whence its ulterior operations were to commence is purely a naval consideration," his position is certainly true in words, but as certainly incorrect in its implied meaning. It is obvious that the army might have marched to Bathz in the course of a few days, but it is also obvious that it could not be conveyed on board a fleet of 400 transports, besides frigates, sloops and flotilla, through a very intricate channel, without some delay. The difficulty of conducting such a fleet at all, through the mazes of such a navigation can only be appreciated by professional men; it was very greatly increased by an adverse wind, blowing for some time with such violence as to render the expedient of warping (the only means of proceeding) totally impracticable; such obstacles to our progress were only to be overcome by great exertions and perseverance, by a considerable but not as I trust an unnecessary expenditure of labour and time. I can only say, that I made every arrangement by appointing the most active officers to every separate part of each service, and that I had every reason to be satisfied with their zeal, activity and exertion. Having anticipated many of these difficulties, I attempted in a conversation with lord Chatham on the 1st of August, to impress them on his lordship's mind, and I inferred from his answers, that he intended to modify his future plans in consequence, and to proceed by South Beveland instead of the West Scheldt. Under this persuasion I directed admiral Otway to take the command of the fleet employed before Walcheren, that I might be at liberty to employ my whole attention in forwarding the different preparations necessary to facilitate the progress of the army to the destination from whence its ulterior operations were to commence. I immediately directed sir Home Popham to proceed through the Slough with several sloops of war, all the bombs, gun brigs and gun boats, and use every exertion in getting the flotilla into the West Scheldt, that it might in the first instance co-operate with commodore Owen in completing the naval blockade of Flushing, and to be ready to proceed to Bathz at the shortest notice whenever its service should be required there, for the purpose of prosecuting the ulterior objects of the Expedition. I also instructed him to hasten as much as possible the progress of the transports through the Slough. The subsequent news of the rapid occupation of south Beveland and of the fort of Bathz, with a quantity of artillery and ammunition in the other forts (v. Journal Army Proceedings, sir John Hope adapted to our future operations; and also of the facility which might be afforded to our arrangements for crossing to Santfliet, by a ford reported capable of being passed by some part of the army, further strengthened my opinion that the landing in South Beveland with all the cavalry and infantry would be the only means of rapidly approaching towards the ultimate objects of the Expedition. Accordingly, in my interview with lord Chatham on the 6th, I stated fully the difficulties I had to encounter from the untoward state of the weather, and from the intricacy of the channel in passing the vessels through the Slough, as also from the difficulties made by the pilots, who refused to take charge of these vessels, or even to carry the line of battle ships into the West Scheldt. The strong impression I felt upon this subject induced me to deviate from the line of conduct I have always adopted in relation to military matters, of not interposing any opinion; and I ventured to propose to his lordship to commence the disembarkation by landing the cavalry immediately on South Beveland and marching them to Bathz, which might be followed by all the infantry not occupied in the siege of Flushing; stating that much delay and difficulty would arise in getting our numerous vessels and transports through the Slough; that in addition to the frigates which were already under orders to proceed into the West Scheldt, I should be able in a day or two to get a sufficient portion of sloops and extra flotilla, consisting of the transports I ordered to be armed and the launches of the fleet to be fitted with carronades, to encrease the flotilla through the Slough to send up to co-operate with the army at Bathz, and such a limited number of transports as might contain articles essential to the first advance of the army. I also informed his lordship that every possible exertion was making to accomplish the passage through the Slough, on the nature of which exertions, being wholly technical, such as buoying and anchoring small transports on the side of the shoals, and making arrangements for warping, (the wind being still adverse) cannot be necessary for me to dwell. That lord Chatham fully understood the nature and extent of the obstacles to our getting into the West Scheldt which I described, is obvious from his letter of the 7th of August, written after the interview in which I had explained them and ventured to propose the remedy of landing the cavalry, &c. in South Beveland. anxious to pursue the line of conduct most congenial to his lordship's wishes, and consequently best adapted to promote a cordial co-operation, I promised every exertion in carrying his intentions into execution. Accordingly, on my return from lord Chatham, I