considerations that must shew that sir | Francis Burdett could not have been influenced by any anti-constitutional motives in his public conduct. He derived those well-grounded presumptions from the hon. baronet's amiable private character, his great stake in the country, and his ancient family. Sir John Anstruther differed most materially from the noble lord who had just sat down, in many points, but in none more than as to his sense of the importance of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wean the feelings of the people of England from the support of that Ilouse. The House stood in that peculiar situation, that it behoved it to guard itself equally from the invasions of the influence of the crown on the one side, and the advancement of popular encroachments upon the other; and the best way to do that effectually was uniformly to support its own rights and privileges. These privileges had never been exercised but for the good of the country at large, and it could not be for the benefit of that country to shrink from the discussion, and the support of them. The question now before the House was extremely clear, whether there had been a libellous publication against the rights and privileges of that House, or not; whether the rights and privileges, so long exercised by that House belonged to it, or not; and if they did, whether the House had or had not, the right of enforcing them. And here he would ask, if it was necessary for the House at that time of day seriously to inquire, whether it had the privileges said to be infringed upon by that publication? The first thing that presented itself in the shape of even a plausible objection to the existence of the privilege in question was, that this was a libel, and therefore did not come under the head of a contempt of court. Admitting it, however, to be a libel, how did it follow that it was not a breach of privilege? Was it no breach of privilege bere, because it was an offence of another kind elsewhere? Or, was it to be said, that because the offence had such extent as to be punishable elsewhere, it was therefore not punishable here, a position which could not be maintained unless the latitude of the crime was to be made a ground of comparative impunity? The offence was indictable in one of the courts of law. What then? Because it was so, were they to pass it over without notice; that was, in other words, were they to be told, that because it was a libel, it could not be a breach of privilege? But it had been argued, that a libel, though a breach of privilege, ought not to be punished as such, but generally as a breach of the peace. Here they had a libel admitted to be a breach of privilege, and that admission ended the argument so far; for if they had privileges they must have the power of supporting them. He, however, denied altogether that an offence amounting to a breach of privilege was removed out of the jurisdiction of that House, because that breach of privilege was also a libel. The hon. baronet began his Letter with stating, that "the House of Commons having passed a Vote, which amounts to a declaration, that an order of theirs is to be of more weight than Magna Charta and the Laws of the Land." This was an insidious and false way of stating a groundless proposition-a groundless calumny. What was the question? Did the House really act in violation of Magna Charta and the law of the land? What was the law of the land? Where was it to be found? Where were they to look for it? He knew of no place to look for it but in the practice of that House and the other established courts of jurisprudence. What, then, was the privilege claimed by that House?-that that House being a third branch of the legislature, should have the power of preventing or removing all obstructions thrown in the way of the free exercise of its judgment-all contempts must be allowed to be classed under the head of such obstructions—all ca. lumnies circulated against the free exercise of their right of judgment would be admitted at once to be breaches of privilege; and, if such calumnies, instead of evaporating in words, should be elaborately embodied in a printed paper, was the breach of privilege the less, or did it, on that account, cease to be a breach of privilege? Should the House of Commons suffer itself to be run down in such a manner? Was there a common club of the meanest description that had not in itself a power of protecting itself against such calumnies from its own members? Obstructions, it could not be denied by any man, the House had a right to remove; and, not merely personal obstructions, for there were obstructions, which, though not operating by actual personal force, had yet the same effect in ultimately influencing the decisions of that House. Whatever went to prevent the free exercise of the judgment of that House was a virtual obstruction, and as such ought to be removed. Were such obstructions altogether unprecedented? Had they been in other times unusual? How had the vote been carried against lord Strafford? Had the exercise of the judgment of the House been free and uncontrouled in that instance? When the walls were placarded with menaces, and members hooted and halloo'd by the mob as Straffordians, as they passed to and from the House And why might they not do the same tomorrow? Aye, but then it might be said that hooting was more like a personal obstruction than placarding and posting upon the walls. But was nothing to be construed as an obstruction but what was personally so? Were there no