the armament up the West Scheldt, which operation1 had always looked upon as the primary object of his instructions, and on the accomplishment of which our best hopes of success in any of the ulterior objects of the Expedition principally, if not wholly depended. CHATHAM, Lieutenant General. PAPERS RELATING TO REAR ADMIRAL SIR No. I.-Copy of a Letter from Rear Ad- hope that I should be permitted, after examining the subject of that paper, to submit to their lordships' consideration such observations as might arise from it; and I have now to request that you will convey to their lordships my thanks for the transmission of the paper, and at the same time solicit their attention to the observations upon it which I have now the honour to enclose.-Feeling perfectly conscious that every exertion had been made by me in forwarding the objects of the Expedition, and that no blame could be justly imputed to myself or the navy, I could not possibly suspect that lord Chatham to the irregularity of presenting immediately to have received, had added the impropriety his Majesty such a paper as that which I (to use no stronger term) of endeavouring to exculpate himself by private insinua tions against the conduct of others Sir; I understand that lord Chatham Every officer has a just right, and where last night produced a private note of mine, he really believes failure to have arisen under date the 27th of August, on the from the misconduct or negligence of subject of provisions and other matters, to those with whom he has been associated the House of Commons.-The allusion to in a joint command, is in duty bound, in provisions in that note was in consequence many cases, to state his opinion officially of an error in the statement which was to the government.-It is then for his Magiven to me, from the principal agent of jesty to judge of the propriety and necestransports, respecting the provisions of the sity of instituting any inquiry upon the army, but it was immediately corrected, subject; but to assume the privilege of and I think [I am not certain,] subse- conveying private insinuations to the prequently reported to their lordships.-Ijudice of others, from whose knowledge mention this that their lordships may be they are studiously concealed, must prove convinced of my anxiety to prevent any utterly destructive of all mutual confidence improper impression in regard to the sup-in joint operations of the army and navy. ply of provisions for the ariny.-The observations which I made in that note, to meet the feelings of his lordship, on the view he had taken of the difficulties which presented themselves on his expectation of success, appear to me unimportant; the thing was decided upon; it was not a moment to analyse the principles of that decision, and my public letters, and examination at the bar of the House of Commons, will, I trust, have explained my sentiments and decision upon this subject. I have, &c. R. J. STRACHAN. No. II.-Copy of a Letter from Rear Admiral Sir R. J. Strachan to J. W. Croker, esq. respecting the Statement of the Earl of Chatham. London, 5th March 1810. Sir; When I solicited my lords commissioners of the admiralty to procure for me an authentic copy of the Statement of lord Chatham upon the late Expedition to the Scheldt, I made that request in the Their lordships will not be able to judge whether there is any foundation for the imputations, that the delays originated with myself, or with any others in the naval service, or whether during my command on the late Expedition, any proceeding on my part, has in any respect justified the line of conduct which lord Chatham has thought fit to adopt towards me. Upon this subject, that I may not interrupt my observations upon his lordship's Statement, I will now advert to my letter of the 27th of August.-That letter was an official one; I have already expressed my regret that it was so inadvertently worded, as to excite any suspi. cion of my imputing blame to the commander in chief of the army, on the ground of his then determining to abandon any further attempt in the Scheldt-1 was not aware that any expressions which I might have considered myself justified in using for the purpose of conveying my sentiments to their lordships, would have been evident that no further operations could at that time be undertaken with any prospect of success," were such as I was not competent to appreciate, and therefore did not presume to discuss. Not being aware from my own observations that further success was unattainable, II ventured to offer the fullest assistance and co-operation of the naval armament under my command in any ulterior measures which might be deemed advisable, and I trust that in making this offer I shall not be thought to have been guided by a too forward and indiscreet zeal, rather than by a due sense of my professional duty. given to the world, if they should have been thought injurious to the character of the commander in chief of the forces.-In my letter to lord Chatham of the 26th of August (enclosure to No. 29. Admiralty papers No. 3.) I offered the fullest cooperation of the navy in any further attempt in the Scheldt, and therefore thought myself bound to state in my official letter, that I had made such offer, and I was of opinion, as I have since explained in my evidence, that it would have been advisable to have attacked forts Lillo and Liefkenshoeik.