serts this, not calculated to perpetuate hostility among the

French peo. ole.

est difficulties, and to conclude peace on that ground, if it can now be obtained, even with this very government.

I am sensible that while I am endeavoring to vindicate his Majesty's servants (2.) Earl Tem against the charges of the honorable ple's remarks. baronet (which are sufficiently, however, refuted by the early part of his own speech), I am in

the continuance of the war to the ambition of the conduct of its rulers, but do not go the length The Declara the enemy, he will declare a system of declaring that, after all this provocation, even tion which as of endless animosity between the na- with the present rulers, all treaty is impractications of Great Britain and France. I ble. Whether it is probable that, acting on the say directly the contrary.1 He who principles upon which they have acquired their scruples to declare that in the pres-power, and while that power continues, they will ent moment the government of France listen to any system of moderation or justice at are acting as much in contradiction to the known home or abroad, it is not now necessary to diswishes of the French nation as to the just pre-cuss. But for one, I desire to express my cortensions and anxious wishes of the people of dial concurrence in the sentiment, so pointedly Great Britain-he who scruples to declare them expressed in that passage of the Declaration in [the government] the authors of this calamity which his Majesty, notwithstanding all the provdeprives us of the consolatory hope which we are ocation he has received, and even after the recent inclined to cherish of some future change of cir- successes which by the blessing of Providence cumstances more favorable to our wishes. It is have attended his arms, declares his readiness to a melancholy spectacle, indeed, to see in any adhere to the same moderate terms and princicountry, and on the ruin of any pretense of liber-ples which he proposed at the time of our greatty, however nominal, shallow, or delusive a system of tyranny erected, the most galling, the most horrible, the most undisguised in all its parts and attributes that has stained the page of history, or disgraced the annals of the world. But it would be much more unfortunate, if, when we see that the same cause carries desolation through France which extends disquiet and fermentation through Europe it would be worse, indeed, if we attrib-curring, in some degree, the censure of the nouted to the nation of France that which is to be at- ble Lord to whom I before alluded. According tributed only to the unwarranted and usurped au- to his principles and opinions, and of some few thority which involves them in misery, and would, others in this country, it is matter of charge if unresisted, involve Europe with them in one against us, that we even harbor in our minds, at common ruin and destruction. Do we state this this moment, a wish to conclude peace upon the to be animosity on the part of the people of terms which we think admissible with the presFrance? Do we state this in order to raise up ent rulers of France. I am not one However email an implacable spirit of animosity against that of those who can or will join in that country? Where is one word to that effect in sentiment. I have no difficulty in rethe declaration to which the honorable gentle- peating what I stated before, that in man has alluded? He complains much of this their present spirit, after what they declaration, because it tends to perpetuate ani- have said, and still more, after what they have mosity between two nations which one day or done, I can entertain little hope of so desirable an other must be at peace-God grant that day event. I have no hesitation in avowing (for it may be soon! But what does that Declaration would be idleness and hypocrisy to conceal it) express upon the subject? Does it express that that, for the sake of mankind in general, and to because the present existing government of gratify those sentiments which can never be France has acted as it has acted, we forego the eradicated from the human heart, I should see wish or renounce the hope that some new situa- with pleasure and satisfaction the termination of tion may lead to happier consequences? On the a government whose conduct and whose origin is contrary, his Majesty's language is distinctly such as we have seen that of the government of this: "While this determination continues to France. But that is not the object-that ought prevail on the part of his enemies, his Majesty's not to be the principle of the war, Whatever earnest wishes and endeavors to restore peace to wish I may entertain in my own heart, and whathis subjects must be fruitless, but his sentiments ever opinion I may think it fair or manly to avow, remain unaltered. He looks with anxious ex-I have no difficulty in stating that, violent and pectation to the moment when the government of France may show a temper and spirit in any degree corresponding with his own." I wish to know whether words can be found in the English language which more expressly state the contrary sentiment to that which the honorable baronot imputes. They not only disclaim animosity against the people of France in consequence of This mode of turning an argument round and presenting it with startling force under directly the

contrary aspect, has already been mentioned as a striking characteristic of Mr. Pitt. The ease and dexterity with which he does it are truly admira

ble.

the present

hope, England to be ready to treat when

ought always

can be done with safety.