continued my arrangements for accelerating the various complicated objects which were to be attended to. The first part of the flotilla which got through the Slough were applied to the cutting off the communication between. Cadsand and Flushing, because his lord. ship had regretted (though without urging it as a subject of complaint) that supplies had been so often thrown into Flushing. In fact, until after the 7th of August, the To this letter I beg to call the most particular attention, as it is very difficult to reconcile the statement in that letter with the insinuations which it is my painful duty to answer. It is no less difficult to reconcile the admission, that "the active enterprize of the enemy and the reinforcement thrown into Flushing rendered it necessary to land general Grosvenor's division" with the assertion in the state-weather continued so bad with the wind at ment, that "it is to be remembered that this was only done because his lordship saw no movement making to push forward a single vessel up the West Scheldt." Upon the justice of the last observation, after the conversation which had passed between us on the 6th, I dare not trust myself with making any comments. I then thought and I still think that if the plan which I had presumed to suggest had been adopted, had the cavalry been landed on South Beveland and a limited number of transports been selected, that a delay of only a few days would have resulted from the adverse accident which had unavoidedly given a different course to the direction of our operations. Lord Chatham seemed to think it neces sary that all the men of war and transports should assemble in the Upper Scheldt at Bathz. My opinion on this subject I have already stated. It is to be remembered that the French fleet had retreated above Lillo, and were dismantled, so that the presence of our line of battle ships in the West Scheldt could not be necessary until the army should have been assembled at Bathz, and even then, unless it should have been deemed inexpedient for the army to have advanced upon Antwerp, until we should have broken the boom of Lillo; I still think that not more than four ships could have been required for that purpose; In the mean time our flotilla would have been amply sufficient to have protected the passage of the army from Bathz to Sandyliet, as I should not have agreed to any proposition for crossing the army unless I had been quite certain that I had the most ample means of giving it the fullest protection. Being, however, particularly S. W. and S. S. W. that we were unable to interrupt the communication of the enemy, as the only vessels by which we could effect it were constantly driven in by the gales and could not keep the sea. The wind which was most adverse to us was most favourable to the enemy, who could from Cadsand run before it into Flushing without the possibility of interruption. On the 7th we were able, by the weather moderating, to establish the sea blockade of Flushing, and on the 9th a considerable body of the flotilla, under the command of sir Home Podham, were carried through the swatch-way of the Caloot-sand at the entrance of the Slough Passage and proceeded to Bathz, where they arrived on the 11th. At the same time a squadron of frigates passed Flushing to join this flotilla and proceeded on the following day up the Scheldt. With respect to the line of battle ships, great difficulty had occurred from the objections of the pilots, but I regretted this less because I had considered these ships, if in cousequence of my offer they should be called for by lord Chatham, as applicable to the co-operation in the attack of the town. And having placed the different divisions of the fleet employed in the various services in the East Scheldt, at Bathz, in the Slough, and in the West Scheldt, under the command of officers of respectability, with directions to press the passage of the transports through the Slough, I remained in the vicinity of Walcheren for the purpose of communicating with lord Chatham, as I conceived it my duty to do, until he should think it right to proceed to South Beveland: The ships of the line, therefore, whose immediate presence at Bathz did not for the rea sons which I have just mentioned appear to me at all necessary, did not pass Flushing until the attack on the 14th. The Courageux, which ship was intended to go up the river when the frigates did, proceeded early in the morning of the 15th. I detained the other, as the anchorage at Bathz was very confined, and at that time extremely crouded, but they were only a few miles lower down, and within reach of going up in one tide whenever it should be required of them to proceed up the river. The transports proceeded up the river in different divisions as fast as the difficulties I have stated could be overcome, and in consequence of the arrangements made and the exertions of the officers employed, with fewer accidents than I believe have ever occurred to so large a fleet in such a navigation. I trust I have now succeeded in proving the point with which I set out, namely, that if the army was not sooner assembled at Bathz, the delay was in no shape imputable to my misconduct; the particular line of operations which had been suggested to the commander in chief of the forces and to myself, as