I

to counteract the impression which the hon. | first night of the session; in respect to the gent.'s speech is calculated to produce, I 3/material points upon which, as I then feel myself obliged (though very reluctant- took the liberty of saying, it appeared to ly at this moment) to state my opinion up-me the averments of his majesty's declaon the question now before the house. Iration required explanation and proof. feel myself the more especially bound to These 3 points were, as the noble lord has do so, because agreeing with the hon. gent. correctly stated: 1st, The assertion that in many of the premises which he has laid the first overture came from the enemy; down, I am proportionably the more an- 2dly, That that overture was accompanied xious to disclaim agreeing with him in his by a proposal to treat on the basis of the conclusions. I am anxious to repeat what uti possidetis; 3dly, The question of our I have before said upon this subject, that having kept faith and concert with our alhowever the negociation may have been lies, particularly with Russia, during the mis-managed, it has not, it cannot have whole course of the negociation. The nobeen, so mismanaged, as to put France in ble lord trusts that I am satisfied upon all the right, and this country in the wrong, these points; I will tell him how far I am as to the general result of the negociation, so.-With respect to the first point, that much less as to the general question of the the first overture came from the enemy, war. There may have been, and I agree have no hesitation in avowing myself perwith the hon. gent., in thinking there have fectly satisfied. My doubts upon this been, some considerable errors in the con- subject, the noble lord will do me the duct of our government. There may be, justice to recollect, were founded upand I agree with the hon. gent., there are on the two letters, Nos. 2, and 3, assertions in the king's Declaration, which of the French publication; the first of are not borne out by the papers upon the which is now shewn to have been interpotable but I cannot agree with the hon.lated, a trick of which it was impossible gent., that the effect of these errors or mis-to form a suspicion; and the second to representations is to prove that an oppor- have been written in answer-not to that tunity has been lost of making an advanta- which it is made to follow immediately in geous peace; that the negociation has been the French publication,-but to that other prematurely and unnecessarily broken off note of M. Taileyrand, inclosing an Exon the part of this country; or that with tract from Buonaparte's Speech, which in a little more patience and dexterity on our the French publication is wholly omitted. part, we should have found France ready When I said that the letter about the asto give such terms as it became his majes-sassin would be of itself an overture, unty's ministers to accept. I cannot believe less something anterior to it in date could that there was, from the beginning, any be produced, I said so on the presumpother intention on the part of the enemy,tion (which I should never have dreamt than to delude and amuse us; I think the of questioning) that all the correspondence false statements in the Declaration are only subsequent to that letter was correctly gi so many ill-contrived attempts to conceal ven in the Moniteur. Undoubtedly the or to excuse our having been so amused case is altered by that letter of M. Talleyand deceived; and so far from conceiving rand, which is now brought to light. Unthe rupture of the negociation to have been doubtedly that letter, and the communi premature, while I agree in thinking the cation of Buonaparte's speech, expressing opportunity ill chosen, I blame only that his willingness to treat on the basis of the choice which let so many better opportuni- stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, conties pass by; which suffered a negociation stituted a distinct overture, to which Mr. which it was evident, from the earliest Fox replied as it was fit he should do.-stage, must terminate, as this has termina- Two things, however, I must remark, ted, to be protracted, by the artifices of which the noble lord does not appear to the enemy, to his advantage alone, and to bear in his recollection; 1st, that I never the infinit detriment of this country. In stating the rounds upon which I have formed these opinions, I cannot do better than follow the order which the noble lord (Howick) has pursued in his speech. The noble lord did me the honour to begin by a reference to a part of my speech, on the

attributed any blame to the making the first overture, supposing we had in fact made it; on the contrary, I distinctly said that at any time when negociation might be desirable, I could not conceive that any delicacy as to which party should make the proposal ought to stand in the way: the

