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"We have at this moment, by the concession of all the world, only two men who are capable of commanding even a small body of troops in a military manner-general Blake and the duke of Albuquerque; and they both of them find themselves without an army; Blake by a misfortune to which it is impossible to attach any blame; and Albuquerque by a misfortune for which he is still less accountable, that of having given umbrage

nothing of gen. Cuesta; but if he were a man of honour and character, he must feel as acutely as any man in this country would under similar circumstances. He was reviled by ministers in parliament, and their attacks on him published here and throughout Europe, even in the very country where he was serving. How was he to defend himself to the Spaniards against our accusations? Even in the defence of our own general, it did not seem that attacks on character, but that state-to the Junta by the circumstances of his ments of facts in the conduct and opera- birth and fortune, and of having excited tions of the general of the allies would be the jealousy of general Cuesta by his resufficient. Was it fit for a British mi- putation and popularity among the troops, nister to make a charge of meditated motives which I fear may lead to the treachery, implying the bringing into dif. sacrifice of his reputation, and to the loss ficulties and the sacrificing of his own of his services to the public cause." army, unless he had a positive certainty of the facts? What foreign general could feel safe if the administration under which this country has the misfortune to groan, would put on paper, make official, and circulate such imputations? At page 50 of the papers, it was stated thus in one of Mr. Frere's letters dated Seville, "It is a matter of general suspicion, and has been for some time past, that gen. Cuesta meditates some serious plan of vengeance, in resentment of the affronts and disgusts which he experienced about half a year ago on the part of the Central Junta. The dispersion and ruin of gen. Blake's army has removed one great obstacle to such a project on his part, and has increased the alarm of those who apprehended it."

Thus it was insinuated that that general was actuated by the basest motives. Insinuations against other generals either of want of talents, or of an indifference to the cause in which they were engaged, were in the same manner indiscriminately published. Of Venegas it was flippantly said in the same letter, "General Venegas himself does not appear possessed of that military reputation, or commanding character, which would be necessary to counterpoise a man of general Cuesta's authority and decided temper."

Thus publishing to the world, that, instead of being united against the enemy, it was sought to poise the Spanish generals against each other, and that such was their disunion, that their time was solely employed in quarrelling among themselves. In the same letter he found, that Mr. Frere, the king's diplomatic minister in Spain, had taken upon himself to give a most decisive opinion upon the talents of the Spanish generals, observing, that,

Could there be a more outrageous attack upon the Junta, than thus to publish to the world that they had taken umbrage at an able general, merely, because he was a man of birth and fortune, and that his services were thus to be lost to the public cause. And yet their lordships had often been told that this very Junta particularly claimed our support, as the steady and ardent defenders of the rights of their country and of just relations existing in society. But still more in these papers, private and confidential communications were betrayed, for a private letter from the duke of Albuquerque was made public, which was evidently intended to be entirely confidential. In this letter he says, I must acquaint you, for your guidance, that the whole of the English staff has expressed the strongest wishes that the command of the army should be given to me, and its dissatisfaction with general Cuesta. Almost all the generals, as well as the chiefs, and most of the of ficers and soldiers, express the same desire. Alava, whose frankness you know, has written in the strongest terms to Valdes pointing out the absolute necessity of removing Cuesta, and that the command should be given either to Blake, Venegas, or myself, though he does not openly mention me, lest they should think he speaks from partiality and interest, being with me." Was it necessary to comment upon the mischievous tendency of such language; was it necessary to point out the pernicious consequences, that must arise from placing gen. Cuesta and the duke of Albuquerque in such a state of mutual jealousy and mutual animosity: Were they to be told that there existed a government in Spain, that there

existed at the same time in that country, a description of men, and those of no mean influence, who looked upon rank and fortune as calculated only to excite suspicion, and disqualify men for being engaged and trusted in a cause, the great object of which was the support of a legitimate monarch, and the assertion of national independence? In what a situation was the duke of Albuquerque placed by the publication of this confidential letter, and which it was evident he did not wish to be made public? The duke of Abuquerque and Cuesta were now together in Cadiz, and what must be the feelings of the former when this publication of his private sentiments respecting Cuesta reached Cadiz? But in what a situation was the country placed by these indiscreet, these criminal disclosures? Would not British ministers be in future shunned, and all confidence withheld from them by those governments to whom they may have sent, for fear that confidence should be betrayed by the British government at home, and private and confidential communications laid before parliament and exposed to all the world? Would not this be the natural result of such shocking injustice, as the publication of these papers displayed? The insinuations published in these documents were not confined to generals alone, but extended also to diplomatic characters. It might have been thought, that the Spanish minister accredited in this country would at least have been treated with respect; but, on the contrary, Mr. Frere had chosen to treat M. Cevallos as a man into whom it was impossible to beat common sense. He says, "In my correspondence with M. de Cevallos, a foolish fallacy, half a dozen times refuted in the course of half a year, was reproduced by him at the end of the discussion."

