might not he be supposed to feel from it, upon general principles, when he saw the private letter exposed, and representing him, as intriguing for command ? Consider the possible consequences of this these papers were of a different description. Was that the case of Cuesta? he had heard the noble lord's opinion loudly proclaimed as that of the army, and he had also stated that it did not affect him in that country now! The weak-unadvised publication to the duke of ness and decrepitude of Cuesta's under- Albuquerque from the impression it might standing had been dwelt upon; but how make on the minds of the people of Cales. would that bear hereafter in justification Might it not be injurious not only to its of those campaigns which another oppor- defence but also to our own interests tunity would be afforded to the noble there, as well as to the cause of Spain ? lord to enter upon? We had been told The noble marquis disdained all reserve before this, of Cuesta's army being much on other points, and he (earl Grey) was superior to any other Spanish army that now glad one paper had been produced, had yet taken the field. We heard as we could thereby disclaim all share in nothing then objectionable in his charac- a barbarous mode of warfare. Seven ter. Nothing of that kind was heard till hundred French prisoners, it is stated very now. That night he was arraigned of all coolly, were thrown into the Minho. sorts of follies and faults, and of no less Possibly this was an act of retaliation; than treachery. The man was not present but a matter so horrid made it indispen to speak for himself: but the sentence of sible, that we should have clearly shewn condemnation was to be passed upon him it to be a retaliation. If ministers with all severity. The noble lord had called thought fit to publish it, they should have Cuesta's army the best disciplined army told the circumstances. This was the of Spain. Was it a slight merit in Cuesta first statement which France could lay to recruit and discipline that force? Re- hold of on such a subject. France might collect the circumstances of Spain after say, there is your document, and you the dispersion of the two armies of Cas- are not able to show why the thing was tanos and the duke of Infantado; there done. The effect this might have on the was nothing left in the field, and yet this war was obvious, on your own countryCuesta collected the best army! Grant- men in prison, and on others in the pe ing, however, that he was unfit to com- ninsula, whom the French may take. mand, was it quite fair, now that he is Though the French have often been highremoved, to make these heavy charges ly censurable in the course of the war, against him, and the same too against yet we know that their army has retained Venegas? The noble marquis says, Cu- many of the honourable feelings of old esta is not now in command. Granted; France. This they had shewn at an early but it was known to him (earl Grey) that period of the late war, when they refused Cuesta was then at Cales, and probably to carry into execution the sanguinary contributing to the defence of that import- decree for giving no quarter to prisoners, ant city, the last port of Spain. But English and Hanoverians. Lord Wellingafter all that had happened in other parts ton, too, had told them how well they had of the country, who could say what treated our soldiers after the battle of might be the consequences of thus re- Talavera. To advert often to this recent nouncing Cuesta? The noble lord had attention to the laws of civilized war, not sufficiently defended himself against which might give France a pretext for the charge of those (perhaps unfounded) departing from this system, was most accusations of Cuesta. He said was it not unwise. There was another case men. material to know the duke of Albuquerque's tioned, of a French officer and some men opinions? Perhaps not. If, indeed, applying to a Spaniard for concealment, the assertions generally of officers of rank in order to take a Spanish place by sur in the Spanish service were stated, there prise; this person let them in, and as was no necessity for the production of a sinated them all. The noble lord insisted private confidential letter, but might it not that there was one part of the information make some difference with respect to the contained in these papers, which it was duke of Albuquerque, that though he unquestionably most rash and imprudent loudly proclaimed his opinion, he was in his Majesty's ministers to divulge, and endeavouring secretly to obtain the com- that was a passage relative to the governor mand for himself? Might not that have a of Avila; that passage, if translated into prejudicial effect towards him? And what French, must shew that the governor of great crime in producing them; and the noble lord had thereby shewn himself totally insufficient to discharge the duties of the important station he then filled. He would, therefore, most cordially support the motion of his noble friend. The motion was then read from the woolsack, and negatived without a division. