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before the divan. The preliminary article to these, and upon which all the reft depended, was a fufpenfion of arms for three months, in order to afford time for a negociation to take effect. The minifter fupported this propofition with fuch cogent arguments as were not eafily fet afide. The ftrict union fubfifting between the courts of Petersburgh and Vienna, from which it was little lefs than evident, that the latter would take an active part in the war-The mighty power of thefe empires, which feemed now to be at its zenith-The inability of the Porte to contend with them both, confidering the vaftness of their armies, and the fuperiority of their difcipline; together with the prefent untoward ftate of things, which rendered her allies incapable of affording her any affiftance.-To give the greater effect to this reafoning, or, at least, to render it more palatable, he fhewed that the prefent ftate of things might not be lasting; the union between the two empires, like all things of the fame nature, was fubject to viciffitude; or one or both of them might be attracted by other objects. While, in the intermediate time, the Porte might recover her affairs, and, by proper improvements and arrangements in her military force, become much better prepared for war than he was at prefent.

The grand vizir declared the propofal for an armiftice to be totally inadmiffible, from its affording every advantage to Ruffia, and none whatever to the Porte. Their perfidious enemy, whofe rapacity and ambition were infatiable, would gladly put them off their guard, and amufe them with a negociation until her preparations were complete; and

then refume the profecution of her defigns, without the smalleft regard to any preliminaries that were laid down as the bafis of an accommodation. He therefore could not confent to a fufpenfion of arms upon any other condition, than that of the French king's becoming guarantee for the ceffion of the Crimea; or, at least, of its being reftored to the fame state in which it had been placed by the treaty of Kainardgi, fo that the khan fhould be independent both of the Ottomans and Ruffians. He, however, made another offer, as a demonftration of the moderation of the Porte; this was, that France fhould engage, in cafe of the failure of the negociation through the obftinacy of Ruffia, tờ prevent her fleets from entering the Mediterranean; but without one of these fecurities, he could not expofe his country to the rifque of being duped by the artifices of her infidious enemies.

The French minifter eafily fhewed the impoffibility of the guaranty required; and to the caufes already affigned, which prevented France from affording naval affistance, he added her late convention with England, by which fhe was restricted from the equipment of any naval armament whatever. He then argued, that the idea of recovering the Crimea by a war, was, in the prefent ftate of things, altogether futile: well, indeed, would it be if she could preferve her immediate poffeffions, in a conteft with fuch potent adverfaries; but the hope of making conquefts was furely too vain to be feriously entertained. He queftioned likewise the juftice of the Porte in renewing her claim upon that peninfula; fince, however injurious and unjust the conduct of

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Ruffia

Ruffia had been in the ufurpation, the fubfequent convention afforded a fanction to the violence, and legalized her title to the poffeffion. To this point the grand vizir is faid to have replied, that the convention was only a temporary arrangement, which was by no means intended to be conclufive; that if it had been otherwife, fo evident a wrong and injuftice could no longer be fubmitted to than while fome uncontroulable neceffity compelled an acquiefcence; and above all, that the facrifice of an ancient and illustrious Muffulman nation, would not only be in the laft degree dishonourable and bafe, but that the ceffion of a country to unbelievers, which had for fo many ages be longed to the faithful, would be a direct breach of the laws of the Alcoran, under a due obfervance of which the Ottoman empire had rifen to fuch unexampled profperity and greatness.

Religion and confcience being thus rendered parties on the fide of war, it was eafily feen that all farther difcuffion on the subject of peace would for the prefent be ufelefs.

The Porte is faid to have demanded of M. de Herbert, the Imperial internuncio, in rather a peremptory manner, what part his mafter intended to take in the war; at the fame time requiring a specific anfwer from the court of Vienna upon the subject by a prescribed day.

The emperor's answer is likewife faid to have been fufficiently haughty, and to amount in fubitance to what follows: That he had reason to expect the Porte would have made the demand with more decency; that the divan could not be

ignorant that his Imperial majefty, as the friend and ally of Ruffia, was bound by treaty to furnish her with 80,000 men, in cafe of a war; that, if the Porte should, confider this as an act of hoftility, he was prepared to abide the confequences; but that if, on the contrary, they should choose, notwithstanding, to maintain the good understanding which fubfifted between the two empires, he would, with pleasure, undertake the office of mediator, in order to prevent the effufion of blood.