He wished it to be distinctly understood, that he did not blame Mr. Frere for making these communications; it was of course his duty to collect all the information he could. He could not commend the flippancy of Mr. Frere's remarks upon the conduct of the Spanish generals, and of the Junta, but he was far from blaming his desire to collect and to communicate information: the blame rested altogether with the ministers for publishing that information in the shape, in which it was now before the House. Above all, the most serious charge against the King's ministers, was in publishing circumstances

by which the safety and lives of persons were endangered. What vote the House would come to he knew not, but he could not think any man had nerves to defend such conduct. It was not only to birth that humanity and protection were owing, but three other names were brought forward at full length, to whom acts were imputed that would subject them to the implacable hatred of the French government, by whose bands, if they fell into them, they must pay the forfeit of their lives. He could not bring himself to point out these papers: the mischief might have been already done; but if it were not, it was not his wish by being more particular to enhance their danger by giving greater publicity to the documents. Every body was treated alike by Mr. Frere and the King's ministers. General Equia, for in stance, of whom he had heard no compromise, "they say, is a man of considerable military geographical knowledge, but with no character for decision, and unfit to command; a useful assistant to Cuesta but not thought much of by him, and that he completed the ruin of his army at Medellin, because he had received no orders from Cuesta." Such publications tended to shut us out of the conti nent more effectually than Buonaparte's measures did. They tended to insulate us by disgracing our character. He then dwelt on the lamentable events which occurred in this dreadful contest; such as assassinations, and the slaughter of 700 defenceless prisoners in cold blood, which nothing could justify. However we might lament that the passions should be so worked up, retaliation ought to be clearly made out, before we published such accounts. Would they reconcile the people of this country to the loss of our own troops in these campaigns? They could only excite indignation against the cold recital of these acts, and the omission of the interference of the British minister, and of any orders to him to that effect. They were spoken of like the ordinary occurrences of war. He never saw a collection of papers more unfit to publish in any shape. In the last session he saw suppressions and selections, it was true; but not to protect individuals in foreign lands, but to screen ministers themselves from the just and merited indignation of parliament; but when they entertained the vain and shallow hope that by a stigma on Spain they might justify their own conduct, no paper was withheld, even at the

risk of incalculable private calamity, and the ruin of the national character. Were there any mode of getting back these papers, their lordships he was convinced would gladly adopt it: but none such occurred. Another bundle was ordered; the constitution and the uniform practice of the government required of ministers to select and prepare it; but after what had passed, the House would make themselves parties to the act, if they did not put themselves in ministers places, and prevent similar errors. He then moved for the appointment of a Secret Committee, to whom the papers concerning Spain and Portugal not yet delivered should be referred, to select and prepare them for the House.

Marquis Wellesley professed his readiness to admit the general principle laid down by the noble lord, respecting the selection of diplomatic documents for publication. He was ready to admit, that in answering the demand of either House of Parliament for the production of such documents, a sacred duty was imposed on the executive power to take care that such publications should not violate the good faith subsisting between governments, or expose the personal safety of individuals. Admitting the sacred obligation of that duty, it was also requisite to attend to the nature and extent of the demand of parliament, and to the peculiar circumstances of the case, which, in the present instance must be acknowledged to involve matter of great delicacy and difficulty. This was a case in which parliament and the nation were intitled to know the truth, and it was difficult, if not impracticable, to satisfy that great public and natural right, consistently with the overstrained restrictions which the noble lord would attempt to impose on the preparation of the official documents required for the information of their lordships. Their lordships would at the same time recollect how general and anxious a wish had been expressed throughout these kingdoms, that every aid should be afforded to Spain which might enable her to assert her national independence, and to restore her legitimate monarchy on the basis of the happiness, the prosperity and the freedom of the people.-It was necessary, therefore, to shew how the efforts of this country in the cause of Spain had been disappointed.-Above all it was necessary to shew why the glorious achievements of the British arms in the

