alliances with the northern powers, and with some of the princes in Germany, which we never did, nor ever could do, without granting them immediate subsidies. These measures were, therefore, I still think, not only prudent, but necessary; and by these measures we made it much more dangerous for the Emperor and Spain to attack us than it would otherwise have been.

But still, sir, though by these alliances we put ourselves upon an equal footing with our enemies in case of an attack, yet, in order to preserve the tranquillity of Europe as well as our own, there was something else to be done. We knew that war could not be begun and carried on without money; we knew that the Emperor had no money for that purpose without receiving large remittances from Spain; and we knew that Spain could make no such remittances without receiving large returns of treasure from the West Indies. The only way, therefore, to render these two powers incapable of disturbing the tranquillity of Europe, was by sending a squadron to the West Indies to stop the return of the Spanish galleons; and this made it necessary, at the same time, to send a squadron to the Mediterranean for the security of our valuable possessions in that part of the world. By these measures the Emperor saw the impossibility of attacking us in any part of the world, because Spain could give him no assistance either in money or troops; and the attack made by the Spaniards upon Gibraltar was so feeble that we had no occasion to call upon our allies for assistance. A small squadron of our own prevented their attacking it by sea, and from their attack by land we had nothing to fear. They might have knocked their brains out against inaccessible rocks to this very day without bringing that fortress into any danger.

I do not pretend, sir, to be a great master of foreign affairs. In that post in which I have the honor to serve His Majesty it is not my business to interfere; and as one of His Majesty's council, I have but one voice. But if I had been the sole adviser of the Treaty of Hanover, and of all the measures which were taken in pursuance of it, from what I have said I hope it will appear that I do not deserve to be censured either as a weak or a wicked minister on that account.

The next measures which incurred censure were the guar

antee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the second Treaty of Vienna, and the refusal of the Cabinet to assist the House of Austria, in conformity with the articles of that guarantee.*

As to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction I am really surprised to find that measure objected to. It was so universally approved of, both within doors and without, that till this very day I think no fault was ever found with it, unless it was that of being too long delayed. If it was so necessary for supporting the balance of power in Europe, as has been insisted on in this debate, to preserve entire the dominions of the House of Austria, surely it was not our business to insist upon a partition of them in favor of any of the princes of the empire. But if we had, could we have expected that the House of Austria would have agreed to any such partition, even for the acquisition of our guarantee? The King of Prussia had, it is true, a claim upon some lordships in Silesia; but that claim was absolutely denied by the Court of Vienna, and was not at that time so much insisted on by the late King of Prussia. Nay, if he had lived till this time, I believe it would not now have been insisted on; for he acceded to that guarantee without any reservation of that claim; therefore I must look upon this as an objection which has since arisen from an accident that could not then be foreseen or provided against.

I must therefore think, sir, that our guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, or our manner of doing it, cannot now be objected to, nor any person censured by Parliament for advising that measure. In regard to the refusal of the Cabinet to assist the House of Austria, though it was prudent and right in us to enter into that guarantee, we were not therefore obliged to enter into every broil the House of Austria might afterward lead themselves into. And therefore we were not in honor obliged to take any share in the war which the Emperor brought upon himself in the year 1733; nor were we in interest obliged to take a share in that war as long as neither side attempted to push their conquests further than was consistent with the balance of power in Europe, which was a case that did not happen. For the power of the House of Austria was not diminished by the event of that war, because they got Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia in lieu of Naples and Sicily;

[In allusion to the instrument drawn up by Charles VI, of Germany, called a Pragmatic Sanction, by which all his

hereditary estates were to go to his fe male descendants.]

nor was the power of France much increased, because Lorraine was a province she had taken and kept possession of during every war in which she had been engaged.

As to the disputes with Spain, they had not then reached such a height as to make it necessary for us to come to an open rupture. We had then reason to hope that all differences would be accommodated in an amicable manner; and while we have any such hopes, it can never be prudent for us to engage ourselves in war, especially with Spain, where we have always had a very beneficial commerce. These hopes, it is true, sir, at last proved abortive; but I never heard it was a crime to hope for the best. This sort of hope was the cause of the late convention. If Spain had performed her part of that preliminary treaty, I am sure it would not have been wrong in us to have hoped for a friendly accommodation; and for that end to have waited nine or ten months longer, in which time the plenipotentiaries were, by the treaty, to have adjusted all the differences subsisting between the two nations. But the failure of Spain in performing what had been agreed to by this preliminary put an end to all our hopes, and then, and not till then, it became prudent to enter into hostilities, which were commenced as soon as possible after the expiration of the term limited for the payment of the £95,000.

