of Pilnitz. the declarations which were made at Mantua, as well as at Pilnitz, as they are given by M. Bertrand de Molville, without acknowledging that this was not merely an intention, but a declaration of an intention, on the part of the great powers of Germany, to interfere in the internal affairs of France, for the purpose of regulating the government, against the opinion of the people. This, though not a plan for the partition of France, was, in the eye of reason and common sense, an aggression against France. The right honorable gentleman denies that there was such Declaration a thing as a treaty of Pilnitz. Granted. But was there not a Declaration which amounted to an act of hostile aggression ?5 The two powers, the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia, made a public declaration, that they were determined to employ their forces, in conjunction with those of the other Sovereigns 4 The Count d'Artois, brother of the King of France, met the Emperor Leopold of Austria, the King of Sardinia, and the King of Spain, at Mantua, in May, 1791, and, on his representation, these monarchs entered into an agreement to march one hundred thousand men to the borders of France, in expectation that the French people, terrified at the approach of the allied powers, would seek safety by submitting themselves to Louis XVI., and asking his mediation; but Louis, hoping at that time to restore the monarchy by his own efforts, discouraged the immediate execution of the plan. See Mignet, p. 119; Alison's History of Europe, vol. i., p. 571, third edition. The following is a copy of this celebrated Declaration, which led to a general war in Europe. It was framed in August, 1791, at Pilnitz, a fortress in Saxony, by the Emperor Leopold and the King of Prussia, and was given to the Count d'Artois, that he might use it to induce the other courts of Europe to enter into a league for restoring Louis XVI. "His Majesty the Emperor, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, having heard the desires and representations of Monsieur and of his royal highness the Count d'Artois, declare jointly, that they regard the situation in which his Majesty the King of France actually is, as an object of common interest to all the Sovereigns of Europe. They hope that this concern can not fail to be acknowledged by the powers whose assistance is claimed; and that in consequence they will not refuse to employ jointly with their said Majesties the most efficacious means, in proportion to their forces, to place the King of France in a state to settle in the most perfect liberty the foundations of a monarchical government, equally suitable to the rights of Sovereigns and the welfare of the French. Then and in that case, their said Majesties are decided to act quickly and with one accord with the forces necessary to obtain the common end proposed. In the mean time they will give suitable orders to their troops, that they may be ready to put themselves in motion."-Alison's History of Europe, vol. i., p. 574, third edition. The French justly regarded this as a hostile act, and, after calling in vain for an explanation from the Emperor, who had marched large bodies of troops to their borders, they declared war against Austria on the 20th of April, 1792. Prussia instantly united with Austria, and, three months after, July 25th, 1792, the Duke of Brunswick invaded France at the head of one hundred and thirty-eight thousand Austrian and Prussian troops. of Europe, "to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundations of a monarchical government equally agreeable to the rights of Sovereigns and the welfare of the French." Whenever the other princes should agree to co-operate with them, "then, and in that case, their Majesties were determined to act promptly, and by mutual consent, with the forces necessary to obtain the end proposed by all of them. In the mean time, they declared that they would give orders for their troops to be ready for actual service." Now, I would ask gentlemen to lay their hands upon their hearts, and say with candor what the true and fair construction of this Declaration was— whether it was not a menace and an insult to France, since, in direct terms, it declared, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and then employed only in domestic and internal Let us suppose the case to be that regulations? of Great Britain. Will any gentleman say that if two of the great powers should make a public declaration, that they were determined to make an attack on this kingdom as soon as circumstances should favor their intention; that they only waited for this occasion, and that in the mean time they would keep their forces ready for the purpose, it would not be considered by the Parliament and people of this country as a hostile aggression? And is there any Englishman in existence who is such a friend to peace as to say that the nation could retain its honor and dignity if it should sit down under such a menace? I know too well what is due to the national character of England to believe that there would be two opinions on the case, if thus put home to our own feelings and understandings. We must, then, respect