PRICE 2D.

TO THE

EDITORS OF THE ANTI-UNION..

Nulli fas fub jungere gentem..

GENTLEMEN,

IMPELLE

VIRG. ENEID.

MPELLED by the energy of that féntiment which every man must feel when he believes that his best intes refts, always infeperably connected with the freedom and independence of his country, are about to be difpofed of for ever, I cannot help foliciting permiffion through your publication to fubmit to my countrymen, fome thoughts on the great fubject which now occupies, I may foy, agonizes, the mind of the Irish public. The fubject of a legislative Union with Great Britain, has been treated in many different points of view, by the ingenious correfpondents of your paper, as well as by that host of writers, who, on this agitating meafure, have given their thoughts to the public. Wit has rediculed and declamation inveighed against it; eloquence has exhausted all its. flores in developing the calamities by which it must be followed; and the pride, the paffions, the indignation of the country, have rifen to repel the indignify of the measure. Every topic which could furnish an argument against it has been reforted to and many of them have been exhaufted, while that, which in my mind, affords the beft ground on which reafon can take her stand against it, has been adverted to but with a cafual glance. I mean its incompatibility with the conftitution of the country, and the incompetence of any legiflation without the exprefs confent of the nation to effect it. "Who shall difpofe of the kingdom of Ireland ?" "Who has a RIGHT to abolifb its independence—to annul its conflitution-and to fubmit the property, liberty, and lives of its people to the abfolute dominion of another country " Thefe are queftions which I conceive have not yet been fully difcuffed, though their importance one might think would have obtained for them the first place in the public mind. They are not the questions of party; they relate not to little meafures of finance, of regulation, or of commerce; they are queftions which now concern the very existence of Ireland; and relate to a measure, which, like the immenfity of fpace, or the infinity of duration, comprehends within its capacious womb, every object that can intereft a people, or affect the intereft and happinefs of individuals. They are queftions which must be confidered Now or NEVER; for if the prefent moment be fuffered to pafs away, the lapfe of

No. XIII.

future ages may not prefent another opportunity to confider them: TO DAY it is PUBLIC VIRTUE to difcufs them-To-MORROW the difcuffion may be TREA-, SON; and the infamy and penalties of REBELLION, will await that tardy virtue which if exerted in time,would have enfured the gratitude and admiration of pofterity..

At fuch a moment as this every man should throw his mite of intellect into the public ftock. I fhall therefore difcharge my duty by fubmitting to my countrymen the two following propofitions, which if I am not deceived, admit of demonftration as complete, as any moral propofition is capable of receiving. I fay then, first, That the measure of a legislative Union, in fuch terms as we are taught to expect, would be a furrender of the conftitution; and confequently, of the liberty and independence of this country;-and fecondly, That the parlialiament of Ireland will be guilty of an act of ufurpation, if they affume a power to enact fuch an Union without the exprefs confent of the people of Ireland.

The dangerous and dark principles which the abstract rights of man afford me, might make the proof of thefe propofitions a matter of great facility; but I reject them; I fhall refort to no principles which have not been recognized by the British conftitution, and inculcated by thofe illuftrious men who have developed and explained it; I difeard the levelling and revolutionary principles of the French fyftem, and disclaim as unconftitutional and unfafe, every principle which would inveft the mob with fupreme power.

66

An UNION then, I fay, would be a furrender of the conftitution. To examine this propofition, it is neceffary we should confider, first, what is meant by "Conftitution," and particularly the conftitution of this country and in the fecond place, what is meant by a “ Legiflative Union."-Constitution, then, when used in a political fenfe, I understand, to mean that system of primitive or fundamental principles according to which the frame of the refpective government was first formed, and by which it must continue to be regulated"-By the "British conftitution, which is alfo that of Ireland; I mean that fyftem of primitive or fundamental principles on which OUR government is formed, and accord-ing to which, fo long as our conftitution lafts, it must be conducted." Thus it is not this or that particular law, nor any certain number of laws, nor all the laws on the ftatute books which form the conftitution; for if it was any, or a certain number, or all of thefe which form it, then the repeal of that particular ftatute, or the repeal of any of that certain number of ftatutes, or the repeal or enaction of any ftatute, would be an alteration, if not an abolition of the conftitution ittfelf. But it is evident..

