ficed to injustice on the part of France for the express purpose of injuring this country. Would it not, therefore, be disgraceful in us not to insist upon the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it had been taken, solely on account of its connection with this country. The resto ration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, was therefore insisted upon as an indis pensable preliminary to the negociation! The French government felt the injustice of the act, and consented to restore it. This was consented to, previous to the com❤ mencement of the negociation, and never afterwards became an object of dispute, And your lordships are perfectly aware, as is clearly evinced by the papers on the table, that the rupture of the negocia tion did not proceed from any discussion about Hanover, but arose from far different

brave, and, as it has been proved, an in-country, to invade and take possession of vincible British army. That army had en- Hanover. Hanover was therefore sacri tered the island with the consent of the king of Naples, who had received them there in the full confidence that they would defend it bravely and gallantly against the enemy, and at the same time in the full persuasion that the island would not be given up to the enemy, Would it not, therefore, have been an indelible disgrace to this country to have given up Sicily to France upon their offer of an equivalent ? Was it for us to traffe with Sicily, and to dispose of it, without the consent of its sovereign? if the king of Naples chose to surrender his dominions for what he might consider a sufficient equivalent, upon the continent of Europe, he was, of course, at liberty to make such an exchange; but it was not for us to traffie with Sicily, and barter it away for any equivalent, without the consent of its sovereign. With respect to Hanover, my lords, I feel some diffi- causes. My lords, the principle upon culty in addressing your lordships upon which his majesty's ministers acted during that topic, not that there is any doubt as the whole of the negociation was, that of to the clearness of the principle upon which good faith towards our allies. Without our pegociation with respect to that elec- that, no treaty can be concluded by this torate rests, or as to the injustice come country, without disgracing ourselves. The mitted by the enemy upon the territories principle acted upon by the French go. of that electorate, but from a doubt that vernment invariably through the whole ne from some perversion or distortion of what gociation was, that of endeavouring to efis clear and obvious, there should be an fect a separation between us and our allies. idea entertained that our beneficent sove-This clearly appears in the four stages of reign had for a moment wished to sacrifice the negociation. The first at the comany British interest to the re-attainment of mencement of the negociation, when the Hanover. My lords, his majesty, with French government offered us terms which, that beneficence which has always charac had we been negociating for ourselves terized his reign, had not the remotest wish alone, might perhaps have been considered that the least British interest should be as the fair price of peace, but which, under sacrificed for the purpose of obtaining the the circumstances in which we negociated, restoration of Hanover. But, my lords, were offered us as the price of dishonour, as the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign the price of the desertion of our faithful ally, was a point in which the honour of this as the price of a direct breach of good faith. country was deeply involved. It was said Here then, it was evidently their object to by a great statesman, now no more, after tempt us by these offers to separate our some remarks relative to Hanover, that if selves from Russia. The second stage of Hanover was invaded on account of its the negociation was, when the French go connection with this country, he would as vernment, partly by threats, partly by insoon fight for Hanover as for Hampshire,spiring hopes and making promises, con the honour of the country being equally trived to persuade the Russian minister at involved in both cases, Hanover, my lords, Paris, M. D'Oubril, to sign a separate was at peace with France, it was not con- treaty of peace. Nothing, my lords, shews pected in any way which could be a legitimore clearly the views and objects of the mate cause for war between France and French government than the alteration in that electorate; yet Hanover was seized by their tone, after they had succeeded in ob France soon after the latter power had de-taining the signature of this separate treaty clared war against this country, and for no with Russia. Then the French government other reason than because it was thought say to our ministers, no, we cannot now by France a good means of injuring this grant you the same terms we were willing

