justification of a battle by the mere fruits of victory, yet even on this ground I must contend that never were there laurels the more opposite of barren, than those which we all admit to have been reaped by our countrymen in Spain. We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced, that our army, equally as our navy, equalled in science and exceeded in courage, that of any other nation in the world; but if we have any anxiety for our character with other armies, if reputation is strength, and if the reputation of a nation, as well as of an individual, consists not in the estimation in which it holds itself, but in the estimation in which it is held by others, is a false vanity, to cause us to shut our eyes and cars to the opinions of other nations, Sir, I say, without much fear of contradic tion, that in the beginning of these events, Spain at least had been convinced by the exertions of her govern

word, and fighting, if you will, for the continuance of the Inquisition. And with these qualifications it is my most firm conviction, that they would have overwhelmed all the armies of France, but that it was their misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all respects the opposite of the peasantry I have described, differing from them, not merely in their moral qualities, but even in their physical appearance; a nobility of various degrees of worthlessness, but with a few brilliant exceptions, generally proportioned to the rank of their nobility, and further cursed by a government, (I speak not of their kings but of the Junta,) both in its form and in its substance, the most abominable that ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a nation. Hence desperate from repeated treason, destitute of confidence not in themselves but in their commanders, unable to stand before the French in battle, but still more unable to abstain from fight-ment, misrepresenting our failure at Buoing. A very serious task it was for England to determine what to do with such materials. One rare and unquestionable feature they presented, a nation that would fight with France, and however some may deplore the events that have taken place, certain I am, that if we had not, at least, | tried the experiment of fighting by their side, these very men who now most loudly condemn the course we have pursued, would be calling for the impeachment of these ministers who had neglected such glorious opportunities; who in the crisis of the fate of France had shrunk from the only field where there was a prospect of contending with success; who had coldly refused our aid to the only allies who were ever worthy of British co-operation. Sir, I think it is too much an habit to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly assuming that nothing but the absolute and complete attainment of our object can justify having fought them. I confess I take a different view of this subject; that men should foresee events and command fate is impossible: it is enough for me, if under the circumstances when the decision was adopted, there were grounds sufficient to decide fair judging men to resolve on assisting with a British army, the cause of the peninsula; and if that resolution being once taken, there was enough to decide a prudent commander to advance from the sea shore, and share the fortune of our allies. I cannot therefore subscribe to the phrase of the barren laurels' of our victories; yet while I never can agree to measure the

nes Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, that Great Britain, omnipotent by sea, was ever ridiculous on land. So much so, that when the army of general Spencer was landed near Cadiz, than which a finer army never left the English shore, it was the wonder as well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such noble-looking soldiers should be so absolutely incapable of fighting; the" beautiful" army was even the emphatic denomination by which the British forces were distinguished; and when sir John Moore was known to be at length on his march, that the beautiful army, the "hermoso exercito" was actually advancing, was a subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much of Spanish exultation; but when that army had commenced its retreat, old impressions were revived with tenfold force,

hermoso' was no longer the epithet bestowed on it, but one which it is impossi ble for me to repeat. Nor let it be said, that Corunna was a full vindication of its fame. We, indeed, know that British heriosm never shone more conspicuous than on that day, but the ray of glory which illuminated that last scene of our retreat, was but feebly reflected through the rest of Spain from that distant part of the peninsula; the French returned in triumph to Madrid, and boasted they had

driven us into the sea,' it was certain we were no longer on the land, and under such circumstances it is not surprising that a nation, which like Spain, must feel conscious that it is in the daily habit of assum

me

ing victory to itself on the lightest |
grounds, should have declined to have
given to us all the credit which we really
deserved. Some gentlemen, I see, are of
opinion that is no great matter what the
Spaniards thought about us, but are we
equally indifferent to the opinions of the
French? Let us not too hastily conclude
that they did full justice to our
rits. We are told, indeed, that at Maida
and in Egypt we had set that point at
rest. Of the first, I shall only say, that it
is within the last month that it has been,
for the first time, mentioned in any news-
paper of France, and that I believe nine
tenths of the French soldiers have never
heard either of the battle, or of the exis-
tence of such a place; and as to Egypt,
surely every gentleman who has con-
versed in France upon that subject, must
have found that their opinion is univer-
sally that which general Regnier in his
most able, but untrue representation, of
those events has laboured to impress,
namely, that the treachery of Menou, and
the detestation in which the army held
the service in Egypt, and their anxiety to
return to France, were the real causes of
their expulsion; and that an overwhelming
force of ninety thousand men, of English,
Turks, and Indians, which he says, and
which they believe, we brought against
them, furnished a decent excuse for their
surrender. Let us remember too, that it
was after these proofs of British military
excellence, that Buonaparté, on the heights
of Boulogne, parcelled out in promise to
his soldiers the estates of the nation bou-
tiquiere'; let us remember also our own
opinions in those days, how general en-
engagements were to be avoided; how a
system of bush fighting was to be adopted
in Kent; and our hopes that England
might be saved after London might be lost,
or what inundations we should make to
protect it. Such language was then term-
ed caution,' but on the proud eminence on
which we are now placed, we may afford
to acknowledge there was in it some mix-
ture of distrust in the good old bayonet of
Britain. Where are the promises of
Buonaparté now? The very ridicule of
such assertions; ridicule, perhaps the
only restraint of such a despot, would ren-
der it impossible for him to repeat them.
Sir, it is these guilty ministers who have
taught to him, and what I think of much
more consequence, have taught to Eng-
land, another stile of conversation. They
have fairly tried that point, so carefully