odious as is the character of that government, I verily believe, in the present state of Europe, that if we are not wanting to ourselves, if, by the blessing of Providence, our perseverance and our resources should enable us to make peace with France upon terms in which we taint not our character, in which we do not abandon the sources of our wealth, the means of our strength, the defense of what we already possess—if we maintain our equal pretentions and assert that rank which we are entitled to hold among nations-the moment peace can be obtained on such terms, be the form of government in France what it may, peace is desirable, peace is then

anxiously to be sought. But unless it is attained on such terms, there is no extremity of war-there is no extremity of honorable contest --that is not preferable to the name and pretense of peace, which must be, in reality, a disgraceful capitulation, a base, an abject surrender of every thing that constitutes the pride, the safety, and happiness of England.

charge of in

drive England to the rupture. They had not strength enough to reject all negotiation, yet they had strength enough to mix in every step those degradations and insults, those inconsistent and unwarranted pretensions in points even of subordinate importance, which reduced ministers to that option which I have described; but which they decided in a way that has exposed them to the censure of the honorable baronet. We chose rather to incur the blame of sacrificing punctil

ernment.

clair's plan.

These, sir, are the sentiments of my mind on this leading point, and with these sentiments I shape my conduct between the contending opin-ios (at some times essential) rather How met by ions of the noble Lord and of the honorable bar- than afford the enemy an opportunity the British gov Answer to Sir onet. But there is one observation of of evading this plain question. "Is John Sinclair's the honorable baronet on which I must there any ground, and, if any, what, upon which consistency. now more particularly remark. He you are ready to conclude ?" To that point it has discovered that we state the Directory of was our duty to drive them. We have driven France to have been all along insincere, and them to that point. They would tell us no yet take merit for having commenced a negotia- terms, however exorbitant and unwarrantable, tion which we ought never to have commenced upon which they would be ready to make peace. without being persuaded of their sincerity. This What would have been the honorable baronet's supposed contradiction requires but a few words expedient to avoid this embarrassment? It to explain it. I believe that those who consti- would have been (as he has this day informed tute the present government of France never us) an address which he had thought of moving were sincere for a moment in the negotiation. in the last session, and which, indeed, I should From all the information I have obtained, and have been less surprised had he moved, than if from every conjecture I could form, I, for one, the House had concurred in it. We would have never was so duped as to believe them sincere. moved that no project should be given sir John Sin But I did believe, and I thought I knew, that in till the enemy were prepared to prethere was a prevailing wish for peace, and a sent a counter-project. If it was a great mispredominant sense of its necessity growing and fortune that that address was not moved, I am confirming itself in France, and founded on the afraid some of the guilt belongs to me; because most obvious and most pressing motives. I did the honorable baronet did suggest such an idea, see a spirit of reviving moderation gradually and I did with great sincerity and frankness tell gaining ground, and opening a way to the hap-him that, if he was really a friend to peace, piest alterations in the general system of that country. I did believe that the violence of that portion of the executive government which, by the late strange revolution of France, unhappily for France itself and for the world, has gained the ascendency, would have been restrained within some bounds-that ambition must give way to reason that even frenzy itself must be controlled and governed by necessity. These were the hopes and expectations I entertained. I did, not withstanding, feel that even from the outset, and in every step of that negotiation, those who happily had not yet the full power to cut it short in the beginning-who dared not trust the public eye with the whole of their designs-who could not avow all their principles-unfortunately, nevertheless, did retain from the beginning power enough to control those who had a better disposition, and to mix in every part of the negotiation (which they could not then abruptly break off) whatever could impede, embarrass, and perplex, in order to throw upon us, if possible, the odium of its failure.

there was no motion he could make so little calculated to promote that object; and I did prevail upon the honorable baronet to give up the intention. If I am right in the supposition I have stated—if I am right in thinking that our great object was to press France to this point, and to put the question, "If you have any terms to of fer, what are they ?"-was there any one way by which we could make it so difficult for them to retain any pretense of a desire of peace as to speak out ourselves, and call upon them either for agreement, or for modification, or for some other plan in their turn? By not adopting the honorable baronet's plan, we have put the question beyond dispute, whether peace was attainable at last, and whether our advances would or would not be met on the part of France. And I shall, to the latest hour of my life, rejoice that we were fortunate enough to place this question in the light which defies the powers of misrepresentation; in which no man can attempt to perplex it; and in which it presents itself this day for the decision of the House and of the nation, and calls upon every individual who has at stake the public happiness and his own, to determine for himself whether this is or is not a crisis which requires his best exertions in the defense of his country.

II. To show which, I shall now proceed, notwithstanding the reproach which has been thrown on our line of conduct, to show the system even of obstinate forbearance, with which we endeav

the French government as compared

(1.) Conduct of the French in the previous negotiation of 1796.