blame would have belonged wholly to the tages, those of character and confidence publishing in his majesty's declaration, an for the future.-The noble lord will not assertion not supported by facts. 2dly, think this commendation unreasonably quaThat my objections to the letter about the lified by the reserve with which I am obliassassin were not confined to the single ged to accompany it, that it is due so far point of its unfitness as an overture; but as the papers enable us to judge. I do were many of them of a nature to be in not blame ministers for not furnishing us no degree done away by the proof of its with more ample documents upon this not having been intended as an overture subject; perhaps they could not be furfor negociation. Those objections I still nished without hazarding mischievous disfeel. I still think the letter in its whole closures: but unquestionably the want of style and tenour, in conception and in any knowledge of the communications betaste, altogether unworthy of the great tween us and Russia, which preceded the man who was the writer of it; and so un-mission of M. D'Oubril, leaves us under like him, so wholly unlike any thing else the necessity of taking upon the minister's of his writing which appears in the papers word the assurance that, up to that period, upon the table, that, when I heard the Russia and England acted cordially and noble lord speak of the interpolations confidentially together. For, if one could which the enemy had audaciously inserted suspect that the mission of M. D'Oubril to in the publication in the Moniteur, I pro- Paris was intended by the court of Petersfess I fully expected to find this letter one burgh as a reprisal for our having advanof them. I was disappointed at finding it ced before them in the negociation faster among our own official papers unaltered, than they had expected, or than we had and still attributed to Mr. Fox.-I was given them notice of our doing or intendno less disappointed at not finding some-ing to do, it would then be impossible thing else, which I understood the noble to contend that we had kept faith and conlord to have promised; but I suppose Icert with Russia, as strictly as we boast of must have misunderstood him. I did, having done: but even then I will confess however, understand him to say, that I should be inclined to doubt whether our when the official correspondence came to be subsequent conduct, after M. D'Oubril's published, we should find that Mr. Fox separate treaty, had not redeemed, or even had rejected with disdain, those exclusive more than redeemed our original failure. compliments to himself, the object of If, on the contrary, M. D'Oubril was sent which is obviously not so much to exalt without sufficient previous notice to us, him, as to vilify all the ministers who had and without waiting for and obtaining our gone before him. I find nothing like it. full consent, our conduct would then be I wish I did. I retain my opinion as to not only unexceptionable, but such as what ought to have been an English mi- would have entitled us to the lasting gratinister's conduct in this respect. But ha- tude of Russia, and have left her deeply ving said thus much, I am not desirous of our debtor ;-but even then I should think pressing this subject farther.-I will come that what we had done, though more pernext to the point which the noble lord has haps than Russia would have been in such treated as the third in succession; that of a case entitled to claim, was not more than our good faith and concert with Russia: an enlarged and enlightened policy warbecause upon this point also I have to ex-ranted us in doing for her.-I am willing, press, in the main, great satisfaction; and however, to believe that there was nothing I willingly defer as long as I can that upon to atone for or to forgive on either side. which I continue to entertain an unfavour-That Russia and England took every step able opinion. I am happy to declare, in concert: And then, while I admit and that so far as the papers enable us to rejoice in the admission, that the good judge, ministers appear to have maintain-faith of the two governments towards each ed our good faith towards Russia wholly other has been sacredly observed, I cannot unimpaired. And so far from undervalu-forbear regretting that so laudable a sysing this merit in the negociation, I am tem should not have been carried fully ready and anxious to hold it up as that and beneficially into execution; that there which is at once most praise-worthy, and has not been as much wisdom as generomost politic; for which, ministers are en- sity and sincerity displayed in the conduct titled to the highest credit, and by which of the alliance; that a concert, so perfect the country obtains the most solid advan-in principle, has been acted upon so ne

gligently or ill-avisedly, as to lose in po-[ment? Was not the omission of any menlicy all the main advantages which such tion of Russia in the king's speech, at the a concert between two great powers is cal-end of the last session of parliament, unculated to procure, and which constitute derstood both here and abroad as a tacit its principal value.-What is, in truth, the abrogation of our alliance? If that alliance main advantage of such a concert and still subsisted at that time, and if the conunion between two great powers such as cert was going on as intimately as is now England and Russia, in a negociation with insinuated, was it not our obvious policy a common enemy? Not surely, that it to give every degree of publicity in our obliges their respective plenipotentiaries power to a state of things so honourable to communicate with each other upon eve-to ourselves, and in its consequences likery step which each may advance in their ly to prove so beneficial to the rest of the treaty not because it binds each not to world? But what was our conduct? and conclude without the other. These are, what were its effects?-When once we had abstractedly taken, disadvantages rather agreed to treat, [See Mr. Fox's dispatch than advantages; they tend to complicate to lord Yarmouth, June 26, 1806. No. 15 of and embarrass; to retard the work of pa- the papers, presented to both houses of parcification; and ultimately may lead to the liament, page 140 of the present volume,} rejection of a peace in the highest degree" separately in form, though in substance, desirable for one party, from the want of in concert with each other," (a most dexsome petty object, or the failure of some terous contrivance some appear to think unreasonable pretension, of the other. it-I conceive it to have been a most misBut what is the advantage which compen-chievous concession); from that moment sates, and more than compensates, all these however our good faith might still be saved, possible inconveniencies? and which, es-every other advantage of concert was irrepecially at such a moment as the present, trievably abandoned. Russia and England and against such an enemy as the nations might still be true to each other: but Rusof Europe have now to contend against, sia and England together were no longer makes the union of two such powers as En- true to the cause of Europe and of the gland and Russia not only a mutual secu-world.-And were not the effects correrity to themselves, but a common bles-spondent with the error of the policy? sing to mankind? What, but that assurance What lost Prussia? I know, the noble lord which it holds out to the world of co-ope- says, the madness, the precipitancy, the infa ration for ends in which all the world is in-tuation of Prussia herself. But are we wholly terested-of a determination either to ob-guiltless? Ilad Prussia nothing to mislead tain such a peace as shall secure the gene- and to deceive her? I know, the noble ral tranquillity, or to carry on war toge-lord will tell us, as he has already told us, ther for the general protection? What, but that Prussia acted without concert or comthe rallying point which it affords to the munication. He will quote that note of the weaker powers;-the bope which it offers king of Prussia, in which he states that his of assistance to those who are able to con- resolution to go to war would be known at tend for their freedom, and of refuge and pro- Paris before it was known at London or at tection to those who fly to it from tyranny Petersburgh. He will lament that Prussia and oppression?-But, for the attainment did not throw herself upon the courts of of these objects, what can be more obvious London and Petersburgh for counsel and asthan that it is not sufficient for such an sistance. But what temptation had Prusunion to exist, unless its existence be sia to take this course? Had she nothing known?-that a concert may be perfectly to deter her from it? Let us see what the cordial between the two contracting pow-court of Berlin would answer for itself. ers; but if its operation be kept secret, if In the declaration which was published by it be not diligently and (I would almost that court at the beginning of October, say) ostentatiously blazoned to the world, speaking of the time when Prussia was it is utterly useless for any purpose of lar-goaded by France into the measures which ger benefit? And what was the fact? Was led immediately to the war, it is said it notorious that England and Russia nego- "two negociations were at that time carciated in concert? Was not the direct con-rying on at Paris; one with Russia, the trary more than suspected? Was not the mission of M. D'Oubril universally believed to be a surprise upon our govern