such things as constructive obstructions? Impediments which were not actually personal, but which had virtually the same effect. Libels came exactly up to the case of constructive obstructions. The privileges of that House were essentially necessary to its existence, and as calumny was the most dangerous assailant their privileges could have, was it to be supposed that the putting that calumny in writing took from the House the right of protecting itself against its influence by the punishment of the author? Or was the House compelled, in such a case, to wait the slow progress of an indictment? a remedy, that after all would not apply to the offence, as an offence against the privileges of that House. The courts below to which they would in that case apply, would not look upon the offence as a breach of privilege, they would not take cognizance of it in that view: they would try it as a breach of the peace, and not as a breach of their privileges. The next question was, if they had those privileges, had they the power of judging of offences against their own privileges? And here perhaps, he ought to apologize to the Chair for merely asking that question; for if the House of Commons was not judge of its own privileges, and the only judge of those privileges, he for his part did not know how the House of Commons could be said to exist at all. In his judgment their independence was totally gone when any other power than themselves was allowed to be judge of their privileges; and in saying this, was * See 2 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. 753. he claiming more for the House of Commons than belonged to the lowest court? The lowest court could punish for contempt, and, what was more, no court would interfere in commitments for contempt by any other. So that the House by inforcing this privilege asked for nothing more than what belonged to every other court. That House had therefore the power of judging of its own privileges, and of protecting those privileges. That power, however, like every other power, admitted of abuse: but the abuse of a thing was no argument against its existence. As to the charge of abuse of its power, the House of Commons might with confidence appeal to the past. It would be found that, for the last three hundred years, in the same proportion as their authority had become more solid and extended, had their exercise of that power been calm, moderate, and prudent. But it had been said that a breach of privilege was no contempt. This objection he did not answer, only because he did not understand it. If a breach of their privileges was not a contempt of their authority, he did not know what contempt was. Again, it was objected, that if they were the judges of their own privileges, they might make what privileges they pleased. But had they done so? Let them look back, and they would see, that that House had never been fond of creating new privileges, they had privileges enough to uphold their own independence, and vindicate their constitutional authority, and one, and perhaps the most important of those privileges, was to prevent their deliberations from being impeded by the attacks of calumny. The calumny, in the present instance, came from one, who had set himself high on the side of the people. He would put the case, that that the same attempts to run down the character and authority of that House had been made by the crown, or he should rather say the scrvants of the crown, and he would ask, in that case, what would have been the language of the gentlemen who were now so moderate and so full of doubts upon the present question? Would those gentlemen have been quite so calm and considerate as they now appeared to be?, or would not the House have heard from them different language and in a much higher tone? But whatever their language might be, he would take the same part in either case, and impartially defend the privileges and authority of that House against both. Committal for contempt was, however, not much disputed, as being that which the House had done at all times. It had been said, that the right of committing for libel could not be traced. He admitted that it could not. They could not trace the fact, from the very simple reason, that libels must have been subsequent to the invention of the art of printing-printing must have been common before a case of libel could have occurred. But if they could not trace the fact, they could easily trace the principle. That did not depend upon the fact of printing. Courts had uniformly punished calumnious expressions. That House had been in possession of the right of doing so from its earliest stage; and the principle upon which it exercised that right was not altered by the calumny appearing in a printed form. He was very far indeed from being dis posed to panegyrize the wisdom or prudence of the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge), in forcing the attention of the House to the libel now before them. But, now that it was before them, and that they were called upon either to stand by, or to renounce their privileges, he admitted that there was no receding from the broad question, It was a remark that would be found to hold without one exception, that whether the government was in the hands of the whigs or the tories, this power of committal had been always exercised by that House, and in every instance of that exercise having been questioned by an appeal to the courts of law, the right was uniformly confirmed by their decision; the courts of law having