(3.) Gross im

passport they

ored to overcome preliminary difficulties-the de- His Majesty's answer was, that it was his deExposition of termined resolution on our part to over- sire to adopt that mode only which was most the conduct of look all minor obstacles, and to come likely to accelerate the object in view; and the to the real essence of discussion upon powers of his plenipotentiary would apply to with that of the terms of peace. To show this, it either object, either preliminary or definitive. the English. is not necessary to do more than to call They appeared, content with his answer, but to the recollection of the House the leading parts what was the next step? In the simple form of of the Declaration of his Majesty; I mean to leave granting a passport for the minister, that part of the subject, also, without the possibili- at the moment they were saying they propriets in the ty of doubt or difference of opinion. It is certain-preferred a definitive peace, because sent to the Ealy true that, even previous to any of the circum- it was the most expeditious-in that glish minister. stances that related to the preliminary forms of very passport, which in all former times has only the negotiation, the prior conduct of France had described the character of the minister, without offered to any government that was not sincerely entering into any thing relating to the terms or and most anxiously bent upon peace, sufficient mode of negotiating-they insert a condition relground for the continuance of hostilities. It is ative to his powers, and that inconsistent with true that, in the former negotiation at what his Majesty had explained to be the nature Paris, Lord Malmesbury was finally of the powers he had intended to give, and with sent away, not upon a question of which they had apparently been satisfied. They terms of peace-not upon a question made it a passport not for a minister coming to of the cession of European or Colonial posses- conclude peace generally, but applicable only to sions, but upon the haughty demand of a pre- a definitive and separate peace.5 vious preliminary, which should give up every thing on the part of the allies; and which should leave them afterward every thing to ask, or rather to require. It is true, it closed in nearly the same insulting manner as the second mission. It is true, too, that subsequent to that period, in the preliminaries concluded between the Emperor and France, it was agreed to invite the allies of each party to a congress; which, however, was never carried into execution. It was under these circumstances that his Majesty, in the earnest desire of availing himself of that spirit of moderation which had begun to show itself in France, determined to renew those proposals which had been before slighted and rejected. But when this step was taken, what was the conduct of those who have gained the ascendency in France? On the first application to know (2.) The dicta on what ground they were disposed the commence to negotiate, wantonly, as will be ment, as to the shown by the sequel, and for no purnegotiation. pose but to prevent even the opening of the conferences, they insisted upon a mode of negotiation very contrary to general usage and convenience contrary to the mode in which they had terminated war with any of the bellig. erent powers, and directly contrary to any mode which they themselves afterward persisted in following in this very negotiation with us! They began by saying they would receive no proposals for preliminaries, but that conferences should be held for the purpose of concluding at once a definitive treaty.1

torial tone from

nature of the

This proceeding was in itself liable to the most obvious objection. But it is more important, as an instance to show how, in the simplest part of the transaction, the untractable spirit of France discovered itself. It throws light on the subsequent part of the transaction; and shows the inconsistencies and contradictions of their successive pretensions. As to the condition then made in the passport for the first time, that the nego tiation should be for a separate peace, his Majesty declared that he had no choice between a definitive and a preliminary treaty; but as to a separate peace, his honor and good faith, with regard to his ally the Queen of Portugal, would not permit it. He, therefore, stated his unalterable determination to agree to no treaty in which Portugal should not be included; expressing, at the same time, his readiness that France should treat on the part of Holland and Spain.

Passport

On this occasion, the good faith of this country prevailed. The system of violence and despotism was not then ripe, and there- changed. fore his Majesty's demand to treat for Portugal at once for a definitive treaty." See his Note in Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii., page 909.

5 The passport addressed to the officers of the French police was in the following words: "Allow to pass freely- furnished with the full powers of his Britannic Majesty for the purpose of negotiating, concluding, and signing a definitive and separate treaty of peace with the French Republic."

Here the word separate was inserted in direct contravention of the arrangement between the two governments, and was obviously intended to make difficulty. England had agreed to negotiate for a definitive, but not for a separate treaty; she could not give up Portugal, which had long been under her protection. The French Directory plainly designed to draw Mr. Pitt into a dilemma: if he accepted the passport, and afterward undertook to treat for Portugal, the negotiation could be broken off on the ground that he went beyond the terms established by the passport; if he refused the passport, it was easy to say he had broken off the negotiation when acceded to by France.

was acquiesced in by the Directory. They, at the same time, undertook to treat on their part for their allies, Holland and Spain, as well as for themselves; though in the subsequent course of the negotiation, they pretended to be without sufficient power to treat for either.

the French as to

ernment and embassador.

his dominions furnish, any person better qualified to do justice to his sincere and benevolent desire to promote the restoration of Peace, and his firm and unalterable determination to maintain the dignity and honor of his kingdom.

