Hope, who transmitted this report, says, he did not believe they were so strong.

The result of all the intelligence received by the army as laid before the council of war on the 27th of August, at Bathz, was, 4,000 men Bergen-op-Zoom, 2,000 Breda, 11,000 Antwerp, (including seamen and artificers,) 500 Tholen, 3,000 on the left bank of the Scheldt, 15,000 to oppose us in the field; Total 35,500.

From which number the quarter-mastergeneral in his evidence, observes, you may reasonably deduct about 5,000 allowing for mistatements and exaggerations; and sir J. Hope, who long commanded the advanced corps, says, that he considered some parts of the intelligence which he received as erroneous and some exaggerated.

As to the article in the report of the secret Committee which states the enemy's force at 26,000 men on the 11th of August, at Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, Antwerp, &c. and on the left bank of the Scheidt, but exclusive of Flushing, this was probably erroneous, because, up to the 27th, it appears there were only 30,000 men in all.

The quarter-master-general is certainly justified in making a deduction from the gross amount of force; because every body who has had experience in those matters knows how difficult it is to obtain accurate reports in the field of the enemy's numbers, and how subject the informants generally are to misstatement; nor could any person be so competent to form a judgment upon what parts were to be credited and what rejected of the intelligence contained in the journal as the quarter-master-general, through whom the whole passed, and who had daily opportunities of collating and duly appreciating the various accounts received.

The only part of the government intelgence which appears not to have been corroborated by that subsequently received at the army, was relative to the enemy's force at Cadsand. This certainly seems to have proved greater than was expected; not however, the first day of our arrival. But very soon afterwards troops who had made one or two marches on their way to the Danube changed their direction, and arrived in that island. It was these troops who got over to Flushing, and increased that garrison from about 3,500 men, at which the government intelligence had rated it, to about 8,000.

But even supposing the information to

VOL. XVI.

have been inaccurate in that particular, I cannot impute blame to the government, when the extreme difficulty is considered of procuring perfectly exact intelligence in almost any case.-When the late lord Chatham, one of the greatest ministers the world ever saw, sent out the expedition to Rochefort, the intelligence upon which he proceeded purported, amongst other things, that the ditch was dry, and it was found to be wet.

The composition of the enemy's force as well as their numbers must be taken into consideration, in order to form a just estimate of his means of resistance. Now certainly, with the exception of the 8,000 men in Flushing, (1,200 of whom only were armed burghers, the rest good troops,) it does not appear that there were in all to oppose us above two or three effective French regiments of the line; there were also some regular Dutch regiments, and the rest of the force was made up of depôt battalions, which, as every body knows, are composed of the most unserviceable part of the regiments they belong to; of raw conscripts, some parts of the crews of the ships; some artificers and armed custom-house officers; in short, a description of force altogether not in the least formidable to any regular troops, much less to British.

Whatever trifling variations may have appeared between the intelligence received by government and that received by the army, one thing is very certain, namely, that at the latest period the enemy had not collected more than about 30,000 men, including all their garrisons and posts of every description, reckoning too in that number such parts of the crews as were available for the defence of Antwerp, and the artificers in that place; and it never can be argued that the enemy might have had at some periods of the operation a greater force than this, because it must be conceded at least that he certainly never would have withdrawn any troops from the points of our attack.

There is no going into a reasoning upon what the enemy might or ought to have done as soon as he determined to make the Scheldt a naval station. Taking things as we found them, it is evident that he had been extremely neglectful of most means of defence. Such was the representation made to government which combined with the many important considerations that I have before alluded to, deter

mined them to send the Expedition to the Scheldt; and undoubtedly nothing that occurred during its progress at all militated against the greatest probability of success, if the originally projected plan could have been carried into

execution.

Before we proceed to examine the intended operation, I must beg leave to make a few observations upon the opinions of sir John Hope and sir William Erskine, which are considered by the noble lord who opened this debate, and and by the right hon. gent. who spoke last, as decisive against the practicability of the undertaking.

No man living can have a higher respect and consideration for that most distinguished and excellent officer, sir John Hope, than I unfeignedly entertain. But I am persuaded, that if he had considered the operation against Antwerp more in detail, his opinion would not have been so unfavourable.

