that an effort was being made by the insurgents to supply, in part, the loss of their own ports, for all the purposes of war upon the Ocean, by the use of those of Great Britain. From that time forward it knew that the insurgents relied entirely upon the ports and waters of neutral nations for the success of their naval warfare. This fact was so notorious, and so well understood in Great Britain, that it was made the subject of special comment by Earl Russell in the House of Commons during the progress of the war (Am. App., vol. v, p. 535).

11. All the really effective vessels of war, ever used by the insurgents, were obtained from Great Britain. This is an undisputed fact. Two, certainly, the Florida and the Alabama, were constructed and specially adapted for warlike use in Great Britain, under contracts for that purpose made directly with the insurgent authorities. All this was known by the British Government, long before either of these vessels, after completing their armament and receiving their commissions, appeared at any of the ports of the Kingdom, asking permission to coal or to repair in fact, it was known before they had appeared in the ports of any nation.

For the purposes of this argument, it matters not whether Great Britain did or did not use

due diligence to prevent the construction or escape of these vessels. The fact that the insurgents, in procuring them, committed an offence against the neutrality laws of the realm, and subjected themselves to punishment therefor, remains undisputed. The individual agents, who, within British jurisdiction, committed this crime against British municipal law, made themselves subject to the penalties of that law. The authorities of the insurgents, who promoted the crime, subjected themselves to such measures as Great Britain might see fit to adopt in order to resent the wrongs inflicted on her, and to cause her sovereignty to be respected.

12. When these vessels were upon the sea, armed and fitted for war, the insurgents had advanced one step towards providing themselves with the means of prosecuting a war against the commerce of the United States; but they needed one thing more to make any war they might wage successful, and that was a base of operations. Without this, the United States would still, to a limited extent, have remained in the possession of the advantages they had gained by a successful blockade. The great difficulty to be overcome was the supply of coals. To no nation could this fact be more apparent than to Great Britain, the flag of

whose magnificent navy was at that time almost constantly afloat in all the principal seas of the world.

13. Great Britain had the undoubted right, upon the discovery of these offences committed by the insurgents against her municipal laws, and of their violations in her territory of the laws of nations, to exclude by force, if necessary, the vessels, in this manner placed upon the seas, from all the hospitalities usually accorded to naval belligerents, in the ports and waters of the kingdom.

This was the prompt decree of Brazil, when her hospitality was abused by one of these vessels (Brit. App., vol. i, p. 293). The Counsel of Great Britain does not deny the power of the British Government to make the same orders.

14. In this way Great Britain might, to a great extent, have prevented the consequences of the original crime committed within her own jurisdiction. It was her duty to use due diligence in her own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within her jurisdiction, to prevent the departure of such a vessel from her territory. If, notwithstanding her diligence, such a vessel was constructed within, and departed from, her jurisdiction, then good faith towards a nation with which she was at peace required that she

should, as far as possible, curtail the injurious consequences of the unlawful act which she had been unable to prevent. She owed no comity to a nation that had abused her hospitality. She was under no obligations to open her ports to a belligerent that had violated her neutrality. No belligerent had the right to demand the use of her ports for the accommodation of his ships of war. It was a privilege she could grant or not as she pleased, and if in this respect she treated both belligerents alike, neither had the right to complain. An order which excluded all guilty of the same offence would have operated alike on all who were guilty, but would not have included the innocent.

15. The United States had the right, as they did, to demand of Great Britain, that she should use all means within her power to avoid the consequence of her failure to prevent the use of her territory for these unlawful purposes. As has been seen, the insurgents commenced in Great Britain their violations of these particular laws of neutrality. They were flagrant acts. They were accomplished in spite of the United States. They were high offences against the authority and dignity of the Government of Great Britain, and, as Earl Russell afterwards said, « totally << unjustifiable and manifestly offensive to the << British Crown » (Am. App., vol. i, p. 631).

To permit them to pass unrebuked, was to excuse them, and was to encourage future transgressions.

As was subsequently, on the 27th of March 1863, said by Mr. Adams, in a conversation with Earl Russell upon this subject: «What was much << needed in America was not solely evidence << of action to prevent these armaments. It was << the moral power that might be extended by << the Ministry in signifying its utter disappro<val of all the machinations of the conspirators << against the public peace. Hitherto the impres«sion was quite general, as well in America as <«in this country, that the Ministry held no << common sentiment, and were quite disposed to << be tolerant of all the labors of these people, if << not indifferent to them. Here they were abso<«<lutely sustaining the rebels in the prosecution «of the war by the advance of money, of «ships, and of all the necessaries with which to « carry it on as well by sea as on the land; and « upon such notorious offences Ministers had << never yet given out any other than an uncer<tain sound. The effect of this must be obvious. «It encouraged the operations of British instiga<tors of the trouble on this side, who believed

that they were connived at, and, so believing, « carried on their schemes with new vigor » (Am. App., vol. iii, p. 125).

Nothing can add to the force of these words.