exercising a powerful influence on our voluntary determinations, inclines us to one action rather than another. The internal state or affection of mind influencing the agent is greatly dependent upon the natural disposition, temperament, and environment. Sometimes, also, an impulse is stronger in us, and will sway our reason at certain moments of our life, and lead to actions which at other times we should view differently, and make us either hesitate or hasten to act. Our voluntary determination, our moral conduct, therefore, although a means for the attainment of a certain end, is also dependent upon our natural impulse and upon the motive which induces us to seek for this end or purpose. The end not only harmonizes with, but is to a great extent dependent upon, the motive. We not only know, but we also feel, that we should act in one way and not in another. It is not only the perception of utility which shapes and directs our actions, but sentiment and feeling.

To discover the general impulse shared by all mankind, the common spring of human conduct, the moral feeling or sentiment which, independently of reason, sways and influences our determinations-and is at the root of our actions-is another of the important problems which moral philosophers have made efforts to solve. The answers to this question given by various philosophers differ. Some, like Hobbes, maintain that man only cares for his own happiness, that every man is fighting for his own hand, and that the spring of his actions is to be sought in egotism. 'The rule of his conduct is his own desire. His apparent love of his neighbour is nothing but a disguised egotism. He does a good action out of selfishness; because it affords him pleasure or serves his purpose. Man's ultimate reason for obeying moral laws is his own desire, his selfishness. Every so-called disinterested or benevolent action will, on closer inspection, be found to be the result of a desire for personal benefit, to be obtained immediately or in the future. Some, like Hume and Adam Smith, however, feel that man also possesses feeling for others. There is a feeling of sympathy in the human breast which makes us shape our actions so as to further the happiness of our fellow creatures. Their happiness and misery, and not

a selfish feeling and a consideration for our own pleasure, are at the root of our nature, and constitute the general principle of moral conduct-that is, the source of moral approbation and blame. This theory, in contradistinction to that of egotism, is termed (by A. Comte) Altruism, from the Latin alter, another—that is, consideration for the happiness of others rather than our own. Adam Smith and Hume are followers of this theory. There is a something within our nature which we prize more than our individual happiness. This something is the sympathy of the moral agent with the sentiments, pleasures, and happiness of the object of our benevolent actions. This is the ultimate element into which our moral sentiments can be analyzed. Our souls are quivering under a sense of sympathy with our fellow men, of pity for their sufferings, and of anger at wrongdoing, and an intense desire rises in us to promote their welfare and happiness. These feelings constitute a mighty power, springing from the consciousness of our nature and influencing our moral conduct, either in action or restraint from committing certain acts. To the first school, that of Egotism, belonged the ancient philosophers and those of the century of the French Revolution, and in modern times, Max Stirner and Nietzsche. In the school of Altruism we may count Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. Adam Smith and J. S. Mill even demand self-sacrifice of the moral agent. "But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others?"

"Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully. acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man. "The Utilitarian morality recognizes in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum-total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means to happiness, of others, either of mankind collectively, or of

individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind.”

§ 5. Another problem which has exercised the minds of moral philosophers is that of the moral standard and the sanction of moral conduct. It is the problem of moral principle in relation to man's will, the nature of moral law and obligation as distinct from motive. This problem treats of the basis and binding quality of moral obligation. "I feel," says Mill, in his "Essay on Utilitarianism,' ," "that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?" Questions of duty and the judgment of conduct vary with individuals and their characters. The responsibilities are different in each case. May not our judgment be involved in confusion, and lead us astray? And while thinking we do the right, may we not be doing the wrong? Where do we find the rule and sanction of our moral conduct-the moral law? To this question, again, two answers have been given. Some philosophers find the standard moral law in ourselves. It is a voice within us that tells us how to distinguish truth from falsehood. The moral law is derived from authority within us; it dwells in the inmost recesses of our nature, and helps us to penetrate through the mist of appearances to a clear perception of duty. This moral law serves us as a guide in our actions, and exercises a sovereign authority over every other spring of authority. This theory is called the Autonomous (Greek, autós, self, and vouos, law), as it finds the moral law in man's own nature. Some philosophers consider this inward voice as that of Reason and Intelligence, and are known as Rationalists. The ancient philosophers, and those of the century of the Great Revolution, were rationalists in this respect, and considered reason as the supreme judge and sovereign authority in moral conduct. Foremost among the exponents of the Autonomous theory is Kant. Reason, however, had to make room for feeling. The sovereign authority is to be found in ourselves, as Hume, Schopenhauer, Adam Smith, and others maintained; it is,

however, not centred in reason, but in feeling. The ultimate sanction of all morality is a feeling innate or implanted in our mind. "It is a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated natures rises, in the more serious cases, into a shrinking from it as an impossibility." Opposed to the Autonomous theory is the Heteronomous, which locates the sanction of moral conduct and the moral law in external authority. The fear of God, the supreme Ruler of the universe, or of our fellow creatures, the hope or finding favour before the eternal Judge or approval from our neighbours, are the bases of the moral duty. The moral law, or the rules and duties of moral conduct, are accepted from an authority other than ourselves, either the will of God, the sovereign, or the law of society.

Closely related to these ethical problems is that of selfcontrol or free-will. Is the supremacy of moral law such as to influence our will and make it subservient? Does our obedience to moral law pre-suppose a deliberate resolution, leaving the moral agent free to contemplate the law, but to shape his action as he pleases, and to apply the law in accordance with circumstances? Or are we bound by nature to act in a given case in a certain way and not otherwise, our will being a chain in the law of causality and our determination, seemingly taken freely by ourselves, only the necessary result of an existing cause pre-determining the events to follow? Two philosophical schools have discussed, and are still discussing, this momentous problem. The first upholds the absolute freedom of the will, as not determined by any cause, and is known as the Indeterminist School. The other adheres to the theory of causality, making the will of the moral agent and his determination dependent upon some preceding cause, and is known as the Determinist School. Indeterminism and Determinism form one of the most important problems, to solve which has been the interest not only of Philosophy, but also of Theology.

CHAPTER XIII

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS; OR, THE THEORY OF

KNOWLEDGE

§1. PHILOSOPHY has often been defined as the theory of "being and knowing." Metaphysics or Ontology inquires into the essence and origin of Being, and the questions dealing with Knowledge in itself-its essence, origin, and limitation-form a new branch of Philosophy, that of the Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. The first Greek philosophers turned their attention to the question of what things really are, and what is the intrinsic nature of things. This philosophizing and re-. flection, however, transcending the existing current and naive conceptions and ideas, gradually led the thinker, searching for truth behind and above things, to another question: Why are my views different from those of the mass of mankind? Why do my theories, based on reflection, differ from the views current in ordinary life? I know that the multitude is in error, and that my explanations are true. There is a world of things without" me, and my mind knows them. Yet, how did this knowledge of things enter my mind, giving rise to the ideas which reproduce the world of things within it? How have I gained this knowledge, and why does the multitude think differently? Where is the source of the truth which I have gained, where is the origin of knowledge and its limitations, and what is its nature and essence? These epistemological inquiries further led to doubt as to the trustworthiness and validity of knowledge. Is it at all possible to know the truth, to find a universally valid criterion? Thus, while the first inclination of the human mind is to