THE SEVENTH DIALOGUE. XVI. 1. Chriftian Faith impoffible. II. Words ftand for Ideas. III. No Knowledge or Faith without Ideas. IV. Grace, no Idea of it. V. Suggesting Ideas not the only Use of Words. VI. Force as difficult to form an Idea of as Grace. VII. Notwithstanding which, useful Propofitions may be formed concerning it. VIII. Belief of the Trinity and other Myfteries not abfurd. IX. Miftakes about Faith an Occafion of profane Raillery. X. Faith, its true Nature and Effects. XI. Illuftrated by Science. XII. By Arithmetic in particular. XIII. Sciences converfant about Signs. XIV. The true End of Speech, Reafon, Science, and Faith. XV. Metaphyfical Objections as ftrong against Human Sciences as Articles of Faith. No Religion, because no Human Liberty. XVII. Farther Proof against Human Liberty. XVIII. Fatalism a Confequence of erroneous Suppofitions. XIX. Man an accountable Agent. XX. Inconfiftency, Singularity, and Credulity of Minute Philofophers. XXI. Untroden Paths and new Light of the Minute Philofophers XXII. Sophiftry of the Minute Philofophers. XXIII. Minute Philofophers ambiguous, enigmatical, unfathomable. XXIV. Scepticism of the Minute Philofophers. XXV. How a Sceptic ought to behave. XXVI. Minute Philofophers, why difficult to convince. XXVII. Thinking, not the epidemical Evil of thefe times. XXVIII. Infidelity, not an Effect of Reafon or Thought, its true Motives affigned. XXIX. Variety of Opinions about Religion, Effects thereof. XXX. Method for proceeding with Minute Philofophers. XXXI. Want of Thought, and want of Education, Defects of the prefent Age. I. THE HE philofophers having refolved to set out for London next morning, we affembled at break of day in the library. Alciphron began with a declaration of his fincerity, affuring us, he had very maturely and with a most unbiaffed mind confidered all that had been faid, the day before. He added that, upon the whole, he could not deny several probable reasons were produced for embracing the chriftian faith. But, faid he, those reasons being only probable can never prevail against abfolute certainty and demonftration. If therefore, I can demonftrate your religion to be a thing altogether abfurd and inconfiftent, your probable arguments in its defence do, from that moment, lose their force, and with it, all right to be answered or confidered. The concurring teftimony of fincere and able witneffes hath, without queftion, great weight in human affairs. I will even grant, that things odd and unaccountable to human judgment or experience, may fometimes claim our affent on that fole motive. And I will also grant it poffible, for a tradition to be conveyed with moral evidence through many centuries. But at the fame time, you will grant to me, that a thing demonftrably and palpably falfe, is not to be admitted on any testimony whatever, which at best can never amount to demonftration. To be plain, no teftimony can make nonsense fenfe: No moral evidence can make contradictions confiftent. Know then, that as the ftrength of our cause doth not depend upon, fo neither is it to be decided by any critical points of history, chronology, or languages. You are not to wonder, if the fame fort of tradition and moral proof, which governs our affent with respect to facts in civil or natural history is not admitted as a fufficient voucher for metaphysical abfurdities and abfolute impoffibilities. Things obfcure and unaccountable in human affairs, or the operations of nature, may yet be poffible, and, if well attefted, may be affented unto: But religious affent, or faith, can be evidently fhewn in its own nature to be impracticable, impoffible, and abfurd. This is the primary motive to infidelity. This is our citadel and fortrefs, which may, indeed, be graced with outworks of various erudition, but, if those are demolished, remains in itself, and of its own proper ftrength impregnable. EUPH.-This, it must be owned, reduceth our inquiry within a narrow compass: Do but make out this, and I. shall have nothing more to fay. ALC.