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ever of any effect; and I am not for sporting with a thing so sacred as an oath. I think it would be good to lay aside all such oaths. Who ever heard that, in revolutions, the oath of fidelity to the former government was ever regarded, or even that, when violated, it was imputed to the persons as a crime? In times of revolution, men who take up arms are called rebels. If they fail, they are adjudged to be traitors; but who before ever heard of their being perjured? On the restoration of King Charles II., those who had taken up arms for the commonwealth were stigmatized as rebels and traitors, but not as men forsworn. Was the Earl of Devonshire charged with being perjured, on account of the allegiance he had sworn to the house of Stuart, and the part he took in those struggles which preceded and brought about the Revolution? The violation of oaths of allegiance was never imputed to the people of England, and will never be imputed to any people. But who brings up the question of oaths? He who strives to make twenty-four millions Pitt respecting of persons violate the oaths they have taken to their present Constitution, and who desires to re-establish the house of Bourbon by such violation of their vows. I put it so, sir, because, if the question of oaths be of the least consequence, it is equal on both sides! He who desires the whole people of France to perjure themselves, and who hopes for success in his project only upon their doing so, surely can not make it a charge against Bonaparte that he has done the same!

Retort on Mr.

oaths

Retort in re

spect to Bona that France and

parte's saying

England could

not exist together.

"Ah! but Bonaparte has declared it as his opinion, that the two governments of Great Britain and of France can not exist together. After the treaty of Campo Formio, he sent two confidential persons, Berthier and Monge, to the Directory, to say so in his name." Well, and what is there in this absurd and puerile assertion, if it were ever made? Has not the right honorable gentleman, in this House, said the same thing? In this, at least, they resemble one another! They have both made use of this assertion; and I believe that these two illustrious persons are the only two on earth who think it! But let us turn the tables. We ought to put ourselves at times in the place of the enemy, if we are desirous of really examining with candor and fairness the dispute between us. How may they not interpret the speeches of ministers and their friends, in both houses of the British Parliament? If we are to be told of the idle speech of Berthier and Monge, may they not also bring up speeches, in which it has not been merely hinted, but broadly asserted, that "the two Constitutions of England and France could not exist together?" May not these offenses and charges be reciprocated without end? Are we ever to go on in this miserable squabble about words? Are we still, as we happen to be successful on the one side or the other, to bring up these impotent accusations, insults, and provocations against each other; and only when we

are beaten and unfortunate, to think of treating? Oh! pity the condition of man, gracious God! and save us from such a system of malevolence, in which all our old and venerated prejudices are to be done away, and by which we are to be taught to consider war as the natural state of man, and peace but as a dangerous and difficult extremity!

tract war

by history.

Sir, this temper must be corrected. It is a diabolical spirit, and would lead to an This disposiinterminable war. Our history is full tion to pro of instances that, where we have over- condemned looked a proffered occasion to treat, we have uniformly suffered by delay. At what time did we ever profit by obstinately persevering in war? We accepted at Ryswick the terms we had refused five years before, and the same peace which was concluded at Utrecht might have been obtained at Gertruydenberg; and as to security from the future machinations or ambition of the French, I ask you, what security you ever had or could have. Did the different treaties made with Louis XIV. serve to tie up his hands, to restrain his ambition, or to stifle his restless spirit? At what time, in old or in recent periods, could you safely repose on the honor, forbearance and moderation of the French government? Was there ever an idea of refusing to treat, because the peace might be afterward insecure? The peace of 1763 was not accompanied with securities; and it was no sooner made, than the French court began, as usual, its intrigues. And what security did the right honorable gentleman exact at the peace of 1783, in which he was engaged? Were we rendered secure by that peace? The right honorable gentleman knows well that, soon after that peace, the French formed a plan, in conjunction with the Dutch, of attacking our India possessions, of raising up the native powers against us, and of driving us out of India; as they were more recently desirous of doing, only with this difference, that the cabinet of France formerly entered into this project in a moment of profound peace, and when they conceived us to be lulled into a perfect security. After making the peace of 1783, the right honorable gentleman and his friends went out, and I, among others, came into office. Suppose, sir, that we had taken up the jealousy upon which the right honorable gentleman now acts, and had refused to ratify the peace which he had made. Suppose that we had said-No! France is acting a perfidious part; we see no security for England in this treaty; they want only a respite, in order to attack us again in an important part of our dominions, and we ought not to confirm the treaty. I ask you, would the right honorable gentleman have supported us in this refusal ? I say, that upon his present reasoning he ought. But I put it fairly to him, would he have supported us in refusing to ratify the treaty upon such a pretense? He certainly ought not, and I am sure he would not; but the course of teasoning which he now assumes would have justified his taking such a ground. On the contrary, I am persuaded that he would have said, "This