peninsula, had not been followed by beneficial consequences, equal to their splendor, and to the fair expectations which they had raised both in this country and in Spain. This could not be effected without tracing these failures to their proper cause; and without pointing out the real sources of the calamities which have been accumulated on the peninsula. The real causes of the failures in Spain were not fully understood in this country. It was essential, therefore, to state and ascertain all the facts and circumstances to which those failures were justly to be imputed. It must be the wish of their lordships and of the nation at large, as it certainly was his earnest wish and the wish of all his colleagues, to disclose all these circumstances with the least possible reserve. This, however, could not be effectually done without producing the papers as they appear on their lordships' table from which it must be seen that the dissensions, the intrigues and the corruptions of the Spanish officers, and that the weakness and incapacity of the Spanish government have been the real sources and springs, as well as the proximate causes of all the misfortunes which have recently afflicted the Spanish nation.

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The noble Lord is of opinion, however, that the publication of these documents must prove highly injurious to the character of the Spanish government; but the noble lord appears to have forgotten that the Spanish government, to whose conduct the papers refer, is actually extinct. Central Junta is dissolved in its own weakness, and a different form of government has succeeded. He and his colleagues were desirous to demonstrate the nature, the progress and the result of these events; but they could not discharge their duty, if they were to be precluded from revealing the real state of a government which no longer exists; and which has fallen amidst the confusion occasioned by its own defects.

The noble lord next complains of the publication of Mr. Frere's letter in which that gentleman states his opinion of the character and conduct of general Cuesta. Now he would challenge the noble lord to rise in his place, and to mark a single point in that letter respecting general Cuesta which was not of general notoriety throughout all Spain, which was not in conformity with the opinion of every officer and soldier in the Spanish army; and of every man who really felt and avowed

an attachment to the Spanish cause. So thoroughly and universally was the conviction of general Cuesta's incapacity felt, that Mr. Frere, as appears by these papers, had actually demanded his dismission from the command of the army, a circumstance which the noble lord has omitted to notice. He (the marquis Wellesley) on his arrival at Seville did not think it necessary to insist on that demand, being satisfied that general Cuesta could not remain in the command; and that the influence of general opinion respecting his incapacity, the infirm state of his body, and the decrepitude of his mind, must speedily occasion his removal without any interposition of the British power. The noble lord seemed to suppose, (a supposition however in which he was mistaken) that general Cuesta still held a command at Cadiz. General Cuesta has had no command in Spain since his removal, which, to the general satisfaction of the Spanish army and people, took place in the beginning of August.

of the armies of a country whose existence he had saved. Thus far their lordships would see how groundless were the apprehensions, how superfluous the invectives of which the noble baron was so prodigal in censuring the pretended indiscretion of his Majesty's ministers. But the further instances adduced by the noble lord in justification of these invectives, would afford a still stronger proof of the injustice of these charges, and of the ignorance which dictated them. The noble lord, as an additional proof of the thoughtless and unfeeling indiscretion of ministers, has stated the case of three persons, who, it seems, will be exposed to the most eminent danger, and to the most rancorous resentment of the enemy, by the publicacation of certain facts of the correspondence before their lordships. The noble lord has abstained from naming them; but he could assure the noble lord, that no necessity existed for such affected caution. Their names were well known both in Spain and France; both to the Spanish and the French governments. Indeed, he might add, that the publication of their names, when accompanied by the mention of their hardy deeds, was one of the proudest distinctions to which the Spanish patriots aspired. This was the case of the several leaders of partizan corps, whose names had already been published in the Spanish gazettes for the purpose of honour and fame, as the noble lord would have known if he had been at all acquainted with the real state of Spain. Another case was that of M. Barrios-M. Barrios is represented as having, in retaliation of some cruel and unworthy treatment inflicted on the Spanish prisoners by a French general, caused 700 French prisoners to be driven into the Minho. No man viewed such a deed with more horror, or more lamented such outrages against the laws of civilized war than he did; but is this fact now first revealed by the papers on the table? And what must their lordships think of the correctness of the information upon which the noble baron rests his charges against ministers, when they come to hear the true statement of that fact? Was not the perpetration of that deed notorious throughout Spain, notorious to the French government? Did not Barrios himself not only loudly proclaim, but proudly boast of it at Seville? Was it not published in all the Spanish and French gazettes, has not Barrios even been publicly proscribed by name by the French