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Friday, March 30. [LORD WELLINGTON's Answer to the VOTE OF THANKS.] The Speaker acquainted the House, that he had received from lieut. general the right hon. lord' viscount Wellington the following letter, in return to the Thanks of this House, signified to him by Mr. Speaker, in obedience to their commands of the 1st day of February last. Avila had betrayed his trust; and if that | ters had, in his opinion, been guilty of a should come to the knowledge of Buonaparté, who was known to be so severe in his judgment, and so prompt and terrific in his punishment of those who disobey his commands, or were in his opinion faulty in their duty, and negligent of the confidence reposed in them, it would be easy for the House to suppose what must be his fate. Perhaps, in consequence of this information his mandate might, at the moment of this debate, be travelling to Spain for the immediate execution of this unfortunate man, thus made a sacrifice, by the eagerness of ministers to place their own conduct in the most favourable point of view, no matter who else might suffer by it. The noble lord had made a brilliant appeal to the House, and had expressed a wish that every word he had said, and every thing he had done during his residence in Spain, might be published to the world at large. This might be very well on his own part, and he had no doubt but the noble marquis formed this wish from his own opinion at least, that such publication would tend to justify his conduct. At the same time, however, that he did this, it behoved him, when he was about to divulge and publish to the world what had passed between other persons and the British government, to be on his guard, and not promulgate any matters or circumstances on which the fate of others might be implicated, not only as to their characters, but even as to their lives. This necessary caution had, in his opinion, been greatly neglected in many parts of the information given to the House and to the world, in the papers now before their lordships; and the House had no other mode of putting a stop to such proceeding in future but by agreeing to the motion of his noble friend. There was only one point more on which he would trouble their lordships. In a former de bate the noble marquis had justified the conduct of lord Wellington at Talavera, by stating that general. Venegas had been stopt in his progress by an order from government, for which the noble marquis could not account; but it had since turned out that general Venegas had been placed in a very disagreeable situation, and that the true cause of his not advancing was from the intelligence he had received, that lord Wellington would not be able to proceed from want of provision. With regard to the papers in question, minis Viseu, March 6th, 1810. "Sir; I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 2d of February, in which you enclosed the Resolutions of the House of Commons of the 1st of February, expressing the approbation of the House of my conduct, and of that of the general officers, officers, and troops composing the army under my command, in the battle fought at Talavera on the 27th and 28th of July last. In obedience to the Orders of the House, I have communicated to the general officers, officers, and troops, this honourable testimony of the approbation of the House; and I beg leave to adopt this mode of expressing to the House the high sense which I entertain of the honour which they have conferred upon me, and upon the army under my command, and to assure them that I shall endeavour to merit their approbation by a zealous discharge of my duty. I must likewise request you, Sir, to accept my thanks for the kindness towards me which you have manifested in the manner in which you have conveyed to me the pleasure of the House; a kindness of which I had already received repeated proofs during the period that I had the honour of being a member of the House of Commons. I have the honour to be, &c. WELlington." [EXPEDITION TO THE SCHELDT.] The Order of the Day for resuming the adjourned debate on the policy and conduct of the Expedition to the Scheldt having been read, Sir Thomas Turton rose to submit his pinion on the subject to the House. The hon. baronet observed, that after the very long and able discussion which this subject had undergone, he should only be wasting the time of that House were he to detain them long. It could not be supposed that he could add any thing to the arguments already adduced in favour of the Resolutions of the noble lord, nor that he could analyse the evidence with better effect than that noble lord had done. It would be necessary, however, before he stated his opinions upon the great question, to premise, that the responsibility attached not alone to the noble lord who had been at the head of the war department, but to all the ministers, still more than to those who had the command of the naval or the military part of the Expedition; in short, that censure was imputable to those persons who composed the cabinet, and that every man who voted on that occasion would be equally responsible for the consequences of that vote. In considering the question, it appeared to him as branching into three heads: First, what was the object of the Expedition? Secondly, what means had been used to carry the object into effect? and Thirdly, whether ministers had been justified in their retention of Walcheren? With respect to the first question, much stress had been laid by gentlemen opposite on the importance of the object-the possession of the island; and it had been stated by a right hon. gent. (the ex-secretary for foreign affairs,) that the Austrian government considered it of high importance, as making a diversion in their favour-This assertion was attempted to be proved by the production of a paper for which a right hon. gent. on the other side of the House (Mr. Canning) had moved. That paper had, however, when brought forward, contradicted the statement which had been made, and thus the strongest argument that had been used in favour of the plan was subverted. The hon. general (Craufurd) had argued that if the troops had been sent into the North of Germany, it would have been attended with no beneficial effect; but he would put it to that hon. general, whether, if the army had been sent to the North of Gerinany, and some attempt was made in that direction, he supposed there would have been so many in the killed and wounded list as were now in that of the dead and sick? If a diversion was to be made in favour of our allies, its object must have been to What draw off the forces of the enemy, concentrated in any one particular place, for the accomplishment of some great purpose.He would ask, whether this had been the result of the Expedition to the Scheldt? Was there a single man drawn from the Danube? No.