Republic and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in the preceding year, and in breach of a positive promise given only a few days before, the French army forcibly took possession of Leghorn, for the purpose of seizing the British property which was deposited there and confiscating it as prize; and shortly after, when Bonaparte agreed to evacuate Leghorn, in return for the evacuation of the island of Elba, which was in possession of the British troops, he insisted upon a separate article, by which, in addition to the plunder before obtained, by the infraction of the law of nations, it was stipulated that the Grand Duke should pay the expense which the French had incurred by this invasion of his territory.

April, 1796, which terminated with these words: "Nations of Italy! the French army is Lombardy. come to break your chains, the French are the friends of the people in every country; your religion, your property, your customs, shall be respected." This was followed by a second proclamation, dated from Milan 20th of May, and signed "Bonaparte," in these terms: "Respect for property and personal security. Respect for the religion of countries, these are the sentiments of the government of the French Republic and of the army of Italy. The French victorious, consider the nations of Lombardy as their brothers." In testimony of this fraternity, and to fulfill the solemn pledge of respecting property, this very proclamation imposed on the Milanese a provisional contribution to the amount of twenty millions of livres, or near one million sterling, and successive exactions were afterward levied on that single state to the amount, in the whole, of near six millions sterling. The regard to religion and to the customs of the country was manifested with the same scrupulous fidelity. The churches were given up to indiscriminate plunder. Every religious and charitable fund, every public treasure, was confiscated. The country was made the scene of every species of disorder and rapine. The priests, the established form of worship, all the objects of religious reverence, were openly insulted by the French troops; at Pavia, particularly, the tomb of St. Augustin, which the inhabitants were accustomed to view with peculiar veneration, was mutilated and defaced; this last provocation having roused the resentment of the people, they flew to arms, surrounded the French garrison and took them prisoners, but carefully abstained from offering any violence to a single soldier. In revenge for this conduct, Bonaparte, then on his march to the Mincio, suddenly returned, collected his troops, and carried the extremity of military execution over the country. He burned the town of Benasco, and massacred eight hundred of its inhabitants; he marched to Pavia, took it by storm, and delivered it over to general plunder, and published, at the same moment, a proclamation, of the 26th of May, ordering his troops to shoot all those who had not laid down their arms and taken an oath of obedience, and to burn every village where the tocsin should be sounded, and to put its inhabitants to death.

Modena.

The transactions with Modena were on a smaller scale, but in the same character. Bonaparte began by signing a treaty, by which the Duke of Modena was to pay twelve millions of livres, and neutrality was promised him in return; this was soon followed by the personal arrest of the Duke, and by a fresh extortion of two hundred thousand sequins. After this he was permitted, on the payment of a farther sum, to sign another treaty, called a convention de sureté, which of course was only the prelude to the repetition of similar exactions.

Nearly at the same period, in violation of the rights of neutrality and of the treaty which had been concluded between the French

Tuscany.

Genoa

In the proceedings toward Genoa we shall find not only a continuance of the same system of extortion and plunder, in violation of the solemn pledge contained in the proclamations already referred to, but a striking instance of the revolutionary means employed for the destruction of independent governments. A French minister was at that time resident at Genoa, which was acknowledged by France to be in a state of neutrality and friendship; in breach of this neutrality Bonaparte began, in the year 1796, with the demand of a loan. He afterward, from the month of September, required and enforced the payment of a monthly subsidy, to the amount which he thought proper to stipulate. These exactions were accompanied by repeated assurances and protestations of friendship; they were followed, in May, 1797, by a conspiracy against the government, fomented by the emissaries of the French embassy, and conducted by the partisans of France, encouraged, and afterward protected by the French minister. The conspirators failed in their first attempt. Overpowered by the courage and voluntary exertions of the inhabitants, their force was dispersed, and many of their number were arrested. Bonaparte instantly considered the defeat of the conspirators as an act of aggression against the French Republic; he dispatched an aid-de-camp with an order to the Senate of this independent state; first, to release all the French who were detained; secondly, to punish those who had arrested them; thirdly, to declare that they had no share in the insurrection; and fourthly, to disarm the people. Several French prisoners were immediately released, and a procla mation was preparing to disarm the inhabitants, when, by a second note, Bonaparte required the arrest of the three inquisitors of state, and immediate alterations in the Constitution. He accompanied this with an order to the French minister to quit Genoa, if his commands were not immediately carried into execution; at the same moment his troops entered the territory of the Republic, and shortly after, the councils, intimidated and overpowered, abdicated their functions. Three deputies were then sent to Bonaparte to receive from him a new Constitution. On the 6th of June, after the conferences at Montebello, he signed a convention, or rather issued a decree, by which he fixed the new form of their government; he himself named provisionally all the members who

