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brave, and, as it has been proved, an in-country, to invade and take possession of yincible British army. Thái army had en- Hanover. Hanover was therefore sacritered the island with the consent of the ficed to injustice on the part of France for king of Naples, who had received them the express purpose of injuring this country. there in the full confidence that they would Would it not, therefore, be disgraceful in defend it biuvely and gallantly against the us not to insist upon the restoration of enemy, and at the same time in the full Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it persuasion that the island would not be had been taken, solely on account of its given up to the enemy. Would it not, connection with this country. The resto therefore, have been an indelible disgrace ration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, to this country to have given op Sicily to was therefore insisted upon as an indis. France upon their offer of an equivalent ? pensable preliminary to the negociation Was it for us to trafft with Sicily, and to The French government felt the injustice of dispose of it, without the consent of its the act, and consented to restore it. This sovereign? if the king of Naples chose to was consented to, previous to the comsurrender bis dominions for what he might mencement of the negociation, and never consider a sufficient equivalent; upon the afterwards became an object of dispute, continent of Europe, he was, of course, and your lordships are perfectly aware, as ai liberty to make such an exchange ; but is clearly evinced by the papers on the it was not for us to traffie with Sicily, and table, that the rupture of the negocia. bartér it away for any equivalent, without tion did not proceed from any discussion the consent of its sovereign.With respect about Hanover, but arose from far different to Hanover, my lords, I feel some diffi- causes. My lords, the principle upon culty in addressing your lordships upon which bis majesty's ministers acted during that topie, not that there is any doubt as the whole of the negociation was, that of to tbe clearness of the principle upon which good faith towards our allies. Without our pegociation with respect to that elec- that, no treaty can be concluded by thiť lorate rests, or aš to the injustice come country, without disgracing ourselves. The mitted by the enemy upon the territories principle acted upon by the French go. of that electorate, but from a doubt that vernment invariably through the whole de from some perversion or distortion of what gociation was, that of endeavouring to efis clear and obvious, there should be an fect a separation between us and our allies. idea entertained that our beneficent sove. This clearly appears in the four stages of reign bad for a moment wished to sacrifice the negociation. The first at the comany British interest to the re-attainment of mencement of the negociation, when the Hanover. My lords, his majesty, with French government offered us terms which, that beneficence which has always charac bad we been negociating for ourselves terized his reign, had not the remotest wish alone, might perbaps have been considered that the least British interest should be as the fair price of peace, but which, under Bacrificed for the purpose of obtaining the the circumstances in which we negociated, restoration of Hanover. But, my lords, were offered us as the price of dishonour, as the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign the price of the desertion of our faithful ally, was a point in which the honour of this as the price of a direct breach of good faith. country was deeply involved. It was said Here then, it was evidently their object to by a great statesman, now no more, after tempt us by these offers to separate our some remarks relative to Hanover, that if selves from Russia. The second stage of Hanover was invaded on account of its the negociation was, when the French goconnection with this country, he would as vernment, partly by threats, partly by insoon fight for Hanover as for Hampshire, spiring hopes and making promises, cong the honour of the country being equally trived to persuade the Russian minister at involved in both cases, Hanover, my lords, Paris, M. D'Oubril, to sign a separate was at peace with France, it was not con- treaty of peace. Nothing, my lords, shews pected in any way which could be a legiti- more clearly the views and objects of the wate cause for war between France and French government than the alteration in that electorate; yet Hanover was seized by their tope, after they had succeeded in obu France soon after the latter power had de- taining the signature of this separate treaty clared war against this country, and for no with Russia. Then the French government other reason than because it was thought say to our ministers, no, we cannot now by France a good means of injuring this grant you the same terms we were willing to do' before. The 'Signature of a separate case; the terms insisted on by Russia were treaty with Russia fis equivalent to a splen- moderate, free from all views of ambition, did victory; therefore we must insist upon and were only directed to the security of better terms. This, niy lords, is not our her allies. She demanded the guarantee language, but your lordships will mark the of Sicily to the king of Naples, and the expression used by the French ministers in evacuation of Dalmatia by the French the papers now in your hands, when speak- troops. By holding Dalmatia, the French ing upon that subject, and which evinces, turn the flank of the defence of · Austria, in the clearest manner, the great impor- and threaten the. Austrian capital.. Daltance which they attached to the separation matia also, though not immediately.conwhich they thought they had effected be- nected with Turkey, is set occupied by the tween Russia and this country. They con- French troops, with hostile designs against sidered it equivaleist to a splendid victory, that power. Dalmatia is not necessary to and this expression was not loosely used in the vast empire obtained by the arms of