcious of no Impulse, or any Manner of Stress whatever made by my Mind upon that Part of the Body. There is, indeed, a Motion of the Spirits,

J

Spirits, or of the thinner Juices from which the Motion of that Part of the Body ultimately proceeds: But we are now inquiring into the first Original or Caufe of that Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, as far as it lies in our Power, and after the Manner by which it proceeds immediately from the Mind, or from the Action of the Mind. But I affirm, that I am confcious of no Action of my Mind in the producing or effecting this Mo tion, but Volition, or the Command of my Will. But that this Action, or Command of my Will, is perform'd by Touch or Impulfe, or has its Effect by thofe, I am able to difcover by no Confcioufnefs, nor find by any Experience.

AND as for the Paffions of the Mind, occafion'd by the Body, and by corporeal Objects, thefe Objects as far as they are in the Soul, have no Refemblance or Relation to Local Motion, or to thofe Motions of the Body by which they are excited. For Example: The Heart is contracted in Grief and Sadness, and dilated in Mirth and Joy: But no Man can imagine that this Contraction, or this Dilatation, can be in the Soul itfelf, as if the Soul of Man were mufcular, compos'd of Fibres and Tendons. For the Senfe of Grief, of which we are confcious, and which we clearly perceive, reprefents neither Local Motion to us, nor any Thing that is moveable, but is a fingular Idea, ha