So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it t looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, and from which refulted that complication of ideas, by which it was reprefented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of fubftance in general; and as fuch, hath been represented in these words; But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas ? No: But" it is by a complication of many simple ideas together: because not imagining how these fimple ideas can subfift by themselves, we accustom our ́« selves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence "they do refult; which therefore we call substance.” And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid for the being of substance, That we accustom ourselves to fuppose a substratum? Is that custom grounded upon true reason, or not? If not, then accidents or modes muft fubfift of themselves; and thefe fimple ideas need no tortoise to support them; for figures and colors, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for fome fancies men have accustomed themselves to. To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author* answers thus : Herein your lordship seems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of substance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging fimple ideas, but by a complication of many fimple ideas together: the other, as if I had faid, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men. As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I say in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. § 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. § 9. where, ex profeffo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be underfood to mean, that that of fubftance was made any other way; however my pen might have slipt, or the negligence of expreffion, where I might have something else than the general idea of fubftance in view, might make me seem to say fo. That I was not fpeaking of the general idea of substance in the paffage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is, Of the complex ideas of fubftances; and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have set down. In which words I do not observe any that deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say it is made by a complication of many fimple ideas together. But speaking in that place of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horfe, gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain combinations of fimple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one fimple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of substance, though made up of modes, from the custom of fuppofing a fubftratum, wherein that combination does fubfift. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct fubftances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of fubftance. * In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester, at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; But that my notion of substance in general, is quite different from these, and has no fuch combination of fimple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I say, *"The idea of pure substance in general, is only a fuppofition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us." And these two I plainly distinguish all along, particularly where I fay," whatever therefore be the secret and abstract nature of fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown cause of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itself." The other thing la'd to my charge, is, as if I took the being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it fo by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the being, but the idea of substance, on our accuftoming ourselves to fuppofe some substratum; for it is of the idea alone I speak there, and not of the being of substance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I can not be fuppofed to question or doubt of the being of substance, till I can question or doubt of my own being. Farther, I fay, †" Sensation convinces us, that there are solid, extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones." So that, I think, the being of substance is not shaken by what I have faid and if the idea of it should be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of substance would not be at all fhaken by my saying, we had but an obfcure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accustoming ourfelves to suppose some substratum; or indeed, if I should say, we had no idea of substance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example: it cannot be doubted but there are diftinct species of feparate fpirits, of which yet we have no distinct ideas at all: it cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all. The being then of fubftance being safe and secure, notwithstanding any thing I have faid, let us fee whether the idea of it be not so too Your lordship asks, with concern, And is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being (if your lordship please, let it be the idea) of substance, that we accustom ourselves to fuppose a substratum? Is that custom grounded upon true reason or no? I have faid that it is grounded upon this, "That we cannot conceive how fimple ideas of fenfible qualities should subfist alone; and therefore we suppose them to exist in, and to be fupported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance." Which, I think, is a true reason, because it is the fame your lordship grounds the fuppofition of a substratum on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents should fubfift by themselves So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordship and confequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the † lb. § 29. B. 2. C. 25. § 2. B. 2. C. 23. § 4. which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, What is the subject wherein color or weight inheres ? he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: and if he were demanded, What is it that solidity and extension inhere in? he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on? To which his anwser was, A great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is something which, in truth, signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under, or upholding. (1) fubftratum to modes or accidents, which is our idea of substance in general, is founded in this, " that we cannot conceive how modes or accidents can fubfift by themselves." (1) From this paragraph, there hath been raised an objection by the bishop of Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, had almost discarded fubstance out of the world: his words in this paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, that have almost discarded fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. To which our author replies:* This, my lord, is an accusation, which your lordship will' pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand what it is almost to discard fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. If your lordship means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any fuch thing as substance, that your lordship will acquit me of, when your lordship looks again into this 23d chapter of the second book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find these words. § 4. "When we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication or col * In his first letter to that bishop. § 3. Of the sorts of substances. AN obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, lection of those several simple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should fubfift alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by fome common subject, which support we denote by the name substance; though it is certain, we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we fuppofe a fupport." And again, § 5. «The fame happens concerning the ope⚫rations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we considering not to fubfift of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of fome other fubstance, which we call spirt; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but fomething wherein thofe many fenfible qualities, which affect our senses, do fubfist, by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subfift, we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the fubftratum to those fimple ideas we have from without: and the other fuppofed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations, which we experiment in ourselves within." And again, $6. "Whatever therefore be the fecret nature of fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown cause of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itself." - And I farther fay in the fame fection," that we suppose these combinations to rest in, and to be adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing else." And § 3. "That our complex ideas of fubftances, befides all those fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confufed idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; and therefore, when we speak of any fort of substance, we fay it is a thing having such and fuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking. "These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable idea, though we know not what it is." "Our idea of body, I fay, * is an extended, folid fubftance; and our idea of foul, is of a fubftance that thinks." So that as long as there is any fuch thing as body or fpirit in the world, I have done nothing towards the difcarding fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any fimple idea or fenfible quality left, according to my way of arguing, fubftance cannot be discarded; because all fimple ideas, all fenfible qualities, carry with them a fuppofition of a substratum to exist in, and of a fubftance wherein they inhere and of this that whole chapter is fo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have almoft, or one jot, discarded fubftance out of the reasonB. 2. C. 28. § 22. by collecting such combinations of simple ideas, as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist to able part of the world. And of this, man, horse, fun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substances, will be my witnesses, as long as any fuch things remain in being; of which I say, * « That the ideas of fubftances are fuch combinations of fimple ideas as are taken to represent diftinct particular things subsisting by themselves. in which the supposed or confused idea of substance is always the first and chief.” If, by almost discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world, your lordship means, that I have destroyed, and almost discarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a substratum,† a fuppofition of we know not what fupport of fuch qualities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us, an obfcure and relative idea: ‡ That without knowing what it is, it is that which supports accidents; fo that of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused, obfcure one of what it does: I must confess, this and the like I have faid of our idea of subslance: and should be very glad to be convinced by your lordship, or any body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that would fhow me a more clear and distinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness Į fhould thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for their account or idea of it is, that it is ens, or, res per fe fubfiftens, & fubftans accidentibus; which in effect is no more, but that substance is a being or thing; or, in short, fomething, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is something which fupports accidents, or other fimple ideas or modes, and is not supported itself, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not fee but Burgerfdicius, Sanderfon, and the whole tribe of logicians, must be reckoned with the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance out of the reafonable part of the world. But fuppofing, my lord, that I, or these gentlemen, logicians of note in the school, should own that we have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of substance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with discarding substance out of the world? For what almost discarding, and reasonable part of the world, fignifies, I must confefs, I do not clearly comprehend: but let almost and reasonable part fignify here what they will, for I dare fay your lordship meant fomething by them; would not your lordfhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if, for acknowledging yourself to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of feveral other things which in this very treatise you confess our understandings come short in, and cannot comprehend, you should be accused to be one of these gentlemen that have almost difcarded God, or those other mysterious things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reasonable world? For I fuppofe your lordship means by almost discarding out of the reasonable world, fomething that is blame B. 2. C. 12. § 6. + B. 2. C. 23. § 1. § 2. § 3. |