were to compose it, and he required the payment | fidence may cement that friendship which has of seven millions of livres as the price of the so long united the two nations. Faithful in the subversion of their Constitution and their inde- path of honor as in that of victory, the French pendence. These transactions require but one soldier is terrible only to the enemies of his lib. short comment. It is to be found in the official erty and his government."-BONAPARTE. account given of them at Paris; which is in these memorable words: "General Bonaparte has pursued the only line of conduct which could be allowed in the representative of a nation which has supported the war only to procure the solemn acknowledgment of the right of nations, to change the form of their government. He contributed nothing toward the revolution of Genoa, but he seized the first moment to acknowledge the new government, as soon as he saw that it was the result of the wishes of the people."26

cur in the interval. But whatever gentlemen He is a stranger, a foreigner, and a usurper. may think of the intention with which these offers were made, there will at least be no question with respect to the credit due to those professions by which he endeavored to prove in Egypt his pacific dispositions. He expressly enjoins his successor strongly and steadily to insist, in all his intercourse with the Turks, that he came to Egypt with no hostile design, and that he never meant to keep possession of the country; while, on the opposite page of the same instructions, he states in the most unequivocal manner his regret at the discomfiture of his favorite project of colonizing Egypt, and of maintaining it as a territorial acquisition. Now, sir, if in any note addressed to the Grand Vizier or the Sultan, Bonaparte had claimed credit for the sincerity of his professions, that he came to Egypt with no view hostile to Turkey, and solely for the purpose of molesting the British interests, is there any one argument now used to induce us to believe his present professions to us, which might not have been equally urged on that occasion? Would not those professions have been equally supported by solemn asseveration, by the same reference which is now made to personal character, with this single difference, that they would have then had one instance less of hypocrisy and falsehood, which we have since had occasion to trace in this very transaction?

He may have motives to negotiate,

It is unnecessary to say more with respect to the credit due to his professions, or the reliance to be placed on his general character. But it will, perhaps, be argued that whatever may be his character, or whatever has been his past conduct, he has now an interest in making and observing peace. That he has an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition, and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain. That it is his interest to negotiate, I do not indeed deny. It is his interest, above all, to engage this country in separate negotiation, in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on | the continent, to palsy at once the arms of Russia, or of Austria, or of any other country that might look to you for support; and then either to break off his separate treaty, or if he should have concluded it, to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt; and to revive at his pleasure those claims of indemnification which may have been reserved to some happier period.27

He unites in his own person every thing that a pure republican must detest; every thing that an enraged Jacobin has abjured; every thing that a sincere and faithful royalist must feel as an insult. If he is opposed at any time in his career, what is his appeal? He appeals to his fortune; in other words, to his army and his sword. Placing, then, his whole reliance upon military support, can he afford to let his military renown pass away, to let his laurels wither, to let the memory of his trophies sink in obscurity? Is it certain that, with his army confined within France, and restrained from inroads upon her neighbors, that he can maintain, at his devotion, a force sufficiently numerous to support his power? Having no object but the possession of absolute dominion, no passion but military glory, is it to be reckoned as certain that he can feel such an interest in permanent peace as would justify us in laying down our arms, reducing our expense, and relinquishing our means of security, on the faith of his engagements? Do we believe that, after the conclusion of peace, he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt, wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir, and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen, whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at Acre ? Can he forget that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Russia, in one campaign, to recover from France all which she had acquired by his victories, to dissolve the charm, which for a time fascinated Europe, and to show that their generals, contending in a just cause, could efface even by their success and their military glory, the most dazzling triumphs of his victorious and desolating ambition?

Would have

the strongest break a peace

motives to

if made.

Can we believe, with these impressions on his mind, that if, after a year, eighteen months, or two years of peace had elapsed, he should be tempted by the appearance of fresh insurrection in Ireland, encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France, and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles; if we were at such a moment without a fleet to watch the ports of France, or to guard the coasts of Ireland, without a disposable army, or an embodied militia, capable of supplying a speedy and adequate re-enforcement, and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops; can we believe that, at such a moment, his ambition and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements or the obligation of treaty? Or if, in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman empire, with no British navy in the Mediterranean, no confederacy formed, no force collected to support it, an opportunity should present itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt, for renewing the avowed and favorite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country, and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of En27 Vide intercepted correspondence from Egypt. gland, and to plunder the treasures of the East,

