WYNDHAM AND WALPOLE ON THE SEPTENNIAL ACT.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Septennial Act was passed in 1716, extending the duration of Parliaments from three to seven years. By an extraordinary stretch of power, the Act was made applicable to the Parliament that passed it, whose members, by their own vote, thus added four years to their tenure of office. This they did on the ground that the nation had just emerged from a dangerous rebellion, and that the public mind was still in so agitated a state, as to render the exciting scenes of a general election hazardous to the public safety. Whatever may be thought of this plea (and perhaps most men at the present day would unite with Mr. Hallam in justifying the measure), no one can doubt that the provisions of the Septennial Act, in respect to subsequent Parliaments, were strictly legal.

This Act has now been in operation eighteen years; and Bolingbroke, who planned the leading meas ures of the Opposition, saw that a motion to repeal it would embarrass the ministry, and gratify at once the landholders and the mob. The landholders, who were almost to a man Jacobites or Tories, would be zealous for the repeal, since they were not only indignant at the Act, as originally directed against themselves, but had found by experience, that it was greatly for their interest to have frequent elections. The influence they possessed over their tenantry, could be exerted at any moment, and cost them little or nothing. This influence the Whigs in power could overcome only at an enormous expense. Every general election was, therefore, a scene of general licentiousness and bribery, to which the common people looked forward as their harvest season; and so vast was the pecuniary sacrifice to which the Whigs were thus subjected, that they could never endure it if the elections were of frequent occurrence. Thus, according to Bolingbroke's calculations, if the Act was repealed, the Whigs would be driven from power; if it was not repealed, they would be loaded with the resentment of all classes, from the highest to the lowest.

There was a part of the Opposition, however, who were delicately situated in respect to this Act. It was a measure of their own. They had argued and voted for it as essential to the public security. Such was the case with Pulteney and most of the disaffected Whigs; and it was a long time before Bolingbroke succeeded in wheedling or driving them into his plan. At last, however, party discipline and the desire of office prevailed. The motion was made on the 13th of March, 1734, and gave rise to one of the most celebrated debates in English history.

It was on this occasion that Sir William Wyndham, the leader of the Tories in the House, delivered what was undoubtedly his master-piece of eloquence. This speech, however, is remembered with interest at the present day, only on account of the altercation to which it gave rise between him and Walpole. He closed with a bitter personal attack on the minister, and thus drew forth a reply of equal bitterness, which concluded the debate. In this reply, however, Walpole, instead of retaliating upon Wyndham, turned adroitly upon Bolingbroke as the real author of all the maneuvers against him; and while he thus threw contempt on Wyndham, by treating him as the mere mouth-piece of another, he inflicted a castigation upon Bolingbroke which, for stinging effect and perfect adherence to truth, has rarely been surpassed in the British Parliament. This, in connection with the attack of Wyndham, will now be given; and the reader will observe how dexterously Walpole, in going on, as he does, briefly to defend the Septennial Act, argues with the Tories on their own ground; showing that frequent Parliaments serve to extend and perpetuate the democratic principle in the English Constitution—a thing against which every true Tory must feel himself bound to contend.

SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM'S' ATTACK

ON SIR ROBERT WALPOLE, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON A MOTION FOR THE REPEAL OF THE SEPTENNIAL ACT, MARCH 13, 1734.

[Mr. Wyndham, after dwelling on a variety of arguments (chiefly in reply to others), which, from a change of circumstances, are of but lit1 Wyndham was born in 1687, of an ancient family, and was heir to one of the richest baronetcies in England. He entered Parliament at the age of twenty-one, and immediately attached himself to Bolingbroke, under whose instruction he soon became expert in all the arts of oratory and intrigue.

tle interest at the present day, concluded in the following manner :]

