consciousness, and within his observation. To love the very things, which both the Scriptures and the practice of men testify we naturally dislike, is the very essence of Christian feeling: but will the mere display of objects, against which we have an enmity, produce affection? If indeed our alienation were the mere result of intellectual mistake, a correct exhibition of truth would remove it; but if it is more deeply laid, if it is founded in nothing less than opposition of heart to rectitude and holiness, as they really are in themselves, something more must be necessary. "The ignorance that is in us," is not merely that of one who wants information, but that of one who has no relish for the objects proposed, and who, therefore, cannot estimate their worth ;--of one who wants the ability to enjoy them. The "darkness" of which we read in the sacred pages, does not surround the objects externally, but it hangs over the mind, and cannot be removed but by His shining into the heart, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness. As, to persons unaccustomed to enjoy any pleasures but those of business or society, unsusceptible of impressions from the sublime and the beautiful, nature in vain unfolds her innumerable charms; so, to a heart depraved and worldly, divine grace and the sanctity of true religion, present nothing capable of affording delight. The most skilful touches will not awaken melody from an instrument out of tune, nor will the string spontaneously vibrate to any sound but that with which its tone is in unison. Charmer may charm wisely, but to the adder which stoppeth her ears, it will be unavailing skill. To spiritual things the ear is shut, the eye is closed: the "working of God's mighty power" must "open the eye," must give the "hearing ear," and communicate the susceptible, the feeling heart; or Christ himself may exhibit the beauty of religion, may proclaim the methods of mercy, and employ means the best adapted to ensure attention, without effect. The Spirit of Christ must be in us, must "work in us to will and to do ;" must "circumcise the heart;" must "take away the stone," and "form us for himself;" or else all means will be ineffectual. The tree must be made good before it will produce good fruit, and the ground must be prepared before it receives the seed, or else it will continue barren. If the word, which is that seed, fall on sterile or a thorny soil, whatever its virtue, or its quickeningpower," disappointment will be the only harvest we shall ever reap. Although the grain of wheat has life, it will not grow on the naked rock. Would any one suppose that the same truths, if presented with equal clearness, would alike succeed in raising the sentiments, which in their own nature they are calculated to inspire, when addressed to Satan and to the Angel The Gabriel? Will there not, in every case, be a diversity in the effect, corresponding to the difference in the mind addressed? Must we not, in accuracy of conception, suppose, that in the mind of Adam, previous to any exercises of understanding and will towards divine objects, there was a certain antecedent congruity with them, which ensured right elections? Was his rectitude the mere effect of moral means? Could the presentation of good inducements, of itself effect with certainty the right volition? Might he not even then have chosen ill? and if so, was there no reason why he did not? Do the brightness of evidence, or the suitableness and excellence of objects, give a holy sanity to the intellectual and voluntary faculties; or a correct principle to the heart? If so, how could sin arise in heaven? Could there be a brighter irradiation of divine beauty than when the first apostate fell? It is plain, the source of choice and action, whether right or wrong, must be within. We therefore infer, that antecedent to the reception of religious truth, and without which it will never be embraced, there is a change wrought upon the mind, by which it becomes pre-disposed towards the objects therein presented; and receives a new, a primary principle, the source of all that is excellent in sentiment, and lovely in practice. In the above reasoning, we have employed the word sentiment, as indicating truth actually embraced, and operating upon the will and the affections; because it is in this sense, that it must be employed by those who speak of it as the result of truth proposed: but there is another meaning of the term, agreeably to which, the change above described may, analogically, be called sentimental. The word is sometimes employed to designate a primary quality of mind, by virtue of which a person is susceptible of the emotions of taste. It is a pre-disposition to certain lively feelings, which will be excited by the occurrence of objects suitable to produce them; and without which, however adapted in themselves to awaken admiration and impart delight, we should behold the most picturesque scenery with indifference. In an unrenewed man, this spiritual tact is wanting, and it would be as absurd to suppose that truths, objectively proposed, would give it, as that the sight of the stormy ocean, or a well watered valley, would communicate the faculty of taste. If, in the nature of things, this spiritual susceptibility must precede a practical reception of truth, it is plain that the cause of it cannot be moral. Is it not essential to a moral cause that it be addressed to the intellect and to the will? that it be hypothetical? that the effect be suspended on acceptance or refusal? Is then the cause of regeneration, in the primary sense of it, dependent on human choice? Or can truth operate in any other way than by voluntary election? That influence which renews, “makes us willing in the day of God's power"-ensures a right volition. But can that which makes us willing, be itself proposed to us as an object of choice? and if not, must it not be essentially distinct from moral means? That which is addressed to a voluntary agent as an inducement, and that which effects its end independently of choice, must be causes essentially distinct in their nature; and however connected by sovereign appointment, or in different ways combining their respective influences to produce one appointed end, they ought by no means to be confounded with each other. To speak of them both as moral causes, is to disregard the clearest distinctions, and to subject those, whom we teach, to dangerous misconceptions. The one presents reasons, the other prepares us to understand and appreciate them by the one are exhibited to us objects which are right and suitable to our necessities; by the other we are made to regard them as good and desirable: the one persuades, and the other ensures the success of persuasion: the one is objective; the other, though we are taught to pray for it as graciously promised, is not, and from its nature cannot be, proposed to our choice: the one is, in short, moral; and the other, as contradistinguished from it, is rightly denominated physical. The term physical, however, is not to be