lates to the Supreme Governor'-toman the subject of it'-and to the rule by which he is governed.' The term governor, it is observed, includes two distinct offices, that of sovereign and that of judge;-the latter being exercised in awarding punishment to the guilty, and the former in conferring benefits beyond desert or equitable claim. office of a judge, as such, never implies sovereignty, and the prerogative of a sovereign never extends to the violation of justice. By confounding royal prerogative with supremacy, or uncontrolable will, tyrannical princes have assumed the right of acting as they pleased, no less in inflicting evils, than in bestowing favours. Hence they have oppressively enacted bad laws, and cruelly executed them. But as every violation of equity is an abuse of supremacy, not of prerogative; so, while suffering can properly proceed only from justice, from sovereignty can spring only what is beneficial. A good king will enact none but wise and salutary laws, and will punish only when those laws are broken; yet, in virtue of prerogative, he may distinguish whom he chuses with marks of royal favour. In like manner the Supreme Governor never afflicts with punishment, but as an equitable judge, and then only exercises sovereignty, when he communicates more than could be justly claimed. Guilt and equity are the cause of all we suffer; prerogative is the source of all we enjoy. How lovely, how delightful is this view of Deity! but how different from the vague, unscriptural representations into which too many are betrayed, as if his glorious sovereignty were an object of dismay. It is frequently mentioned with the epithets tremendous, dreadful, and terrible, and as distinct from justice. Now what can be the notions attached to these terms, which will at all accord with reason, or the divine records? Equity, indeed, through our defection, and exposure to the righteous sentence of violated law, has become inexpressibly awful: but of what other attribute in Deity can we speak in similar language? If there be any thing besides justice, which can be denominated terrific, it must be capricious will armed by irresistible power. But that be far from the righteous God. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" It is to our crimes and not to divine sovereignty that we are indebted for all the misery which we feel or fear; and for all the happiness we enjoy or anticipate, we are obliged solely to sovereign favour. "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through our Lord Jesus Christ." Behold the equity and sovereignty of God! To one or other of these principles, and that without the least infringement of their mutual claims and

united concord, may be referred every act of divine legis lation; and every effect from the exercise of supreme go vernment and grace. The establishment of this fact, we consider as of incalculable value, both to the theological student, and to every private Christian. The manner in which it may be applied and improved, as well for the solution of difficulties, as the exercise of devotion, is excellently shewn in this judicious and admirable section.

In the second section, moral government is considered in reference to its subject, man. Here we are presented with a survey both of the original and present state of human accountable creatures; and their defection from pristine integrity is proved as well from incontrovertible fact, as from holy Scripture. The consequences of this defection are traced and their grounds stated. Then follow proofs that these changes by no means affect the true foundation of accountability. The argument by which this is established is conducted on sound principles, and with great perspicuity and effect. The remarks on Will especially are well worthy the attention of all who would be prepared to meet the various errors of the day, whether they arise from the compulsive, or self-determining hypothesis ;-from the sceptical, the antinomian, or the pelagian school. For the arguments, our readers are referred to the work itself. The principles established are thus stated:

The sum of what has been advanced is this: God has given to the soul of man, as a form, an invariable principle, a tendency towards good and happiness in general; but the will never chuses what is not represented to it by the understanding. The will however is capable of renouncing a good represented, and a happiness enjoyed of an inferior kind, though a better does not actually and distinctly appear; because the soul may be conscious, that what it possesses is not the chief good, is not its ultimate happiness; conscious, that it has not attained to its original destination, and that a greater good is attainable, than any which it has yet experienced. Thus the soul's general tendency to ultimate good and happiness, keeps it ever in expectation, through every stage of life, and in all its various pursuits. Its fault, therefore, or moral failure and criminality, consists in a temporary but idolatrous resting in what is not the chief good of man; and this idolatry is committed not only when an inferior good is falsely deemed preferable to another, but also when any created good whatever is not chosen with reference to the chief, and in subordination to it. This statement is founded in fact, in universal and impartial experience, to which the appeal is now made.' pp. 173-4.

Towards the close of this section, the source of moral defect, or the origin of evil is considered: not indeed as to the circumstances or mode of its introduction, about which we can know nothing certainly, which is not explicitly revealed, but in reference to its true cause. To know more of the manner of its occurrence than the fact that temptation was employed, is perhaps of little importance, but of how much consequence it is to know the principle whence it proceeded, may sufficiently appear from the long current, and yet too extensively received, dogmas respecting reprobation on the one hand, and, on the other, the widely prevailing contingent scheme, involving at once an infringement on divine prescience, and the entire subversion of moral government. On account of the difficulties which have occurred in the investigation of this interesting subject, many have inferred, if not the criminality, at least the uselessness of farther discussion. Aware of this, Dr. W. in his Introduction has met the objection in the following manner:

The author was aware, that there were many persons of great and deserved celebrity, who went little farther than to ascribe to God the causation of good only, with a bare denial of his being the "Author of sin ;" and who when pressed with the question-how the certain futurition of denounced evil, proclaimed in the language of prophecy, and the divine causation of it, can be separated in a clear and satisfactory manner-were accustomed to return for answer, "Beware of going too far-we shall know it well in a future state." After all, however, as it must confessedly be a good and useful event to be well informed on this point in another world, there seems no sufficient reason why farther information in the present, should be dreaded as remarkably dangerous. If some have been unprofitably perplexed in their researches, it by no means follows that we are to regard the question as a speculative nicety, productive of small advantage supposing it to be satisfactorily answered. It is, on the contrary, in the humble judgment of the writer, one of primary importance, intimately connected with almost every branch of moral philosophy, and with the whole system of revelation respecting sin and grace. These topics of religion are founded in eternal truth; and a clear perception of their sources is calculated both to delight the understanding, and invigorate the heart. The inspired oracles do not, perhaps, expressly state the ultimate source of sin, (and the same may be said of many other points of confessed importance ;) but they afford ample evidence from whence the conclusion may be deduced. They constantly maintain that God is the source of our good; and that we ourselves are the cause of our moral evil. The scattered rays of these primary truths are brought by the apostle James into a focus: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth

forth sin, and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err my beloved brethren. Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of Lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.' Here we are

plainly taught that GOD is the origin of all good, so as to exclude the idea of his being the source of any moral evil; and that the origin of human moral evil is in MAN, so as to exclude every cause exterior to himself: from which two ideas, as will hereafter be shewn, it inevitably follows, that the origin of moral evil is a negative principle.' PP. 8-11.

For these reasons, and with this guide, the author proceeds to consider the subject; and whatever differences of opinion may subsist as to complete success, few, after impartially weighing what is here, and in various parts of this work, advanced, will be disposed to deny, that he has cast much light on this important fact. Every thing of value which had been previously advanced is brought distinctly into view, and within a small compass; many original ideas are added; and the whole is applied to great practical uses, with a skill and force seldom perhaps exceeded. It must however always be recollected, that the question is not, why the Divine Being, when able to prevent the occurrence of moral failure, and foreseeing the event, chose to permit it; but, what was the true cause of that event, when suffered to operate? These are distinct questions, and though many considerations in reference to the former are offered in the course of this essay, it is the latter which is more especially discussed.

The third section of this chapter is, Of the moral rule by which man is governed.' Here the erroneous and dangerous position, that the will of God is the ultimate source of right, or that any thing is right merely because he wills it,' is considered and ably refuted. Except we view it as arising from a confounding of the evidence of truth, and the source of it, that such a sentiment should have obtained credit among reflecting persons, is indeed surprizing. ، To us, observes the author, ، it is admitted, it is a sufficient evidence that a thing is right, because God wills it; and "thus saith the Lord," demands our faith and obedience; but the supposition of a supreme will, without a rule of right according to which it is directed, is equally false and dishonourable to God.' We have not unfrequently met with inquiring persons, whose objections to revelation have arisen chiefly, if not solely, from having been taught that the doctrine referred to, was that of the Scriptures:

nor do we wonder that it should be a powerful obstacle to their reception of the sacred record, from which however no such sentiment can legitimately be deduced. Their language

is, "shall not the judge of all the earth do RIGHT?' clearly implying that there is a standard of right, independent of will. There are indeed positive institutions, of which no reason is apparent, but they are always conformable to the mutual relations of the governor and the governed, on which relations all moral laws are directly founded. It is, however, properly noticed, that the obliging law, results not merely from what man is now, but also from what the human system was originally.

In Chapter the fourth, moral government is considered as it relates to different dispensations of revealed religion, and the first section is, Of revealed 'religion in general, and particularly from Adam to Moses.' In this connexion occur the following remarks respecting questions not unfrequently, but very unprofitably discussed.

Observing that among men there awaits every conditional engagement a permanent consequence on either side, some have been led to enquire, what would have been the consequence of Adam's continued obedience? To this enquiry different answers have been given, not one of which, I conceive, needs to be noticed, because the question overlooks the nature of the subject. For it might as well be asked, what would have been another plan of creation and providence, if the present had not been adopted? And this would lead us to the fruitless enquiry, in how many different ways was it possible for God to form a universe? Every thing on the plan actually adopted proceeds on the supposition of Adam's apostacy; therefore to suppose his constant obedience, is not only to suppose an alteration in a single part of the divine scheme, but to substitute another system. Though we discard the unfounded notion of Adam's apostacy being decreed, and the self-contradictory notion of a decree to permit it: it was foreseen in its adequate cause, and the divine plan proceeds on that foreknowledge. Nearly allied to the preceding question, is, what must have been the consequence respecting fallen Adam's posterity in this world, on supposition that no Saviour had been provided? This, as well as the former enquiry, overlooks the nature of the subject, and takes for granted that the consequence might have taken place, without supposing another world. Whereas the truth is, that since the present plan of things, in all its parts, proceeds on the supposition of a Saviour provided, to suppose this removed is to suppose another universe. On the whole, relative to

Justitia Dei, absolute considerata, est universalis naturæ divinæ Rectitudo, ac Perfectio. Ita enim se habet natura divina, antecedenter ad omnes actus voluntatis ipsius, et suppositiones objectorum, erga quæ egrederetur." Owen De Justitia Divina. p. 7. Ox. 1653.