-It appeared to me that this offered a chance of opening some further field of enterprize for the navy, or at all events of ascertaining whether the destruction of the enemy's fleet, or of any considerable part of it, was indeed practicable; but in expressing my wish, I meant to represent it to be more of a military than a naval question, and I never presumed to set my opinion upon that subject against the professional opinion of the army, still less to impute any misconduct or blame as attaching to their determination, that such an attack was not advisable. When all these circumstances, their publicity, and my readiness at all times to do justice in this respect to the army, are considered; I cannot think that a misinterpretation of the general expression in a public official letter could even palliate, much less justify, the secret attack which has been made upon my character and conduct. With these general observations I submit to their lordships that it is much more easy to answer direct charges than indirect insinuations, and I trust they will therefore excuse my troubling them at greater length than I should otherwise have thought necessary. I have, &c. R. J. STRACHAN. No. III. Rear Admiral Sir R. J. Strachan's OBSERVATIONS on the Earl of CHATHAM'S STATEMENT of his Proceedings dated 15th October 1809, presented to the King 14th February 1810.-London, 5th March 1810. Upon the first point to which lord Chatham in his Narrative has called his Majesty's attention, namely, "the ground upon which after the army was at length assembled near Bathz a landing in prosecution of the ulterior objects of the Expedition was not deemed advisable," it would be improper for me to make any observation, because the reasons which are said to have rendered it" clear and Upon the second point, namely, "Why the army was not sooner assembled at Bathz to commence further operations," I feel confident that I shall have no difficulty in proving, in direct contradiction to the assertion in lord Chatham's Statement, that the delay did in no shape rest with me, or depend upon ahy arrangements in which the navy was exclusively concerned, but that on the contrary every facility was afforded by the navy towards accele rating the movement of the army, and every exertion used by all those under my command in the various and complicated services entrusted to them. I have in vain endeavoured to ascertain the foundation upon which the assertion rests, that it was distinctly agreed upon that a vigorous attack by the navy upon the sea front should be made at the same time that the troops after effecting their landing advanced to invest Flushing, it being hoped that by a powerful co-operation from the sea at the moment the troops presented themselves before the place, the labour and delay of a regular siege might have been avoided." I cannot find any instructions, orders, letters or communications, either previous to our departure from the Downs or subsequent, alluding to any such agreement, and can have no difficulty, ment was made, but that from the nature not merely in asserting that no such agreeof the thing itself it is quite impossible that any such agreement could have been made. It certainly was in contemplation, if the enemy's fleet had remained in the lower part of the river, more particularly in the vicinity of Flushing, to have pushed a fleet of line-of-battle ships in the Scheldt to attack them, and a squadron for that purpose among other objects was ready under the orders of lord Gardner. With that squadron I intended to have proceed ed to the attack of the enemy's fleet if it had not retreated up the river before the armament arrived on the coast of Zealand. It was also in my contemplation by means of that squadron to co-operate with the army in any attack upon Flushing wherein the assistance of the navy should be thought desirable. This is proved by my orders to lord Gardner of the 10th and 20th of July; but it is so far from being true that this view of mine was the result of any agreement preconcerted with lord Chatham, as the Statement seems to imply, that the first spontaneous offer of such co-operation on my part was passed by without any immediate notice by his lordship. This offer was contained in my letter of the 8th of August, to which I shall shortly have occasion to allude. For particulars of the co-operation and assistance actually afforded by the navy in the commencement of our operations, I may refer to the last paragraph of lord Chatham's dispatch of the 2d August. " In answer to the imputation of misconduct thrown upon me for not having realized the hope that by a powerful co-operation from the sea at the moment the troops presented then selves before the place, the labour and delay of a regular siege might have been avoided," it is perhaps sufficient to state, that such a hope must appear very chimerical except upon one or two suppositions. If the commander in chief, from a conviction that the works of Flushing on the land side were either too weak or too extensive, or manned by a garrison too inadequate to resist a sudden and general assault, bad proposed a simultaneous attack from the line-of-batthe ships, our fire might certainly have contributed to the success of such a project; but an enterprise so desperate as this, under the well ascertained circumstances of the fortress and garrison, can never have been for a moment in contemplation. If for the purpose of sparing to his army the labour and delay of a regular siege, the commander in chief had wished to make his attack on the sea front, to embark the assailing army in the boats of the fleet, and to land them under the protection of our ships of the line, I need only say that I was perfectly ready to share the hazards of such an attack, and that the ships were prepared for the service. It could not be for me to suggest such a measure, which of course must originate with the commander in chief, to whom how ever I thought it my duty to state in my letter of the 8th of August my readiness to "act under a previous concert for cooperation with