Chalcis. We shall ere long see how Olynthus filled its new place as an Hellenic state. But the position of Potidæa proved impregnable, defended as it was on both sides by walls built across the narrow isthmus; and after wasting three months before it, Artabazus rejoined Mardonius.

The Persian commander opened the campaign of B.C. 479 by advancing into Boeotia; but, before commencing active operations he made an attempt to detach the Athenians from the common cause through the mediation of Alexander, king of Macedonia. He offered them the active friendship of the great king, reparation for the damage done in Attica, and a large accession of territory. The Macedonian prince found the Athenians amidst the ruins of their city, suffering from the loss of their last harvest and destitute of seed for the new year. The Lacedæmonians sent envoys, entreating them to resist the tempting offers, and promising relief for their present distress. The Athenians dismissed Alexander with the message that never, till the sun should change his course, would they become the friends of Xerxes; and they assured the Lacedæmonians that so long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should be made with Persia. Declining their offers of present aid, they pressed them to send an army into Boeotia for the common defence against Mardonius. This the Spartan envoys promised; but they had no sooner returned home, than the Peloponnesians concentrated all their force on completing the defences of the Isthmus; and the Athenians recrossed the strait to Salamis, leaving their country a second time to the mercy of the Persians (May-June, B.C. 479). Even then, though indignant at the selfish policy of their allies, they spurned the renewed offers made by Mardonius from Athens, which he had reoccupied without injuring the country or the new buildings of the city. A single senator who dared to counsel submission was stoned to death by the common impulse of his colleagues and the people, while the Athenian women stoned his wife and children. But the consciousness of wrong infused a wholesome dread into the minds of the Spartans, lest Athens should after all consult her own safety; and then her fleet would have rendered useless the defences of the Isthmus: They at length posted a powerful army at the Isthmus, under their king Pausanias, ready to advance into Boeotia, to which country Mardonius had retired, after once more ravaging Attica. The Persian chose his position in the plain of the Asopus, as fitted for his cavalry, in a friendly country, and near his magazines at Thebes; and he fortified an immense camp between Platea and

B.C. 479.]

ADVANCE OF THE GREEK ARMY.

437

Erythræ. His forces appeared equal to the task he had undertaken; but they were demoralized by the king's retreat, and Artabazus was jealous of Mardonius. The feeling of the Persians is attested by a very interesting anecdote, which Herodotus heard from a person who was present at a banquet given by the Theban commander to Mardonius. A Persian, who was placed with him on the same couch, began to lament that of all his countrymen feasting there or lying in the neighbouring camp, but few would soon survive. And, on being asked why he did not utter this conviction to Mardonius, the Persian replied, that men could not avert what God had decreed, nor would those doomed to destruction believe the warning of their fate; adding the memorable words, so often repeated by those who would benefit men in spite of themselves: "The worst of human pains is this, to have a mind full of counsel, and yet the power to effect nothing." * " Among the Medizing Greeks, only the Thessalians and Boeotians were staunch; the Phocians were held in such suspicion, that, if we may trust the story so picturesquely related by Herodotus, they were actually surrounded by the Persian cavalry, with the intention of massacring them, when their firm attitude induced Mardonius to change his mind.

At length the Spartans and their allies advanced from the Isthmus to the plain of Eleusis, where they were joined by the Athenians and Plateans, who crossed over from Salamis under Aristides. They numbered 5000 Spartans, 5000 Corinthians, 3000 Sicyonians, 3000 Megarians, 8000 Athenians, and 600 Platæans. The contingents of other states made up a total of 38,700 heavy-armed soldiers. There were no cavalry, and few archers. Herodotus reckons the Helots in attendance on the Spartans at 35,000, and the other light-armed troops at 34,500, besides 1800 Thespians so badly armed as to be reckoned only in this class. The entire Greek army amounted to 110,000 men.

Pausanias led them from Eleusis over the ridge of Citharon, and hung upon its northern declivity near Erythræ, overlooking the camp of Mardonius, without venturing into the plain. An attack of the Persian cavalry, under Masistius, a chief whose courage equalled his splendid appearance, was repulsed by the

* Herod. ix. 16. ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα undεvòs Kрatéεiv. Those familiar with Dr. Arnold's Letters will recognise the quotation. Mr. Grote remarks on the strong impression we receive of the sources of information possessed by Herodotus, when we find him in direct communication with a person who had feasted with Mardonius.

