difficult for men to do good, having a strong bent, and powerful inclination, to what is evil....But if we should allow the case to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better. agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of Sin impossible. For if an impossibility of avoiding Sin wholly excuses a man; then, for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part ; and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty....If the influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same, to excuse persons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of natural inability, (which is suppossed) then undoubtedly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the same influence to excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossibility wholly excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes the act or omission less blameable in proportion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty according to the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blameable, as if there had been no difficulty in the case : And so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excuseable, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly excuses and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach. And if the case of moral impossibility or necessity, be just the same with natural necessity or coaction, as to influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty, does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person is in great part, excused, and is nine degrees in ten, less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all; and he has but one

degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain on Arminian principles, viz. because as difficulty by antecedent bent and bias on the Will, is increased, liberty of in difference, and selfdetermination in the Will, is diminished; so much hinderance and impediment is there, in the way of the Will's acting freely, by mere selfdetermination. And if ten degrees of such hinderance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of blameableness,cæteris paribus, in the neglect; the man being no further blameable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that af fair: For blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of liberty.

From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and difficuly of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin, or any thing blameable: Because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is required and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness to sin or is fault increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omission; yet it is diminished in another respect, to balance it; namely, as the sinfulness or blameableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.

To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a selfmoving power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself down with that force; for which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of it. But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances its selfmoving power, and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all; this therefore wholly excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not im

possible, but yet more difficult: So that it can now only move down with the force of one pound: But however this is all that is required of it under these cirumstances; it is wholly excused from nine parts of its motion: And if the scale, under these circumstances, neglects to move, and remains at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion; which it had as much liberty and advantage for as in usual circumstances, it has for the greater motion, which in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty, does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blameworthy.

And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty, or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding sin and blame, and the doing what is virtuous and praiseworthy, must be always equally easy.

Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin, &c. led him into another great inconsistence. He abundantly insists, that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault. He says, in the forementioned treatise, p. 14. « Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help?" And p. 15. "It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid." And in p. 341, to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, saying. "Why doth God command, if man hath not free Will and power to obey?" And again in the same and the next page. "Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do what is required?" And in p. 373, he cites another saying. "A law is given to him that can turn to both parts, i. e. obey or transgress it: But no law can be against him who is bound by nature."

And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words "The nature of Adam had

power to continue

innocent, and without sin; whereas it is certain our nature never had so.".... But if we have not power to continue innocent and without sin, then sin is consistent with Necessity, and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid; and those things cannot be true which he asserts elsewhere, namely. "That if we be necessitated, neither sins of omission por commission, would deserve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blameless: And if so, we are under a necessity of being blameworthy.....And how does this consist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience, to all the commands of God, then we are under a necessity of breaking some commands, in some degree; having no power to perform so much as is commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do?

And Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves in what they say of the inability of fallen Man in this respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any thing of us beyond our present power and ability to perform; and also hold, that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience, and has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect: Wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the grossest inconsistence. For, (as I have observed elsewhere)" they hold, that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law, that they were under originally; and instead of it, has introduced a more mild constitution, and put us under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect sincerè obedience, in compliance with our poor, infirm, impotent circumstances since the fall."

Now, how can these things be made consistent? I would ask, what law these imperfections of our obedience are a breach of? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever under, then they are not sins. And if they be not sins, what

need of Christ's dying to satisfy for them? But if they are sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a breach of their new law; for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections: And therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old law; for that, they say, is entirely abolished; and we never were under it. They say, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying, to sat isfy for them? What need of his suffering to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience, than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously? If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that old law for- us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law; still I would inquire, what need of Christ's dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we are not able to keep it?

So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, not only in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law. “I grant, (says Dr. Stebbing*) indeed, that by reason of original sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition,

* Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit, second edition, page 112, 113.