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which makes the difficulty in the names of substances.
the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name
is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less
being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of
its name be obscure or uncertain.

§ 16. 5. Simple ideas have few ascents in linea predicamentali.
FIFTHLY, This farther may be observed concerning simple ideas,
and their names, that they have but few ascents in linea predica-
mentali (as they call it) from the lowest species to the summum
genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but
one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it ;) that so the differ-
ence being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in
one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the
genus of the other two: v. g.There is nothing that can be left
out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one com-
mon appearance, and so have one general name as rationality
being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with
brute, in the more general idea and name of animal) and therefore
when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend
both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one
general name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which de-
notes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red,
and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name color,
it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind
only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And
when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend
both colors and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a
word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one
sense and so the general term quality, in its ordinary accepta-
tion, comprehends colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qual-
ities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure,
and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce
their ideas by more senses than one.

§ 17. 6. Names of simple ideas stand for ideas not at all arbi

trary.

SIXTHLY, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed
modes, have also this difference; that those of mixed modes stand
for ideas perfectly arbitrary; those of substances are not per-
fectly so, but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude; and
those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of
things, and are not arbitrary at all.
all. Which what difference it

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makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.

CHAP. V.

OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.

§1. They stand for abstract ideas, as other general names. THE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been showed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention.

§ 2. 1. The ideas they stand for are made by the understanding. THE first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas;) in which sort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it.

§ 3. 2. Made arbitrarily and without patterns.

In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence, Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery or incest be right, will a man seek it any

where amongst things existing?) Or is it true, because any one

has been witness to such an action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific idea, whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no.

§ 4. How this is done.

To understand this aright, we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists: and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: first, It chooses a certain number; secondly, It gives them connection, and makes them into one idea thirdly, It ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind, and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

§ 5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the ex

istence.

NOBODY can doubt, but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And I think nobody can deny, but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

To

§ 6. Instances-Murder, Incest, Stabbing.

see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by

the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature. For what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word murder, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son, or neighbor; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parricide, whilst the other make no distinct species at all ?`But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, or daughter; yet in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes abitrarily unites into complex ideas, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called stabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this It say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding; and there is nothing more.. evident than that for the most part, in the framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes,) without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§ 7. But still subservient to the end of language. BUT though these complex ideas, or essences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they (are not made at random,) and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not always copied from

nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language, The use of language is, by short sounds to signify with ease and despatch general conceptions: wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract ideas, of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. (It suffices, that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing, the idea of father, or mother, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbor, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbor: and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas of mother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a distinct abstract idea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under incest; and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious descriptions.

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8. Whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof.

A MODERATE Skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this; it being so obvious to observe great store of

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