the understanding deftroy thofe that are there. Thedominion of man, in this little world of his own underftanding being much-what the fame as it is in the great

porter, or a fupport, is not represented to the mind, by any clear and distinct idea; therefore the obfcure and indistinct, vague idea of thing, or fomething, is all that is left to be the pofitive idea, which has the relation of a fupport, or fubftratum, to modes or accidents; and that general, indetermined idea of fomething is, by the abftraction of the mind, derived alfo from the fimple ideas of fenfation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the pofitive fimple ideas got by sensation and reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of fubstance, which, without thefe pofitive, fimple ideas, it would never have.

This your lordship (without giving by detail all the particular steps of the mind in this bufinefs) has well expreffed in this more familiar way: "We find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a fubftratum, or subject, wherein they are; fince it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or accidents fhould fubfift by themfelves."

:

Hence your lordship calls it the rational idea of fubftance and fays, "I grant that by fenfation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reafon is fatisfied that there must be fomething beyond thefe, because it is impoffible that they fhould fubfift by themselves;" fo that if this be that which your lordship means by the rational idea of fubftance, I fee nothing there is in it against what I have faid, that it is founded on fimple ideas of fenfation or reflection, and that it is a very obfcure idea.

Your lordship's conclufion from your foregoing words is, "and fo we may be certain of fome things which we have not by thofe ideas ;" which is a propofition, whofe precife meaning, your lordship will forgive me, if I profefs, as it ftands there, I do not understand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship means,

world of vifible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and fkill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The fame inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding any fimple idea, not received in by his fenfes from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste, which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a fcent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will alfo conclude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true diftinct notions of founds.

§ 3.

THIS is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impoffible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than thofe five, as they are ufually counted, which he has given to man : yet I think it is not poffible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howfoever conftituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, befides founds, tastes, fmells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made with but four fenfes, the qualities then, which are the object of the fifth fenfe, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception as now any belonging to a fixth, feventh, or eighth fenfe, can poffibly be which, whether yet fome other creatures, in fome other parts of this vast and stupendous univerfe, may not have, will be a great prefumption to deny. He that will not fet

we may certainly know the existence of fomething, which we have not by those ideas; or certainly know the distinct properties of fomething, which we have not by thofe ideas or certainly know the truth of fomè propofition, which we have not by thofe ideas: for to be certain of fomething may fignify either of these. But in which foever of these it be meant, I do not fee how I am concerned in it.

himfelf proudly at the top of all things, but will confider the immenfity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconfiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whofe faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehenfion, as a worm fhut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the fenfes or understanding of a man; fuch variety and excellency being fuitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five fenfes, though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either fuppofition ferves equally to my prefent purpose.

CHAP. III.

OF IDEAS OF ONE SENSE.

1. Divifion of Simple Ideas.

THE better to conceive the ideas we receive from fenfation, it may not be amifs for us to confider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themfelves perceivable by us.

First, then, There are fome which come into our minds by one fenfe only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themselves into the mind by more fenfes than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only. Fourthly, There are fome that make themselves way, and are fuggested to the mind by all the ways of fenfation and reflection.

We fhall confider them apart under their feveral heads.

Ideas of one Senfe, as Colours, of Seeing, Sound, of Hearing, &c.

FIRST, There are fome ideas which have admittance only through one fenfe, which is peculiarly adapted to receive

them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their feveral degrees or fhades, and mixtures, as green, fcarlet, purple, tea-green, and the reft; come in only by the eyes: all kind of noises, founds, and tones, only by the ears: the feveral taftes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if thefe organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's prefence-room (as I may fo call it), are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no poftern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

The most confiderable of thofe belonging to the touch, are heat and cold, and folidity; all the reft con-. fifting almoft wholly in the fenfible configuration, as fmooth and rough; or elfe more or lefs firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough,

·§ 2. Few Simple Ideas have Names.

I THINK, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular fimple ideas, belonging to each fenfe. Nor indeed is it poffible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the fenfes, than we have names for. The variety of fmells, which are ast many almoft, if not more, than fpecies of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and flinking commonly ferve our turn for thefe ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a rofe and violet both fweet, are certainly very diftinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, four, harth, and salt, are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relifhes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every fort of creatures, but in the different parts of the fame plant, fruit, or animal. The fame may be faid of colours and founds. I shall therefore, in the account of fimple ideas I am here giving, content myself to fet down only fuch, as are most material to our prefent purpose, or are int VOL. I.

themselves lefs apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongst which, I think, I may well account folidity; which therefore I fhall treat of in the next chapter.

CHAP. IV.

OF SOLIDITY.

§1. We receive this Idea from Touch.

THE idea of folidity we receive by our. touch; and it arifes from the refiftance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it poffeffes, till it has left it. There is no idea, which we receive more conftantly from fenfation, than folidity. Whether we move or reft, in what posture foever we are, we always feel fomething under us that fupports us, and hinders our farther finking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that, whilft they remain between them, they do by an infurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that prefs them. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call folidity. I will not difpute, whether this acceptation of the word folid be nearer to its original fignification, than that which mathematicians ufe it in; it fuffices, that I think the common notion of folidity will allow, if not justify, this use of it; but, if any one think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my confent. Only I have thought the term folidity the' more proper to exprefs this idea, not only becaufe' of its vulgar ufe in that sense: but also because it carries fomething more of pofitive in it than impenetrability, which is negative, and is perhaps more a confequence of folidity than folidity itself. This, of all other, feems the idea moft intimately connected with an effential to body; fo as no where elfe to be found or imagined, but only in matter. And, though our senses take no notice of it, but in maffes of matter, of a bulk fufficient to cause a fenfation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea from such groffer sensible bodies, traces