to this, in respect of expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion, as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration and therefore what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.

§ 12. Duration has never two parts together, expansion all together.

DURATION, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of herishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; as expansion is the idea of lasting distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of succession.) And therefore though we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past, he can never recal, and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings: who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of any magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no farther removed from his sight than the present: they all lie under the same view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For the existence of all things depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other;

every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther speculation.

CHAP. XVI.

OF NUMBER.

§ 1. Number the simplest and most universal idea. AMONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple than that of unity, or one. It has no shadow of variety or composition in it; every object our senses are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagined.

§ 2. Its modes made by addition.

By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it.) (Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen and so of a score, or a million, or any other number.

§ 3. Each mode distinct.

THE simple modes of number are of all other the most distinct; every the least variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote: (two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?

§ 4. Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise. THE clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all

others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension, where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered: which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90. But it is not so in extension, where whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch, is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot or an inch; and in lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts; nor can any one assign an angle which shall be the next biggest to a right one.

§ 5. Names necessary to numbers.

By the repeating, as has been said, of the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for several collections of units, distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers,

and a memory to retain that series, with their several names : (al all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new or distinct name or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after,) and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by subtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, though not perhaps of morc. For the several simple modes of numbers, being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference, but more or less, names or marks for each distinct combination, seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For without such names or marks we can hardly well

make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combi nation is made up of any great multitude of units: which put together without a name or mark, to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.

§ 6. Names necessary to numbers.

THIS I think to be the reason, why some Americans I have spoken with (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct idea of that number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple life, (unacquainted either with trade or mathematics, had no words in it to stand for 1000 so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers, they would show the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude which they could not number: which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. * The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above 5; any number beyond that, they made out by showing their fingers, and the fingers of others, who were present. And I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them, by millions of millions, of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most four and twenty decimal progressions, without confusion. But to show how much distinct names conduce to our well reck. oning, or having useful ideas of numbers, let us set all these following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number; v.g. Nonilions. Octilions. Septilions. Sextilions. Quintilions.

The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions (which is the denomination of the second six figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number: but whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and ideas of them both got * Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brazil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20.

more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

§7. Why children number not earlier.

THUS children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and (one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell 20.) And some, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. (For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of one unit. 2. That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the numbers follow one another in either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.

§ 8. Number measures all measurables.

THIS farther is observable in number, that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are expansion and duration and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of eternity and immensity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of num