conversation, but forms a part of the writ-France, and can only be held by the latter ten sentiments of the French government power as a post of offence towards Austria upon that event. A suspicion afterwards and the Porte, and of hostility towards arose, that this treaty would not be ratified, Russia. These were the only terms inor probably intelligence of the refusal of sisted on by Russia, not to gratify any obthe emperor of Russia to ratify it had then jects of ambition, not for the increase of reached Paris, although of this we know power, but to obtain security for ber allies, nothing. Which brings me to the third stage to obtain that in which this country was of the negociation; when the French go- equally interested. The guarantee of Sivernment, finding the treaty would not be cily to the king of Naples was clearly a ratitied, immediately offered us better terms, British object, and in which this country in the hope of finding that though they has a preferable interest. This evacuation could not separate Russia from this country, of Dalmatia: by the French troops, to which they might, by the offer of better terms than Russia confined herself, not making any they had previously offered, separate this demand of the territory, is also of imporcountry from Russia. Failing, however, tance to this country as well as to our ally. equally in their endeavours to induce Russia With this good faith and moderation on the to enter into a separate treaty, or to induce part of Russia, would it not bave been an this country to enter into a separate treaty, indelible disgrace to this country if we had they at length agreed to a negociation ; to violated good faith on our part? If we had be carried on conjointly for the interests of accepted separate terms, would it not, after Russia and Great Britain. This brings me the good faith displayed by the emperor of to the fourth and last stage of the nego-Russia, have been a foul stain upon the ciation, when they departed from the prin- country never to be washed away--a disciple they had agreed to, of negociating grace and a degradation which never could with Russia and England conjointly, when have been disunited from our name? And they refused to agree to the terms asked on what are these terms which were offered to behalf of Russia, and again offered terms us as the price of disgrace and dishonour ? to this country, on the principle of a sepa- We were to be allowed to keep Malta, rale negociation. The rupture of the nego- which France can never take from us exciation was, of course, the consequence. cept by acquiring a naval superiority. The My lords, in all this procedure on the part Cape of Good Hope also, which is equally of the French government, it is manifest, secure to us, and which if it should be by that, from the first moment of the nego- accident taken by any French fleet, which ciation to the last, their only object was to might escape our blockading squadrons, endeavour to effect a separation between would not remain 6 months in the possesthis country and Russia. Had Russia, my sion of France. India, where our power lords, insisted upon extravagant and im- is not to be shaken by any efforts of France, moderate terms, or bad she insisted upon and Tobago, merely' to mention which, is points trifling and uuinteresting, it would sufficient; these were the terms offered to us have been a painful duty for me to stand to induce us to disgrace and dishonour ourup in this place and state the rupture of the selves by violating our good faith, and denegociation in consequence of any such serting our faithful ally. My lords, I should conduct on the part of Russia. But, my have rejoiced if I could bave had the oplords, the very contrary of all this was the portunity, instead of moving an address to his majesty upon the rupture of the nego- that this house have taken into serious ciation, of moving an address upon the con consideration the papers relative to the clusion of peace. That I have not that op- late negociation, which he has been pleased portunity, is wholly to be attributed to the to lay before them, and that we see with enemy, to his views of ambition, to the gratitude, that he has employed every principles upon which he acted, and which means 10 restore the blessing of peace, in were ulterly irreconcileable with those prin- a manner consistent with the interests and ciples upon which this country must ever glory of his people, and at the same time, act, for the preservation of her interests, with an observance of that good faith with and the maintenance of her bonour. I am our allies, which this country is bound to sure I shall have every heart and mind in retain inviolate. That while we lament the country with me, 'when I say that this that by the unbounded ambition of the country never can negociate upon a prin-enemy, these laudable endeavours to reciple of inferiority to France. An expres store tranquillity to his kingdom, bave sion was used by the French ministers, been frustrated, we beg leave to assure his which is stated in the papers, that if we had majesty, that no exertion shall be wanting made peace at the period alluded to in the on our part to support and assist bim, in papers, the treaty of the confederation of the adoption of such measures as may yet the Rhine would never have been signed, or be found necessary, either for the restoat least would not have been publish- ration of peace, or to meet the various ed. It happens, however, that supposing exigencies of the war in this most imporpeace to have been concluded with the ut- tant crisis.” most rapidity after the arrival of our minis- Lord Hawkesbury rose, and said :ters at Paris, the treaty could not have Although, my lords, we may differ in some been signed before the treaty of the German instances with respect to the particular confederacy was published. Thus this mode and course pursued in this negociar very confederation must unavoidably have tion, yet, on the present occasion, there preceded. the treaty, and, supposing it to can be no room for difference as to the have happened the day after, it would ner great principles and the result. I am concessarily have been a cause