|

avoided by their predecessors, and have brought our armies to a meeting with the finest armies of France; and after lamenting the heroes that have fallen, may we not reflect that the heroes who survive, by the mere consciousness of their own excellence, form a more efficient strength than while their numbers were entire ? This sentiment will be communicated to their comrades who shall join them in arms, and justifies me, I think, in concluding, that the present ministers have added more to our strength, as well as to our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors by abstaining from it in Poland.-Such is the view which I take of what is past: With respect to the second point, whether the time is indeed come, when our further assistance can only be destruction to ourselves, without being serviceable to our allies? I cannot but express a more hesitating opinion; but this, I say, a very little time must shew us that; and if there are indeed good grounds of hope, any premature expression of our despondency will certainly extinguish them. The Junta is at length fortunately demolished. The French are again dispersed over every part of the peninsula, the peo ple are still every where in arms, and peculiarly unsubdued in those provinces, the largest in possession of the French. Let us not damp that spirit which may still effect much, and which must effect something, which must at least give long employment to the forces of our enemy.

On this subject of thus employing our enemy, I confess I agree with the hon. gent, who has last spoken, that, if indeed it depended solely upon us, whether our allies should continue that sacrifice of blood, which they have so profusely shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing our quiet at such a price; but convinced as I am on the contrary, that whether we stand by them, or whether we forsake them, those gallant nations will still continue to bleed at every pore. I say that under such circumstances, our assistance assumes a new character, and that independent of the advantages to be derived to ourselves; independent of, I believe, 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen; independent of not less than 300,000 more required even to preserve existence in the peninsula; independent of Brazil and South America, for ever severed from our enemies; and independent of the fleets of the peninsula, I trust rescued from their grasp; independent of these gains to our

selves, there is another feeling binding | Portuguese troops in case of ill success. upon a nation, as well as upon an indivi- He should be glad to know, whether he dual, not to forsake our friend because he meant to bring them here, or to send them is in his greatest danger.-Still, however, to Ireland. Was it wished to send Roman I acknowledge a limit there must be, be- Catholic soldiers there? If so, it was only yond which we cannot go, and whenever in the extremes of bigotry that ministers we can agree in declaring that could find security? He would ask ministers whether they had employed trans

Funditus occidimus neque habet Fortuna regressum, then, indeed, the first laws of self-pre-ports to carry away our cavalry from servation will call on us to discontinue the contest. But surely Great Britain will not utter such a sentiment until her allies shall be disposed to join in it. They do not despair, and I will never despair of them so long as they do not despair of themselves, so long as I should leave it in their power to say to us at a future day, "whence these chains? If you had stood firm a little longer, if you had not so soon fainted, we should not at this day be in the power of our enemies."

General Ferguson rose to make a few observations upon the subject under discussion. Much had been said by the right hon. gent. who brought forward the Resolution, of the importance of taking 30,000 Portuguese troops into British pay. As he had been in that country, he thought it his duty to tell the House what he had reason to believe on the subject. In the first place, then, he did not think there were 30,000 soldiers in Portugal: those that were there, had, certainly, by the exertions and skill of general Beresford, and other British officers, attained an appearance of discipline; but he feared that an army adequate to the task of now defending Portugal, must be able to make a stand in the first instance, and if obliged to retreat, must still, as opportunity offered, return to the charge, and thus make resistance after resistance. He was decidedly of opinion, from what he had seen and heard of them, that on the very first defeat, the little discipline of the Portuguese army would vanish, and a dispersion would be the consequence.

Mr. Fitzgerald said, that with respect to the character of the Portuguese nation, he agreed with the gallant general who had just sat down. If they were insensible to loyalty, religion, and the love of country, when that country was first invaded by the enemy, he would have no opinion of them even under British officers. This very circumstance must shew them that they had not a man in their own country who could lead an army. He begged to ask the right hongent. where he meant to remove the

thence? In this service our money would
be better employed. If we sent an army
to Portugal, it must be able to take the
field independently, and without occasion
for assistance. When he saw ministers
going to commit extravagancies like the
present, he thought that that House should
interfere to prevent the effects of such
insanity. As to any benefit to be derived
from these levies against the common
enemy, he fully concurred in opinion with
the gallant officer who had just sat down,
He had, indeed, never heard of any
achievement performed by the Portuguese,
with the exception of that in which 2,000
men, headed by the bishop of Oporto,
entered Oporto and took 24 Frenchmen
prisoners. The idea of retaining Portugal,
therefore, appeared to him to be quite
chimerical; while our keeping up a force
there would be attended with enormous,
expence. Indeed, he had lately seen a
military memoir, presented to Louis XIV.
at the time of the contest for the Spanish
succession, from which it appeared, that
our maintaining a force in Portugal, with- \
out advancing into Spain, was the very
course of policy which it was considered
for the interest of the French that our
government should pursue; and it would
not be denied that there was a considerable
analogy between the conduct of that war
and of the present.

Mr. C. Beresford thought he should not do his duty, if he silently passed by a disparagement of the bravery and exertion of a nation, which, if we did not assist, must be reduced to the necessity of having its troops disbanded. The hon. gent. then mentioned the connection which the emperor of France was about to form, and which he thought could not fail to affect the politics of Europe: and this surely was not a time for us to abandon a faithful ally. He should therefore vote for the motion.

Lord Milton had approved of our original interposition in the cause of Spain; but he disapproved of the conduct of the war, and particularly of the system now proposed, which would convert us