that no fuch repeal, &c. is confidered as a change of the conftitution; it muft, therefore, be the original principles on which the common law refts; thofe principles which govern the legiflature in the enaction of every statute; thofe principles, in a word, on which the legislature itself is framed; it must be thofe that form the conftitution. Thus, if by mistake or undue influence, the legislature could be perfuaded to enact a law inconfiftent with any of thefe firft principles, that law would be unconftitutional; fuch, for inftance, would be a law empowering his Majesty or his minifter to take the property of the fubject, or to confine his perfon, or to difpofe of his life, at his will and pleafure. Thus, alfo, if the legislature, of its own authority, fhould abolish the monarchy, the government which they fhould eftablifh in its place, would be unconftitutional: Such for inftance, was the protectorate of Cromwell.

What then, are thofe premature and fundamental principles? The civil and political liberty of the fubject, I conceive to be the first and chief It includes the right of the fubject to be bound by no laws but thofe to which he affents, either exprefsly by the reprefentative whom he elects, or virtually by the reprefentative who is chofen by that defcription of his countrymen which the law confiders moft likely to make a wife choice for the general good. This too, includes the political independence of the ftate; for if the ftate were dependent on another power, then this right of the fubject to be bound by no laws but thofe to which he affented either exprefsly or virtually, as above, could not exist. He would be bound by laws made neither by him, nor his reprefentative, nor the reprefentative of any defcription of his countrymen, but by that paramount ftate. A country thus fubordinate or dependent on another cannot be faid to have any conftitution: America had none before the affertion of her independence-Ireland had none while fhe was bound by British ftatutes.

of the Irish people; let us now fee what is meant by a legislative Union with Great Britain.

An Union then means, that two of thofe three branches of the conftitutional legiflature fhall be abolifhed for ever; that there fhall never be, hereafter, an Irish Houfe of Peers, or an Irish Houfe of Commons; and that the people of Ireland fhall, henceforward, be governed by the King, and Parliament of Great Britain, encreafed by the addition of a few Peers and Commoners fent from Ireland. Of thefe Irifh reprefentatives, the number must be fuch as to bear a very small proportion to the Peers or Commons of Great Britain; of courfe they muft, in all cafes, be unable to procure the enaction of any meafure which they may think beneficial to Ireland, or to prevent the enaction of any measure which they may know to be injurious to its intereft, or deftructive of its rights.

I fay, therefore, that an Union furrenders this great and vital principle of the constitution; that the people of Ireland fhall be governed by a King, and two houfes of Parliament; the one confifting of irish Peers, the other of Irish Commoners. I fay, alfo, that by giving up this conftitutional mode of government, it fubjugates Ireland to the abfolute and uncontroulable dominion of the British Parliament. But when one country is fubject to the absolute and uncontioulable power of another country, it ceafes to be free or independent; its citi zens no longer enjoy civil or political liberty; the people of Ireland, therefore, in cafe they fubmit to an Union, will immediately cease to be governed by laws to which they have either actually, or virtually confented by their reprefentatives; they will ceafe to enjoy civil or political liberty; and therefore, an Union, I fay, is a complete furrender of the constitution of Ireland, inafmuch as it furrenders the two great principles of which that conftitution confifts.

I conceive I have thus fully cftablished, the fift of the propofitions which I undertook to prove, namely, that an Union would be a complete furrender of the conftitution, and confequently, of the liberty and independence of the country. But two objections are made to this proof. First, that though Ireland, in cafe of an Union, would lofe the form of her conftitution, yet she would retain the fubftantial benefits of it; for fhe would be reprefented in the British Parliament, and would enjoy all the freedom, civil and political, that would be enjoyed by Great Britain, herself. I answer, it is a fallacy. First, Ireland's being reprefented in the British Parliament, would be perfe&ly immaterial—she would derive no benefit, whatfoever, from that reprefentation; becaufe, though her reprefentatives were perfectly virtuous, and entirely unanimous on every question, yet the paucity of their members, would render any queftion or vote of their's for Ireland, nugatory; and as to this country enjoying the fame freedom and privileges as England, I fay it is neither certain, nor likely, nor, I will add, paffible, that the fhould do fo. It is not certain, becaufe the united legiflature might