for war. My vineed, that, at this inoment, while our lords, I will only make one more observa- enemy continues to pursue his aggressions, tion respecting the stay of our minister at and to follow that system by which his Paris. It was perfectly evident that, when conduct has been regulated since the comthe chief of the French government set out inencement of his career,, such a peace as to take the command of the army, it was we alone look to as affording security to impossible that the negociation and hosti- ourselves and allies is utterly unattainable. lities against an ally of one of the parties I therefore most completely concur with negociating could go on pari passu. The the noble lord upon the great points which assembling of the French army was, indeed, he has stated, and of course do not feel de2 sufficient cause for breaking off the nego- sirous of urging any material objection to ciation, and when the chief of the French the address. At the same time this adgovernment set out to commence hostilities dress may, in some parts, be liable to amagainst the ally of Russia, it was clearly im- biguity, and therefore, if I do agree to it, possible that ihe negociation and the hos- it must be with some qualification. But, tile attack could go on at the same time. my lords, I most particularly approve of My lords, at the opening of the session, the conduct of the government, in the good every thing like a pledge to his majesty re- faith which it has maintained with respect specting the result of the negociation was to our allies. And if Russia had insisted carefully avoided, until the papers should upon the evacuation of Dalmatia by the be regularly before the house.", Now that French, and if that were the only point of the subject comes regularly under your difference between us and the French golordships' discussion, I intend to propose vernment, I have no hesitation in saying that your lordship should pledge your-that, upon that point alone, ministers selves to support his majesty in this cou would have been fully justified in breaking test, the continuance of which has been off the negociation. I have always thought, rendered absolutely necessary by the am- and maintained, my lords, that if there was bition of France. His lordship concluded any point which ought to be attended to by moving, “ That an humble address be inore than another, if there was any point presented to his majesty, to assure him which ought to be insisted on in preference
to every thing except our own vital inte at the context, and this shews that the rests, that point was, that Dalmatia and words are not general, but that they refer Istria, formerly dependencies of the Vene-fonly to Sicily specifically. But I confess, tian states, sbould be evacuated by the that, though the words had been general, Freneh troops. Ju these points then I'mosa yet I should not have considered the mere unequivocally agree with the noble lord verbal declaration of any minister, without who bas proposed the address. But while any written document on the subject from
say this, I beg not to be understood as hiin, by which he could be bound, as a suffiapproving all that passed in the course of cient ground to warrant the assertion, that this negociation. Where we approve of the basis of the uti possidetis was actually the general result, we may still difter mate- and distinctly agreed to by the French go, rially as to some particular parts. At the vernment. This, my lords, is a point of same time I am perfectly ready to allow, material importance, not only with respect that where we do approve of the general to this, but with regard to all other nege principles that pervade the whole, and of ciations. I have always understood that the practical result, we ought not to be too the grounds of negociation were to be laid fastidious respecting modes, or too par- down in written documents, and to be ticular in searching out minute and compa-taken from conferences reduced to writing ratively trifting errors. This I declared on at the time, so as to leave no room for a former occasion, and I still adhere to the cavil, and to bind the parties to something opinion which I then expressed. But when specifie, which they could never recede a declaration is solemnly made to the pub- from, without exposing their want of faith lic, which is not borne out by the papers to all the world. There may undoubtedly now on your table, I must confess that this be some previous communications between appears to me no trifling matter, and there the parties, leading to a particular point, fore it makes a most material difference. and these may undoubtedly be very prou I allude, my lords, to the declaration of his perly produced, in order to throw light majesty, where it is stated that the French, upon particular parts of the subject, and to from the outset of the negociation, agreed enable others to judge of the precise meanto proceed upon the basis of actual pos- ing and bearing of certain expressions, in session, subject to the interchange of such which there might otherwise be some am. equivalents as might be for the advantage biguity, Indeed there can be no doubt and honour of the two countries. Now 1 that lond Yarmouth fully believed, that the confess that, after a most careful examina- basis of uti possidetes had been proposed by tion of these papers, I have found nothing Talleyrand. Still, however, this is an o in the whole of them that can be considered parte statement, which the other party may as a certain and unequivocal foundation admit or deny as they may think proper. for such a declaration. Before the arrival Sueh statemente can never constitute the of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of essence of a negociation, or afford a clear actual possession was so far from being and undeniable ground of proceeding. " agreed upon, that ' another very different there is any object, which in cases of this was expressly stated to be the grounds sort ought to be attended to more than upon which the Freneb government would another, it is to have distinct and positive euter upon a negociation. Lord Yarmouth, admission of the basis, to have something