-It was said, that if the army of the enemy was not drawn off, others were prevented from joining them. This, however, was proved to be another fallacious subterfuge, as it was well known by ministers themselves, that on the arrival of our troops at Walcheren, the Austrians had been annihilated, and their cause lost beyond the possibility of salvation. The next consideration for the House was, whether the object was commensurate with the risk; and whether the sacrifices we made were not greater than the advantages we had attained. The second object of the Expedition was stated to be the capture of Antwerp; the destruction of the basin of Flushing; of the arsenals and of the fleet which was lying in the Scheldt and building at Antwerp. then were the means adapted to accomplish the end? It was natural to think, that, on such an occasion, ministers, in deciding on the expediency of the measure, would have consulted experienced persons, on whose judgment they could rely, and in whose opinions they could place confidence. They did consult such men, and five generals of the first respectability and of known military character, declared themselves adverse to the plan, as they considered the risk to be encountered too great for the advantages that might possibly accrue. Notwithstanding this, however, the noble lord (Castlereagh) without consulting the earl of Chatham, the Commander in Chief, or even asking a question of the second in command, sir E. Coote, dispatched the Expedition, the greatest that ever left the shores of this country, without plan, whilst the superior officers were destitute of that confidence which was the soul of energy, and the only basis upon which the hope of success could rest. When sir David Dundas was consulted by the noble lord in the month of March, his lordship said the object was Flushing, and stated that he had intelligence of there being eight sail of the enemy's ships which might be destroyed by a comparatively small force; and the answer given to the noble lord was, that there was no force in a state to be employed for that purpose. Here then was a confession that out of a stand ing army of 105,000 men, an account of which was on the table of the House, there were not 15,000 to send upon the Expedition. When this fruitless Expedition was at length determined on, sir Richard Strachan was chosen to take the command, which he did with the greatest reluctance, assigning as a reason that he knew it could not succeed.It was somewhat extraordinary his majesty's ministers did not, when they found this sentiment prevail with the gallant Admiral, entrust the command to somebody else. He knew the situation of the country from personal observation and was well aware that any man affixing a flag on the steeple of Middleburgh, would, in the course of one week, collect from the various depots, for several miles round, an army of 10,000 men. The noble lord, too, should have been well aware that there was no chance of destroying the fleet in the Scheldt, as, on the least alarm, they could have run up above Antwerp. And, in addition to this, he was told by sir R. Strachan, that there was no plan of the navigation of the river; and that, without such a plan, it would be impossible to get up without a pilot on board each ship, which it was impossible to procure. And yet after all these opinions, the noble lord sent out a fleet of thirty-three ships of war, and the greatest force that had ever left England upon a similar occasion. This Expedition sailed under a commander in chief who knew nothing of Antwerp; who knew nothing of the opposition he had to encounter, and who had in fact to wait for information till he got to the place of his destination, while, at the same time, the naval commander declared bis conviction that the attempt would fail. The instructions given to the commander in chief were, that the troops were to land, carry into effect as much of the object of the Expedition already detailed as possible, to garrison Walcheren, and the remainder of the forces were to return. So that even supposing there were no difficulties to encounter, by the time the troops arrived at Antwerp, calculating on the deductions which must necessarily take place in garrisoning Walcheren, South Beveland and the other places they passed through, their numbers would not exceed 18,500 men, and that force would have to contend against the army of the enemy, which, from documents on the table, it was proved, contained a force of 26,000 men, amongst whom were 10,000 veteran troops. This circumstance proved the weakness of ministers in relying on the evidence of informers, who were always ready to increase facilities and remove difficulties, but whose information on the present occasion had in every instance proved false. He now came to the question of the retention of Walcheren.-No doubt his Majesty's ministers regretted the many melancholy calamities which occurred in that pestilential island, and sympathized with the distresses of those unfortunate individuals whose misfortunes and sufferings were so great; but they were not the less responsible for their conduct, nor the less culpable for exposing so brave an army to such certain destruction. Here the hon. bart. took a feeling survey of the many disastrous consequences of the troops remaining in the island of Walcheren, and referred to the letters of sir Eyre Coote, and other documents, for a description of the unhappy circumstances attending that impolitic measure, the retention of that island after the principal objects of the Expedition had failed. And now having gone through a detail, which from repetition must have become tedious, he would put it to any twelve men of common sense, whether from the evidence before the House any argument could be adduced to justify