This is precisely the interest which he has in but none to negotiation. But on what grounds are make peace. we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification? Under all the circumstances of his personal character, and his newly acquired power, what other security has he for retaining that power but the sword? His hold upon France is the sword, and he has no other. Is he connected with the soil, or with the habits, the affections, or the prejudices of the country?

in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France? | world. Through all the stages of the RevoluWould it be the interest of Bonaparte, under tion, military force has governed, and public such circumstances, or his principles, his mod- opinion has scarcely been heard. But still I eration, his love of peace, his aversion to con- consider this as only an exception from a generquest, and his regard for the independence of al truth. I still believe that in every civilized other nations-would it be all or any of these country, not enslaved by a Jacobin faction, pubthat would secure us against an attempt which lic opinion is the only sure support of any gov. would leave us only the option of submitting ernment. I believe this with the more satisfacwithout a struggle to certain loss and disgrace, tion, from a conviction that, if this contest is hapor of renewing the contest which we had prema- pily terminated, the established governments of turely terminated, without allies, without prep-| Europe will stand upon that rock firmer than aration, with diminished means, and with in- ever; and, whatever may be the defects of any creased difficulty and hazard? particular Constitution, those who live under it will prefer its continuance to the experiment of changes which may plunge them in the unfath omable abyss of revolution, or extricate them from it only to expose them to the terrors of military despotism. And to apply this to France, I see no reason to believe that the present usurp ation will be more permanent than any other military despotism which has been established by the same means, and with the same defiance of public opinion.

No evidence of

his power.

Hitherto I have spoken only of the reliance which we can place on the profesthe stability of sions, the character, and the conduct of the present First Consul; but it remains to consider the stability of his power. The Revolution has been marked throughout by a rapid succession of new depositaries of public authority, each supplanting its predecessor. What grounds have we to believe that this new usurpation, more odious and more undisguised than all that preceded it, will be more durable? Is it that we rely on the particular provisions contained in the code of the pretended Constitu- | tion, which was proclaimed as accepted by the French people as soon as the garrison of Paris declared their determination to exterminate all its enemies, and before any of its articles could even be known to half the country, whose consent was required for its establishment?

military despot.

ism.

and stronger

What, then, is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated? Is it that All these facts we will in no case treat with Bona- call for delay parte? I say no such thing. But I evidence. say, as has been said in the answer returned to the French note, that we ought to wait for “experience and the evidence of facts" before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible. The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced; but on a question of peace and war, every thing depends upon degree and upon comparison. If, on the one hand, there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed; if we should hereafter see signs of

I will not pretend to inquire deeply into the His new Consti- nature and effects of a Constitution tution creates a which can hardly be regarded but as a farce and a mockery. If, however, it could be supposed that its provisions were to have any effect, it seems equally adapted to two purposes, that of giving to its founder, for a time, an absolute and uncontrolled author-stability in the government which are not now ity, and that of laying the certain foundation of disunion and discord, which, if they once prevail, must render the exercise of all the authority under the Constitution impossible, and leave no appeal but to the sword.

Most unstable

power.

to be traced; if the progress of the allied army should not call forth such a spirit in France as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing; if the danger, the difficulty, the risk of continuIs, then, military despotism that which we are ing the contest should increase, while the hope accustomed to consider as a stable of complete ultimate success should be diminof all kinds of form of government? In all ages of ished; all these, in their due place, are considthe world it has been attended with erations which, with myself and, I can answer the least stability to the persons who exercised for it, with every one of my colleagues, will have it, and with the most rapid succession of changes their just weight. But at present these considand revolutions. In the outset of the French erations all operate one way; at present there is Revolution, its advocates boasted that it furnished nothing from which we can presage a favorable a security forever, not to France only, but to all disposition to change in the French councils. countries in the world, against military despot- There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful ism; that the force of standing armies was vain co-operation from our allies; there are the stronand delusive; that no artificial power could re-gest marks of a disposition in the interior of sist public opinion; and that it was upon the foundation of public opinion alone that any government could stand. I believe that in this instance, as in every other, the progress of the French Revolution has belied its professions; but, so far from its being a proof of the prevalence of public opinion against military force, it is, instead of making our situation comparatively stead of the proof, the strongest exception from worse, will have made it comparatively better. that doctrine which appears in the history of the If, then, I am asked how long are we to per

France to active resistance against this new tyranny; and there is every ground to believe, on reviewing our situation and that of the enemy, that, if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope, the continuance of the contest, in

of property in

prevent the res

severe in the war, I can only say that no period | anticipate, that the restoration of monarchy uncan be accurately assigned. Consider- der such circumstances is impracticable? No definite period can ing the importance of obtaining combe assigned. plete security for the objects for which we contend, we ought not to be discouraged too soon; but on the contrary, considering the importance of not impairing and exhausting the radical strength of the country, there are limits beyond which we ought not to persist, and which we can determine only by estimating and comparing fairly, from time to time, the degree of security to be obtained by treaty, and the risk and disadvantage of continuing the con

test.

not to force

monarchy

Bourbons.