We have been told, sir, in this House, that no faith is to be given to prophecies, therefore I shall not pretend to prophesy; but I may suppose a case, which, though it has not yet happened, may possibly happen. Let us then suppose, sir, a man abandoned to all notions of virtue or honor, of no great family, and of but a

mean fortune, raised to be chief minister of state by the concurrence of many whimsical events; afraid or unwilling to trust any but creatures of his own making, and most of them equally abandoned to all notions of virtue or honor; ignorant of the true interest of his country, and consulting nothing but that of enriching and aggrandizing himself and his favorites; in foreign affairs, trusting none but those whose education makes it impossible for them to have such knowledge or such qualifications, as can either be of service to their country, or give any weight or credit to their negotiations. Let us suppose the true interest of the nation, by such means, neglected or misunderstood; her honor and credit lost; her trade insulted; her merchants plundered; and her sailors murdered; and all these things overlooked, only for fear his administration should be endangered. Suppose him, next, possessed of great wealth, the plunder of the nation, with a Parliament of his own choosing, most of their seats purchased, and their votes bought at the expense of the public treasure. In such a Parliament, let us suppose attempts made to inquire into his conduct, or to relieve the nation from the distress he has brought upon it; and when lights proper for attaining those ends are called for, not perhaps for the information of the particular gentlemen who call for them, but because nothing can be done in a parliamentary way, till these things be in a proper way laid before Parliament; suppose these lights refused, these reasonable requests rejected by a corrupt majority of his creatures, whom he retains in daily pay, or engages in his particular interest, by granting them those posts and places which ought never

to be given to any but for the good of the public. Upon this scandalous victory, let us suppose this chief minister pluming himself in defiances, because he finds he has got a Parliament, like a packed jury, ready to acquit him at all adventures. Let us further suppose him arrived to that degree of insolence and arrogance, as to domineer over all the men of ancient families, all the men of sense, figure, or fortune in the nation, and as he has no virtue of his own, ridiculing it in others, and endeavoring to destroy or corrupt it in all.

I am still not prophesying, sir; I am only supposing; and the case I am going to suppose I hope never will happen. But with such a minister and such a Parliament, let us suppose a prince upon the throne, either for want of true information, or for some other reason, ignorant and unacquainted with the inclinations and the interest of his people; weak, and hurried away by unbounded ambition and insatiable avarice. This case, sir, has never yet happened in this nation. I hope, I say, it will never exist. But as it is possible it may, could there any greater curse happen to a nation, than such a prince on the throne, advised, and solely advised, by such a minister, and that minister supported by such a Parliament ? The nature of mankind can not be altered by human laws; the existence of such a prince or such a minister we can not prevent by act of Parliament; but the existence of such a Parliament I think we may. And as such a Parliament is much more likely to exist, and may do more mischief while the septennial law remains in force, than if it were repealed, therefore I am most heartily for the repeal of it.

SPEECH

OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE ON A MOTION TO REPEAL THE SEPTENNIAL BILL, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1734, IN REPLY TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

actuated only by motives of envy, and of resentment against those who have disappointed them in their views, or may not perhaps have complied with all their desires.

But now, sir, let me too suppose, and the House being cleared, I am sure no one that hears me can come within the description of the person I am to suppose. Let us suppose in this, or in some other unfortunate country, an antiminister, who thinks himself a person of so great and extensive parts, and of so many eminent qualifications, that he looks upon himself as the only person in the kingdom capable to conduct the public affairs of the nation; and therefore

SIR, I do assure you, I did not intend to have troubled you on this occasion. But such incidents now generally happen toward the end of our debates, nothing at all relating to the subject; and gentlemen make such suppositions (meaning some person, or perhaps, as they say, no person now in being), and talk so much of wicked ministers, domineering ministers, ministers pluming themselves in defiances-which terms, and such like, have been of late so much made use of in this House-that if they really mean nobody either in the House or out of it, yet it must be supposed they at least mean to call upon some gentleman in this House to make them a reply. I hope, therefore, I may be allow-christening every other gentleman who has the ed to draw a picture in my turn; and I may likewise say, that I do not mean to give a description of any particular person now in being. When gentlemen talk of ministers abandoned to all sense of virtue or honor, other gentlemen may, I am sure, with equal justice, and, I think, more justly, speak of anti-ministers and mockpatriots, who never had either virtue or honor; but in the whole course of their opposition are

honor to be employed in the administration by the name of Blunderer. Suppose this fine gentleman lucky enough to have gained over to his party some persons really of fine parts, of ancient families, and of great fortunes, and others of desperate views, arising from disappointed and malicious hearts; all these gentlemen, with respect to their political behavior, moved by him, and by him solely; all they say, either in private