if they thould think it for the benefit of the empire at large, deprive this particular part of it of many privileges which they reft of the empire fhould continue to enjoy. They might eftablish univerfally the mode of trial now established in the difturbed counties; that is, repeal the trial by jury. They might repeal, as to this country, the Habeas Corpus Act; or, under different pretences, perpetuate the fufpenfion of it from year to year. It is not likely that Ireland would enjoy the fame, freedom, because being completely under the dominion of Great Britain, it is highly probable, the latter would act then towards her in the fame way, and on the fame principles, as the has heretofore done; but heretofore, it has undeniably been the policy of Great Britain to reftrain the liberty, to cramp the commerce, and to narrow the conftitutional privileges of this country. If it be faid, the formerly did fo from fear of a feparation, fhould Ireland become too powerful, but that he would do fo no longer, because the incorporation of the two countries would render a feparation impracticable; I anfwer the argument is founded on a falfe affumption; for the legislative incorporation would not make a feparation impracticable; becaufe, Ift. the great body of the Irish people would, notwithstanding an Union, preferve their distinct religion, their prefent habits of life, and thinking, their prefent love for freedom, their longing for political power and independence. 2d, their infular fituation, and local feparation from Great Britain, would then, because it must ever, continue to fuggeft a defire and ambition of feparate and independent government. 3d, the enemies of Great Britain would then, as they will ever, continue, as at prefent, to urge Ireland to feparation. And 4th, if the wealth of the country encreafed, it would furnish new means to effect a feparation; if the country became poorer, its poverty would be a goad to revolt. With regard to the

fubftantial benefits of the British conftitution, it is,

therefore, neither certain, nor likely, that Ireland would enjoy them equally with Great Britain, after an Union and with refpect to political freedom, it is not poffible, in cafe of an Union, that Ireland fhould enjoy it; for having given up her feparate existence, and fubmitted to the will of another country, her political freedom would be an impoffibility. As well might it be faid, that the different portions of Poland, which have been meted out to the feveral continental powers, poffefs the fame degree of freedom as the refpective countries with which they have become incorporated.

By an Union, then, countrymen, the conftitution of Ireland is gone for ever. The conftitution gone! What then, countrymen, have we been fighting for? For what have we met our deluded fellow-countrymen in arms? Why have we fattened the fields of Wexford, and of Wicklow, and of Kildare, with the blood of Irifhmen? Was it that when we had fecured to Ireland that conftitution under which we had profpered and been happy, we fhould carry it on the point of our fwords to the foot of the British minifter, and there re

fign it for ever? Why didwe extort a conftitution from the weak and reluctant hand of dominating Britain in 82? Was it that after having played with it for a year or two, we fhould give it up without a struggle, and return to a state ftill more ignominious than that from which we emerged? Shall we be the only nation in the hiftory of the earth, who, poffeffing freedom and independence, enlarged commerce, improving agriculture, and a multiplied population, fhall refign freely, and without neceffity, all these invaluable bleffings into the hands of another, and I will add, a rival nation; and say to them here we are, take us and ours-we pretend no longer to govern ourfelves you are wifer, and more virtuous than we give us only food to eat, and raiment to put on, and we will ferve you!" No! It cannot, it will not be it is not in human nature. The nation of heroes, who, in 82, raifed itfelf by a prodigy of valour and wifdom into the notice and admiration of the world, will not in 99, again precipitate itfelf into voluntary difhonour, and blacken the page of history with the first example of a voluntary and untempted furrender of the imperial privileges of freedom and independence-a furrender of them by one nation to another, from whofe weaknefs they had been wrefted, and who was unable to revoke them. (To be continued.)

PRICE. 2D.

TO THE

EDITORS OF THE ANTI-UNION..

HAVING,

Continued from our last.

AVING, I hope, fuccefsfully attempted to prove that a legiflative Union with Great Britain would be a furrender of the conftitution of Ireland, I now proceed to my fecond propofition, which is, "That the parliament of Ireland will be guilty of ufurpation, if they affume a power to enact fuch an Union, without the exprefs confent of the people."