in others the indignation which such an act would excite in ourselves; and when we see it established, on the most indisputable testimony, that both at Pilnitz and at Mantua declarations were made to this effect, it is idle to say that, as far as the Emperor and the King of Prussia were concerned, they were not the aggressors in the war. "Oh! but the decree of the 19th of November, 1792." That, at least, the right honorable This famous" Decree of Fraternity" was passed under the following circumstances. The allied Austrian and Prussian armies, under the Duke of Bruns wick, were beaten back by the French, who immediately pressed forward into the Austrian Netherlands, and made themselves masters of the country by the decisive battle of Jemmape, November 6th, 1792. When the news reached Paris, the decree in question was passed in the exultation felt at this and other victories of the republic. It was in the fol lowing words: "The National Convention declare, in the name of the French nation, they will grant fraternity and assistance to all those people who wish to procure liberty. And they charge the executive power to send orders to the generals to give assistance to such people; and to defend citizens who have suf fered, and are now suffering, in the cause of liberty." -Alison, vol. i., p. 592, third edition. The reader will decide whether to consider it with Decree of the al Convention. Explanation of this decree by the French minister at gentleman says, you must allow to be an act of | aggression, not only against England, French Nation but against all the Sovereigns of Europe. I am not one of those, sir, who attach much interest to the general and indiscriminate provocations thrown out at random, like this resolution of the 19th of November, 1792. I do not think it necessary to the dignity of any people to notice and to apply to themselves menaces without particular allusion, which are always unwise in the power which uses them, and which it is still more unwise to treat with seriousness. But if any such idle and general provocation to nations is given, either in insolence or in folly, by any government, it is a clear first principle, that an explanation is the thing which a magnanimous nation, feeling itself aggrieved, ought to demand; and if an explanation be given which is not satisfactory, it ought clearly and distinctly to say so. There should be no ambiguity, no reserve, on the occasion. Now we all know, from documents on our table, that M. Chauvelin [the French minister] did give an explanation of this silly decree. He declared, "in the name of his government, that it was never meant that the French government should favor insurrections; London. that the decree was applicable only to those people who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic; but that France would respect, not only the independence of England, but also that of her allies with whom she was not at war." This was the explanation of the offensive decree. "But this explanation was not satisfactory." Did you say so to M. Chauvelin? Did you tell him that you were not content with this explanation? and when you dismissed him, afterward, on the death of the King [of France], did you say that this explanation was unsatisfactory? No. You did no such thing; and I conIf not satisfact. tend, that unless you demanded furtry were bound ther explanations, and they were retoy and fused, you have no right to urge the would satisfy. decree of the 19th of November as an act of aggression. In all your conferences and correspondence with M. Chauvelin, did you hold out to him what terms would satisfy you? Did you give the French the power or the means of settling the misunderstanding which that decree, or any other of the points at issue, had created? I maintain, that when a nation refuses to state to another the thing which would satisfy her, she shows that she is not actuated by a desire to preserve peace between them; and I aver that this was the case here. The Scheldt, for instance. You now say that the navigation of the Scheldt was one of your causes of complaint." ory, the minia declare what Mr. Fox, as an empty vaunt, or with Mr. Pitt, as a declaration of war against all the thrones of Europe. "When the French conquered the Austrian Netherlandis (as mentioned in the preceding note), they forcibly opened the navigation of its principal river, the Scheldt, down to the sea. This had been closed for nearly one hundred and fifty years, out of regard to the rights of Holland (through which it entered The plan of unit to prevent the war would have been praisewort upon. Did you explain yourself on that subject? Did you make it one of the grounds for the dismissal of M. Chauvelin? Sir, I repeat it, that a nation, to justify itself in appealing to the last solemn resort, ought to prove that it has taken every possible means, consistent with dignity, to demand the reparation and redress which would be satisfactory; and if she refuses to explain what would be satisfactory, she does not do her duty, nor exonerate herself from the charge of being the aggressor. The right honorable gentleman has this night, for the first time, produced a most important