the army in such a plan of attack as might accelerate the surrender of Flushing.". But such a proposal, in point of fact, was not made to me; from whence I must conclude, that it was not thought to offer any rational prospect of adequate advan tage. A concerted and combined attack, it should seem, was thought hopeless until the land batteries should be in a condition to act; but that a" vigorous attack by the navy upon the sea front, an attack undertaken at the moment the troops presented themselves before the place," would have afforded reasonable grounds of hope; although it is evident that in this case the enemy, after simply shutting their gates against the army, whose mus quetry unassisted by great guns could have done little mischief to the garrison, would have directed their whole fire against us, and having crippled a part of our fleet, would have been still able to impose upon our troops the labour and delay of a regular siege. I will next advert to the charges or insinuations, in relation to my conduct, in having failed" in performance of an assurance that the whole of the armament should be at once transported up the Scheldt," in having adopted a measure which, though of great advantage as applied to the division intended for the at tack of Walcheren, was not a little at vari auce with the leading purpose of the Ex. pedition, namely the running with the right wing, and the advance of the army at once up the Scheldt. These observations are accompanied with a denial that even this change in the destination of part of the fleet from the West to the East Scheldt, "would have delayed the advance more than three or four days;" a remark in which I entirely concur with lord Chatham, though on grounds very different from those assumed in the Statement. Upon this part of the case I must recur shortly to the original discussions, and plans, relating to the Expedition, and the circumstances under which we arrived at Walcheren. It had been at one time proposed before we quitted London to land the whole army in Tholen and South Beveland, as presenting fewer difficulties than the navigation of the Scheldt, which under the most fas 1121] PARL. PAPERS.-Expedition to the Scheldt. vourable circumstances must always be liable to various contingencies. This proposal was, I understand, a good deal discussed, and on this point it is only necessary to refer to my instructions to sir R. Keats, where he was directed to give every assistance in transporting the troops to South Beveland and Tholen. Another plan had been proposed of disembarking in the Slough, marching across South Beveland, embarking again at Bathz, and landing at Santvliet. This plan appeared to be approved by many good judges of military operations, for one proof of which I may refer to the Minutes of Evidence. The third plan which was suggested as preferable to either of the former, provided we met with no obstacles was to proceed directly up the West Scheldt, and this was ultimately adopted, because by keeping the troops in the transports it promised to preserve them in a more efficient state until their immediate service should be called for. To this arrangement the command of the Wieling passage was thought to be necessary, for which reason a respectable force was destined to occupy Cadsand. Speaking of the failure of the attack on "in the first Cadsand, lord Chatham says, place the beach was so exposed that in blowing weather it was found impossible to land." Secondly, "From what cause I know not, the marquis of Huntley's division could not be taken up in the first instance high enough to attack the Breskins battery, the only one from its situation of much importance." Lastly, "Commodore Owen appears to have experienced great disappointment in not having the support of lord Gardner's fleet and his boats.' I trust that I shall be able to answer in a very few words the preceding insinuations. I confess that I was aware of the importance of Cadsand before we sailed from England; lord Chatham from being impressed with the same idea was induced to send over an engineer (capt. Paisley) to report on the practicability of effecting a landing on the beach. The same engineer in his evidence and speaking of the time to which lord Chatham alludes, when he (the beach was so expossays, ed, &c,") answers," it appears to me there was no difficulty in landing unless what might arise from the enemy having a greater force than we could oppose to them in the first instance; of the enemy's force I am not a judge." VOL. XVI, 66 [1122 I do not believe that the Breskens battery had occurred to any person until I stated in the printed secret circular memorandum," that the first thing the enemy ought to do would be to erect a mortar and furnace battery at Breskens, &c." I never heard a wish on the subject of passing the Breskens battery, and I do think if it had been represented to me as so extremely strong I should have urged the propriety of landing below it, and taking it in reverse in preference to the risk which the troops in transports would be "the batsubjected to by passing it. The engineer in minutes of evidence, says teries appeared to me to have very little strength, the batteries appeared to me to be open batteries." I refer to these Minutes of Evidence merely as proofs of the inaccuracy of the Statement. I selected commodore Owen, an officer of great intelligence and professional talent, for the purpose of co-operating with the marquis of Huntley; I gave him latitude of discretion; the every quarter master general sent lord Huntley a copy of the commodore's instructions, and I apprehend there is no position or part of the beach between Sluys and the Ghent Canal on which he would not have attempted to effect a