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the appearance. The importace, however, of the undertaking, and the vast variety of matter which it contains, now call on us for a more minute examination into its merits.
As no species of publication requires more scrupulous accuracy than reports of judicial proceedings,--since on the fidelity of reporters the evidence of a considerable part of the law of England in a great measure depends ---S0, when that accuracy is observer, from none does greater utility result to the public. Different methods of reporting have been adopted by different authors: but we think that the plan followed by the present writers, of detailing at some length the arguments of counsel and the reasoning of the court, is preferable to that of giving a very abridged state of the case, and the micre point decided, without stating the principles on which the decisions proceeded. Still, however, in the present instance, we cannot refrain from expressing our opinion that the arguments of counsel are given with too much diffuseness, and that they might be condensed with great advantage to the reader; whose time, attention, and purse, would all be consulted by such a measure. Some excuse may indeed be offered by Mr. Durnford and Mr. East, for what appears to us in the light of a fault; viz. that the publication of their work at the end of each term necessarily deprives them of that leisure, which would probably be employed in revising and improving their reports. Swift apologised to a correspondent for having written a long letter, by saying that “ he had not time to write a short one;" and it is much easier and more expeditious to transcribe the argu. ments of counsel from a note book, than, after having consi. dered and digested them, to state these parts which more pare ticularly apply to the subject. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the present reportárs, for the strict observance of the most essential requisites in their undertaking: since we believe that their fidelity and accuracy cannot in any instance be called in question, but that the public may rely with full confidence on their authority.
We shall present our readers with the report of one case, to enable them to judge of the manner in which the whole is executed ; and we slect a cause in which the decision is intimately connected with the interests of general literature. It is determined by the case of Beckford v. Hood, East. 38 Geo. III. that an author, whose work is pirated before the expiration of twenty-cight years from its first publication, may maintain an action for damages against the offending party, although the work was not entered at Stationers' Hall, and although it was first published without the name of the author affixed. Such an entry is only necessary to support the action for penalties.
• This was an action upon the case ; and the first count of the de. claration stated that the plaintiff was the author of a certain book entitled “ Thoughts upon Hunting ;" and being such author within the space of twenty-eight years last, viz. on &c. at &c. first published the said book; that all the copies of the book sy by him published having been sold, the plaintiff before and at the time of the grievance after mentioned intended to publish a new edition and had laid out 100l. in preparing the same, yet the defendant afterwards and within the space of twenty-eight years from the day of the first publishing of the said book, viz. on &c. at &c. wrongfully and without the plaintiff's leave and against his will published and exposed to sale and sold divers, to wit, four hundred copies of the said book ; by means whereof the right title and interest of the plaintiff in the said book is much lessened in value. The second count stated that the plaintiff had the sole and exclusive liberty and right of printing a cer. tain other book called “ Thoughts upon Hunting," whereof the plaintiff was and is the author, and which had been within twentyeight years last to wit, on &c. first published by him as such author, yet the defendant knowing the premises and contriving to injure the plaintiff afterwards viz. on &c. at &c. wrongfully and unjustly and without the plaintiff's leave and against his will printed published and exposed to sale and sold divers, to wit, four hundred copies of such last mentioned book, whereof the plaintiff had the sole and exclusive liberty and right of printing as aforesaid ; by means whereof the right title and interest of the plaintiff of in and to such sole and ex. clusive liberty and right of printing is much hurt and lessened in value.
• The defendant pleaded the general issue; and on the trial at the sittings for Westminster after last Hiliary term before Lord Kenyon, tha jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case.
« The plaintiff is the author of the book stated in the declaration, entitled « Thoughts upon Hunting ;” and in May 1781 he published the first edition of it, without any name prefixed to the title-page. In 1782 he published a second edition, and in 1784 a third edition with his name prefixed to the title-page. Neither the original or subsequent editions were ever entered in the hall of the company of Stationers. In August 1796 the defendant published the same work under the title of “ Thoughts upon Hare and Fox-hunting," with the plaintiff's nanie prefixed to the title-page. The plaintiff is still living, and never disposed of his right or interest in the said work. The question for the opinion of the Court is, Whether the plainting is entitled to recover in this action" :
Lord KENYON Ch. J. All arguments in support of the rights of learned men in their work must ever be h ard with great favour by men of liberal minds to whom they are ad essed. It was probably on that account that when the great quest on of literary property was discussed some judges of enlightened understanding went the length of maintaining that the right of publication rested exclusively in the authors and those who claimed under them for all time : but the other opinion finally prevailed, which established that the right was confined to the times limited by the act of parliament. And that I have
no doubt was the right decision. Then the question is whether, the right of property being vested in authors for certain periods, the common law remedy for a violation of it does not attach within the times limited by the act of parliament. Within those periods the act saye that the author shall have the sole right and liberty of printing &c. Then, the statute having vested that right in the author, the common. law gives the remedy by action on the case for the violation of it. Of this there could have been no doubt made, if the statute had stopped there. But it has been argued that, as the statute in the same clause that creates the right has prescribed a particular remedy, that and no other can be resorted to. And if such appeared to have been the intention of the Legislature, I should have subscribed to it however inadequate it might be thought. But their meaning in creating the penalties in the latter part of the clause in question certainly was to give an accumulative remedy: nothing could be more incomplete as a remedy than those penalties alone ; for without dwelling upon the incompetency of the sum the right of action is not given to the party grieved, but to any common informer. I cannot think that the Legislature would act so inconsistently as to confer a right, and leave the party whose property was invaded without redress. But there was good reason for requiring an entry to be made at Statisners' Hall, which was to serve as a notice and warning to the public, that they might not ignorantly incur the forfeitures or penalties before enacted against such as pirated the works of others : but calling on a party who has injured the civil property of another for a remedy in damages cannot properly fall under the description of a forfeilure or penally. Some stress was attempted to be laid on the acts passed for preserving the property of engravers in their works, in which a special provision is made to meet such a case as the present, and to give the same right of action as is here contended for. But it is well known that provisions of that kind are frequently inserted in acts of parliament pro majori cautelâ ; and no argument can be drawn from them to affect the construction of other acts of parliament. On the fair construction of this act therefore I think it vests the right of property in the authors of literary works for the times therein limited, and that consequently the common law remedy attaches if no other be specifically given by the act; and I cannot consider the action given to a common informer for the penalties, which might be pre-occupied by another, as a remedy to the party grieved within the meaning of the act.
