in clearing the ground a little, and removing fome of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world,if the endeavours of ingenious and induftrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned,but frivolous ufe of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the fciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philofophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite converfation. Vague and infignificant forms of fpeech, and abufe of language, have fo long paffed for myfteries of fcience; and hard and mifapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prefcription, fuch a right to be miftaken for deep learning, and height of fpeculation, that it will not be easy to perfuade, either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance,and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the fanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I fuppofe,fome fervice to human understanding: though fo few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the ufe of words; or that the language of the fect they are of, has any faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this fubject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveteratenefs of the mischief, nor the prevalence of the fafhion, fhall be any excufe for thofe, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not fuffer the fignificancy of their expreflions to be inquired into.

I have been told, that a fhort epitome of this treatise, which was printed 1688, was by fome condemned without reading, because innate ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not fuppofed, there would be little left, either of the notion or proof of fpirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatife, I fhall defire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away falfe foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of truth; which is never injured or

endangered fo much, as when mixed with, or built on falfehood. In the second edition, I added as followeth

The bookfeller will not forgive me, if I fay nothing of this fecond edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, fhall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He defires too, that it fhould be known, that it has one whole new chapter concerning Identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. Thefe, I muft inform my reader, are not all new matter, but most of them either farther confirmations of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being miftaken in the fenfe of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I muft only except the alterations I have made in Book II. Chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deferved as accurate a view, as I was capable of; thofe fubjects having, in all ages, exercifed the learned part of the world, with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge, that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason fomewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world, with as much freedom and readinefs, as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right, thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppofe that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I feek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence foever it comes.

But what forwardness foever I have to refign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; yet this I muft own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from thofe exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book; nor have, from any thing that has been urged against it, found reason to alter my VOL. I. C

fenfe, in any of the points which have been questioned.. Whether the fubject I have in hand requires often more thought, and attention, than curfory readers, at least fuch as are prepoffeffed, are willing to allow or whether any obfcurity in my expreffions cafts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to other's apprehenfions in my way of treating them: fo it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly understood. There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myfelf, to conclude, that either my book is painly enough written to be rightly understood by thofe who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or else, that I have writ mine fo obfcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be the truth, it is myfelf only am affected thereby, and therefore I fhall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be faid, in answer to those several objections I have met with, to paffages here and there of my book: fince I perfuade myfelf, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false, will be able to fee, that what is faid is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my oppofer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good thoughts fhould be loft, have published their cenfures of my Effay, with this honour done to it, that they will not fuffer it to be an Effay; I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and fhall not wafte my reader's time in fo idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to leffen the fatisfaction any one has in himself or gives to others, in fo hafty a confutation of what I have written.

The bookfellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Effay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leifure, make any additions or alterations I fhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that befides feveral corrections I had madə

here and there, there was one alteration which it was neceffary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood.. What I thereupon faid was this:

Clear and diftinct ideas are terms, which, though familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And poffibly it is but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to confider them fo far as to know what he himself or others precifely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By thofe denominations, I mean fome object in the mind, and confequently determined, i. e. fuch as it is there feen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when fuch as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and fo determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate found, which is to be steadily the fign of that very fame object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a fimple idea, I mean that fimple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is faid to be in it: by determined, when applied to a complex ideo, I mean fuch an one as confifts of a determinate number of certain fimple or lefs complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and fees in itself, when that idea is prefent in it, or fhould be prefent in it, when a man gives a name to it: I fay fhould be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is fo careful of his language,as to ufe no word, till he views in his mind the precife determined idea, which he refolves to make it the fign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obfcurity and confufion in men's thoughts and difcourfes.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's difcourfes and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his

mind a determined idea, which he makes it the fign of, and to which he fhould keep it fteadily annexed, during that prefent difcourfe. Where he does not or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his arenot fo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obfcurity and confufion, where fuch terms are made ufe of, which have not fucha precife determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas, a way of fpeaking lefs liable to mistakes, than clear and diftinct; and where me: nave got fuch determined ideas of all that they reason, quire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controverfies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain ufe of words, or (which is the fame) indetermined ideas, which they are made to ftand for ; I have made choice of these terms to fignify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it,.slistinct from the found it uses as a fign of it. 2. That this idea thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itfelf, and knows, and fees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precife idea. If men had fuch determined ideas in their inquiries and difcourfes, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and difcourfes went, and avoid the greateft part of the difputes and wranglings they have with others.

Befides, this, the bookfeller will think it neceffary I hould advertife the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of The Affociation of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. Thefe, with fome other larger additions,never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the fame manner, and for the fame purpofe, as was done when this Effay had the fecond impreffion.

In the fixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21ft chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.