landing if any proposition or request had been made by lord Huntley to that effect. I only require on this point that a dispassionate attention should be paid to my orders; that my letter of the 20th July to lord Gardner, coupled with that of the 16th, should be read with attention; and that a reference should be made to the evidence of commodore Owen and the marquis of Huntley, which I think will unequivocally prove, that no application was ever made to me for a proportion of boats beyond what was carried by commodore Owen's squadron. Our original determination of landing in Zoutland Bay was laid aside in consequence of intelligence received at Deal of the preparation of the enemy on that part of the coast, and a memoir was drawn up on this subject which was submitted to lord Chatham and lord Castlereagh, and approved of by both; and it was consequently determined to land on Domburgh Beach; but on our arrival at Walcheren, the surf was found to be so heavy on Domburgh Beach, in consequence of a strong westerly wind, that landing there was impossible; it became therefore absolutely 4 C necessary to take shelter in the Roompot | water for the transports and victuallers and Veergat, and the constant succession which must necessarily attend this service, of gales for many days after our arrival, it is now judged most adviseable that the made it impossible, independently of other operation should take place by the Veer obstacles, to recur to the original inten- Passage." tion of entering the western mouth of the Scheldt. Upon the change in our measures, which was thus forced upon us by the untoward state of the weather, I must here beg leave to offer a very few remarks. It is admitted by lord Chatham to have been in some respects advantageous, by placing the transports and small craft in a place of security, and by facilitating the disembarkation of the troops on the BreeSand. His lordship further states, that by this change of the destination of the fleet the occupation of Cadsand became unnecessary, and that if it could have been accomplished, it would have occasioned a very inconvenient separation of our force. On the other hand, this change of destination necessarily tended to produce some delay in the naval operations, by forcing us to proceed by a circuitous instead of a direct navigation; but the main question is, how far it necessarily tended to retard the attainment of the ulterior objects of the Expedition. I have already stated, that for the purpose of attaining those objects three plans had been proposed, the last of which, as I conceived, had been selected as the most advantageous, only upon the supposition of our encountering no obstacle to the navigation of the whole fleet up the West Scheldt. Now the Weiling Channel had been rendered inaccessible to us by our failure at Cadsand, and consequently our expectations in this respect had been wholly overthrown, and the ground of preference on which the third plan had been adopted was in course removed; but it is evident that the practicability of the first plan which proposed to carry the army through the East Scheldt to Tholen, or that of the second, according to which the troops were to have been landed on South Beveland and to have proceeded to Bathz, could not be materially affected by the enemy's possession of Cadsand, or at all by the circumstance of our fleet being compelled by stress of weather to take shelter in the Veer Gat; on the contrary it will appear by the military instructions to sir J. Hope "that the navigation of the East Scheldt being little understood, and whether there was sufficient depth of Now the only imaginable impediments to the further progress of our army must have been apprehended either from a military force of the enemy_occupying South Beveland, or from the French fleet in the West Scheldt, or from the enemy's flotilla; but the corps of sir J. Hope became possessed of the whole of South Beveland on the 2d August. The French fleet had retired beyond the boom of Lillo on the 1st August, from the enemy's flo tilla which was unable to prevent the corps under sir J. Hope from taking possession of Bathz, or to regain possession of it before the greater part of the guns which had been previously spiked were rendered serviceable, and which on the first appearance of the British flotilla retired in confusion, and never afterwards repassed the boom of Lillo, no opposition to the movements of the army could at any time have been reasonably apprehended. With respect to the immediate difficulties which may have operated as an ob jection to the disembarkation of the troops on South Beveland, and to their subsequent march across that island, I need only refer to the opinions of the naval officers who were employed in the Slough, by which I think it will appear that 20,000 men and 4,000 horses might have been landed from the Slough in 48 hours, that cavalry and ordnance horses might easily perform this march from the Slough to Bathz in 36 hours, the distance being from 30 to 35 miles. With regard to ar tillery, it was stated by sir J. Hope, in answer to a question as to the number of guns found in Bathz and Waerden which might have been used for the ulterior objects, that there were 12 24-pounders in the battery at Waerden, and 14 or 15 at Bathz, all of which, as the general believed, were on travelling carriages. I might add that the quantity of ordnance and ordnance stores taken on the island, as appears by the return in Journal Army Proceedings, was such as I should suppose to be sufficient for all the possible wants of the army. When, therefore, lord Chatham contends in his Statement that the second point, namely, "why the army was not brought up sooner to the destination from |