security is a refinement upon jealousy. You have security, the only security that you can ever expect to get. It is the present interest of France to make peace. She will keep it, if it be her interest. She will break it, if it be her interest. Such is the state of nations; and you have nothing but your own vigilance for your security."

naparte's mo. tives to con

secure this fame, the only species of fame, perhaps, that is worth acquiring? Nay, granting that his soul may still burn with the thirst of military exploits, is it not likely that he is disposed to yield to the feelings of the French people, and to consolidate his power by consulting their interests? I have a right to argue in this way when suppositions of his insincerity are reasoned upon on the other side. Sir, these aspersions are, in truth, always idle, and even mischievous. I have been too long accustomed to hear imputations and calumnies thrown out upon great and honorable characters, to be much influenced by them. My honorable and learned friend [Mr. Erskine] has paid this night a most just, deserved, and eloquent tribute of applause to the memory of that great and unparalleled character, who is so recently lost to the world.27 I must, like him, beg leave to dwell a moment on the venerable GEORGE WASHINGTON, though I know that it is impossible for me to bestow any thing like adequate praise on a character which gave us, more than any other human be

"It is not the interest of Bonaparte," it seems, Reply as to Bo-"sincerely to enter into a negotiation, or, if he should even make peace, tinue the war. sincerely to keep it." But how are we to decide upon his sincerity? By refusing to treat with him? Surely, if we mean to discover his sincerity, we ought to hear the propositions which he desires to make. "But peace would be unfriendly to his system of military despotism." Sir, I hear a great deal about the short-lived nature of military despotism. I wish the history of the world would bear gentlemen out in this description of it. Was not the government erected by Augustus Cesar a military despotism? and yet it endured for six or seven hundred years. Military despotism, unfortunate-ing, the example of a perfect man; yet, good, ly, is too likely in its nature to be permanent, and it is not true that it depends on the life of the first usurper. Though half of the Roman Emperors were murdered, yet the military despotism went on; and so it would be, I fear, in France. If Bonaparte should disappear from the scene, to make room, perhaps, for a Berthier, or any other general, what difference would that make in the quality of French despotism, or in our relation to the country? We may as safely treat with a Bonaparte, or with any of his successors, be they whom they may, as we could with a Louis XVI., a Louis XVII., or a Louis XVIII. There is no difference but in the name. Where the power essentially resides, thither we ought to go for peace.

He may see

Beek peace.

great, and unexampled as General Washington was, I can remember the time when he was not better spoken of in this House than Bonaparte is at present. The right honorable gentleman who opened this debate [Mr. Dundas] may remember in what terms of disdain, of virulence, even of contempt, General Washington was spoken of by gentlemen on that side of the House.28 Does he not recollect with what marks of indignation any member was stigmatized as an enemy to his country who mentioned with common respect the name of General Washington? If a negotiation had then been proposed to be opened with that great man, what would have been said? Would you treat with a rebel, a traitor! What an example would you not give by such But, sir, if we are to reason on the fact, I an act! I do not know whether the right honshould think that it is the interest of Bo- orable gentleman may not yet possess some of reasou to naparte to make peace. A lover of his old prejudices on the subject. I hope not: military glory, as that general must I hope by this time we are all convinced that a necessarily be, may he not think that his meas- republican government, like that of America, ure of glory is full; that it may be tarnished by may exist without danger or injury to social ora reverse of fortune, and can hardly be increased der, or to established monarchies. They have by any new laurels? He must feel that, in the happily shown that they can maintain the relasituation to which he is now raised, he can notions of peace and amity with other states. They longer depend on his own fortune, his own genius, and his own talents, for a continuance of his success. He must be under the necessity of employing other generals, whose misconduct or incapacity might endanger his power, or whose triumphs even might affect the interest which he holds in the opinion of the French. Peace, then, would secure to him what he has achieved, and fix the inconstancy of fortune. But this will not be his only motive. He must see that France also requires a respite-a breathing interval, to recruit her wasted strength. To procure her this respite, would be, perhaps, the attainment of more solid glory, as well as the means of acquiring more solid power, than any thing which he can hope to gain from arms, and from the proudest triumphs. May he not, then, be zealous to