paper; the instructions with Russia which were given to his Majesty's minister at the court of St. Peters- thy if only acted burgh, about the end of the year 1792, to induce her Imperial Majesty to join her efforts with those of his Britannic Majesty, to prevent, by their joint mediation, the evils of a general war. Of this paper, and of the existence of any such document, I, for one, was wholly ignorant. But I have no hesitation in saying that I entirely approve of the instructions which appear to have been given; and I am sorry to see the right honorable gentleman disposed rather to take blame to himself than credit for having written them. He thinks that he shall be subject to the imputation of having been rather too slow to apprehend the dangers with which the French Revolution was fraught, than that he was forward and hasty-"Quod solum excusat, hoc solum miror in illo."8 I do not agree with him. I by no means think that he was blamable for too much confidence in the good intentions of the French. I think the tenor and composition of this paper was excellent— the instructions conveyed in it wise, and that it wanted but one essential thing to have entitled it to general approbation, namely, to have been acted upon! The clear nature and intent of that paper I take to be, that our ministers were to solicit the court of Petersburgh to join with them in a declaration to the French government, stating explicitly what course of conduct, with respect to their foreign relations, they thought necessary to the general peace and security of Europe, and what, if complied with, would have induced them to mediate for that purpose. This was a proper, wise, and legitimate course of proceeding. Now, I ask you, sir, whether, if this paper had been communicated to Paris, at the end of the year 1792, instead of Petersburgh, it would not have been productive of most seasonable benefits to mankind; and, by informing the French in time of the means by which they might have secured the mediation of Great Britain, have not only avoided the rupture with this country, but have also restored general peace to the ocean), under the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia, which settled the political relations of modern Europe. Holland and her protector, England, had just ground of complaint for the aggression, though it was too unimportant in itself to justify a war. The only thing he excuses is the only thing in him which I admire. dismissing lin. But "France," it 66 seems, then declared war against us; and she was the aggress- England the or, because the declaration came from aggressor in her." Let us look at the circumstan- M. Chauveces of this transaction on both sides. Undoubtedly the declaration was made by them; but is a declaration the only thing which constitutes the commencement of a war? Do gentlemen recollect that, in consequence of a dispute about the commencement of war, respecting the capture of a number of ships, an article was in the continent? The paper, sir, was excellent in its intentions; but its merit was all in the composition. It was a fine theory, which ministers did not think proper to carry into practice. It was very much like what the right honorable gentleman at the head of the Board of Control [Mr. Dundas] said some years ago of the commercial system upon which we have maintained our government in the East Indies. "Nothing could be more moral, more beautiful, and benevolent, than the instructions which were sent out to our governors; but unfortunately those in-serted in our treaty with France, by which it structions Had been confined to the registers of the corporation; they were to be found only in the minute-books of Leadenhall Street. Their beneficial effects had never been felt by the people, for whose protection and happiness the theories were framed."9 In the same manner, this very commendable paper, so well digested, and so likely to preserve us from the calamities of war, was never communicated to the French; never acted upon; never known to the world until this day; nay, on the contrary, at the very time that ministers had drawn up this paper, they were insulting M. Chauvelin in every way, until about the 23d or 24th of January, 1793, when they finally dismissed him, without stating any one ground upon which they were willing to preserve terms with the French.10 9 It is striking to see how dexterously Mr. Fox turns back Mr. Dundas' words upon himself in this case, as he did those of Lord Malmesbury upon Mr. Pitt on a preceding page. was positively stipulated that in future, to prevent all disputes, the act of the dismissal of a minister from either of the two courts should be held and considered as tantamount to a declaration of war? I mention this, sir, because when we are idly employed in this retrospect of the origin of a war which has lasted so many years, instead of turning our eyes only to the contemplation of the means of putting an end to it, we seem disposed to overlook every thing on our own parts, and to search only for grounds of imputation on the enemy. I almost think it an insult on the House to detain them with this sort of examination. Why, sir, if France was the aggressor, as the right honorable gentleman says she was has thought proper to order that you should retire from the kingdom within the term of eight days." Mr. Pitt justified his sending M. Chauvelin out of the kingdom on this ground, that by the death of Louis XVI. he was reduced to the character of a private individual; and was ordered to leave the country under the Alien Act, which authorized the government to send out of the kingdom any foreigners they thought proper. 