As to bribery and corruption, if it were possible to influence, by such base means, the majority of the electors of Great Britain, to choose such men as would probably give up their liberties-if it were possible to influence, by such means, a majority of the members of this House to consent to the establishment of arbitrary power-I should readily allow, that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other side were just, and their inference true. But I am persuaded that neither of these is possible. As the members of this House generally are, and must always be, gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country, is it possible to suppose that any of them could, by a pension or a post, be influ

tution, by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious? I will allow, that with respect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewise be granted that the humor he happens to be in at the time, and the spirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no encroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themselves in any danger, there may be many of the electors who, by a bribe of ten guineas, might be induced to vote for one candidate rather than another. But if the court were making any encroachments upon the rights of the people, a proper spirit would, without doubt, arise in the nation; and in such a case I am per

be too much elated with success, and too much dejected with every misfortune. This makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of state, and never long of the same mind. And as this House is chosen by the free and unbiased voice of the people in general, if this choice were so often renewed, we might expect that this House would be as wavering and as unsteady as the people usually are. And it being impossible to carry on the public affairs of the nation without the concurrence of this House, the ministers would always be obliged to comply, and consequently would be obliged to change their measures as often as the people changed their minds. With septennial Parliaments we are not ex-enced to consent to the overthrow of our constiposed to either of these misfortunes, because, if the ministers, after having felt the pulse of the Parliament (which they can always soon do), re- | solve upon any measures, they have generally time enough, before the new election comes on, to give the people proper information, in order to show them the justice and the wisdom of the measures they have pursued. And if the people should at any time be too much elated or too much dejected, or should, without a cause, change their minds, those at the helm of affairs have time to set them right before a new election comes on. As to faction and sedition, I will grant, that in monarchical and aristocratical governments, it generally arises from violence and oppression; but in popular or mixed governments, it always arises from the people's having too great a share in the government. For in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many fac-suaded that none, or very few, even of such electtious and unquiet spirits, who can never be at rest, either in power or out of power. When in power they are never easy, unless every man submits entirely to their directions; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against those that are in, without any regard to justice, or to the interest of their country. In popular governments such men have too much game. They have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impression of, and to raise discontents against those that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and these discontents often break out into seditions and insurrections. This would, in my opinion, be our misfortune, if our Parliaments were either annual or triennial. By such frequent elections, there would be so much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would destroy that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our constitution. In short, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preserve our constitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preserve this law, which I really think has brought our constitution to a more equal mixture, and consequently to a greater perfection, than it was ever in before that law took place

ors, could be induced to vote for a court candidate-no, not for ten times the sum.

There may be some bribery and corruption in the nation; I am afraid there will always be some. But it is no proof of it that strangers [i. e., non-residents] are sometimes chosen; for a man may have so much natural influence over a borough in his neighborhood, as to be able to prevail with them to choose any person he pleases to recommend. And if upon such recommendation they choose one or two of his friends, who are perhaps strangers to them, it is not from thence to be inferred that the two strangers were chosen their representatives by the means of bribery and corruption.

To insinuate that money may be issued from the public treasury for bribing elections, is really something very extraordinary, especially in those gentlemen who know how many checks are upon every shilling that can be issued from thence; and how regularly the money granted in one year for the service of the nation must always be accounted for the very next session in this House, and likewise in the other, if they have a mind to call for any such account. And as to gentlemen in office, if they have any advantage over country gentlemen, in having something else to depend on besides their own private for

Walpole's notorious system of bribery was cer tainly not conducted in so bungling a manner.

SPEECH

OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE ON A MOTION FOR ADDRESSING THE KING FOR HIS REMOVAL, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY, 1741.

INTRODUCTION.

THE unpopularity of Walpole was greatly increased by the disasters of the Spanish war, all of which were ascribed to his bad management or want of preparation. The Opposition, therefore, decided, early in 1741, on the extreme measure of proposing an address to the King for his removal. Accordingly, Mr. Sandys, who was designated to take the lead, gave notice of a motion to that effect on the 11th of February, 1741. Walpole rose immediately and thanked him for the information. He went on with great calmness and dignity, to assure the House that he was ready to meet every charge that could be brought 3 Allusion is here made to the ferment created | Peace of Utrecht, by which the English gained far by the trial of Sacheverell, and the fall of the Whig less, and their opponents more, than had been administration of Godolphin, Somers, &c., conse- generally expected under the Whig administra. quent thereon. This change of ministry led to the tion.