-Know then, that the fhallow mind of the vulgar, as it dwells only on the outward furface of things, and confiders them in the grofs, may be easily imposed on. Hence a blind reverence for religious faith and mystery. But when an acute philofopher comes to diffect and analyse these points, the imposture plainly appears: And as he has no blindness, fo he has no reverence for empty notions, or, to speak more properly, for mere forms of: speech, which mean nothing, and are of no use to mankind. II. Words are figns: They do or should stand for ideas; which fo far as they fuggeft they are fignificant. But words that fuggeft no ideas are infignificant. He who annexeth a clear idea to every word he makes ufe of, speaks fense But where fuch ideas are wanting, the speaker utters nonfenfe. In order, therefore, to know whether any man's speech be fenfelefs and infignificant, we have nothing to do but lay afide the words and confider the ideas suggested by them. Men, not being able immediately to communicate their ideas one to another, are obliged to make use of fenfible figns, or words; the use of which is to raise those ideas in the hearer, which are in the mind of the speaker: And if they fail of this end, they serve to no purpose. He, who really thinks hath a train of ideas fucceeding each other and connected in his mind: And when he expreffeth himself by difcourfe, each word fuggefts a distinct idea to the hearer or reader; who by that means hath the fame train of ideas in his, which was in the mind of the speaker or writer. As far as this effect is produced, so far the discourse is intelligible, hath sense and meaning. Hence it follows, that whoever can be supposed to understand what he reads or hears, must have a train of ideas raised in his mind, correfpondent to the train of words read or heard. These plain truths, to which men readily affent in theory, are but little attended to in practice, and therefore deferve to be enlarged on, and inculcated however obvious and undeniable. Mankind are generally averse from thinking, though apt enough to entertain discourse either in themselves or others: The effect whereof is, that their minds are rather stored with names than ideas, the husk of science rather than the thing. And yet these words without meaning do often make distinctions of parties, the fubject matter of their difputes, and the object of their zeal. This is the most general caufe of error, which doth not influence ordinary minds alone, but even those who pafs for acute and learned philofophers, are often employed about names inftead of things or ideas, and are supposed to know when they only pronounce hard words, without a meaning. III. Though it is evident that, as knowledge is the perception of the connexion or disagreement between ideas, he who doth not distinctly perceive the ideas marked by the terms, fo as to form a mental propofition answering to the verbal, cannot poffibly have knowledge: No more can he be faid to have opinion or faith which imply a weaker affent, but ftill it must be to a propofition, the terms of which, are understood as clearly, although the agreement T t or disagreement of the ideas may not be fo evident, as in the cafe of knowledge. I fay, all degrees of affent whether founded on reason or authority, more or less cogent, are internal acts of the mind, which alike terminate in ideas as their proper object: Without which there can be really no fuch thing as knowledge, faith, or opinion. We may perhaps raise a duft and difpute about tenets purely verbal: But what is this at bottom, more than mere trifling? All which will be eafily admitted with refpect to human learning and fcience; wherein it is an allowed method to expose any doctrine or tenet, by ftripping them of the words, and examining what ideas are underneath, or whether any ideas at all? This is often found the shortest way to end difputes, which might otherwise grow, and multiply without end, the litigants neither understanding one another nor themselves. It were 'needless to illuftrate what shines by its own light, and is admitted by all thinking men. My endeavor fhall be only to apply it in the prefent cafe. I suppose I need not be at any pains to prove, that the fame rules of reafon and good fenfe, which obtain in all other fubjects, ought to take place in religion. As for thofe, who confider faith and reason as two distinct provinces, and would have us think good fenfe has nothing to do where it is most concerned, I am refolved never to argue with fuch men, but leave them in quiet poffeffion of their prejudices. And now, for the particular application of what I have faid, I fhall not fingle out any nice difputed points of school divinity, or those that relate to the nature and effence of God, which being allowed infinite you might pretend to screen them, under the general notion of difficulties attending the nature of infinity. IV. Grace is the main point in the chriftian difpenfation, nothing is oftner mentioned or more confidered |