other with the English ministry. In both these negociations the intentions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested.”

And then it proceeds to specify the stipula- tion with France, it will be remembered, tions hostile to Prussia in each. Such then that though good faith between the conwas the impression at Berlin. The court tracting parties be much, it is not all; of Berlin was satisfied that England and that such a connection loses half its value, Russia were carrying on not a joint negoci-as well as half its sanctity, when it is not ation, but two distinct and separate negoci-avowed in the eyes of the world; that what ations :-" separate in form" we know they we appear anxious to conceal, or afraid to unfortunately were; and how should the acknowledge ourselves, will not readily be court of Berlin guess that they were "in believed or trusted in others; that "sepasubstance" united? And under this impres-rately in form, but substantially in consion it is that the noble lord expresses his cert," is a form of treaty which has all the astonishment and indignation at the con-disadvantages of combination, without any duct of that court-that he admires the of the advantages for which combinarashness, the want of common sense, the tion is most to be prized. Had we absolute madness and infatuation of Prus-treated “formally,”—as well as "substansia in not having thrown herself altogether tially,-in concert," M. D'Oubril could upon the courts of Petersburgh and Lon-never have signed his separate treaty; even don:-Upon two courts, of whom she on- had we been "substantially,"-as well as ly knew that they were engaged in se- "formally,-separate," we at least should parate negociations,-of whose concert not have been subject to the awkward and with each other therefore she could enter- difficult suspense which followed that sigtain no reasonable belief; and further, that nature. This difficulty, however, was unas far as related to herself, they were each doubtedly well worth incurring for the bein their respective treaty, stipulating some-nefit of effectual concert; but how could thing disadvantageous to Prussia! Would that concert be effectual, which was known not the infatuation, the folly, the childish to none but the parties who concealed it, credulity of Prussia have been much rather and to the enemy who stipulated for its to be admired, if with no other data than concealment in order that he might deny these she had formed the rash opinion that it, and which presented to all other nato the courts of Petersburgh and London tions no other appearance than that of disshe could safely betake herself for succour? union of councils and diversity of objects? -And if at the same time at which this I come now to the last of the three undoubted fact of the separate negocia-points, upon which the noble lord expects tions with M. D'Oubril and lord Yarmouth to find me satisfied, the assertion in his was communicated by M. Talleyrand to majesty's declaration, that France prothe Prussian minister at Paris, M. Talley-posed to treat on the basis of the uti posrand had (as no doubt he had) the good-sidetis. And upon this, with the utmost ness further to communicate in confidence seriousness and sincerity I feel myself comthat sentence of the English secretary of pelled to declare, that so far from having state's letter of the 8th of April, in which received any satisfaction, I am, after the Mr. Fox declares his persuasion that "the most diligent and impartial examination of project of a new combination against the papers, more thau ever convinced, that France is utterly chimerical," then I the assertion is not borne out by the eviwould be glad to know what rational Prus-dence adduced in support of it. It is a sian could have advised his king to look question of evidence; it is a plain issue of for aid against France from the joint coun- fact, upon which an ordinary jury might sels and exertions of two powers, who were decide; and I am confident that any jury notoriously pursuing courses separate from, would find the allegation not proved. The and independent of, each other; but each noble lord, indeed, goes a very short way separately and respectively hostile to Prus-to work upon this point, and travelling sia and of whom one, and that the one altogether out of the record before the which had been hitherto the soul of all house, and putting by all the written docu confederacies against France, had volun-ments by which he originally engaged to tarily confessed to France herself that the day of such confederacies was gone by, and that the attempt to revive them would be utterly chimerical :-I trust that in all alliances which this country may hereafter contract, whether for war or for negocia