11 This was the treaty of Commerce and Navigation made with France by Mr. Pitt, September 26th, 1786. The second article contains the provision here referred to. Mr. Pitt could answer Mr. Fox's argument only by saying, "This article does not now apply. I made the treaty with the regal government of France, and it can not be pleaded in behalf of the new government, which I have not recognized." But unfortunately for Mr. Pitt, he was continuing to act upon the Commercial Treaty as a treaty still in force. And how could he do this, and yet not be subject to the article respecting the dis 10 As the treatment of M. Chauvelin formed the hinge of the controversy between Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, it will be proper briefly to remind the reader of the principal dates and facts. M. Chauvelin was sent to London as French minister by Louis XVI. When that monarch was virtually deposed by the events of August 10th, 1792, M. Chauvelin was informed that his functions as minister were suspended, and though new credentials were sent him by the existing French government, they were not received. Informal communications did, however, pass between him and Lord Grenville, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but the tone of his Lordship was considered, not only by the French, but by Mr. Fox and his friends, as offensive, and even insulting. M. Charvelin was addressed as styling himself pleni-missal of a minister? By acting upon the treaty, potentiary of France, and reminded that all official communication with that country had ceased. He was told that France "must confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, with out violating their rights." Such language, when France had been asking the mediation of England to prevent a general war in Europe, and while she was offering explanations of her decrees, was strongly condemned by Mr. Fox. Even if but little confidence could be reposed in the sincerity of the French, this treatment was felt to be wrong and irritating. On the 24th of January, 1793, three days after Louis XVI. was beheaded, the following note was addressed to M. Chauvelin by Lord Grenville: "I am charged to notify you, sir, that the character with which you have been invested at this court, and the functions which have so long been suspend. ed, being now entirely terminated by the fatal death of his Most Christian Majesty, you have no longer any public character here; and his Majesty he did in fact recognize the new government. This So throughout, did not Prussia call upon us for the stipulated number of troops, according to the article of the definitive treaty of alliance subsisting between us, by which, in case that either of the contracting parties was attacked, they had a right to demand the stipulated aid? and the same thing again may be asked when we were attacked. The right honorable gentleman might here accuse himself, indeed, of reserve; but it unfortunately happened, that at the time the point was too clear on which side the aggression lay. Prussia was too sensible that the war could not entitle her to make the demand, and that it was not a case within the scope of the defensive treaty. This is evidence worth a volume of subsequent reasoning; for if, at the time when all the facts were present to their minds, they could not take advantage of existing treaties, and that too when the courts were on the most friendly terms with one another, it will be manifest to every thinking man that they were sensible they were not authorized to make the demand. I really, sir, can not think it necessary to follow the right honorable gentleman into all the minute details which he has thought proper to give us respecting the first aggression; but that Austria and Prussia were the aggressors, not a man in any country, who has ever given himself the trouble to think at all on the subject, can doubt. Nothing could be more hostile than their whole proceedings. Did they not declare to France, that it was her internal concerns, not her external proceedings, which provoked them to confederate against her? Look back to the proclamations with which they set out.12. Read the declarations which they made themselves to justify their appeal to arms. They did not pretend to fear her ambition--her conquests-her troubling her neighbors; but they accused her of new-modeling her own government. They said nothing of her aggressions abroad. They spoke only of her clubs and societies at Paris. France was attacked in her internal, and not merely in her external concerns. to act otherwise.13 They could not have lived so long under their ancient masters without imbibing the restless ambition, the perfidy, and the insatiable spirit of