most likely to insure the attainment of the ultimate objects of the expedition, was departed from, is notorious; but I have endeavoured to shew that the failure of the attack on Cadsand was not owing to any defect in the orders and instructions issued by me, and it was evidently impossible, that while Cadsand and Flushing remained in the hands of the enemy, I could carry such a naval armament as was assembled under my orders to the point of general rendezvous. No `precautions of mine could secure the fleet and army against the fury of the elements, or enable us in spite of the adverse gales to reach by the shortest course our proper destination. In conveying the fleet to a secure place of refuge, and one where the disembarkation of the troops took place with little loss of time and without any loss of lives, I trust I shall not be accused either of a dereliction of my duty or of any inattention to the interests of the army. From this period I considered myself bound implicitly to accede to the wishes of the Commander in Chief. With him alone was there an option between a march of 36 hours and a voyage of an indefinite length. I trust that it was owing to no defect of zeal on my part, and I am sure it was owing to no want of exertion on the part of the many excellent naval officers whom I had the honour to command, that the progress of a fleet which it was necessary to warp, or in less technical language to haul by human labour, through the windings of a most intricate channel, and often directly in the teeth of the wind, appeared so tardy that lord Chatham "saw no movement making to push forward a single vessel to the West Scheldt." The exertions of the naval officers and men were not rendered less irksome by the persuasion that the labour, which though incessant often proved unavailing, might have been spared to them at the expence of a short march across the island of South Beveland. To impute to me or to the navy, under the name of delay, the loss of time which was passed by me in constant solicitude and by the men in unremitting toil, is not what I should have expected from lord Chatham. It would have been more agreeable to myself to have offered to their lordships a simple journal of the daily transactions of the fleet, as that course would have afforded me the opportunity of paying a just tribute of gratitude to the numerous able and zealous officers, by whom I was aided in the different branches of the service, under my directions, and who may possibly consider themselves as unjustly subject, together with myself, to some imputation, from the marked and perhaps invidious accuracy with which the particular days of arrival of different divisions are specified in lord Chatham's Statement. But I am convinced that it was not the intention of his lordship, in collecting such a multitude of dates, to attribute any blame to those officers. He has closed his report by pointing me out as the only object of his animadversion. He leaves me "to account for the difficulties which prevented the investment of Flushing, as well as to shew the obstacles which presented themselves to the early progress of the armament up the West Scheldt." He was not aware, it seems, that the first point was rendered impossible by the state of the winds: he was not even aware that the circumstances of his being blown into the East Scheldt had impeded his early progress up the West Scheldt.. Concerning lord Chatham's opinions I have now ceased to be solicitous, but I am and ever shall be sincerely anxious that their lordships should not see cause to regret the confidence with which they have been pleased to honour me upon this occasion. R. J. STRACHAN, Rr. Adm. Breach of Privilege-Mr. John Gale Jones, 14, 548, 691 Burdett, Sir Francis: Mr. Leth- Burdett, Sir F. Proceedings re- Cartwright, Major; his Petition Chatham, Earl, 3, 734 Disturbances in the Metropolis, Farquharson, Mr. ; his Petition, Finance Committee, 13 Foskett, Captain; his Petition, Hunt, Mr. 450, 637 Irish Post Office; Treasurer of, Irish Tythes, 658. Jeffery, Robert, 426 Lake, Captain Warwick and Metropolis; the late Distur- Montague, Mr. 29 Macoa; Expedition against the Portugal, 15 Prisoners of War, 833 Privately Stealing Bill, 762 Privilege, Breach of; Newspaper. Abbot, Rt. Hon. C. see Speaker Bankes, H. i, 12, 16, 25, 32, Barham, J. 641, 786, 791, 895, 913 Bathurst, B. 16, 193, 299, 404 Binning, Lord, 473 Blachford, B. P. 186 Brand, T. 1, 261 Brougham, Mr. 7, 12, 421, 1036 Browne, H. 785 Ferguson, Gen. 15 Fitzgerald, W. 15, 316, 6S6 Burdett, Sir F. 14, 179, 395, Folkestone, Viscount, 4, 14, 426, 444 Burrell, Sir C. 626 Byng, G. 789, 817 Calcraft, J. 15, 450, 637, 643, Canning, G. 15, 12, 324, 444, 538, 715, 732, 736, 740, 776, Castlereagh, Viscount, 16, 81 (Right Hon. S. Perceval) 7, 9, 15, 16, 28, 181, 188, 192, 175, 180, 182, 190, 292, 440, 463, 698, 877, 917, 972 Hall, Sir J. 256, 720 Herbert, Mr. 254, 684, 763 Hutchinson, C. H. 18, 623, 789 Lambe, W. 758, 786, 1080 Lethbridge, T. 136, 176, 185, Lyttleton, W. H. 440, 621, 746, Markham, Admiral, 22 Marryatt, J. 255 Martin, H. 13, 1078, 1085 Master of the Rolls, (Sir W. Matthew, General, 688 Milton, Lord, 620, 970, 1003, Montgomery, Sir H. 755, 838 Morris, E. 771, 812 Newport, Sir J. 9, 677, 761, Osborne, Lord F. 314 Parker, Capt. 615, 901 |