Strong and virulent censures have been cast on me for having commenced the war without a single ally; and this deficiency has been ascribed to the multifarious treaties in which I have bewildered myself. But although the authors of this imputation are well apprised that all these treaties have been submitted to and approved by Parliament, yet they are now brought forward as crimes, without appealing to the judgment of Parliament, and without proving or declaring that all or any of them were advised by me. A supposed sole minister is to be condemned and punished as the author of all; and what adds to the enormity is, that an attempt was made to convict him uncharged and unheard, without taking into consideration the most arduous crisis which ever occurred in the annals of Europe. Sweden corrupted by France; Denmark tempted and wavering; the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel almost gained; the King of Prussia, the Emperor, and the Czarina, with whom alliances had been negotiating, dead; the Austrian

dominions claimed by Spain and Bavaria; the Elector of Saxony hesitating whether he should accede to the general confederacy planned by France; the Court of Vienna irresolute and indecisive. In this critical juncture, if France enters into engagements with Prussia, and if the Queen of Hungary hesitates and listens to France, are all or any of those events to be imputed to English counsels? And if to English counsels, why are they to be attributed to one man?

2. I now come, sir, to the second head, the conduct of domestic affairs. And here a most heinous charge is made, that the nation has been burdened with unnecessary expenses, for the sole purpose of preventing the discharge of our debts and the abolition of taxes. But this attack is more to the dishonor of the whole Cabinet council than to me. If there is any ground for this imputation, it is a charge upon King, Lords, and Commons, as corrupted or imposed upon. And they have no proof of these allegations, but affect to substantiate them by common fame and public notoriety!

No expense has been incurred but what has been approved of, and provided for, by Parliament. The public treasure has been duly applied to the uses to which it was appropriated by Parliament, and regular accounts have been annually laid before Parliament of every article of expense. If by foreign accidents, by the disputes of foreign states among themselves, or by their designs against us, the nation has often been put to an extraordinary expense, that expense cannot be said to have been unnecessary; because, if by saving it we had exposed the balance of power to danger, or ourselves to an attack, it would have cost, perhaps, a hundred times that sum before we could recover from that danger, or repel that attack. In all such cases there will be a variety of opinions. I happened to be one of those who thought all these expenses necessary, and I had the good fortune to have the majority of both Houses of Parliament on my side. But this, it seems, proceeded from bribery and corruption. Sir, if any one instance had been mentioned, if it had been shown that I ever offered a reward to any member of either House, or ever threatened to deprive any member of his office or employment, in order to influence his vote in Parliament, there might have been some ground for this charge. But when it is so generally

laid, I do not know what I can say to it, unless it be to deny it as generally and as positively as it has been asserted. And, thank God! till some proof be offered, I have the laws of the land, as well as the laws of charity, in my favor.

Some members of both Houses have, it is true, been removed from their employments under the Crown; but were they ever told, either by me, or by any other of His Majesty's servants, that it was for opposing the measures of the administration in Parliament? They were removed because His Majesty did not think fit to continue them longer in his service. His Majesty had a right so to do; and I know no one that has a right to ask him, "What doest thou?" If His Majesty had a mind that the favors of the Crown should circulate, would not this of itself be a good reason for removing any of his servants? Would not this reason be approved of by the whole nation, except those who happen to be the present possessors? I cannot, therefore, see how this can be imputed as a crime, or how any of the King's ministers can be blamed for his doing what the public has no concern in; for if the public be well and faithfully served, it has no business to ask by whom.

5

As to the particular charge urged against me, I mean that of the army debentures, I am surprised, sir, to hear anything relating to this affair charged upon me. Whatever blame may attach to this affair, it must be placed to the account of those that were in power when I was, as they call it, the country gentleman. It was by them this affair was introduced and conducted, and I came in only to pay off those public securities, which their management had reduced to a great discount; and consequently to redeem our public credit from that reproach which they had brought upon it. The discount at which these army debentures were negotiated was a strong and prevalent reason with Parliament to apply the sinking fund first to the payment of those debentures; but the sinking fund could not be applied to that purpose till it began to produce something considerable, which was not till the year 1727. That the sinking fund was then to receive a great addition, was a fact publicly known in 1726; and if some people were sufficiently quick-sighted to foresee that the Parliament would

"One who held himself bound to neither party.