to do before. The signature of a separate | case; the terms insisted on by Russia were treaty with Russia fe equivalent to a splen- moderate, free from all views of ambition, did victory; therefore we must insist upon and were only directed to the security of better terms. This, my lords, is not our her allies. She demanded the guarantee language, but your lordships will mark the of Sicily to the king of Naples, and the expression used by the French ministers in evacuation of Dalmatia by the French the papers now in your hands, when speak-troops. By holding Dalmatia, the French ing upon that subject, and which evinces, turn the flank of the defence of Austria, in the clearest manner, the great impor-and threaten the Austrian capital. Daltance which they attached to the separation matia also, though not immediately.con which they thought they had effected be- nected with Turkey, is yet occupied by the tween Russia and this country. They con- French troops, with hostile designs against sidered it equivalent to a splendid victory, that power. Dalmatia is not necessary to and this expression was not loosely used in the vast empire obtained by the arms of conversation, but forms a part of the writ-France, and can only be held by the latter ten sentiments of the French government power as a post of offence towards Austria upon that event. A suspicion afterwards and the Porte, and of hostility towards arose, that this treaty would not be ratified, Russia. These were the only terms inor probably intelligence of the refusal of sisted on by Russia, not to gratify any obthe emperor of Russia to ratify it had then jects of ambition, not for the increase of reached Paris, although of this we know power, but to obtain security for her allies, nothing. Which brings me to the third stage to obtain that in which this country was of the negociation; when the French go-equally interested. The guarantee of Sivernment, finding the treaty would not be cily to the king of Naples was clearly a ratified, immediately offered us better terms, in the hope of finding that though they could not separate Russia from this country, they might, by the offer of better terms than they had previously offered, separate this country from Russia. Failing, however, equally in their endeavours to induce Russia to enter into a separate treaty, or to induce this country to enter into a separate treaty, they at length agreed to a negociation; to be carried on conjointly for the interests of Russia and Great Britain. This brings me to the fourth and last stage of the nego-Russia, have been a foul stain upon the ciation, when they departed from the prin- country never to be washed away—a disciple they had agreed to, of negociating grace and a degradation which never could with Russia and England conjointly, when have been disunited from our name? And they refused to agree to the terms asked on what are these terms which were offered to behalf of Russia, and again offered terms us as the price of disgrace and dishonour? to this country, on the principle of a sepa- We were to be allowed to keep Malta, rate negociation. The rupture of the nego- which France can never take from us exciation was, of course, the consequence. cept by acquiring a naval superiority. The My lords, in all this procedure on the part Cape of Good Hope also, which is equally of the French government, it is manifest, secure to us, and which if it should be by that, from the first moment of the nego-accident taken by any French fleet, which ciation to the last, their only object was to endeavour to effect a separation between this country and Russia. Had Russia, my lords, insisted upon extravagant and immoderate terms, or had she insisted upon points trifling and uninteresting, it would have been a painful duty for me to stand up in this place and state the rupture of the negociation in consequence of any such conduct on the part of Russia. But, my lords, the very contrary of all this was the

British object, and in which this country has a preferable interest. This evacuation of Dalmatia by the French troops, to which Russia confined herself, not making any demand of the territory, is also of importance to this country as well as to our ally. With this good faith and moderation on the part of Russia, would it not have been an indelible disgrace to this country if we had violated good faith on our part? If we had accepted separate terms, would it not, after the good faith displayed by the emperor of

might escape our blockading squadrons, would not remain 6 months in the possession of France. India, where our power is not to be shaken by any efforts of France, and Tobago, merely to mention which, is sufficient; these were the terms offered to us to induce us to disgrace and dishonour ourselves by violating our good faith, and deserting our faithful ally. My lords, I should have rejoiced if I could have had the opportunity, instead of moving an address

majesty, that no exertion shall be wanting on our part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as may yet be found necessary, either for the resto ration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in this most impor tant crisis."