the race. They have imitated the practice of their great prototype, and, through their whole career of mischiefs and of crimes, have done no more than servilely trace the steps of their own Louis XIV. If they have overrun countries and ravaged them, they have done it upon Bourbon principles; if they have ruined and dethroned Sovereigns, it is entirely after the Bourbon manner; if they have even fraternized with the people of foreign countries, and pretended to make their cause their own, they have only faithfully followed the Bourbon example. They have constantly had Louis, the Grand Monarque, in their eye. But it may be said, that this example was long ago, and that we ought not to refer to a period so distant. True, it is a remote period applied to the man, but not so of the principle. The principle was never extinct; nor has its operation been suspended in France, except, perhaps, for a short interval, during the administration of Cardinal Fleury; and my complaint against the Republic of France is, not that she has generated new crimes-not that she has promulgated new mischief-but that she has adopted and acted upon the principles which have been so fatal to Europe under the practice of the house of Bourbon. It is said, that whereever the French have gone, they have introduced revolution-they have sought for the means of disturbing neighboring states, and have not been content with mere conquest. What is this but adopting the ingenious scheme of Louis XIV.? He was not content with merely overrunning a state. Whenever he came into a new territory, he established what he called his chamber of claims, a most convenient device, by which he inquired whether the conquered country or prov. ince had any dormant or disputed claims—any cause of complaint-any unsettled demand upon any other state or province-upon which he Sir, in all this, I am not justifying the French; might wage war upon such state, thereby disI am not trying to absolve them from cover again ground for new devastation, and gratsinax of the blame, either in their internal or ex-ify his ambition by new acquisitions. What have the republicans done more atrocious, more Jacobinical than this? Louis went to war with HolHis pretext was, that Holland had not treated him with sufficient respect. A very just and proper cause for war indeed! The aggres French utter conducted on ly wrong, but ternal policy. I think, on the contraBourbon prin- ry, that their successive rulers have ciples. been as bad and as execrable, in vari-land. ous instances, as any of the most despotic and unprincipled governments that the world ever saw. I think it impossible, sir, that it should have been otherwise. It was not to be expected that the French, when once engaged in foreign wars, should not endeavor to spread destruction around them, and to form plans of aggrandizement and plunder on every side. Men bred in the school of the house of Bourbon could not be expected 12 The manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick when he invaded France, declared that "all persons found in arms against the allied powers should be punished as rebels to their King; and in case the King and Queen were not immediately set at liberty, the city of Paris was threatened with the horrors of military execution, with avenging punishment and total destruction." Bourbons, and be made with This, sir, leads me to an example which I think seasonable, and worthy the attention Treates were of his Majesty's ministers. When made with the our Charles II., as a short exception to the policy of his reign, made the triple alliance for the protection of Europe, and particularly of Holland, against the ambition of Louis XIV., what was the conduct of that great, virtuous, and most ought now to the French, back to the or igin ofthe war without going 13 There is great adroitness in thus tracing the French spirit of aggression to the principles and practice of the Bourbons, especially as Mr. Pitt, in refusing to treat with Bonaparte, had pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons as the most certain mode of preparing the way for peace. tected at the now made the effect, no step was taken, no remonstrance made, no mediation negotiated, to stop the career of conquest. All the pretended and hypocritical sensibility "for the rights of nations, and for social order," with which we have since been stunned, can not impose upon those who will take the trouble to look back to the period when this sensibility ought to have roused us into seasonable exertion. At that time, however, the right honorable gentleman makes it his boast that he was prevented, by a sense of neutrality, from taking any measures of precaution on the subject. I do not give the right honorable gentleman much credit for his spirit of neutrality on the occasion. It flowed from the sense of the country at the time, the great majority of which was clearly and decidedly against all interruptions being given to the French in their desire of regulating their own internal government. able statesman, M. de Witt, when the confeder- | plained of the aggression, and yet no stir was ates came to deliberate upon the terms upon made about it. The