At the fame time the greatest preparations were made for war, not only in Hungary and the frontier provinces, but in Bohemia and the interior countries; and still more particularly at Vienna, as the grand arfenal of fupply to all parts, through the medium of the Danube, and its concurrent rivers. Four armies were ordered to be affembled; one at Carlstadt, in Croatid, under the command of general de Vins; another at Peterwaradin, in Hungary, commanded by general Langlois; a third on the borders of Lithuania, under general Febris; and the fourth in the Buccowine, under the orders of the prince of Saxe-Cobourg. Two other generals, ten lieutenantgenerals, and thirty major-generals, were all ordered to prepare for active fervice in the frontier armies. If any thing were yet wanting to fhew the fixed determination of the court of Vienna, the measure of fending general Alvinzi to act in, and obferve the conduct of the Ruffian armies during the war, and the receiving a Ruffian officer of equal rank to act the fame part in the Auftrian, would have been alone a fufficient explanation.

Yet the Turks, in defiance of experience, had still fuch confidence in

the

the public faith of nations, as vainly to flatter themselves, that, as no injury had been offered, nor wrong received by the emperor, but that, on the contrary, the greateft and moft beneficial conceffions, fuch as none of his ancestors ever had hoped for, were repeatedly granted during his reign, fo he would be contented merely to fulfil the terms of his alliance, without engaging as a principal in the war. They were likewife fo weak as to place a truft in political gratitude, which no true politician could have done. For, valuing themselves highly upon the inviolable faith and honour which they had obferved (although the wounds of recent hoftility were fcarcely yet clofed) during the diftreffes of Maria Therefa, when half the Chriftian princes of Europe, taking advantage of the deplorable ftate of her affairs, were leagued in a combination for her deftruction, when the Porte, by acting upon the fame principle, might have greatly enlarged the empire on the European fide, befides eftablishing a fecure barrier to her old dominions, and when, by fo acting, he might have extinguished the houfe of Auftria for ever, which had for fo many ages been her hereditary enemy, yet, as the then facrificed all thefe advantages, to the obfervation of

juftice and good faith, and compaffion for the fate of an ancient and illuftrious family upon the brink of ruin, fo fhe conceived that the emperor fhould regulate his present political conduct by that difinterefted example.-Indeed, we fshall hereafter fee, in more than one inftance, how ftudioufly the Porte avoided giving any caufe of umbrage to the emperor, and of affording any colourable pretence for his becoming an actual enemy; fo that little doubt can be entertained, if ambition was capable of admitting any limits, but that he would be gratified with fuch conceffions, as might probably, in the main, prove more beneficial than any acquifitions that were to be the hardfought fruits of a lorg and bloody war.

In the mean time, the grand vizir did not fo much rely on juftice or gratitude, as not to use the greateft poffible exertions to provide, on every fide, for defence, or for actual war; and he ufed fuch admirable induftry and celerity in drawing over the Afiatic troops, and collecting the European, that, during the winter, he had formed armies to the amount of 200,000 fighting men on this fide of the Hellefpont.

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CHA P. II.

