the noble lord (Castlereagh) had his plan | rior, simultaneous, subsequent operation!" -that the admiralty had theirs, and that-Now to have any chance of success, it the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Per- was necessary that the main body should ceval) had his, each distinct from the have got to Santvliet as speedily as posother. The plan of the noble lord, if one sible; and accordingly four days were might guess from the outline, was to make calculated for its passage from the Downs a dash, which disdained to stop at even to Santvliet. Sir R. Strachan had said, the most desperate risks, and appalling that if wind and weather were favourable, dangers. The plan of the admiralty, it might be done in a week; but after all, at least fixed upon at the sailing, though with every precaution that could have hostile to the romantic notions of the noble been taken, some vessels were behind, and lord, was much more prudent. It would some had been stranded. In addition to not hazard the navy in a most intricate that cause of delay, it was found quite navigation. The right hon. the Chancel- necessary to take South Beveland, since lor of the Exchequer's plan was not how the enemy had batteries on that island all he should support the cause of his allies; up the river as far as it extended; and, not how the operations of the Expedition besides, Bathz might have been expected should affect the scale of the war in Ger- to hold out for some time. The noble many; not how it should tend to turn in lord then referred to a letter of lord Cas. favour of Austria, the equally poised for- tlereagh to the commander in chief, of the tune of that awful campaign, but all his 23d of June, stating that on the 21st he attention was absorbed in calculating upon had received the King's pleasure that the that arrangement which should convey Expedition should go forward. The aryour Expedition with the least possible dent zeal of the secretary of state had quantity of dollars. The right hon. gent. outrun the royal sanction; for he had, totally overlooked that axiom in war, that previously to obtaining it, directed sir D. bullion was as necessary as powder and Dundas to hold the army in readiness. shot, and was, when well applied, not less The great objects of the Expedition were operative. (Hear, hear!) What plan the stated to be, the capture or destruction of secretary of state for foreign affairs was the enemy's ships at Antwerp, at Terneuse, more particularly attached to, he could and in the Scheldt, and, if possible, the not tell; but it was probable, that just at rendering of the river Scheldt no longer that time, he had some little plan of his navigable; and this they now told us was own which he did not communicate to his to be done by a coup-de-main. He doubted colleagues. The admiral appeared to much, after all, that there were in existhave a plan; but the commander in chief ence such arsenals as those at Terneuse appeared to have no plan at all. Through- here directed to be destroyed. As for out the whole of his examination it was the " powerful diversion in favour of our clear that he had at no time during the allies," how could the noble lord expect campaign considered of any plan at all, it to be so, when he knew, that, after the neither was there any pointed out to him coup-de-main, our force, for want of foin the instructions of the government? reign coin, must return immediately? The noble lord here declared that he felt This was the object on which the eyes of it difficult to settle what plan he should his Majesty's ministers had been fixed for proceed to discuss on the present occasion; so long a period. As to the scheme of but he should at all events endeavour to destroying the navigation of the Scheldt, follow up what seemed to have been the it was impracticable. intention of the government. The general understanding of the business seemed to be, that part of our army was in the first instance to take possession of the island of Walcheren, and another corps to take Cadsand. The main body was to advance to Santvliet to about the number of 22,000), including however eight detachments to be sent to South Beveland. This was so far the apparent plan, which, however, related, according to some of the documents before the House, in not very intelligible language, to "a second, ulte

The noble secretary of state, however, hoped confidently that all the difficulties would be overcome. How? Not by methods provided or foreseen by government, but forsooth, by the valour and energy of his Majesty's troops. He could not, however in this place omit a principal point, the probability of those ships being protected by the enemy. And here for the first time the noble lord prudently considered difficulties and possible failure, and yet pointed out no method by which to overcome them. He had however fol

gun-boats. He armed but six and twenty of them in one day. His Majesty's ministers, in their calculations, had reckoned on no such impediments; there was to be the easiest and quickest of passages over, and on the land there were to be found the most excellent roads. They calculated the progress of the Expedition by a sort of time-keeper without friction; but a little friction occurred on entering into the Scheldt, which they never dreamed of: a ship laden with guns to arm the gunboats was behind hand, and impeded their proceedings.