have shown, too, that they are alive to the feelings of honor; but they do not lose sight of plain good sense and discretion. They have not refused to negotiate with the French, and they have accordingly the hopes of a speedy termination of every difference. We cry up their con27 The news of Washington's death, which took place December 14th, 1799, had just arrived in England.

28 This hit was directed against Mr. Dundas, because he was one of Lord North's ministry, who had poured out this abuse upon Washington. 29 It is curious to observe how adroitly Mr. Fox turns back upon his opponent almost every argu ment he uses. Thus, in the present case, Mr. Pitt had enumerated the Americans among those whom the French had injured and insulted. Mr. Fox replies that the Americans did not for this reason re

Louis XVIII.

duct, but we do not imitate it. At the beginning | to deliver up their property; nor do I even know of the struggle, we were told that the French that they ought. I doubt whether it would be were setting up a set of wild and impracticable the means of restoring tranquillity and order to theories, and that we ought not to be misled by a country, to attempt to divest a body of one them; that they were phantoms with which we million and a half of inhabitants, in order to recould not grapple. Now we are told that we instate a much smaller body. I question the must not treat, because, out of the lottery, Bona- policy, even if the thing were practicable; but parte has drawn such a prize as military despot- I assert, that such a body of new proprietors ism. Is military despotism a theory? One would forms an insurmountable barrier to the restorathink that that is one of the practical things tion of the ancient order of things. Never was which ministers might understand, and to which a revolution consolidated by a pledge so strong. they would have no particular objection. But But, as if this were not of itself sufficient, what is our present conduct founded on but a Louis XVIII., from his retirement at Increased by a theory, and that a most wild and ridiculous the-Mittau, puts forth a manifesto, in declaration of ory? For what are we fighting? Not for a which he assures the friends of his principle; not for security; not for conquest; house that he is about to come back with all but merely for an experiment and a speculation, the powers that formerly belonged to his family. to discover whether a gentleman at Paris may He does not promise to the people a Constitunot turn out a better man than we now take him tion which might tend to conciliate their hearts; to be. but, stating that he is to come with all the old régime, they would naturally attach to it its proper appendages of bastiles, lettres de cachet, gabelle, &c.; and the noblesse, for whom this proclamation was peculiarly conceived, would also naturally feel that, if the monarch was to be restored to all his privileges, they surely were to be reinstated in their estates without a compensation to the purchasers. Is this likely to make the people wish for the restoration of royalty? I have no doubt but there may be a number of Chouans in France, though I am persuaded that little dependence is to be placed on their efforts.

D.ficulties

the return of the Bourbuns.