To prove the incompetency of the legislature to do an act which overturns and abolishes the conftitution, under which they are appointed, and which it is their duty to adminifter, it is neceffary only to prove that no legiflature can have an abfolute and unlimited power; for if there be any limit to their authority, they must of neceffity be restrained by that limitation from doing any act which goes to the everfion of the conftitution which gives them birth; because it would be abfurd and a contradiction to fuppofe that a conftitution defigned for the permanent government of a people, fhould give. a power to a body appointed only to govern under and by that conftitution, to destroy the conftitution itself-one might as cafily fuppofe a part to be greater than the whole, as that a legislature appointed to govern, according to a fixed constitution, fhould have a power of abrogating the very power which gives them existence. If there be any limitation, then I fay, to the power of the legiflature, that limitation restrains them from repealing. or abrogating the parent conftitution. But I fay, it is abundantly clear as well as from the nature of what is called the fupreme power in every state, as from the peculiar nature of the legislature under our conftitution, that this limitation of the power of parliament does exist.

It is clear, first, from the nature of the fupreme power in government; for fupreme power, when applied to a governing or legislative body, must mean in the firft inftance, a RECOGNIZED authority or RIGHT vested in them by the governed, or those who framed the government. If fupreme power be understood in any fenfe diftinct from a recognized authority, or vefted right, it must be meant for force or might, and becomes rather expreffive of a phyfical than of a moral idea. If by the "SuPREME POWER," which is faid to refide fomewhere in all governments, be meant a power that extends to acts of all kinds whatever, uncontroulable by any fixed principle, moral right or duty, then there ceafes to be any folid diftinction between legitimate government and the most unjust defpotifm or tyranny; because there is nothing to reftrain the one or the other from acting oppreffively, unjustly, or tyrannically. If there be no paramount principle, right, or duty, to reftrain the authority or bind the power of a legislative affembly, the only difference between them and a Nero, or a Caligula, is a

No. XIV.

numerical difference; the difference between one for inftance and five hundred, and if it be true that the government of a multitude of tyrants is more degrading and dangerous than that of a fingle one, the people of thefe free countries are in a much worfe fituation than the inhabitants of Conftantinople where the fovereign power refides in one man. one man. It is plain, therefore, that there is a limit to the fupreme power with which every government is faid to be vefted, and this limitation of the governing power is recognized by the writers on the law of nature as well as thofe who have treated of government in a flate of fociety. Thus CUMBERLAND in treating of this law of nature deduced as a corollary this limitation of the fupreme power of the state "Notandum porro eft, quod ab eodem fine propter quem conftituitur imperium, feu poteftas civilis, naturaliter et neceffario limitatur. Omne quippe medium fine fuo adaptandum eft, ut nec ab eo deficiat nec eum excedat. Adeoque manifeflum eft quod in ordine ad honorem Dei Gentiumque omnium felicitatem, non poteft fundari imperium quod JUS habeat HEC EVERTENDI." [Cumberland de legibus nature, Confectarium 7th] that is, "It is worthy of obfervation that every government or civil power is natu rally and neceffarily limited by the end for which it is inftituted; for every mean fhould be adapted to the end aimed at, fo that it should neither exceed nor fall fhort of it; and therefore, it is manifeft that in order to promote the glory and honour of Almighty God and the happinefs of all nations, no kind of government can be established which can have any right or power to overturn or defeat these great ends."

The limitation of the Sovereign power is here fully and explicitly recognized by a writer of high authority: The extent of that limitation he defcribes in a fubfequent paffage- Nihil, fays he, illis (thofe poffeffing the fupreme power of the ftate) vetitum eft, nifi ne necessariam Dominiorum divifionem violent,qua Deo fua, hominibufque aliis affignantur; neve ceteras leges naturales evertant ad quas confervandas ipfa fundantur & quarum viribus tota debetur regnantium fecuritas ac felicitas," (Cumberland ibidem;) that is, "They are under no restriction, but that they fhall not violate the neceffary diftinction of property by which what belongs to the Deity and to men is refpectively affigned to each, and that they should not contravene thofe laws of nature, to preserve which they are inftituted, and on which the fecurity and happinefs even of those who govern depend. Thofe, then, who poffefs the fupreme power in a state have not a right to violate property, because they were instituted for the protection of it, and they cannot have a power inconfiftent with the end of their inftitution. But what property more valuable to man than his right to liberty? what property more valuable to a community than it's independence? If there be none, then I fay it is proved that the fupreme power in any state cannot have a right or an authority to enact any law or to perform any act which goes to the violation of the political liberty and independence of the state which they govern. Now