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The next charge made by the noble lord against his Majesty's government (a most serious charge if founded in fact) was a violation of honour in publishing a private letter of the duke of Albuquerque. Now he would assert in front of that noble lord, that there was not a sentiment contained in that letter, which was not of fect notoriety throughout Spain; that there was not a sentiment in it which that illustrious person had not himself publicly and loudly proclaimed! So far from complaining of the publication of that letter, the duke of Albuquerque would heartily rejoice at it; and confident he was, that he should receive the cordial thanks of that spirited officer, of whose personal friendship he boasted, for having thus publicly recorded his real opinions, and his just pretensions to which on every occasion he was proud to bear testimony. But the talents and merits of that gallant and illustrious commander, stood in need of no testimony from him. Let the safety of Cadiz, let his rapid march for the defence of that last hold of Spanish independence, attest his zeal, his patriotism, his skill, his fortitude and his glory. If Cadiz yet be safe, its safety is due to the prompt decision of that gallant and noble mind, whose conduct formed a splendid contrast with that of many others; who might, therefore, justly condemn examples which he disdained to imitate, and avow his claims to the superior command

government? Where then is the secret | which the publication of these papers has disclosed? The transaction, however dreadful, was public. M. Barrios had first made a solemn remonstrance against Marshal Ney's proceedings towards the Spanish prisoners, and failing in that remonstrance, retaliation had been ordered.

The noble lord then pathetically deplores the dangers to which the governor of Avila has been exposed, by the publication of these documents. These papers would convict him of having betrayed to the Spanish general Cuesta, letters and dispatches from Joseph Buonaparté and general Jourdan, and thereby expose him to the most cruel resentment of the enemy. But what is the fact? Avila was in the hands of the French; and the governor of Avila was in the French interest. It was not he who betrayed the letters into the hands of general Cuesta; but they were found upon a Spanish friar, to whom they had been confidentially entrusted: What danger then can the governor of Avila incur from the production of those papers? The governor of Avila was still attached to the cause of the invader; and even while he (lord Wellesley) was in Spain, the whole of those dispatches which had been delivered to general Cuesta, with all the circumstances of the case, were published at Seville. None of the persons, therefore, for whose safety the humanity of the noble lord is so alarm. ed, have been exposed to any danger by the publication of the papers on the table. He moreover believed that they were now out of the reach of the enemy's power; what then is the cause which has thus disturbed the noble lord's temper, and perverted his judgment? The noble lord cannot have read the papers, or he does not understand them. With what confidence then does he come here to charge others with neglect, when he himself is so grossly misinformed; and yet presumes to pass so severe a sentence. The noble lord has betrayed the utmost ignorance with respect to every point upon which he has touched; and he (lord Wellesley) was justified in again asserting, that the noble lord stood convicted either of not having read the papers on the table, or if he had read them, of not understanding them. He trusted, therefore, that their lordships' House would spurn those imputations of indiscretion and neglect, with which the noble lord has charged his Majesty's mi

nisters; and that they would reject a motion which would deprive them of that full information respecting the affairs of Spain, which alone could guide their fu ture determination, with regard to the interests of that country. The papers already on the table, and those yet to be produced, would amply supply that information, and would disclose the truth in full and open day. Their lordships would there see that the weakness, the dissentions, and the corruptions of the Spanish officers and government, were the real sources and springs of all the disasters and calamities which have befallen the Spanish nation. That knowledge would furnish the grounds of a better system of policy for Spain, and perhaps for England, the ally of Spain. That was a question, however, which he should have another occasion more fully to discuss. At present he should implore their lordships not to accede to the motion intercepting the papers by a secret Committee: He implored them not to obscure by their own act the lights necessary for the full and clear knowledge of those great and interesting questions. A most material part of the correspondence consisted of his own dispatches during his late embassy to Spain. These were essential to illustrate the events which had preceded his arrival in that country, as well as the probable course of her future fate. He therefore implored their lordships, that they would not permit any part of his own dispatches to be suppressed; that they would not permit the noble lord to rob him of the advantage of a public manifestation of the conduct which he had pursued during his mission, and that at least the record of his transactions in Spain might be preserved to their lordships and the public, pure and entire.

Earl Grey, notwithstanding the loud and triumphant tone of the noble marquis, rose to support the opinions of his noble friend, on the impropriety and unfeeling want of humanity in the disclosures contained in the papers; though he did not dispute the propriety of giving information in every view for their lordships satisfaction, without compromising the safety of individuals. If it were necessary, in justice to individuals and the country, that they should be informed of the character of the generals and commanders of the army, ministers might have given that information without endangering the safety of persons. But the passages in

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