that; and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference is from previous ground and reason in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follow an other, without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason, why it should follow.

Yea, in this, case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an antecedent or a previous thing, as the ground of its existence, not only that has no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference, which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative neglect, rejection or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: And yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground, or reason of this act of preference, excita ing it, and disposing the mind to it. Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that conse quent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow.

An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view, If the mind in this comparative act, prefers that which ap pears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no

circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: If in the choice he makes between them, he choos es that, which he has the least appetite to, and refuses that, to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made ab solutely without previous Motive, excitement, reason or temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either: Because his volition in this case is a comparative act, attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other sort of food, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and Motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle, volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive then it can go without Motive: For when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without Motive. If volition goes beyond the strength and tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the independence of volition or Motive. And if so, no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.

If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales, at least as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all.

Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some Motive; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infalli

bly follow that Motive.....This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on Motives: If it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little without them, or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's supposition, that voli. tion must be without any previous ground in any Motive, thus: If it be, as he supposes, that the Will is not determined by any previous superior strength of the Motive, but de termines and chooses its own Motive, then when the rival Motives are exactly equal in strength and tendency to induce, in all respects, it may follow either; and may in such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes the other......And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of the Will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives; for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in the ground cannot be the reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere.

And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubby does much insist that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any previous superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its Motive to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes, that with regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before another it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but the Will disposes itself to follow the Motive.

IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsist ent with agency; and that to suppose a being to be an agent

in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction. P. 311, and throughout his discourses on the subject of liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make liberty and necessity, action and passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary.

And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of volition; yea, every act of free volition: And therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from him be necessary....That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, "If a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power or liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here he supposes, all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and so that his good or evil choice itself, is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, he might, if he had PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary. So in p. 356, "Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater good....yet he may if he PLEASE, CHOOSE otherwise." Which is the same thing as if he had said, he may, if he chooses, choose otherwise." And then he goes on...." that is, he may, if he pleas es, choose what is good for himself," &c. And again in the same page, "The Will is not confined by the understanding, to any particular sort of good, whether greater or less; but is at liberty to choose what kind of good it pleases.".....If there be any meaning in the last words, the meaning must be this, that the Will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose; supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice. The liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's having power to move his body agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to

use, or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, in p. 379, speak ing of the faculties of his mind, he says, “Man has power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he pleases." And that he supposes an act of choice, or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chosen acts, and even the acts of choice themselves, is very plain în p. 283. «He can command his actions; and herein consist his liberty; he can give or deny himself that pleasure as he pleases." And p. 377. If the actions of men are not the produce of a free choice, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature, he cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or evil, is the produce of Will or free choice; so that a man in either case, had it in his power, and was at liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he CHOOSES to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of liberty of CHOOSING, according as he CHOOSES. So that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it.is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of all free actions, as the PRODUCE of free choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says in p. 372, 373.

Now these things imply a twofold great absurdity and in- ́ consistence.

1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is commanded by, and is the produce of free choice, is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labor at all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very first act is the produce of another act that went before it.

2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his prin