THE THIRD DIALOGUE. I. Alciphron's Account of Honor. II. Character and Con duct of Men of Honor. III. Senfe of moral Beauty. IV. The Honeftum or to kalon of the Ancients. V. Tafte for moral Beauty whether a fure Guide or Rule. VI. Minute Philofophers ravished with the Abstract Beauty of Virtue. VII. Their Virtue alone difinterested and heroic. VIII. Beauty of fenfible Objects, what, and how perceived. IX. The Idea of Beauty explained by Painting and Architecture. X. Beauty of the moral Syftem, wherein it confifts. XI. It fuppofeth a Providence. XII. Influence of to kalon and to prepon. XIII. Enthufiafm of Cratylus compared with the fentiments of Aristotle. XIV. Compared with the Stoical Principles. XV. Minute Philofophers, their Talent for Railery and Ridicule. XVI. The Wifdom of those who make Virtue alone its own Reward. T HE following day, as we fat round the tea-table, ina fummer parlour, which looks into the garden, Alciphron, after the first dish, turned down his cup, and, reclining back in his chair, proceeded as follows. Above all the fects upon earth, it is the peculiar privilege of ours, not to be tied down by any principles. While other philofophers profefs a fervile adherence to certain tenets, ours affert a noble freedom, differing not only one from another, but very often the fame man from himself. Which method of proceeding, befide other advantages, hath this annexed to it, that we are, of all men, the hardest to confute. You may, perhaps, confute a particular tenet, but then this affects only him who maintains it, and fo long only as he maintains it. Some of our fect dogmatize more than others, and in fome, more than other points. The doctrine of the usefulness of vice is a point wherein we are not all agreed. Some of us are great admirers of virtue. With others, the points of vice and virtue are problematical. For my own part, though I think the doctrine maintained yesterday, by Lyficles, an ingenious speculation; yet, upon the whole, there are divers reafons which incline me to depart from it, and rather to espouse the virtuous fide of the question; with the smallest, perhaps, but the most contemplative and laudable part of our fect. It feemeth, I fay, after a nice inquiry, and balancing on both fides, that we ought to prefer virtue to vice; and that such preference would contribute both to the public weal, and the reputation of our philofophers. You are to know then, we have among us feveral that, without one grain of religion, are men of the niceft honor, and, therefore, men of virtue, because men of honor. Honor is a noble unpolluted fource of virtue, without the leaft mixture of fear, intereft or superftition. It hath all the advantages, without the evils, which attend religion. It is the mark of a great and fine foul, and is to be found among persons of rank and breeding. It affects the court, the fenate, and the camp, and, in general, every rendezvous of people of fashion. tue. EUPH. You fay then, that honor is the fource of vir ALC.-I do. EUPH.-Can a thing be the fource of itself? EUPH.-The fource, therefore, is diftinguifhed from that of which it is the fource. ALC.-Doubtlefs. EUPH.-Honor then is one thing, and virtue another. ALC.-I grant it. Virtuous actions are the effect, and honor is the fource or caufe of that effect. EUPH. Tell me. Is honor the will, producing those actions, or the final caufe for which they are produced, or right reason, which is their rule and limit, or the object about which they are converfant? or do you by the word Honor, underftand a faculty, or appetite? all which are fuppofed, in one fenfe or other, to be the fource of human actions. ALC.-Nothing of all this. EUPH. Be pleafed then to give me fome notion or definition of it. Alciphron, having mufed a while, answered, that he defined honor to be a principle of virtuous actions. To which Euphranor replied; if I understand it rightly, the word principle is variously taken. Sometimes, by principles, we mean the parts of which a whole is composed, and into which it may be refolved. Thus the elements are faid to be principles of compound bodies. And thus words, fyllables, and letters are the principles of fpeech. Sometimes, by principle, we mean a fmall particular feed, the growth or gradual unfolding of which doth produce an organized body, animal or vegetable, in its proper fize and fhape. Principles, at other times, are fuppofed to be certain fundamental theorems in arts and sciences, in religion and politics. Let me know in which of these fenfes, or whether it be in fome other sense, that you understand the word, when you fay, honor is a principle of virtue. To this Alciphron replied, that, for his part, he meant it in none of those fenfes, but defined honor to be a certain ardor of enthusiasm that glowed in the breaft of a gallant man. Upon this, Euphranor obferved, it was always admitted to put the definition in place of the thing defined. Is this allowed, faid he, or not? ALC.-It is. EUPH.-May we not, therefore, fay, that a man of honor is a warm man, or an enthufiaft? Alciphron hearing this, declared, that fuch exactnefs was to no purpofe, that pedants, indeed, may difpute and define, but could never reach that high sense of honor, which diftinguifhed the fine gentleman, and was a thing rather to be felt than explained. II. Crito, perceiving that Alciphron could not bear being preffed any farther on that article, and willing to give fome fatisfaction to Euphranor, faid, That of himself, indeed, he should not undertake to explain fo nice a point; but he would retail to them part of a converfation he once heard between Nicander, a Minute Philofopher, and Menecles, a christian, upon the fame fubject, which was, for fubftance, as follows: M. From what principle are you, gentlemen, virtuous ? M. May not a man of honor debauch another's wife, or get drunk, or fell a vote, or refufe to pay his debts, without leffening or tainting his honor? N. He may have the vices and faults of a gentleman : but is obliged to pay debts of honor, that is, all fuch as are contracted by play. M. Is your man of honor always ready to refent affronts, and engage in duels ? N. He is ready to demand and give a gentleman's fatisfaction, upon all proper occifions. M. It should feem, by this account, that to ruin tradefmen, break faith to one's own wife, corrupt another man's, take bribes, cheat the public, cut a man's throat for a word, are all points confiftent with your principles of honor. N. It cannot be denied that we are men of gallantry, men of fire, men who know the world, and all that. M. It seems, therefore, that honor among infidels, is like honesty among pirates: fomething confined to themselves, and which the fraternity may perhaps find their account in, but every one else should be on his guard againft. By this dialogue, continued Crito, a man, who lives out of the grand monde, may be enabled to form fome notion of what the world calls honor, and men of honor. EUPH.-I must intreat you not to put me off with Ni- . cander's opinion, whom, I know nothing of; but rather |