to his majesty upon the rupture of the nego- that this house have taken into serious ciation, of moving an address upon the con- consideration the papers relative to the clusion of peace. That I have not that op-late negociation, which he has been pleased portunity, is wholly to be attributed to the to lay before them, and that we see with enemy, to his views of ambition, to the gratitude, that he has employed every principles upon which he acted, and which means to restore the blessing of peace, in were utterly irreconcileable with those prin- a manner consistent with the interests and ciples upon which this country must ever glory of his people, and at the same time, act, for the preservation of her interests, with an observance of that good faith with and the maintenance of her honour. I am our allies, which this country is bound to sure I shall have every heart and mind in retain inviolate. That while we lament the country with me, when I say that this that by the unbounded ambition of the country never can negociate upon a prin-enemy, these laudable endeavours to reciple of inferiority, to France. An expres- store tranquillity to his kingdom, have sion was used by the French ministers, been frustrated, we beg leave to assure his which is stated in the papers, that if we had made peace at the period alluded to in the papers, the treaty of the confederation of the Rhine would never have been signed, or at least would not have been published. It happens, however, that supposing peace to have been concluded with the utmost rapidity after the arrival of our minis- Lord Hawkesbury rose, and said :ters at Paris, the treaty could not have Although, my lords, we may differ in some been signed before the treaty of the German instances with respect to the particular confederacy was published. Thus this mode and course pursued in this negocia very confederation must unavoidably have tion, yet, on the present occasion, there preceded. the treaty, and, supposing it to can be no room for difference as to the have happened the day after, it would ne- great principles and the result. I am con cessarily have been a cause for war. My vineed, that, at this moment, while our lords, I will only make one more observa- enemy continues to pursue his aggressions, tion respecting the stay of our minister at and to follow that system by which his Paris. It was perfectly evident that, when conduct has been regulated since the comthe chief of the French government set out mencement of his career,,such a peace as to take the command of the army, it was we alone look to as affording security to impossible that the negociation and hosti- ourselves and allies is utterly unattainable. lities against an ally of one of the parties I therefore most completely concur with negociating could go on pari passu. The the noble lord upon the great points which assembling of the French army was, indeed, he has stated, and of course do not feel dea sufficient cause for breaking off the nego-sirous of urging any material objection to ciation, and when the chief of the French the address. At the same time this adgovernment set out to commence hostilities dress may, in some parts, be liable to amagainst the ally of Russia, it was clearly im- biguity, and therefore, if I do agree to it, possible that the negociation and the hos-it must be with some qualification. But, tile attack could go on at the same time. my lords, I most particularly approve of My lords, at the opening of the session, the conduct of the government, in the good every thing like a pledge to his majesty re- faith which it has maintained with respect specting the result of the negociation was to our allies. And if Russia had insisted carefully avoided, until the papers should upon the evacuation of Dalmatia by the be regularly before the house.. Now that French, and if that were the only point of the subject comes regularly under your difference between us and the French golordships' discussion, I intend to propose vernment, I have no hesitation in saying that your lordships should pledge your-that, upon that point alone, ministers selves to support his majesty in this contest, the continuance of which has been rendered absolutely necessary by the ambition of France. His lordship concluded by moving," That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to assure him

would have been fully justified in breaking off the negociation. I have always thought, and maintained, my lords, that if there was any point which ought to be attended to more than another, if there was any point which ought to be insisted on in preference

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to every thing except our own vital inte- at the context, and this shews that the rests, that point was, that Dalmatia and words are not general, but that they refer Istria, formerly dependencies of the Vene-only to Sicily specifically. But I confess, tian states, should be evacuated by the that though the words had been general, French troops. In these points then I most yet I should not have considered the mere unequivocally agree with the noble lord verbal declaration of any minister, without who has proposed the address. But while any written document on the subject from I say this, I beg not to be understood as him, by which he could be bound, as a suffi◄ approving all that passed in the course of cient ground to warrant the assertion, that this negociation. Where we approve of the basis of the uti possidetis was actually the general result, we may still differ mate- and distinctly agreed to by the French go rially as to some particular parts. At the vernment. This, my lords, is a point of same time I am perfectly ready to allow, material importance, not only with respect that where we do approve of the general to this, but with regard to all other nego principles that pervade the whole, and of ciations. I have always understood that the practical result, we ought not to be too the grounds of negociation were to be laid fastidious respecting modes, or too par- down in written documents, and to be ticular in searching out minute and compa- taken from conferences reduced to writing ratively trifling errors. This I declared on at the time, so as to leave no room for a former occasion, and I still adhere to the cavil, and to bind the parties to something opinion which I then expressed. But when specific, which they could never recede a declaration is solemnly made to the pub-from, without exposing their want of faith lic, which is not borne out by the papers to all the world. There may undoubtedly now on your table, I must confess that this be some previous communications between appears to me no trifling matter, and there- the parties, leading to a particular point, fore it makes a most material difference. and these may undoubtedly be very pro I allude, my lords, to the declaration of his perly produced, in order to throw light majesty, where it is stated that the French, upon particular parts of the subject, and to from the outset of the negociation, agreed enable others to judge of the precise mean to proceed upon the basis of actual pos-ing and bearing of certain expressions, in session, subject to the interchange of such which there might otherwise be some am. equivalents as might be for the advantage biguity. Indeed there can be no doubt and honour of the two countries. Now I that lord Yarmouth fully believed, that the confess that, after a most careful examina-basis of uti possidetis had been proposed by tion of these papers, I have found nothing Talleyrand. Still, however, this is an er in the whole of them that can be considered parte statement, which the other party may as a certain and unequivocal foundation admit or deny as they may think proper. for such a declaration. Before the arrival Such statements can never constitute the of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of essence of a negociation, or afford a clear actual possession was so far from being and undeniable ground of proceeding. If agreed upon, that another very different there is any object, which in cases of this was expressly stated to be the grounds sort ought to be attended to more than upon which the French government would another, it is to have distinct and positive enter upon a negociation. Lord Yarmouth, admission of the basis, to have something indeed, gives a statement in writing as a which may be put on record, which the conversation which he had with Talleyrand, party cannot deny, and to which you may and he, no doubt, firmly believed that Tal-refer, and from which, if the other party leyrand had proposed the basis of actual should recede, all the world would be sa possession. But in looking over the papers, tisfied that you were in the right and he in and examining with all the attention in my the wrong. In all negociations, therefore, power the written account which the noble the settling of a clear and distinct basis, is lord has given of that conversation, I can one of the most material objects. It was find nothing that can afford a distinct, pre-not sufficient then that lord Yarmouth uncise, and unequivocal proof that the basis of derstood that the basis of actual possession actual possession was clearly agreed to by had been acceded to by Talleyrand. But you the French minister. The words are: "Vous ought to have demanded a precise and l'avez, nous me vous la demandons pas."-categorical recognition of that basis as a But in order to affix the proper and pre-preliminary step, before you gave cise meaning to these words, we must look powers to treat to your negociator. Thiş

