insurgents never had any available base of operations for naval warfare within the limits of their own territory. From that time forward until the end of the contest, the United States maintained a blockade of all the insurgent ports, which was recognized by all neutral nations as lawful, and was so far effective as to prevent any vessel of war (unless the Tallahassee and Chickamauga, with perhaps some other small vessels, should be excepted,) from using these ports as a base for hostile operations upon the sea. No supplies for such operations were ever obtained there, nor were any repairs effected.

It is true, the Nashville escaped through the blockade from the port of Charleston, but when she escaped she was in no condition for war, and within three days was at Bermuda in want of coal. After there taking on board a full supply, she was enabled to make her voyage of eighteen days to Southampton. The Florida ran the blockade inwards and reached Mobile, where she was detained, more than four months, by the naval forces of the United States. At the end of that time, she effected an escape, but with only a short supply of coal, for within ten days after her escape she appeared at Nassau « in distress for want of coal. After having been fairly set upon her cruise from Nassau, she not unfrequently

remained at sea two months and more without renewing her supply.

5. This was at all times known to the British Government. The blockade was the subject of frequent correspondence between Mr. Adams and Earl Russell, and was acknowledged to be sufficiently effective to bind neutrals.

6. By depriving the insurgents of the use of their base of naval operations at home, the United States obtained a decided and important advantage in the progress of the war. It was a war, on the part the United States, for the suppression of a wide-spread rebellion against the authority of the Government. At the outset, the power of the insurgents appeared so great, and their organization was so complete, that, in the opinion of the British Government, it was proper they should stand before the world, and be recognized as belligerents. The territory, which they claimed as their own and sought to control, embraced a large extent of sea coast, well supplied with ports and harbors, available for all the purposes of commerce and naval warfare. In fact, it embraced two out of the five navy-yards of the United States, and a port at which extensive preparations had been made for the establishment of a sixth.

The people of the States not in rebellion, but remaining loyal to the Government, were a commercial people, and largely engaged in navigation. At the commencement of hostilities, the insurgents proclaimed their intention of making war upon this commerce. To prevent this, and to keep such ports as were in the possession of the insurgents from being used as bases of the operations for such a war, the United States at once determined to establish and effect their blockade. With the superior power and resources under the control of the Government, it was able to accomplish this work; and before the insurgents could supply themselves with ships of war, their ports were closed against all effective operations from their own territory as a base.

This advantage was one the United States had the right to retain if within their power so to do. No neutral nation could interfere to prevent it.

7. The loss which the insurgents had thus sustained at home, they endeavored to repair by the use of the ports and territorial waters of neutral nations: and, in point of fact, they did carry on substantially their entire naval warfare against the commerce of the United States, from a base of operations outside of their own territory. This fact is not denied. It is entirely

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separate and distinct from that of « permission » or « sufferance, » which only becomes important when it is sought to charge the neutral, whose territory is used, with the consequences of the use.

8. Toleration by a neutral of the use of its ports and waters by the ships of war of a belligerent to facilitate the operations of his naval warfare, is equivalent to a permission to use such ports and waters as a base of naval ope

rations.

This principle was recognized by the Emperor of Brazil in his instructions to the presidents of his provinces on the 23d of June, 1863 (Brit. App., vol. i, p. 292). It was adopted by Earl Russell on the 12th of June, 1862, after the original escape of the Florida from Liverpool, and before the commencement of the correspondence in reference to the construction and outfit of the Alabama, when, in a letter addressed to Mr. Adams, he said: « Attempts on the « part of the subjects of a neutral government «to take part in a war, or to make use of the << neutral territory as an arsenal or barrack «for the preparation and inception of direct

and immediate hostilities against a state with << which their government is at peace, as by << enlisting soldiers or fitting out ships of war, «and so converting, as it were, neutral terri

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<tory into a hostile depot or post, in order « to carry on hostilities therefrom, have an << obvious tendency to involve in the war the <neutral government which tolerates such pro«ceedings. Such attempts, if unchecked, might « imply, at least, an indirect participation in « hostile acts, and they are, therefore, consistently treated by the government of the neutral <state as offences against its public policy << and safety, which may thereby be implica«ted (Am. App., vol. i, p. 665.

If such proceedings by subjects, when « tolerated » or « unchecked, » may imply an indirect participation by the neutral in the hostile acts of a belligerent, how much stronger is the implication when the proceedings are those of the belligerent himself.

9. It will not be denied that « toleration, » << permission » or «sufferance, » by a neutral, in this connection, implies a knowledge of the act or thing tolerated, permitted or suffered; or, that which is equivalent, a culpable neglect in employing the means of obtaining such knowledge.

10. As early as the escape of the Florida from Liverpool, on the 22d of March, 1862, the British Government had knowledge, or, to say the least, had << reasonable grounds to believe,»