the French com

ample than those

In spite of these obstacles and others more minute, the British plenipotentiary (5.) Exchange of at length arrived at Lisle. The full powers, those of powers were transmitted to the missioners less respective governments, and were of the English found unexceptionable; though the embassador. supposed defect of these full powers is, three months after, alleged as a cause for the rupture of the negotiation! And what is more remarkable, it did so happen that the French full pow ers were, on the face of them, much more limited than ours; for they only enabled the commissioners of the Directory to act according to the instructions they were to receive from time to time. On this point it is not necessary now to dwell; but I desire the House to treasure it in their memory, when we come to the question of pretense for the rupture of the negotiation. Then, sir, I come to the point in which we

glish at once

treaty fully

I must here entreat the attention of the House (4.) Use of insult to the next circumstance which ocing language by curred. When the firmness of his the British gov. Majesty, his anxious and sincere desire to terminate the horrors of war, and his uniform moderation overcame the violence, and defeated the designs of the members of the executive government of France, they had recourse to another expedient, the most absurd, as well as the most unjustifiable. They adverted to the rupture of the former negotiation, as if that rupture was to be imputed to his Majesty; and this insinuation was accompanied with a personal reflection upon the minister who was sent by his Majesty to treat on the part of this country. His Majesty, looking anxiously as he did to the conclusion of peace, disdained to reply otherwise than by observing that this was not a fit topic to be agitated at the moment of renew-have incurred the censure of the hon- (6.) The Ening a negotiation, and that the circumstances of orable baronet, for delivering in on our offered their the transaction were well enough known to Eu- part a project. To his opinion I do not project in a rope and to the world. And the result of this subscribe, for the reasons that I stated drawn out negotiation has confirmed, what the former had before. But can there be a stronger proof of sufficiently proved, that his Majesty could not his Majesty's sincerity than his waving so many have selected, in the ample field of talents which points important in themselves, rather than suffer the negotiation to be broken off? What was our situation? We were to treat with a government that had in the outset expressed that they would treat only definitively, and from every part of their conduct which preceded the meeting of our plenipotentiary and their commissioners, we might have expected that they would have been prepared to answer our project almost in twentyfour hours after it was delivered. We stood with respect to France in this pre- (b) England had dicament-we had nothing to ask center of them. The question only was, simply to say how much we were to give of that what she was which the valor of his Majesty's up. arms had acquired from them and from their allies. In this situation, surely, we might have expected that, before we offered the price of peace, they would at least have condescended to say

46

The following are the words which charge the rupture of the preceding negotiation on the English: The Directory requires that it shall be established as a principle, that each English packet-boat which shall have brought over either the plenipotentiary or a courier shall not be allowed to make any stay." "The Directory desires, at the same time, that the couriers should not be sent too frequently; the frequent sending them having been one of the principal causes of the rupture of the preceding negotiation."

Nothing more frivolous could be conceived of as a reason for such a rupture. Nothing of this kind was mentioned at the time. The French minister did in

one instance inquire, whether it was necessary for Lord Malmesbury to send a courier to England every time he received a communication from the Directory-a question which seems plainly to have been designed as a taunt; and bis Lordship coolly replied, that he should do it "as often as the official communications made to him required special instructions." The "personal reflection" on Lord Malmesbury was in the following words: "The Directory consents that the negotiation shall be opened by Lord Malmesbury. Another choice would, however, have appeared to the Directory to augur more favorably for a speedy conclusion of peace." This was a gratuitous insult. Lord Malmesbury was distinguished for his courteous deportment, and no complaint had been made of him by the French government. Even Belsham, who was so rabid against Mr. Pitt and his friends, that Fox once said concerning his Memoirs of the Reign of George III., "how can a man write history in this way?" admits that his Lordship "was uniformly mild and temperate, his manners polite and pleasing."-Vol. vi., page 322. It is plain the Directory meant to force Mr. Pitt, by their treatment, to break off the negotiation.

Reasons for so

doing: manded a de

(a) France definitive treaty.

from enemy, but had

willing to give

ed us to make. But, sir, in this situation, what what were the sacrifices which they expectspecies of project was it that was presented by his Majesty's minister? A project the most distinet, the most particular, the most conciliatory and moderate, that ever constituted the first words spoken by any negotiator. And yet of this project what have we heard in the language of the French government? What have we seen dispersed through all Europe, by that press in France which knows no sentiments but what the French police dictates? What have we seen dispersed by that English press which knows no other use of English liberty but servilely to retail and transcribe French opinions? We have been told that it was a project that refused to

embrace the terms of negotiation! Gentlemen | and defeats. To a power which had never sep