• ASHHURST J. In the case alluded to of Donaldson v. Becket in the House of Lords, I was one of those who thought that the invention of literary works was a foundation for a right of property inde. pendently of the act of Queen Anne. But I shall not enter into the discussion of that point now, as the question in the present case is much narrowed. And upon the construction of that act I entirely concur with my Lord that, the act having vested the right of property in the author, there must be a remedy in order to preserve it. Now I can only consider the action for the penalties given to a common informer as an additional protection, but not intended by the Legislature to oust the common law right to prosecute by action
any person who infringes this species of property, which would otherwise necessarily attach upon the right of property so conferred. Where an act of parliament vests property in a party, the other consequence follows of course, unless the Legislature make a special provision for the purpose ; and that does not appear to me to have been intended in this case. I am the more inclined to adopt this construction, because the supposed remedy is wholly inadequate to the purpose. The penalties to be recovered may indeed operate as a punishment upon the offender, but they afford no redress to the in. jured party; the action is not given to him, but to any person who may get the start of him and sue first. It is no redress for the civil injury sustained by the author in the loss of his just proñts.
• Grose J. The principal question is whether within the periods during which the exclusive right of property is secured by the statute to the author he may not sue the party who has invaded his right for damages up to the extent of the injury sustained ; and of this I conceive there can be no doubt. In the great case of Millar v. Taylor Mr. Justice rates gave his opinion against the common law right contended for in authors; but he was decisively of opinion that an exclusive right of property was vested in them by the statute for the time limited therein. No words can be more expressive to that effect than those used by him. But it is to be observed that the pea nalties given by the act attach only during the first fourteen years of the copyright; and during that time only is the offender liable for such penalties if he invade the author's right: but he is liable during the whole period prescribed by the act to make good in an action for damages any civil injury to the author. If this construction were not to prevail, during the last fourteen years of the term the author would be wholly without remedy for any invasion of his property, But there must be a remedy, otherwise it would be in vain to confer a right. I was at first struck with the consideration that six to five of the judges, who delivered their opinions in the House of Lords in the case of Donal's on v. Beckei, were of opinion that the common law viiht of action was taken away by the statute of Anne : but upon further view it appears that the amount of their opinions went only to establish that the common law right of action could not be exercised beyond the time limited by that statute.
• LAWRENCE T. I entircly concur with the opinions delivered by iny Biethren upon the principal point, and the case of Tonson v. Collins, 1 Blic. Rep. 330. is an additional authority in support of it; for there Lord Mansieli said that it had been always holden that the entry in Stationers' Hall was only necessary to enable the party to bring his action for the penalty, but that the property was given absoluiely to the author, at least during the term.
• Fostea to the Plaintiff.' We should have been happy to have transcribed the report of the case of Bauerman v. Rudenius, Trin. 38 Geo. III. p. 663, h.id not the confined nature of our limits prevented us. - It was there decided that the defendant might give in evidence the declarations or admissions of the plaintiff on the record to defeat
the action, although such plaintiff appear to be only a trustee for a third person. We refer the reader particularly to this report, for the masterly and eloquent judgment delivered by the Chief Justice ; and for the able manner in which he has pointed out some of the differences subsisting between the mode of proceeding in courts of law and courts of equity, with the advantages resulting from such differences.
Art. X. Considerations on the Doctrines of a Future State, and the
Resurrection, as revealed, or supposed to be so, in the Scriptures; on the Inspiration and Authority of Scripture itself; on some Peculiarities in St. Paul's Epistles ; on the Prophecies of Daniel, St. John, &c. To which are added some Strictures on the Prophe. cies of Isaiah. By Richard Amner. 8vo. Pp. 312. 58. Buards. Johnson. 1797. THIS author now engages our attention for the third time
during the course of between twenty and thirty years *. That he is a sincere inquirer we very readily acknowlege, and of this his writings bear testimony the most satisfactory; but we must rank him in the class of Daubters; and he is so very diffident, or at least expresses his doubts so often, as to become unpleasant to the reader who is expecting instruction. Yet, whatever his hesitations may be, it is evident that he investigates with a naccurate as well as modest attention; and though the result is not very favourable to some opinions which human authority has decided and pronounced to be orthodox, yet we are led to presume that he is not an Unitarian respecting the person of Christ; because, having mentioned in a note + some passages which denote inferiority, and others that indicate high characters and powers, we find him declaring— All which being admitted, I do not see for my own part, how that equality of the Son with the Father, which some contend for, can be maintained, on the one hand; nor how on the other, when the high characters and powers are adverted to, we are justified in taking away, as some now affect to do, every kind of religious worship, homage, veneration, or respect, call it what we will, from the character, authority, and lordship of Jesus.'
However this be, Mr. A. doubtless inclines to materialism, so far as to regard death as the extinction of existence, and a future life as necessarily connected with a resurrection, or as being each expressions of the same state and event. In the course of this inquiry, he combats the opinion of the late very re.
* See M. Rev. for Feb. 1774, vol. 1. p. 159; also Aug. 1776, vol. lv. p. 133. . † P. 67.