[it is sometimes assumed to be, one of the pillars of that law. It might, indeed, be possible, for the purpose of sustaining the doctrine in question, to draw a distinction between legal and political equality; in other words, to say that all States are equal in respect of their claims to free and independent existence, however much they may chance to differ in respect of political weight and influence in the society of States. But it unfortunately happens that if a State is infirm in respect of real political influence, it is found to be practically infirm for the purpose even of defending the rights upon which its very existence depends. The proof of this is supplied by the number of treaties which exist among the leading European States, having for their objects, or for some of their objects, the guaranty of the independence and neutralization (in case of war) of the smaller and weaker States. The impotency of the bare sentiment of the equality of States, when tested in the tumultuous movements of the more powerful States, brought about by a great European crisis, was exhibited in the wars of the first Napoleon; and has been exhibited more recently by the conduct of Russia in her relations with Turkey; of France in respect of Savoy and Nice; and of Prussia and Austria in respect of Denmark. The hasty treaty concluded between England and France and Germany respectively, in the very crisis of the last war, for the better securing the neutralization of Belgium, is a more recent illustration of the practical limitations with which the doctrine of the equality of States must at present be received.

Another modification of this doctrine of equality, which at one time was of considerable importance, but which now has been reduced to its proper insignificance, is that due to the precedence of different States in respect of rank. Mr. Ward, in his "Enquiry," has devoted a very entertaining and instructive chapter to an elucidation of the historical aspects of this subject. The hierarchical

Corder in which the claims of the Pope, of the Emperor of Germany, of States entitled to royal honours (among which the republics of Switzerland, of the United Netherlands, and of the United States were included), and of States either newly sprung from, or constitutionally dependent on, other States, were arranged was the result partly of Papal domination and direction, partly of spontaneous custom, partly of express convention. The maritime ceremonial honours due as between the ships of different States are now regulated by considerations of reciprocal courtesy on equal terms, and not by regard to legal claims. Questions of precedence, again, between the representatives of different States are now relegated to the general topic of the rights of ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.

[CHAPTER II.

OF AMBASSADORS AND THE DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE BETWEEN STATES.

THE continuous and active intercourse between the governments of modern States has given a prominence in the Law of Nations to the subject of ambassadors and diplomatic intercourse of a very different sort from that which it formerly possessed. Mr. Ward, in his "Enquiry," has described the successive steps by which, between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, exceptional and transient embassies became transformed into frequent and lasting ones, and these again into general and permanent embassies. Mr. Ward has also illustrated his remarks by references to the national suspiciousness which attended the early practice of embassage, and the frivolous, though often disastrous, contentions for precedency which prevailed among the diplomatic representatives of the different States.

The instincts of good sense have, however, finally prevailed over the morbid susceptibility which in these respects so long attached to the leading European governments, and the legal situation, rights, and duties of every class of diplomatic representatives have now, either by treaty or by well-recognised usage, been ascertained with a very considerable amount of precision.

The right enjoyed by a State of sending a diplomatic representative must of course be exactly correlative with the duty incumbent upon another State of receiving one. The right of sending a diplomatic representative, and keeping him in residence at a foreign

[* Vol. ii. p. 477.]

[court, is now recognised as one of the inherent and essential rights of every true State, and a corresponding duty lies on every State of receiving, and permitting the continued sojourn of, such a representative. The only questions which have presented any difficulty in this matter relate either to the political qualifications of the State, or government of a State, which claims to send the representative, or to the personal objections which may be taken to any particular representative who happens to be nominated.

As to the political qualifications of the sending State or government, the question is rather part of one already discussed, that is, whether the notion of a gradation of States, in respect of sovereignty and independence, is admissible or not. With respect to confederated States, it will depend rather on the terms of the federal union than on general law whether any member of the union. can or cannot claim to have a resident minister at a foreign court. In the case of a State which has only recently emerged into independence, the admission of its claim to have a permanent political representative, vested with the usual powers and privileges of a reprcsentative of a sovereign State, would be a decisive recognition on the part of the admitting State of the sovereignty and independence of the new State. On the other hand, the mere reception of a diplomatic agent from the de facto government of a soi-disant State, either for the conduct of a special class of negociations, or for the more convenient management of all matters of political moment arising between the governments, could not be treated as the recognition of any general right on the part of the (perhaps only) provisional government to diplomatic representation. Each case of this kind must be treated on its own merits, and the only principle that can be laid down with any confidence is, that the right to send to the court of a foreign government, and to retain there,

Ca diplomatic representative vested with all the rights and privileges which inherently belong to the highest classes of such officials, and which will be briefly described lower down,-belongs, and belongs only, to a true State; though, whether it can be exercised as of right by a de facto government of that State must depend upon the fact of the actual recognition of that government (for such purposes at least) by the particular State in respect of which the claim to exercise the right is made.

The other question above alluded to touches the personality of the diplomatic representative selected. This question involves rather considerations of courtesy than of strict right, because if a foreign government resisted without avail the appointment of a particular representative, the end of the appointment, that is, the facilitation of intercourse between the two States, must be in a large measure frustrated. Thus the necessity of choosing a representative likely to be generally acceptable at the court to which he is commissioned is so commanding, that the abstract possibility of forcing a given representative upon a reluctant government is more a matter of curious speculation than of useful inquiry. The generally admitted principles, however, seem to be that a government is not entitled to object to the appointment of a diplomatic agent to itself, without assigning its grounds; and among these grounds, nationality, religion, rank and even sex* would not be held good, though the circumstance of the agent being one of its own subjects might be held a good ground of objection.

The sensitiveness to minute questions of ceremony by which the courts of the leading European States

[* Bynk. Lib. II. c. v. Ratio utique feminas a legationibus non arcet, in feminis enim reperies quidquid in legatis desideraveris.]