courts of Europe Savoy ought to which they should treat with the French mon- stood by and saw the outrage; and have been proarch? When it was said that he had made un- our ministers saw it. The right hon- time, and not principled conquests, and that he ought to be orable gentleman will in vain, there- ground of conforced to surrender them all, what was the lan- fore, exert his powers to persuade tinuing the war. guage of that great and wise man? "No," said me of the interest he takes in the preservation he; "I think we ought not to look back to the of the rights of nations, since, at the moment origin of the war so much as the means of put-when an interference might have been made with ting an end to it. If you had united in time to prevent these conquests, well; but now that he has made them, he stands upon the ground of conquest, and we must agree to treat with him, not with reference to the origin of the conquest, but with regard to his present posture. He has those places, and some of them we must be content to give up as the means of peace; for conquest will always successfully set up its claims to indemnification." Such was the language of this minister, who was the ornament of his time; and such, in my mind, ought to be the language of statesmen, with regard to the French, at this day; and the same ought to have been said at the formation of the confederacy. It was true that the French had overrun Savoy; but they had overrun it upon Bourbon principles; and, having gained this and other conquests before the confederacy was formed, they ought to have treated with her rather for future security, than for past correction. States in possession, whether monarchical or republican, will claim indemnity in proportion to their success; and it will never so much be inquired by what right they gained possession, as by what means they can be prevented from enlarging their depredations. Such is the safe practice of the world; and such ought to have been the conduct of the powers when the reduction of Savoy made them coalesce. The right honorable gentleman may know more of the secret particulars of their overrunning Savoy than I do; but certainly, as they have come to my knowledge, it was a most Bourbon-like act. A great and justly celebrated historian, I mean Mr. Hume, a writer certainly estimable in many particulars, but who is a childish lover of Princes, talks of Louis XIV. in very magnificent terms. But he says of him, that, though he managed his enterprises with great skill and bravery, he was unfortunate in this, that he never got a good and fair pretense for war. This he reckons among his misfortunes. more of the republican French? In seizing on Savoy, I think they made use of the words convénances morales et physiques." 9714 These were her reasons. A most Bourbon-like phrase. And I therefore contend, that as we never scrupled to treat with the princes of the house of Bourbon on account of their rapacity, their thirst of conquest, their violation of treaties, their perfidy, and their restless spirit, so, I contend, we ought not to refuse to treat with their republican imitators. Can we say Ministers could not pretend ignorance of the unprincipled manner in which the French had seized on Savoy. The Sardinian minister com 14 Conveniences moral and physical. ed the media. ber by France. But this neutrality, which respected only the internal rights of the French, and England ought from which the people of England to have accept would never have departed but for tion urged upon the impolitic and hypocritical cant which was set up to arouse their jealousy and alarm their fears, was very different from the great principle of political prudence which ought to have actuated the councils of the nation, on seeing the first steps of France toward a career of external conquest. My opinion is, that when the unfortunate King of France offered to us, in the letter delivered by M. Chauvelin and M. Talleyrand, and even entreated us to mediate between him and the allied powers of Austria and Prussia, they [ministers] ought to have accepted of the offer, and exerted their influence to save Europe from the consequence of a system which was then beginning to manifest itself. It was, 15 15 Early in 1792 the King of France sent a letter to the King of England, through Talleyrand and Chauvelin, requesting the latter to mediate between France and the allied powers, Austria and Prussia. "I consider," says Louis, "the success of the alliance in which I wish you to concur with as much zeal as I do, as of the highest importance; I consider it as necessary to the stability of the respective Constitutions of our two kingdoms; and I will add that our union ought to command peace to Europe." A few weeks after, the French monarch again applied to the King of England, through M. Chauvelin, "to interpose, and, by his wisdom and influence, avert, while there is still time, the progress of the confederacy formed against France, and which threatened the peace, the liberties, and the happiness of Europe." After an interval of twenty days, July 8, 1792, the British government declined. The Duke of Brunswick invaded France at the close of the same month. |