understood as synonimous with natural, but as marking any exertion of positive power, to whatever end it may be directed, which does not operate by inducement or the mere force of reason. But it is asked, if the cause be physical, must not the effect also be physical? Do not causes produce effects of the same character with themselves? In some respects they do, in others they do not. If the one be positive, so will be the other; but it does not follow that what is produced, should have the same denomination with the source of its existence. Water is formed by a mixture of airs; and a solid by that of fluids. There cannot be a more striking distinction than between matter and spirit, yet the latter is the cause of the former, and the difference is not in degree merely, but in kind. That the power exerted, considered as a cause, should have one appellative, and the result another, is by no means singular; since the end of an exertion of physical energy may be, to produce, not a new substance or faculty, but a right order, an harmonious congruity, a just adaptation to some office. The mind of man, in reference to divine things, is naturally in a state of disorder: not only is it indisposed to inquire into them, but, if accidentally directed that way, they are not properly represented by the understanding; and even if the intellect does dictate rightly, the affections are not interested, and the will is disinclined to obey. To adjust these irregulari ties, and to restore these principles of action to a state suited to a proper discharge of their functions, are, from the very nature of man as an accountable moral agent, to produce a moral effect. Yet the power by which this change is accomplished, since it is the essential property of a moral cause to operate by inducement, cannot be of that character; and since inducements are offered in vain to a mind not susceptible of them, its exertion is necessary previously to a right issue when they are presented. Thousands who have had every evidence of which divine truth is capable, have nevertheless rejected it; and yet facts have evinced, that the mind of a poor negro could be so wrought upon by a superior impulse, as to be disposed to renounce the follies of idolatry, to long for something unknown which might satisfy his mind and heart, and to be prepared for the immediate reception of Christianity as soon as it was announced. Infants and idiots, who are placed beyond the range of moral influence, must experience a renewal fitting them for heaven, before they can be admitted there; and yet with regard to either of those, who will say, that the alteration is merely physical? It is not true, therefore, that effects must, in all cases, be of the same character with their causes. Having shewn that this primary change must precede the right reception of truth, and that it cannot, therefore, take its rise from a moral cause; it follows, that the influence which produces it, must be distinct from that of the word, or of truth in any way objectively proposed;-and that it must operate directly on the mind. There is, however, a sense in which the word may less properly be called an instrument, even of the primary regeneration we have described; although neither possessing inherent efficiency to secure that result, nor, from its nature as a moral cause, capable, by any supposed influence upon, or in it, of having such power communicated to it. The reason is, that God has, in his infinite wisdom, seen fit, generally, though not necessarily, to attach the administration of the Spirit to the dispensation of Gospel truth. To renew, is his immediate work; but he chuses to perform it chiefly in those people, to whom are sent the objective means which are to elicit its energies. Where he designs to produce a moral adaptation to receive the message, there he provides that the proclamation shall be made; and since the renewed disposition becomes known only by its exercises, and those exercises are induced by means of truth, the recognition of the one, entirely depends on the exhibition of the other. It is under the dispensation of divine truth, that we perceive the fruits of regeneration, and, therefore, we call the former the instrument of the latter. "It hath pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." Thus men are also spoken of as instruinental in conversion, not because they have power to change the human heart, but because God has chosen to connect his work with theirs yet, as in the latter case, the operation of Deity is not to be confounded with the efforts of man, so neither, in the former case, are the distinctions between that influence which changes the heart, and the truth which addresses the understanding, to be exploded or overlooked. Nor does this representation, in the least, either diminish the importance of the word, or weaken our inducements to make it known. The word, thus considered, answers all the purposes in reference to moral government, for which its nature is adapted; and from the established course of the divine procedure in his sovereign acts, we have not ground to expect the exertion of God's saving power, where we neglect to send the testimony of his abounding grace; while, on the contrary, both his conduct and his promise, lead us to believe, that where we announce his truth, he will prepare the mind for its reception, Divine influence, therefore, and the influenee of truth, are so intimately connected as to be seldom disjoined, and yet so distinct, as, from their respective natures, to be incapable of blending in operation, though the ultimate end of each is the same. The representation here given, though deduced from clear principles of reason, does not depend on abstract argument for its support, since it is the obvious and repeatedly inculcated doctrine of Scripture. We cannot here make a regular induction of evidence by particular citations, but a few remarks on the classes of texts which corroborate our statement may be useful. As to the passages which have been adduced against the notion of direct influence, we may observe, that it may be shewn, by their connexion, that they refer, not to initial regeneration, but to that which is evidenced by its effects, and as such, publicly recognized in the moral system of divine administration. To quote such passages, therefore, is irrelevant to the argument; the influence of the word, in that sense, being fully admitted by those who oppose the notion of its proper efficiency in producing the primary change. But for the principles defended in the work before us, we may mention all those descriptions of the natural state of man, which speak of his moral incapacity to improve the best adapted means; which represent him as "having eyes but seeing not; “ears but hearing not" and a "heart which perceiveth not ;" as being "blind," "dead," and destitute of that "Spirit of God," without which no man "knoweth the things of God." To these may be added, all which describe the Divine energy as exerting itself in, and not merely towards man; as taking |