lowed this consideration of difficulties up by saying, although the objects of our Expedition could be removed farther from us at the discretion of the enemy, yet upon the whole it was deemed necessary to recommend the undertaking of the Expedition. The House should bear in mind, that we could not go from Santvliet to Antwerp with safety, but with the possession of one of the banks of the Scheldt. The north bank of that river, and the possession of South Beveland, were also thought to be indispensable. Sir H. Popham had given it as his opinion, that with every circumstance of wind, &c. being favour- He now came to the intelligence able, we might be on the coast from the submitted to the secret Committee; Downs in 24 hours, and in 48 hours aftera person it appeared whom ministers wards at Santvliet. Sir R. Strachan had represented as one well acquainted said, that we could not do it without great with the navigation of the Scheldt, danger and loss to our ships and boats and worthy of the firmest reliance being from Bathz, which must therefore be placed on his statements, described the taken, and where sir J. Hope had stated, Slough Passage as difficult for even small that there were 14 or 15 guns mounted. single vessels, and declared it to be neSouth Beveland and Bathz must therefore cessary to have a pilot in every line-ofhave been taken. Sir R. Keats, one of the battle ship and frigate in order to effect most experienced naval officers, held a that passage with safety. How were our high command in the Expedition; but it fleet provided in this respect? They had did not appear that he was in any respect only one pilot; and sir R. Strachan deever previously consulted. That gallant clared that he could not get one bold officer nevertheless had made a communi- enough to venture to carry his ship safe cation to lord Castlereagh, who shewed up this dangerous and difficult navigation. but little disposition to consult with him. It was true the river might be buoyed, Sir R. Keats, it seemed, was in favour of but this would occupy a week, and preproceeding to the ulterior objects at once, clude all possibility of a rapid advance.and against wasting time or troops in Wal- It also appeared, from the testimony of cheren: This circumstance would prove this person, that it was only possible to material, in some respects, in reviewing proceed to Bathz with the wind in two the whole case. When asked as to the points of the compass, between the South time that might be occupied in advancing and West, and perhaps with a scant wind to Antwerp, the main object of the Expe- in two other points. But ministers did dition, sir Richard said it depended en- not care for these difficulties; they protirely on the state of the weather, and was ceeded, as if they could have relays of subject to many chances; that if Bathz favourable winds at every corner of this were defended, it might have retarded winding river. The time necessary to the Expedition a few days: That unless take possession of South Beveland, and we landed with great celerity, the efforts to reduce Bathz, they left entirely out of the enemy might make ultimate success of their consideration. Sir John Hope doubtful, and even though we arrived in had declared, that it might have held out time off Santvliet, yet the nature of the Ex- several days, if defended, and in this pedition was peculiarly subject to chances; opinion he was confirmed by lord Rossand the probability was, that those chances lyn. The speedy surrender of both might happen which would render success these places therefore was very unexvery uncertain. He said likewise that we pected, and could never have been anticould not go up the Scheldt with less than cipated in any preliminary view taken eighty gun-boats, to enable us to cope by ministers, if they did ever take any with the numerous French flotilla in that preliminary general view of the matter. river. You might pass over from Deal to Bathz in particular was capable of a re Santvliet in four days, but you are resistance sufficiently long to have disconminded by sir Richard, that you must certed their whole plan of operations. -stop in the Scheldt and wait to arm your Lillo and Liefkenshoeik were also by

ministry. Some facts, indeed, and those of importance, the noble earl had stated to the House; one of which was, that you could not proceed up the Scheldt, unless you had the advantage of a west erly wind: and he had also added, that with that desired westerly wind you were under the necessity of meeting with a high surf, that rendered your landing extremely difficult. Being asked further respecting the difficulties of going up the river Scheldt, he had told them, that he had always understood that the entering and advancing with an armament up a winding river, where navigation was not perfectly known to those who wished to go up, was an undertaking of very great difficulty and of danger. His lordship, however, had further stated and seemed astonished at any question being put to him on the subject, that in his opinion it was not possible to have landed the army with its artillery, its stores, &c. at Santvliet on the sixth; but general Macleod and general Fyers thought of being bcing before Antwerp on the 10th, and presumed the landing at Santvliet on the 4th. The House then would see how these great characters agreed as to the efficiency of the means, and the practicability of the object.

many deemed indispensable and capable of similar resistance. To man the flotilla in the river to take possession of Beveland-to reduce Bathz-and to have wind and weather for all occasions, presented to our ministers neither difficulty nor subject for deliberation. General Brownrigg, who seemed somewhat to participate in the sanguine expectations of lord Castlereagh, in his evidence, stated, that, if the army could have landed on the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, of August, they might have been successful. Being further examined, he said, that, taking possession of Cadsand would be but the work of an hour. But he, like ministers, forgot that the north-western wind, an unruly spirit, must blow before they could undertake or attempt to accomplish their object. Gen. Brownrigg imputed the failure of the whole to the unfortunate necessity which obliged the armament to take shelter and assemble in the Roompot. Lord Castle reagh, when examined, would not fix dates so nearly as general Brownrigg; but he was of opinion, that, under favourable circumstances, the armament might have arrived early, and been succesful. On being questioned as to the force and dispositions of the enemy, his answer was, that he could not presume to judge what might be the movements of the enemy. He had thus endeavoured to shew, that As a member of that House the noble four days were not sufficient for the purlord might have declined answering this pose intended, and in this his opinion he question, when pressed on him, but since. was corroborated by that of the earl of he had answered it, he stood condemned Chatham, the commander in chief; but out of his own mouth.-What! was he ministers had evidently calculated, withnot to calculate on the resistance likely to out considering any of the three or four be offered to his Expedition-to ascertain preliminary circumstances (which he had as far as possible, the movements likely, already noticed) and an intricate, danor in the power of the enemy to be made? gerous, and difficult navigation. The Was he to send troops, not alone to learn same sort of rashness and precipitation whether they could proceed, but whether which was evident in the plan of minis they could ever return? This was a pointters, was also a distinguished feature in he ought most decidedly to have ascertained, as the fate of the army, of the Expedition, and eventually of the kingdom, whose last and greatest hopes were thus embarked upon the issue, depended upon it.

The noble lord (Porchester) came next to the examination and evidence of a noble earl (Chatham) who was the commander in chief of this Expedition. The noble earl was certainly very prudent and cautious in respect to giving any opinion; he had no wish to engage in that sort of campaign: but what had come from him was certainly, in its effect, very like a sarcasm upon his colleagues in the

the mode of carrying it into execution. They had formed a great plan for attacking Antwerp, for the capture and destruction of the French ships, the arsenals, depots, &c. and various other important objects; and yet it was not until after orders were given to prepare the troops for this service, that they had begun to arrange a plan of operations for making good their entrance into the Scheldt. They never contemplated the obstacles in their way, nor the sufficiency of the means of attaining their object. He could compare the undertaking to nothing. but the instance of the architect, who was said to have built his chamber-floor, be