Sir John Hope seems to have thought Antwerp a more formidable place than there is any reason to suppose it was. Having adopted that opinion, not commanding the army himself, and not being in possession of all the information received at the head quarters and by the government, it was not likely that he should turn his thoughts to the details of the different attacks which might be undertaken. If he had done so, I have no doubt that his energetic mind, acting upon his extensive military knowledge and experience, would have suggested to him the great probability of success in the enterprise. But sir John Hope says distinctly, that he thinks you might have landed at Sandfleet and proceeded to Antwerp, if you had been in a situation to do so before the army became unserviceable from sickness, and he no where says that a regular siege was indispensable; only that he thinks Antwerp could at no time have been taken without bringing heavy artillery before it, and opening trenches. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that heavy artillery and trenches necessarily imply a regular siege in all its forms, as I shall very plainly shew when we come to the particulars of the intended operation.

Sir William Erskine does certainly seem to have formed a very erroneous conception indeed of the manner in which we should have been under the necessity of conducting our operations in the Upper

Scheldt, and rates much higher than he could possibly be justified by circumstances in doing the resistance we might expect.

Before I proceed any further I must beg leave to say, that I have a very sincere personal friendship and regard for sir W. Erskine, both on his own account, and on that of his gallant father, under whom I served much, and with whose friendship I was particularly honoured, and I give him ample credit for a great deal of cleverness. But here we come to a fair discussion of our military opinions, as if we were met in a council of war, where difference is of course admissible, it being intended to find in the collision of sentiments a true result.

The opening three parallels against Antwerp, as if it were Lisle or Valenciennes, I must own, seems to me to be quite out of the question. Sir William Erskine allows twenty days for the preparations, and twenty-one days open trenches before the town of Antwerp, though the garrison was of such a description that it could not possibly venture to make a sally, or even to occupy the outworks if there had been any in a state of defence, (which I very much doubt,) and though it appears that there was no covered way, nor a glacis in proper preservation. The citadel of Antwerp, which is much stronger than the town, was taken in the year 1746, by count Clermont, after five days open trenches.

Sir William Erskine says it would have required twenty days open trenches to take Lillo; whereas, in the year 1747 it was taken in four days by Marshal Loewendhal, though the attack was carried on by zig-zag upon a dyke, and only one battery employed, consisting of four cannon, two mortars, and three howitzers. We should of course have proceeded in the same manner; and why we should be twenty days in accomplishing what was effected in four days in the year 1747 I cannot understand.

In examining the plan of attack as pro jected by our government, I shall contine myself strictly to the circumstances as they arose, because to them that plan in its execution must necessarily have been adapted. I beg therefore that what I am going to say may be rigidly tried by those circumstances, and by the detailed intelligence of which the House is in possession.

The noble lord termed all views of ope

rations beyond what actually took place, visionary and idle speculations; but I must beg to observe, that whatever is founded upon the certain data of accurate intelligence, of circumstances that did arise, and of the evidence of able and scientific professional men employed upon the Expedition, by no means deserves that cha

racter.

The plan projected by government consisted of two parts-the reduction of the island of Walcheren, including the fortress of Flushing; and the destruction of the enemy's naval establishments in the Scheldt, together with as large a proportion of the fleet as might be possible.

sources.

As the two operations were so closely connected; as the first point of attack lay upon your way to the second; and as it was necessary to reduce Walcheren and Flushing for the security of your retreat, it became a matter of indispensable prudence to allot such a force for the first object as would prevent a possibility of check or failure, in case the enemy should prove stronger than you had reason to suppose; therefore 13,000 men were placed under the command of sir Eyre Coote for the attack of Walcheren, though it was clearly foreseen that if the enemy should prove no stronger in that point than was reported, viz. from 3,000 to 4,000 men, full half of this corps might safely be employed in the Upper Scheldt, still leaving a sufficient force for the siege of Flushing.

The right wing of the army, which was destined to go immediately through the Weiling channel up the West Scheldt, was preceded by lord Huntley's division as the advanced guard; part of this division was to destroy the batteries of Cadsand, which commanded the navigation of the Weiling channel, and part to make a diversion to the West of Flushing in order to favour the operations against Wal

cheren.

It has been objected, by the noble lord and by the right hon. gent, who spoke

It is urged then, that if the progress of the armament up the West Scheldt was to depend upon the completion of the investment of Flushing, and that if lord Huntley's division, which was to form a part of the corps destined to land at Sandfleet, was to retain possession of Cadsand till Flushing surrendered, the assertion, that the landing at Sandfleet of the whole of the troops intended for that service, might have been possible upon the first, second, and third of August, is quite inaccurate, and instead of a rapid operation up the Scheldt, it must necessarily become a slow

one.