uniformly justified that power upon the same grounds upon which they professed to hold their own. He was surprised at the noble lord's citing a publication of the House of Lords respecting their own privileges, as an authority to weigh with that House in determining upon their's. He would refer that noble lord to the answer given to that publication for the vindication of the privileges of that House. In all times the House punished for libel as an attack upon their privileges. The case of the King versus Flower was a proof of this. He did not want to borrow support from the other House, but he had no objection to their aid where their cases properly applied. Crosby, the Lord Mayor of London, was sent to the Tower. He applied to the Common Pleas for his Habeas Corpus; the other person taken up with him, and committed by virtue of the same warrant, applied to the King's Bench for his Habeas also The Habeas was refused in both instances. Lord De Grey, a great constitutional lawyer, an upright judge, and an honest man, remanded the Lord Mayor, and why? because the reason assigned for commitment was deemed sufficient contempt on the face of the warrant. That great lawyer pronounced the House of Commons to be the judges of its own privileges. The law of their privileges was to be found in their own adjudications of those privileges and their mode of punishment was that of commitment. what were the words of Lord De Grey, in speaking of this right of commitment on the part of the House-"They have a right to commit, because it is necessary they should." This was the reason as signed by lord De Grey, and the moment they parted with the right of judging their own privileges, that moment they ceased to be independent. But The case of Alexander Murray was another in which the right of the House to commit had been tried by an application for an Habeas Corpus, and confirmed. Murray was remanded. The case of the Kentish petition was also in point. At that time the parliament was a Tory one; the ministers, Tory; the six persons who presented the petition were committed-in the course of that year there was a change of Ministers; and the next year there was a Whig ministry, and a Whig parliament. What did they? They not only followed up the proceedings of their predecessors, but embodied them into Resolutions; so that here was a case, where in the heat of party contest, men differing upon every other subject, agreed upon this point of privilege; this was in 1701. The case of Chief Justice Holt was greatly relied upon; but let gentlemen remember, that if Lord Chief Justice Holt was of one opinion, the other eleven Judges were of an opposite opinion. Besides, were they to be told, that the authority of other great lawyers went for nothing? The hon. baronet had made light of the names of De Grey, Mansfield, and Kenyon; those sages of modern times; but it did not follow, that the House would think as lightly of them as the hon. baronet. Besides, lord Holt never denied the right of the House to commit for contempt. Lord Holt merely questioned the limits, whereas the hon. baronet denied the existence of the power; and he candidly cited the authority of lord Holt in aid of, his own opinion, as if the authority that objected to the excess of the power, was fairly to be brought forward as an evidence, that the power did not exist at all! He mentioned this, therefore, merely to guard the House against confounding the opinions of the hon. baronet with the judgments of lord Holt. He therefore was warranted in repeating, that the House of Commons in their assertion of this right, was claiming nothing more than what of right belonged to the lowest and most confined jurisdiction. Of all their privileges, none was more important to them than that of preserving their authority from those contumelious and licentious calumnies which had a tendency to shake their dignity by lowering their character in public estimation. Attacks of this description, no matter how embodied, or from what quarter directed, whether from a mob out of doors, or one of their own members from within, the privileges of that House were equally competent to resist and punish whatever form they assumed, whether they ap. peared in the shape of a libel or of a personal breach of the peace; they would in either case be no less breaches of privilege, and as such, subject to the undisputed cognizance of that House. ing it (whatever it was meant to be) a With respect, then, to the hon. baronet, he would say, that as to the course he had taken up, it appeared to him to be an hopeless one; at least, he might be allowed to say, that the reasoning, upon which his doctrines had been founded, did not appear to him calculated to impress conviction upon those who read it; the arrangement was bad, and the management of the argument was worse. The question, in fact, had been often agitated; it had been the subject of many pamphlets in the time of Wilkes. The proceedings in the year 1701, and on the question But the fact was, that the House then, involving the legal jurisdiction of the as in all other cases, was employed in House of Lords in the case of Ashby and vindicating not the whole detail of their White, all these sources furnished ample privileges, but the individual right and matter to the hon. baronet, but he might privilege in question. The pamphlet was, have borrowed with more selection than he repeated, deserving only of contempt, he had done. Indeed, the pamphlet of and he had therefore not the slightest apthe hon. baronet teemed