Similar attempt on

Emperor. Ineffectual attempt to Surprize Belgrade. Gradifca defeated. Auftrians commence hoftilities. War declared at Vienna. Court of Warjaw refuses a paffage to the Imperial troops, in the purfuit of their military operations. Republic of Venice adheres inflexibly to her determination of not being drawn into the war, and of not lending one of her ports to the Ruffians for the ufe of their fleets. Probable motives for this conduct. Her final determination being communicated to the Emperor at Trieste, by a deputation of the fenate, is by him highly refented, and the deputies treated with extraordinary haughtiness. He opens a fubfcription for a large loan in the Low Countries, but with little Juccess. Emperor joins the grand army on the Danube, and is prefent at the taking of Schabatz. Prince Lichtenstein's troops repulfed in their attempt to ftorm Dubicza; are attacked next day in their trenches; their works deftroyed; and obliged to abandon the fiege, and repafs the Unna. Desperate valour difplayed by the Turks in this campaign. Wije fyftem adopted by the Grand Vizir in the conduct of the war. Wears out his enemy by continual attack, fmall action, and unremitted duty. Checks at Dubicza and other places, change the character of the war, which becomes defenfive and languid on the Auftrian fide. Great diffatisfaction in the camps and at Vienna, increafed by the tardiness of the Ruffians, whofe junction had been long in vain expected. Not leffened by the innovations and reforms introduced by the Emperor. Prince of Cobourg repeatedly attacked with great fury by the Turks. Emperor prepares at length for the fiege of Belgrade, which bad been held out as the first object of the campaign. Collects a prodigious artillery, and throws three bridges over the Suave for that purpoje. Grand Vizir, at the head of the grand Ottoman army, marches hastily from Siliftria, to interrupt his defign. Encamps in a most advantageous pofition on the Danube. Emperor breaks down his bridges, entrenches his troops, and adds new works to his already firong camp near Semlin. Sickness and a dreadful mortality, attended by a prodigious defertion in the Imperial armies. Three regiments drawn from Vienna, and 30,000 recruits hastily ordered to fupply thefe lofjes. Prodigious waste of treasure and men in the course of the campaign. Recruits eagerly fought in all quarters. King of Sardinia forbids any to be raised in his dominions. Prince of Saxe Cobourg, being at length joined by a Ruffian body of forces under general Soltikow, they jointly commence the fiege of Choczim. The town, magazines, and arjenal being deftroyed, by a dreadful fire of artillery and bombs, the Serafquier is fummoned to furrender, but refufes. Ruins of Choczim heroically defended by the gallant Serafquier and his intrepid garrijon until the end of September. Grand Vizir lays bridges over the Danube at Cladova, and invades the Bannat of Temefwar. Defeat of the Austrians near Orjova. Continued loffes and misfortunes. That fine country overrun and ruined. Rout of the Emperor's army on his retreat from Karanfebes. Marshal Laudobn takes the command of the army in Croatia, where he reduces Dubicza and Novi,

after

after moft obftinate defences. Heavy rains, and the approach of winter, oblige the Grand Vizir to evacuate the Bannat. Emperor's return to Vienna, after writing a general letter to his army. Armistice concluded between the Auftrian and Turkish commanders on the Danube. Manifefto iffued by the Grand Signior, to encourage the Hungarians to shake off the Auftrian yoke, occafioned the Emperor to promise them a restoration of their conftitution and rights. Proceedings at Conftantinople relative to the campaign, the evacuation of the Bannat, and the conduct of the Grand Vizir.

I'

"T might have been fuppofed, from the tenor of the emperor's public and private conduct, both before and after his arriving at the fole government of his dominions, that he had placed the wifdom and acts of the greatest legiflators and heroes before him as models, by which he was to regulate his own conduct both in government and war, as intending, on a foundation thus furely laid, to raife to himself a monument of the moft lafting fame. The opinions of men were accordingly raised to a very high pitch in his favour; his fubjects warmly hoping that his reign would have been happy to them and glorious to himself: nor were foreigners at all backward in adopting fimilar fentiments.

We have fince, however, had too many occafions for obferving, that his civil government fell infinitely fhort of the expectations that had been formed; that his character as a legiflator, as it became difplayed, and the effects of his regulations were felt and understood, was far from rifing in the public opinion; and that his subjects, instead of being eafy and happy, were directly the reverfe, and almoft every where difcontented and wretched. His military talents were in a great meafure yet unknown: fo that this path to glory being ftill open, while his defire of fame, and his paffion for

all the apparatus and organical parts of war were confpicuous, it was naturally expected that he would juftify the public eftimation in that refpect, and repair in the field the deficiencies of his civil character. The fhort war in Bohemia was not fufficient in any degree to develope his genius in this line. With one of the greatest and best appointed armies in the univerfe, with generals of the highest form and character to conduct his operations, he was contented to avail himfelf of the peculiar fituation of the country, and, adopting all the caution of an old commander, to cover that vast force by impaffable defiles, woods, and mountains, from the enterprize and ability of an enemy, who at all times, and in all fituations, was juftly terrible. Opposed thus to the moft military monarch of the age, this caution, though it could afford no fcope for ability or enterprize, demonftrated a folidity of judgment which by no means excluded the qualities of active genius, and which, if it accompanied, would materially aid the exertion of them. His exalted adversary apparently juftified this conduct, from the neceffity it placed him under of adopting a fimilar fyftem of inaction. And in the event of fuch a conteft, to fuftain (as was the cafe) neither lofs nor reproach, was itself an honour. The late conteft about the

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