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would have avoided all obscurity. There those who think that our colonial posses could have been no room, at least no fair sions ought to be extended indefinitely. grounds for cavilling after this. I do not Colonies are undoubtedly valuable to a by any means object to previous commu- commercial country, but they are not va nications. These may be useful and even luable to us beyond what we can protect necessary. Neither do I object to their and govern. We ought to consider what production, but as they form no part of are our own means, what our military force the essence of the proceedings, they cannot is, and what it may be made. Every thing be admitted as the only proof of the par- that is beyond what we can protect and goticular basis agreed upon. This ought to vern is only a delusive power, or rather a be clearly seen from the written and essen-source of weakness. But after all, my lords, tial documents, and of all others this is the the great question as to peace is, could it point upon which precision is necessary. possibly be obtained? Could we, con But more particularly in the present in-sistently with the honour and interests of stance, the utmost precision is to be ex- our country, conclude a peace with the pected, after the declaration which has French governnient at the present moment? been made by his majesty, that the French Now, there are two points to be considered government, from the beginning, admitted here. First, what was the situation of the the basis of actual possession. Yet, my continent at the commencement of the lords, notwithstanding this, the declaration treaty with France in 1801? It was cer is not borne out by these papers, and the tainly very different from what it is now. atmost that they prove is this, that lord At that time Holland and Switzerland, Yarmouth believed that the basis of actual though subject to the influence of France, possession was admitted by M. Talleyrand were not completely united to it. Naples in a conference. Having, my lords, said was entire, and Austria, though she had thus much on that particular point-a point lost much of her military reputation, was which most certainly claimed considerable still a great power. Whatever she had lost in attention, on account of its importance in point of military character, she was, in various views, I have no hesitation in say point of population and extent of territory, ing, that I most heartily concur in the ge-equal to what she had been at the comneral result of the negociation, and, with mencement of the war with France. It the above exception, that I most cordially was said then, that the best chance for the join in the address, and in the assurances of salvation of Europe was in peace. We support to his majesty,in prosecuting the war, were powerful at sea, the French were which it has been found impossible imme-powerful on the continent. This great diately to put an end to, upon grounds in power they had acquired owing to the any degree consistent with the security and energies which were roused by the French honour of this country, or the maintenance revolution, to which a military direction of good faith with our allies. My lords, had been given. The advantages which 1 feel it due to myself, and to the house, they possessed, arose out of the particular to state my views with respect to the war circumstances in which they were placed, in which we are engaged, and with respect and were not natural, but artificial. His to the means which we have to support it. tory proves, my lords, that when a military No man can possibly be more anxious for direction is given to the energies of a people the restoration of peace to this country and called forth by the peculiar circumstances to the world, if peace could be obtained attending great and general revolutions, apon terms consistent with security and they are then commonly most formidable honour. For peace, I agree with the noble to their neighbours. Many therefore lord, great sacrifices might be made, if it thought, and I confess I joined in the opi was likely to be permanent, and would nion, that if France was left to herself, her afford in any way a proper compensation power would sink to its natural level. This for these sacrifices. Though I think, my was one powerful motive for concluding al lords, that foreign conquests are not to be peace, which appeared to be highly desiyielded lightly, though I think that the rable, provided the state of things in Eu conquest of colonies may be very advan-rope could be left as they were at the time. tageous to the country to a certain extent, Now, however, all the states to which I and that these are undoubtedly of great valué, as the means of procuring a safe and permanent peace, yet I am not one of You. VIII.

have alluded, have been either completely subdued by France, or reduced within comparatively narrow limits. In 1801 there T