indeed, gives a statement in writing as a wbich may be put on reeord, which the conversation which he had with Tálleyrand, party cannot deny, and to which you may and he, no doubt, firmly believed that Tal- refer, and from wbich, if the other party keyrand had proposed the basis of actual should recede, all the world would be sa possession. But in looking over the papers, tisfied that you were in the right and he is and examining with all the attention in my the wrong. Ia all negociations, therefore, pouver the written account whieh the noble the settling of a clear and distinct basis, is lord bas given of that conversation, I can one of the most material objects. It was find nothing that can afford a distinct, pre- not sufficient then that lord Barmouth uscise, and unequivocal proof that the basis of derstood that the basis of actual possession actual possession was clearly agreed to by had been aceeded to by Valleyrand. But you the French minister. The words are : "Vous fought to have demanded a precise and l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas."- categorical recognition of that basis as a But in order to affix the proper and pre-preliminary step, before you gave full cise meaning to these words, we must look powers to treat io your negociator. This
would have avoided all obscurity. There | those who think that our colonial possesă could have been no room, at least no fair sions ought to be extended indefinitely. grounds for cavilling after this. I do not Cofonies are undoubtedly valuable to a by any means object to previous commua commercial country, but they are not va nications. These may be useful and even luable to us beyond what we can protect necessary. Neither do I object to their and govern. We ought to consider what production, but as they form no part of are our own means, what our military force the essence of the proceedings, they cannot is, and what it may be made. Every thing be admitted as the only proof of the par- that is beyond what we can protect and go. ticular basis agreed upon, This ought to vern is only a delusive power, or rather a be clearly seen from the written and essen-source of weakness. But after all, my lords, tial documents, and of all others this is the the great question as to peace is, could it point upon which precision is necessary. possibly be obtained ? Could we, cons But more particularly in the present insistently with the honour and interests of stance, the utmost precision is to be ex- our country, conclude a peace with the pected, after the declaration which has french government at the present moment? been made by his majesty, that the French | Now, there are two points to be considered government, from the beginving, admitted here. First, what was the situation of the the basis of actual possession. Yet, my continent at the commencement of the lords, notwithstanding this, the declaration treaty with France in 1801? It was cers is not borne out by these papers, and the tainly very different from what it is now: atmost that they prove is this, that lord At that time Holland and Switzerland, Yarmouth-believed that the basis of actual though subject to the influence of France, possession was admitted by M. Talleyrand were not completely united to it. Naples in a conference. Having, my lords, said was entire, and Austria, though she had thus much on that particular point-a point lost much of ber military reputation, was which most certainly claimed considerable still a great power. Whatever she had lost in attention, on account of its importance in point of military character, she was, in tarious views, I have no hesitation in saya point of population and extent of territory, ing, that I most heartily concur in the ge- equal to wirat she had been at the cointeral result of the negociation, and, with mencement of the war with France. It the above exception, that I most cordially was said then, that the best chance for the join in the address, and in the assurances of salvation of Europe was in peace. We support to his majesty,in prosecuting the war, were powerful at sea, the French were which it has been found impossible imme- powerful on the continent. This great diately to put an end to, upon grounds in power they had acquired owing to the any degree consistent with the security and energies which were roused by the French honoor of this country, or the maintenance revolution, to which a military direction of good faith with our allies. My lords, had been given. The advantages which I feel it due to myself, and to the house, they possessed, arose out of the particular to state mỹ views with respect to the war circumstances in which they were placed, in which we are engaged, and with respect and were not natural, but artificial. Hisa to the means which we have to support it. tory proves, my lords, that when a military No man éan possibly be more anxious for direction is given to the energies of a people the restoration of peace to this country and called forth by the peculiar circumstances to the world, if peace could be obtained attending great and general revolutions, apon terms consistent with security and they are then commonly most formidable honour. Por peace, I agree with the noble to their neighbours. Many therefore Ford, great sacrifices might be made, if it thought, and † confess I joined in the opi. Was ikely to be permanent, and would nion, that if Francé was left fó-herself, ner afford in any way a proper compensation power would sink to its natural level. This for these sacrifices. Though I think, my was one powerful motive for concluding a lords, that foreign conquests are not to be peace, which appeared to be highly desiVielded lightly, though I think that the rable, provided the state of things in Euconquest of colonies may be very advan- rope could be left as they were at the time. tageous to the country to a certain extent, Now, however, all the states to which I and that these are undoubtedly of great have alluded, have been either completely value, as the means of procuring & safe and subdued by France, or reduced within compermanent peace, yet I am got one of paratively narrow limits. In 1801 there You, YUH.