My honorable friend [Mr. Erskine] has been censured for an opinion which he gave, in the way of and I think justly, that the change of property in France since the Revolution must form an almost insurmountable barrier to the return of the ancient proprietors. "No such thing," says the right honorable gentleman, “nothing can be more easy. Property is depreciated to such a rate, that the purchasers would easily be brought to restore the estates." I think differently. It is the character of every such convulsion as that which has ravaged France, that an infinite and undescriba-There may be a number of people dispersed over ble load of misery is inflicted upon private families. The heart sickens at the recital of the sorrows which it engenders. The Revolution did not imply, though it may have occasioned, a total change of property; the restoration of the Bourbons does imply it; and such is the difference. There is no doubt but that if the noble families had foreseen the duration and the extent of the evils which were to fall upon their heads, they would have taken a very different line of conduct; but they unfortunately flew from their country. The King and his advisers sought foreign aid, and a confederacy was formed to restore them by military force. As a means of resisting this combination, the estates of the fugitives were confiscated and sold. However compassion may deplore their case, it can not be said that the thing is unprecedented. The people have always resorted to such means of defense. Now the question is, how this property is to be got out of their hands. If it be true, as I have heard it said, that the purchasers of national and forfeited estates amount to one million and a half of persons, I see no hopes of their being forced

fuse to negotiate; but by showing their readiness to do so, had the hopes of a speedy termination of

their differences with France. In this he refers to the mission of Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice of the United States, Patrick Henry, and W. V. Murray, in 1799, to settle terms of peace between France and the United States. Their mission was successful, and an amicable adjustment took place a few months after.

France, and particularly in certain provinces, who may retain a degree of attachment to royalty; how the government will contrive to compromise with that spirit I know not. I suspect, however, that Bonaparte will try. His efforts have been already turned to that object; and, if we may believe report, he has succeeded to a considerable degree. He will naturally call to his recollection the precedent which the history of France itself will furnish. The once formidable insurrection of the Huguenots was completely stifled, and the party conciliated, by the policy of Henry IV., who gave them such privileges, and raised them so high in the government, as to make some persons apprehend danger therefrom to the unity of the empire. Nor will the French be likely to forget the revocation of the edict; one of the memorable acts of the house of Bourbon, which was never surpassed in atroc ity, injustice, and impolicy, by any thing that has disgraced Jacobinism. If Bonaparte shall attempt with the Chouans some similar arrangement to that of Henry IV., who will say that he is likely to fail? He will meet with no great obstacle to success from the influence which our ministers have established with the chiefs, or in the attachment and dependence which they have on our protection. For what has the right honorable gentleman told them, in stating the con

30 The Chouans were Royalists, particularly those on the Loire, who rose against the revolutionary government.

tingencies in which he will treat with Bonaparte? He will excite a rebellion in France. He will give support to the Chouans, if they can stand their ground; but he will not make common cause with them; for, unless they can depose Bonaparte, send him into banishment, or execute him, he will abandon the Chouans, and treat with this very man, whom, at the same time, he describes as holding the reins and wielding the powers of France for purposes of unexampled barbarity.

Retort upon Mr. Pitt an to cruelties

Naples.

Sir, I wish the atrocities, of which we hear so much, and which I abhor as much as any man, were, indeed, unexampled. practiced at I fear that they do not belong exclusively to the French. When the right honorable gentleman speaks of the extraordinary successes of the last campaign, he does not mention the horrors by which some of these successes were accompanied. Naples, for instance, has been, among others, what is called delivered; and yet, if I am rightly informed, it has been stained and polluted by murders so ferocious, and by cruelties of every kind so abhorrent, that the heart shudders at the recital. It has been said, not only that the miserable victims of the rage and brutality of the fanatics were savagely murdered, but that, in many instances, their flesh was eaten and devoured by the cannibals, who are the advocates and the instruments of social order! Nay, England is not totally exempt from reproach, if the rumors which are circulated be true. I will mention a fact, to give ministers the opportunity, if it be false, to wipe away the stain that it must otherwise affix on the Brit

ish name. It is said, that a party of the republican inhabitants of Naples took shelter in the fortress of the Castel de Uovo. They were besieged by a detachment from the royal army, to whom they refused to surrender; but demanded that a British officer should be brought forward, and to him they capitulated. They made terms with him under the sanction of the British name.