with evidence of prehension as to any effect it could have dull, clumsy, ill-digested plagiarism, old upon the sound good sense of the people and exploded doctrines revived without of England; at the same time, the privi even their original strength, and put so leges of that House could never suffer badly, as if they were either wholly mis- from discussion-the more they were disunderstood, or stupidly misapplied; and cussed, the firmer they would stand. this naturally brought him to the con- What the House meant to do, he was at a sideration of the importance of the pamph- loss to know. The pamphlet appeared to let in question. He could not help think-him to be an aukward compilation of very bad arguments in very bad language; | of bad taste, but, in his conclusion, adand he must again repeat his wish that such a work had been left to its own fate. He could not extol the wisdom or the prudence of the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge), in visiting it with a character of importance so foreign to its own merits. He would advise that hon. gent. the next time he felt his zeal prompting him so hastily, to pause a little to consider the ulterior consequences a first step in such matters might lead to. He would advise that hon. gent. before he took a similar proceeding in future, to consult with others whose experience might be found to equal his own, and whose counsel might prove no unworthy or unnecessary accession to the native resources of his own practical wisdom. mitted, that it could do no harm. The learned and hon. gent. also accused his hon. friend of want of candour, and for proof of it, referred to the quotation on the title page. This might have proceeded from inadvertence or accidental inaccuracy; but, supposing that not to have been the case, want of candour could be no ground for complaining to that House. The right hon. and learned baronet, however, before he accused his hon. friend of want of candour, should be certain that he had acted with complete candour himself. He had referred to the Resolutions of the House in the year 1621, in which the privileges of the House were enumerated, and in the giving of which he accused his hon. friend of having made an omission, whereas in fact, the Resolutions referred to by the right hon. and learned gent. were those of December, 1621, and his hon. friend referred to those of June, 1621, drawn up, as was supposed, by lord Coke. Another hon. and learned gent. the other day, had complained of the publication in question, in as far as it presumed to doubt of the legality of the Speaker's warrant. The jet of his hon. friend's argument, however, was fair on this point; and if he could question the validity of such a warrant at all, was exactly such as he must be supposed to have used. Before gentlemen pronounced the worthy baronet guilty of so serious an offence as that which the motion inferred, on a ground such as this, they were bound to look to the opinions of authors of reputation and weight, on the subject of warrants, and to their description of those which bore the marks of being legal or illegal. Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, talking of legal warrants, laid it down that four things were necessary in them; as, the hand and seal of the person by whom the warrant was granted; lawful authority on the part of the person granting the warrant; lawful cause for granting it; and, a lawful conclusion. In all of these respects, so far, at least, as they could be seen on the face of the warrant itself, the paper authorising the com Lord Folkestone expressed himself to be the more desirous to follow the learned gentleman, because, though a gentleman of so grave authority, he found himself compelled to say, that he differed from him widely, on almost every point to which he had alluded. The hon. gent. who brought forward the motion, had abstained from stating what were his views of the subject, and this he had a right to complain of on the part of the House. In this respect the hon. gent. had left the question entirely open to conjecture of every kind. He had not failed, however, to inform the House, how much he had been alarmed by the speech of the hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett), and how anxious he felt to see a check given to the practices in which that hon. baronet had been in the habit of indulging. Such an ef. fect, indeed, had the speech of his hon. friend, the worthy baronet, had on the hon. mover, that, as he himself expressed it, "his hair stood on end." This conduct of the hon. mover had been attended with disagreeable effects; for, from this circumstance of their being in utter ignorance of the ideas of the hon. mover, every gentleman had taken an opposite view of the matter. Some complained of one expression, others of another. The hon. and learned gent. who had just sat down, ac cused his hon. friend of inaccuracy, but principally of bad taste. The motion of the hon. mover went to this, That the pub-mitment of Gale Jones was deficient. lication of the worthy baronet was a scandalous and libellous paper. The learned gent. who had just sat down, however, had taken no steps to prove that the publication was scandalous or libellous; he only attempted to shew, that it exhibited proofs Was it not, therefore, too much to lay it down, that for a person unlearned in the law to hold, agreeably to the opinion of writers on that subject, that such a warrant was illegal, was a gross and scandalous libel? Another right hon. and learned gent. had |