142 CHAPTER V. OF THE OFFICE AND DUTIES OF THE CIVIL RULER. "Besides to know Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, What severs each, thou hast learn'd, which few have done: MILTON, Sonnet xvii. MS. reading. "I esteem it, above all things, necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and on the other, a care of the commonwealth. .... These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude, that all the power of civil government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come. . . . . With the care of souls the civil magistrate ought not to interfere." LOCKE, Letter on Toleration, Works, fol., Lond. 1759, pp. 244, 245. "A law against the majority of the people is, in substance, a law against the people itself; its extent determines its invalidity; it is not particular injustice, but general oppression; and can no longer be considered as a private hardship, which might be borne, but spreads and grows up into the unfortunate importance of a national calamity.. "A law directed against the mass of the nation has not the nature, nor has it the authority, of a reasonable institution." BURKE, Tracts on the Popery Laws. "The ruler is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."-ROMANS, xiii. 4. 1. THE most popular reply to these arguments on the evils and injustice of establishments is one that claims more attention than has yet been given to any of the replies which have hitherto been noticed. It may be stated broadly in terms like these-"It is the duty of a government to instruct its subjects in religion;" or, more guardedly, "It is the duty of a Christian government to instruct its subjects in the truths of the Christian faith." As the main subject of this chapter is an examination of the duties and office of the civil magistrate in matters of religion, it would be useless to spend time in illustrating the evils consequent upon the establishment of disputed points in theology and useless rites of worship, which, however harmless when regarded as indifferent, become most noxious when once established. These are left altogether out of view; and we come at once to the substance of the argument itself. 2. It is but fair, however, to premise, that this statement of the argument is by no means just, inasmuch as it does not touch the question in dispute. The proposition that ought to be proved is this-that it is the duty of a government, or of a Christian government, to compel its subjects to diffuse what some of them-in this country the majority of them, only the proportion is no part of the question-do not believe, and to punish them for their unbelief. If any object to this statement of the doctrine, the answer is obvious Shew us an establishment supported unanimously by the people, and where there is no punishment, no compulsion, but all are its voluntary supporters, and dissenters will bid it God's speed, and wish it continuance of union and success. It is such establishments only as involve compulsion, persecution, and injustice that dissenters condemn. 3. The first question that presents itself is of the last moment, and one which has received answers so contradictory, that if oneness be an attribute of truth, there is no truth in any of them, nor in the principle which they are adduced to support. On what law, or on what authority, is this duty of the civil magistrate founded? On the law of nature-that is, of equity or of utility—or on the law of revelation? Both answers have their advocates, and therefore it is important that each of them be carefully examined. Take first, then, the law of revelation, as explained in the precepts and in the examples of the Bible; and in neither will it be possible to find even the shadow of an argument in favour of the existent system. 4. (i.) The first appeal is to the example of the Jewish Theocracy. "Under the economy of the law," it is held, "the diffusion of religious opinions was sanctioned by the highest authority; the Levites were even set apart and paid to diffuse them; and therefore, unless it can be shewn that the precepts or the principles of the gospel set it aside, the question must be regarded as for ever settled by Jehovah himself." Now, in answer to this argument, let it be observed 1. If the diffusion or the maintenance of opinions were the end of the law, it failed. It is notorious, that while the Jews practised its precepts, for its truths or spirituality they had no regard. It was to them a volume of characters only, not of meaning and promise; and hence, when Christ appeared, they rejected his explanation of it with almost universal contempt. Besides, when that "which is perfect has come," Christians should be cautious in taking precedents from an economy which was but "in part," and which most judicious inquirers hold to be abrogated by the economy of the gospel.* 2. The Jewish was a secular, not a spiritual system. Its object was not the maintenance or the diffusion of opinion, but-the observance of the laws. The Levites, who had their share of the land of promise in tithes, were not merely the religious teachers of the people; they were the officers of the state, the servants of the invisible King.† 3. God himself was lawgiver and judge: his de See note M. † See note N. H cisions were infallibly true, and his precepts infallibly just. Unless, therefore, it can be proved that this attribute of infallibility has actually been communicated to the state church, there is no resemblance between the circumstances of the Jewish government and the circumstances of our own. 4. The institutions of that economy were adopted with the unanimous and repeated consent of the community at large. There was an explicitly legalized contract between the people and Goda contract solemnly ratified at different periods of their history. Now, if in modern times it can be shewn that the universal suffrages of a nation have entrusted to the hands of their rulers their * The Jewish economy, with all its peculiarities, was expressly accepted by the Jewish nation; and this acceptance of it was ratified at different times, not virtually, but actually and collectively, by the whole people; by "their elders, their officers, with all the men of Israel, their little ones, their wives, and the stranger within their camp, from the hewer of their wood to the drawer of their water." (Deut. xxix. 10—12; Exod. xix. 5, 6; Deut. v. 2, 3; Josh. xxiv. 22; 2 Kings, xi. 17; 2 Chron. xv. 12-15.) Is there even the semblance of logical truth in such reasonings as these-Because God himself saw it right to enforce his own law, moral and ceremonial, on the Jewish people, who had voluntarily accepted it, therefore the civil magistrate may enforce his notions of religion on the consciences of his subjects who do not accept them, but who believe them, on the contrary, repugnant to the statements of the Bible? It must be a somewhat curious minor premiss that connects such facts with such a conclusion. |