The learned gentleman has, indeed, told us that almost every man now possessed Inquiry whethof property in France must necessa- er the changes rily be interested in resisting such a France would change, and that therefore it never toration of the can be effected.28 If that single consideration were conclusive against the possibility of a change, for the same reason the Revolution itself, by which the whole property of the country was taken from its ancient possessors, could never have taken place. But though I deny it to be an insuperable obstacle, I admit it to be a point of considerable delicacy and difficulty. It is not, indeed, for us to discuss minutely what arrangement might be formed on this point to conciliate and unite opposite interests. But whoever considers the precarious tenure and depre

ry title, and the low price for which they have generally been obtained, will think it, perhaps, not impossible that an ample compensation might be made to the bulk of the present possessors, both for the purchase-money they have paid and for the actual value of what they now enjoy; and that the ancient proprietors might be reinstated in the possession of their former rights, with only such a temporary sacrifice as reasonable men would willingly make to obtain so essential an object.

as

skine as to the

in the English

But, sir, there are some gentlemen in the The object is House who seem to consider it already certain that the ultimate success to upon France. which I am looking is unattainable. They suppose us contending only for the restoration of the French monarchy, which they be-ciated value of lands held under the revolutionalieve to be impracticable, and deny to be desirable for this country. We have been asked in the course of this debate: Do you think you can impose monarchy upon France, against the will of the nation? I never thought it, I never hoped it, I never wished it. I have thought, I have hoped, I have wished, that the time might come when the effect of the arms of the allies might so far overpower the military force, which keeps France in bondage, as to give vent and scope to the thoughts and actions of its inhabitants. We have, indeed, already seen abundant proof of The honorable and learned gentleman, howwhat is the disposition of a large part of the ever, has supported his reasoning on Hit at Mr. Ercountry; we have seen almost through the whole this part of the subject, by an argu- rise of three of the Revolution the western provinces of France ment which he undoubtedly considers per cent, stock deluged with the blood of its inhabitants, obsti- unanswerable-a reference to funds, nately contending for their ancient laws and re- what would be his own conduct in similar cirligion. We have recently seen, in the revival of cumstances; and he tells us that every landed that war, fresh proof of the zeal which still ani- proprietor in France must support the present mates those countries in the same cause. These order of things in that country from the same efforts (I state it distinctly, and there are those motive that he and every proprietor of three per near me who can bear witness to the truth of cent. stock would join in the defense of the Conthe assertion) were not produced by any instiga- stitution of Great Britain. I must do the learned tion from hence; they were the effects of a gentleman the justice to believe that the habits rooted sentiment prevailing through all those of his profession must supply him with better provinces forced into action by the "law of the and nobler motives for defending a Constitution, hostages" and the other tyrannical measures of which he has had so much occasion to study and the Directory, at the moment when we were examine, than any he can derive from the value endeavoring to discourage so hazardous an en- of his proportion, however large, of three per terprise. If, under such circumstances, we find cents, even supposing them to continue to inthem giving proofs of their unalterable persever-crease in price as rapidly as they have done durance in their principles; if there is every reasoning the last three years, in which the security to believe that the same disposition prevails in and prosperity of the country has been estabmany other extensive provinces of France; if lished by following a system directly opposite every party appears at length equally wearied to the counsels of the learned gentleman and his and disappointed with all the successive changes friends. which the Revolution has produced; if the question is no longer between monarchy, and even the pretense and name of liberty, but between the ancient line of hereditary princes on the one hand, and a military tyrant, a foreign usurper, on the other; if the armies of that usurper are likely to find sufficient occupation on the frontiers, and to be forced at length to leave the interior of the country at liberty to manifest its real feeling and disposition; what reason have we to

R R

The learned gentleman's illustration, however, though it fails with respect to himself, is hap

28 An immense amount of confiscated property had Erskine had correctly argued that if this was to be passed into new hands during the Revolution. Mr. restored to the former proprietors, nearly all France had the strongest motives to resist the return of the Bourbons. The obstacle plainly would have been insurmountable; and when they did return in 1814, nothing of this kind was attempted.