ministers in risquing an army on such an occasion. There was another point however to which he had to advert, and which he thought called for the interference of the House. It was the common yourse of an individual who was accused of a breach of privilege, to go out of the House, and leave the question to the discussion of those who had to judge of the charge. But if a man was to give a vote in favour of his own acquittal, it was contrary to every principle of justice. His Majesty's ministers now stood in that view; they stand accused of the most serious offences, and he trusted they would themselves see the force and the equity of the remark. Their situation was something similar to a man standing at the bar of a court of justice, who at the moment the jury were about to decide upon his fate, jumps into the box and insists upon dictating the decision to which they should come. He would ask his Majesty's ministers whether, if they were acquitted by a majority equal to their own number, they would call that a justification, or whether, in conscience, they could feel themselves exonerated from all further imputation by such an acquittal?-Was it not sufficient that there were so many others in the House, who were in some measure bound to support their patrons, without themselves lending their aid, and not only assisting to acquit, but actually approving their own conduct? He would put it to their own honour, whether they ought not to retire. (A laugh was heard on the ministerial bench.) He knew what was meant by that laugh-it was as much as to say, "Would you do so?" He would do so; and should feel ashamed to act otherwise. The hon. member expressed an anxious hope that the House would do their duty upon the present occasion, and convince the country that they would not suffer the blood and the treasure of the country to be wasted with impunity, in the execution of plans of impotence, calculated only to end in disgrace and national ruin. The hon. baronet, after making some further observations, in which he attributed the losses and disasters that had taken place to the disunions in his Majesty's councils, who were waiting for the eastern star (marquis Wellesley) to illumine the dark horizon, concluded by supporting the Resolutions of the noble lord. Mr. Canning explained that it was not he who moved for the paper alluded to by the hon. baronet as explanatory of the wishes of Austria; nor did he vindicate the Expedition on that ground of continental diversion. General Loftus said, that he had listened with the same degree of attention to the hon. baronet's speech as he had to all that had been advanced by the hon. gentlemen who had previously spoken upon the present important subject, and was convinced that the more this subject was discussed, provided it was with that temper and patience that had hitherto, so much to the credit of the House, been manifested throughout the debate, the more the country would see that ministers were bound to undertake such an enterprise as that which had been undertaken against the great and growing force of the enemy in the Scheldt. But to consider the important question fairly, they must look to the actual situation of Europe at the time this Expedition was undertaken, particularly to the situation of the French and Austrian armies on the Danube, and the severe check the French had met with, which obliged Buonaparté to lay upon his arms for such a length of time, waiting for reinforcements from the interior of France, from the interior of Holland, from the The Netherlands, and from the very banks of the Scheldt. Therefore, if there ever was a time for this country to make a great exertion, it was at the time this Expedition took place, which was not only a great diversion for our ally, the Emperor of Austria, but also was that, which we were called upon to make from our own situation, cost what it would.Besides it was the bounden duty of government not alone to provide means of preservation in case of attack, but to destroy those means of attack, which the enemy was known to be preparing, and by that enterprize to remove altogether the danger of our having to contend for existence upon our own soil. hon. general then desired they would look to France with all her gigantic powers at present to look at her in possession of the Netherlands-to look at her in possession of the Flemish ports, and then to look at the Narrow Seas, and to recollect that Holland was not now that Holland that once could and did preserve the balance of Europe, and then fairly to lay their hands upon their hearts and say, if a government consulting the security of the country were not bound to undertake such an enterprize as that which had been undertaken against the enemy's alarming and growing force in the Scheldt? It must have long since been seen that if France was allowed to keep possession of the Netherlands for any length of time, it would not be in the power of all Europe to set any bounds to the progress of her arms. We had seen the United Provinces fall under her power, and France had the command of all the means and resources of that power, at present she had carried her arms into Germany, and extended her conquests there as far as she pleased. Her great object now was, to possess herself of the command of the Narrow Seas, so that our trade should neither go out nor return, but at her pleasure. It was almost fatal to England, that France should be in possession of the Flemishports, for if any accident was to befal our fleets at sea, that great extent of coast, our north-east coast, would be exposed naked and open to the enemy. The failure of the Expedition led him to call upon ministers to pay attention to that north east coast, particularly to Yarmouth and the neglected batteries there, also to the neglected batteries at Lowestoff; for if the enemy possessed himself of these positions it would be difficult to remove him |