Megarians and Athenians; and the death of the commander, whose body the Persians strove fiercely but in vain to recover, seemed to give an omen of the coming victory. The wailings of the Persians were echoed from the surrounding hills, and their whole army assumed the signs of mourning, while the Greeks

paraded the body through their ranks in a cart. Thus encouraged, and finding his position on the high ground short of water, Pausanias assumed the defensive by descending into the plain. The nature of his movement, and the consequent change of position effected by Mardonius, will be at once understood from the plan.

B.C. 479.]

BATTLE OF PLATEA.

439

The two armies now faced each other on opposite sides of the Asopus. The right of the Greeks was held by the Lacedæmonians, the left by the Athenians, the centre by the troops of the other states. Mardonius deviated from the usual Persian array, which made the centre the post of honour, and himself took the left, with the chosen Persians and Medes, opposite to the Lacedæmonians. On the right he set his Macedonians and Greeks against the Athenians; the rest of the Asiatic soldiers filled the centre. Both sides hesitated to begin the encounter; and Mardonius used the pause for intrigues with some of the wealthier Athenians, which were firmly repressed by Aristides, while the Persian cavalry harassed the rear of the Greeks and cut off their supplies. But after two days Mardonius became impatient, and, against the advice of Artabazus and the Thebans, he prepared for a decisive battle. During the night his intention was communicated to Aristides by Alexander the Macedonian, who doubtless felt it high time to make his peace with the Greeks. On hearing the news, Pausanias took the step, most extraordinary for a Spartan general, of exchanging places between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, on the ground that the latter had already met and vanquished the formidable Persians, whom the Spartans had not yet encountered. The sign of alarm was not lost upon Mardonius, who forthwith attempted to shake the Greek array by repeated charges of cavalry, and not without success.* Thus harassed, Pausanias decided on withdrawing, during the night, into the so-called "Island," between two branches of the river Oëroë, which flow down from Citharon. The confusion attendant upon a night march over unknown ground, and especially the obstinacy of one of the Spartan captains, who long refused to retreat when in presence of an enemy, caused such disorder and delay, that, while the Greek centre overshot their mark and retreated quite to Platæa, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were overtaken by the Persians before they had come up with the Athenians. The Persian archers, forming a breast work of their wicker shields, poured in a galling flight of arrows, which Pausanias was obliged to bear till the victims, which even at this crisis he would not omit to offer, should become favourable. At length his prayer to Hera, whose temple stood in full view on the citadel of Platæa, was answered by a favourable omen, which was anticipated by the

* We can hardly decide whether the story of his challenge to a single combat with champions of equal numbers-Lacedæmonians against Persians-is anything more than a Homeric embellishment. See Herod. ix. 71.

onset of the Tegeans. The Lacedæmonians rushed to their support; the frail breast work went down before the charge, and the Persians again found themselves, as at Marathon and Thermopyla, engaged in close conflict with the serried phalanx, long spears, and full armour of the Greeks. They fought with even more than their wonted bravery, grasping the spears and breaking them with their hands. Mardonius, who doubtless felt that there was no return for him to Persia if he lost this field, was conspicuous in front on a white charger, till he was slain by a Spartan, whose name was curiously fitted to his exploit.* Nearly all his bodyguard, of a thousand chosen men, died around him; the wearied Persians gave way when they saw their leader fall; the other Asiatics turned their backs without a blow; and the routed army fled for shelter to their palisaded camp behind the Asopus. One division of 40,000 Persians, under Artabazus, had been left behind in the rapid advance of Mardonius, and took no part in the battle. Artabazus, after trying in vain to moderate the rashness of his commander, had formed his division as a reserve, and was advancing to the scene of action, when he saw the total rout of the main army. He immediately retreated, and, passing by the camp and Thebes itself, began his march back to Asia.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Plateans, summoned by a hasty message from Pausanias, came up on the Spartan left, and encountered the Thebans and Boeotians. Those of the Greeks who had made the greatest sacrifices for their country stood front to front with those who had most completely sold themselves to the invader; and, besides, their animosity was inflamed by old domestic feuds. After a fierce contest, the Boeotians were forced back to Thebes, their retreat being covered by their cavalry. The other Medizing Greeks kept aloof from the fight, and fled as soon as they saw the defeat of the Thebans. Indeed it is remarkable how small a portion of the two armies was engaged on the field of Platea. The battle was really decided by "the Dorian spear" in the conflict of the Spartans and Tegeans with the Medes and Persians; on the left it was confined to the Athenians and Boeotians. The other contingents of the Greek army were far in the rear; the rest of the Asiatics fled without a stroke. The victory was followed up by the storming of the fortified camp with a slaughter which must have been truly fearful, to give even a colour of truth to the * Aeimnestus, signifying ever to be remembered. Eschylus, Persæ, 817.