convince us, betakes himself at once to the aid of the noble person whose intervention was employed on this occasion, and asks us if we will not believe lord Yarmouth's word? Is the assertion of my lord Yarmouth good for nothing?'-For every thing:

sation? It is said, " M. Talley rand would not have given it in writing!" How do you know that? Lord Y. distinctly says that he was never instructed to attempt to obtain it. But it was in the very nature of such a communication,' says the noble secretary of state (lord Howick), that it should not be reduced into writing:-the attempt to embody such overtures into a distinct official shape, has a tendency to put an end to that sort of preliminary, unavowed insinuation which has usually preceded formal negoci

and in a matter of private concern, I, for one, | to them? How can they know it? how should desire no other evidence; though can they be expected to take cognizance of even there, if there were contradictory it? Even in the other house of parliament testimony offered in opposition to it, I am they have not the advantage which we have afraid I must have recourse to other colla-here; and even we should have been deteral evidence to turn the scale. But can prived of it, if the noble lord had hapany thing be more unfair or unreasonable pened not to be returned to the present than this direct personal reference to lord parliament.-If it was intended from the Yarmouth? unfair to the noble person him- beginning to lay the whole weight of this self, upon whom, singly, is thus attempted assertion on lord Yarmouth's single declato be thrown the whole weight of a ques-ration, why was not lord Y. duly apprised tion upon which the honour of this country of this intention, and directed to reduce is pledged, upon which we are at issue with that declaration into a written official shape? the enemy in the face of the world? Was The memorandum of the 13th of June is such a question ever so decided? Was a wholly insufficient for this purpose. Why point in dispute between two governments was he not instructed to obtain in writing ever before attempted to be rested on the from M. Talleyrand the proposal which he single responsibility of any individual, how-understood him to have made in converever respectable? Would any individual whatever undertake to convey a communication from government to government, at the risk of having such a load of responsibility cast upon him? We have heard from the noble lord himself that he had no such apprehension; that he was not by any means prepared for the use which is now made of his name; that he took for granted all along, that he was not the single and sole testimony on which the question between the two governments rested; that he imagined there was other concurrent evidence in the corre-ations for peace; and which if you dis spondence which was carried on, concur- credit and bring into disuse, wars must go rently with his mission, between the two on interminably; for how is the disposi ministers for foreign affairs; that M. Tal- tion to put an end to them to be ascertainleyrand distinctly told him, that he wrote ed? I confess I see none of the dangers to Mr. Fox to the satne effect with the which the noble secretary of state apprecommunication made to him (lord Yar- hends here: but if they exist, they are of mouth); that he fully believed the letter his own creating. It is not the reducing of which he was himself the bearer from into writing such communications as were Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, to be upon the made unofficially; it is not that, but it is same subject; and that he is astonished to the relying upon them, when not so aufind himself at this time of day the only thenticated, in subsequent official papers; support with which ministers have provided it is the making a whole negociation turn themselves for a point upon which they lay upon an imputed admission of the enemy, so much stress. And well may the noble which admission, at the time when it was lord express his surprise, and his resent-made, you thought it indelicate to reduce ment at having such a burthen laid upon into writing; this it is that has a tendency his shoulders. The noble lord himself to discredit and bring into disuse that sort feels and cannot therefore think it any of preliminary overture. Every foreign personal disrespect to him, if there are minister may well be cautious how he comthose who feel with him-that he is not mits himself by any verbal communication; alone presentable to the world as a suffi- which, while out of pretended delicacy cient evidence upon such a question. We, you will not press him to render it precise and to be sure, have the advantage in this house formal, you at the same time carefully lay of the noble lord's presence, as a member up to be produced against him afterwards, of it. But this house is not the only judge according to your own construction. And in this question. It is a question for Eu-after th example of lord Y., any gentle rope, for posterity to decide: and what is man may well decline to be the channel of the noble lord's private parole testimony such a communication, at the risque of