It was agreed that their persons and property should be safe, and that they should be conveyed to Toulon. They were accordingly put on board a vessel; but, before they sailed, their property was confiscated, numbers of them taken out, thrown into dungeons, and some of them, I understand, notwithstanding the British guarantee, actually executed !31

All this was literally true, and took place in the summer of 1799. Lord Nelson was the officer referred to: he was led by his infatuated attachment to Lady Hamilton, the favorite of the Queen of Naples, into conduct which has left an indelible stain on his memory. After the retreat of the French from Southern Italy, the leaders of the republican government, which had been organized at Naples, were besieged in the castles of Uovo and Nuovo by the Cardinal Ruffo at the head of the Royalists. The remainder of the story will be given in the words of Mr. Southey, the biographer of Nelson. "They [these castles] were strong places, and there was reason to apprehend that the French fleet might arrive to relieve them. Ruffo proposed to the garrison to capitulate, on condition that their persons

Peroration.

Where then, sir, is this war, which on every side is pregnant with such horrors, to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till we establish the house of Bourbon! And this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. Why, sir, before this you have had a successful campaign. The situation of the allies, with all they have gained, is surely not to be compared now to what it was when you had taken Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Condé, &c., which induced some gentlemen in this House to prepare themselves for a march to Paris. With all that you have gain. ed, you surely will not say that the prospect is brighter now than it was then. What have you gained but the recovery of a part of what you before lost? One campaign is successful to you; another to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, and rancor, which are infinitely more flagitious, even, than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on forever; as, with such black incentives, I see no end to human misery.

We

And all this without an intelligible motive. All this because you may gain a better peace a year or two hence! So that we are called upon to go on merely as a speculation. must keep Bonaparte for some time longer at war, as a state of probation. Gracious God, sir! is war a state of probation? Is peace a rash system? Is it dangerous for nations to live in amity with each other? Are your vigilance, your policy, your common powers of observation, to be extinguished by putting an end to the horrors of war? Can not this state of

and property should be guaranteed, and that they should, at their own option, either be sent to Toulon or remain at Naples, without being molested either in their persons or families. This capitulation was accepted; it was signed by the Cardinal, and the Russian and Turkish commanders, and, lastly, by Captain Foote, as commander of the British force. About six-and-thirty hours afterward, Nelson arrived ing his cruise, consisting of seventeen sail of the line, in the bay, with a force, which had joined him durwith seventeen hundred troops on board, and the Prince Royal of Naples in the Admiral's ship. A flag of truce was flying on the castles and on board the Sea-horse. Nelson made a signal to annul the treaty, declaring that he would grant rebels no other terms than those of unconditional submission. The Cardinal objected to this; nor could all the arguments of Nelson, Sir W. Hamilton, and Lady Hamilton, who took an active part in the conference, convince him that a treaty of such a nature, solemnly concluded, could honorably be set aside. He retired at last, silenced by Nelson's authority, but not convinced. Captain Foote was sent out of the bay; and the garrisons, taken out of the castles under pretense of carrying the treaty into ef fect, were delivered over as rebels to the vengeance of the Sicilian court.-A deplorable transaction! A stain upon the memory of Nelson, and the honor of England! To palliate it would be in vain; to justify it would be wicked: there is no alternative, for one who will not make himself a participator in guilt, but to record the disgraceful story with sorrow and with shame."-Life of Nelson in Harper's Fam ily Library, vol. vi., 177-8.

550

66

[1800.

I conclude, sir, with repeating what I said before: I ask for no gentleman's vote who would have reprobated the compliance of ministers with the proposition of the French government. I ask for no gentleman's support to-night who would have voted against ministers, if they had come down and proposed to enter into a negotiation with the French. But I have a right to