The division of lord Huntley's corps is likewise objected to, and his being instructed to make a regular report to lord Chatham of his proceedings at Cadsand, as necessarily occasioning delay.

Aud it is further remarked, that you cannot recollect from the written dispositions laid before the House by the quarter-master-general, that any part of sir Eyre Coote's corps was to be withdrawn from Walcheren before the fall of Flushing.

The previous dispositions could in prudence only have been made in contemplation of the possibility of finding the enemy much stronger upon the island of Walcheren than was expected; therefore, so large a corps was destined for that service in the first instance, and a diversion combined with the operations of that corps by a part of the force under lord Huntley. This was taking every precaution against failure or check; and as to the occupation of Cadsand during the siege of Flushing,

could safely take from sir Eyre Coote's | force at least 6,000 men: these, already embarked in ships of war, he would at once have determined to employ in the ulterior operation; and if it were judged necessary to occupy Cadsand until Flushing should fall, (which, however, seems doubtful,) he would have ordered a part of sir Eyre Coote's troops jointly with the marines of the fleet to perform that service, thus setting the whole of lord Huntley's division at liberty.

It must not be objected, that the enemy might afterwards have come in superior force, driven you out of Cadsand, and reestablished the batteries there.

In the first place, when they saw our armament advancing up the Scheldt, of course their whole attention would be drawn to those points of attack where alone they could hope to make any effectual resistance; and as to the Weiling passage, I do not apprehend that it was of such very material importance to us after we had gone through; but, whether that were the case or not, it would certainly take some time to re-establish the batteries which we had destroyed, and furnish them with ordnance of a proper calibre which must be brought from a distance. With respect to their throwing over troops from Cad. sand to Flushing, they would first have to collect fresh naval means for that purpose, and I should conceive that having passed into the Scheldt we must always have had it in our power to intercept that communication. These considerations lead me to suppose, that we should probably not have found it necessary to retain possession of Cadsand, even during the siege of Flushing. This, however, must have depended upon circumstances, and could only be decided on the spot. Cadsand taken, and half of the Walcheren corps withdrawn, or more probably not landed there at all, the Expedition would have proceeded towards. Sandfleet.

The next difficulty, about which so much has been said on the other side of the House, are the batteries on South Beveland. It is argued, that the battery of Borslen and that of Warden'were not in possession of sir John Hope's corps till the 1st of August, and the fort of Batz not till the morning of the 2d, therefore the first division of the army could not possibly have arrived at Sandflect on the 1st of August, as its progress must necessarily be impeded by those obstructions. But really to talk of the Borsten and Warden

batteries as obstructions, is quite ridiculous, for 2 or 300 men of the advanced corps would have taken them in an hour or two; and though sir John Hope says, that with the means he had, viz. no artillery heavier than 6 pounders, the fort of Batz might, if well defended, have held out for some days, yet with the means our advanced corps possessed it must have fallen directly. Sir John Hope observes, that against the necessary means, alluding of course to a few heavy guns and some howitzers, Batz could not have held out more than a few hours. In point of fact, it surrendered as soon as it was summoned. I consider, therefore, that even if the armament had gone up the Scheldt previous to the occupation of South Beveland by sir John Hope, the batteries upon that island would have been no obstruction to its progress.

Having arrived in the Upper Scheldt, I conclude that lord Chatham would have determined upon attacking Liefkenshoeik and Lillo, whilst that part of the army destined to act immediately against Antwerp was disembarking at Sandfleet. I am borne out in this conclusion by the general Disposition made out by lord Chatham previous to the sailing of the expedition, which Disposition lies now on the table.

Liefkenshoeik is not near so strong as Lillo, nor has it any casemates; therefore as the latter, in 1747, fell in four days, it is fair to presume that the former would have been taken in three.

After leaving about 5 or 600 men in Liefkenshoeik the same corps would have attacked Lillo; and allowing four days for the reduction of that fort, and three days over for landing and other delays, I think there is no doubt of our being in possession of those two places in ten days from our first arrival off Batz.

Two thousand troops, and a body of seamen, with ship guns, some howitzers, and vigorous naval co-operation, would, I think, have been completely sufficient for this service. If however any reinforcement should be required, it would have been close at hand.

It cannot be urged against this calculation of time, that when Lillo fell in four days it was closely invested, and that now it would not have been so: Liefkenshoeik being taken first, the communication between the left bank of the Scheldt and Lillo would become intercepted before the attack of that place began; and with respect