MR. FOX ON THE REJECTION OF BONAPARTE'S OVERTURES. probation be as well undergone without adding | ocally as heretofore. But I will not go into the to the catalogue of human sufferings? "But internal state of this country. It is too afflictwe must pause!" What! must the bowels of ing to the heart to see the strides which have Great Britain be torn out-her best blood be been made by means of, and under the miseraspilled her treasure wasted-that you may ble pretext of this war, against liberty of every make an experiment? Put yourselves, oh! that kind, both of power of speech and of writing; you would put yourselves in the field of battle, and to observe in another kingdom the rapid apand learn to judge of the sort of horrors that proaches to that military despotism which we you excite! In former wars a man might, at affect to make an argument against peace. I least, have some feeling, some interest, that know, sir, that public opinion, if it could be colserved to balance in his mind the impressions lected, would be for peace, as much now as in which a scene of carnage and of death must 1797; and that it is only by public opinion, and inflict. If a man had been present at the bat- not by a sense of their duty, or by the inclinatle of Blenheim, for instance, and had inquired tion of their minds, that ministers will be brought, the motive of the battle, there was not a soldier if ever, to give us peace. engaged who could not have satisfied his curiosity, and even, perhaps, allayed his feelings. They were fighting, they knew, to repress the uncontrolled ambition of the Grand Monarch. But if a man were present now at a field of slaughter, and were to inquire for what they were fighting-"Fighting!" would be the answer; "they are not fighting; they are pausing." Why is that man expiring? Why is that other writhing with agony? What means this implacable fury?" The answer must be, "You are quite wrong, sir, you deceive your self-they are not fighting-do not disturb them -they are merely pausing! This man is not expiring with agony-that man is not deadhe is only pausing! Lord help you, sir! they are not angry with one another; they have now no cause of quarrel; but their country thinks that there should be a pause. All that you see, sir, is nothing like fighting-there is no harm, nor cruelty, nor bloodshed in it whatever it is nothing more than a political pause! It is merely to try an experiment-to see whether Bona-ing to a new class of feelings among the parte will not behave himself better than heretofore; and in the mean time we have agreed to a pause, in pure friendship!" And is this the way, sir, that you are to show yourselves the advocates of order? You take up a system calculated to uncivilize the world—to destroy order to trample on religion-to stifle in the heart, not merely the generosity of noble sentiment, but the affections of social nature; and in the prosecution of this system, you spread terror and devastation all around you.

Sir, I have done. I have told you my opinion. I think you ought to have given a civil, clear, and explicit answer to the overture which was fairly and handsomely made you. If you were desirous that the negotiation should have included all your allies, as the means of bringing about a general peace, you should have told Bonaparte so. But I believe you were afraid of his agreeing to the proposal. You took that method before. Ay, but you say the people were anxious for peace in 1797. I say they are friends to peace now; and I am confident that you will one day acknowledge it. Believe me, they are friends to peace; although by the laws which you have made, restraining the expression of the sense of the people, public opinion can not now be heard as loudly and unequiv

ask, and in honor, in consistency, in conscience, I have a right to expect, the vote of every honorable gentleman who would have voted with ministers in an address to his Majesty, diametrically opposite to the motion of this night.

These eloquent reasonings are said to have produced a powerful effect on the House, but Mr. Pitt's political adherents could not desert him on a question of this nature. Not to have passed the address approving of his conduct, would have been the severest censure, and it was accordingly carried by a vote of 265 to 64. Bonaparte made this the occasion of appeal

French. Hitherto liberty had been the rallying
word in calling them to arms; the First Consul
now addressed their sense of honor, and roused
all by the appeal. Russia had already with-
drawn from the contest, leaving Austria as the
only ally of England on the Continent. Bona-
parte instantly assembled his troops on the Rhine
and Alps; made his celebrated passage of the
St. Bernard in the month of June; crushed the
Austrian power in Italy by the battle of Maren-
go (June 17th, 1800); and concluded the cam-
paign in forty days! In Germany, the Austri-
ans were again defeated by Moreau in the bat-
tle of Hohenlinden (Dec. 3d, 1800), and com-
pelled to sue for peace, which was concluded be-
tween them and the French by Napoleon about
a year after this debate, Feb. 9th, 1801.
Pitt resigned nine days after, chiefly (as became
afterward known) in consequence of a difference
with the King on the subject of Catholic Eman-
cipation.

Mr.

Mr. Addington [afterward Lord Sidmouth] succeeded as minister, and in a short time opened negotiations for peace, the preliminaries of which were signed Oct. 1st, 1801. These were followed by the treaty of Amiens, which was concluded about six months after, March 27th, 1802.

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