AND now again to the field, for we are following in the footsteps of him who "strewed our earth with hostile bones;" whose career was little more than a succession of battles, the thunder of which burst upon Europe with such stunning rapidity, as effectually to hinder any event unconnected with their fierce and fatal results from fixing itself in the minds of men, during the brief intervals of occasional repose. Napoleon's battles constitute not only his own history, but the great landmarks in the history of his time, a circumstance which renders a just understanding of the character of these actions indispensably necessary to a proper appreciation of the period in which they were fought, and of the ruling powers who then influenced the destiny of millions.

The last battle of Arcole had been fought on the 17th November, and on the 5th December Marshal Alvinzy already received a letter from the Emperor of Austria, again commanding him to proceed forthwith to the relief of Mantua. This order the fieldmarshal communicated to the generals of his army, requesting their opinion of its practicability, together with their advice as to the best mode of carrying it into effect. All were unanimous in declaring it impracticable. The army, they said, counted only 37,000 men, was greatly disorganised in consequence of the loss of officers, and of the sufferings and privations it had undergone during the last operations; it was, besides, in want of provisions, money, clothing, carriages, and matériel of every description. The elements had also added to the difficulties; snow had fallen in such quantities in the mountains of the Tyrol and the Venetian Terra Firma, as to render them in a great measure impassable;

and the possession of the road across Monte-Baldo was deemed indispensably necessary to the success of every attempt.

On the other hand, the accounts from Mantua were of the most afflicting nature. Marshal Wurmser declared, indeed, that there could be no thought of surrender as long as a single "horse, cat, or rat, remained unconsumed within the walls of the fortress;" but the power of endurance was rapidly giving way. Wholesome food had long been wanting ; fuel also failed; and the troops were exposed without fire to all the inclemencies of a severe winter. hospitals were destitute of medicines, and unchecked sickness crowded the lazar-houses of woe and suffering in all the ghastly forms impressed by famine; death alone was busy in Mantua, from which hope itself had almost fled.

The

The cabinet of Vienna, well aware of the distressing state of affairs, made generous efforts to strengthen Marshal Alvinzy's army. Provisions, money, clothing, carriages, and pontoons were forwarded. Recruits and drafts were sent from the interior by forced marches, and by the beginning of January the army again mustered 48,000 men ready for the field; but these men had been hastily collected, were insufficiently organised, and the old soldiers, from whom the young were naturally to take their tone and feeling, were bending beneath the recollection of their late disasters. The order for their immediate advance was, however, imperative.

The French army had received reinforcements to the amount of 7000 men from France, and the Italian levies had also rendered some of their garrisons and detached corps disposable for service

in the field. Their return strength at this moment was 57,000 men, of whom 48,000 were effective with the army deducting as usual 10,000 men for the blockading corps, and 2000 for other detached purposes, which we find specified, it leaves 36,000 disposable for active operations. Of these forces, 12,000 under Joubert occupied Rivoli, the Corona, and the passes of Monte - Baldo: Massena, Augereau, the reserve and the cavalry, observed the line of the Adige from Verona to Legnano. Major, afterwards Colonel Weirotter, chief of the staff, was the officer who, when generals and marshals paused, projected the plan which was now to be pursued for the relief of Mantua. The project was to deceive the French respecting the real point of attack, and to fall with the principal part of the army on the division of Joubert, which was farthest from assistance, and to destroy it entirely before it could be supported. The severity of the season, the quantities of snow which had fallen, and the difficulties of attacking the Corona, the most commanding point of MonteBaldo, under such circumstances, would, it was concluded, help to make the French think themselves secure in their mountain-fastness. To confirm them in this belief, two corps, one of 9000 under Provera, the other of 5000 men under General Bayalish, were to advance towards Verona and Legnano, as if intending to force the passage of the Adige; both were to turn their feint attacks into real ones if the opportunities offered, and Provera in particular, was commanded to force the passage of the river, and proceed to Mantua. If this project was too complicated, perhaps, for a military operation, which should always be as simple as possible; if it depended too much on the punctual and exact performance of duty by detached corps and commanders; we are, nevertheless, bound to allow, that it was devised with great ability and calculated with singular accuracy; and its ultimate want of success must be ascribed more to the severity of the season, and the misconduct of the troops, than to its o.vn demerits. But when the soldier is wanting in nerve, confidence, or goodwill, when the elastic spring which must hurl him against

the foe is once relaxed, then strategists and tacticians exert their skill in vain, and find their best efforts tend only to disappointment and defeat; a good reason, it might be supposed, for bestowing more fostering care and kindness on the labourer in the humbler ranks of war, on whom so much is ultimately made to depend. In the British army it happens that, owing to some gallant quality which our people derive from the land of their fathers, personal courage has never been found wanting: we have, therefore, thought ourselves entitled to cast science entirely overboard; and so completely have we succeeded in this laudable task, that we do not possess a single volume of strategy in the language. What progress any science can make without the aid of letters it is needless to say; and yet is the value of science illustrated on every page of military history. And if a small portion only of the skill evinced in projecting the operation we are about to describe, had been displayed during the enterprises of Castiglioni and Arcole, it is almost impossible, considering how nearly the results were balanced, notwithstanding the mismanagement on the part of the Austrians, to see how they could have failed of success.

The Austrian flanking corps advanced to the Adige, and on the 8th already drove in the French outposts: an attempt to surprise Legnano failed; but though Provera lingered with his movements, Bayalish acted with so much spirit as completely to deceive his opponents. On the 11th Marshal Alvinzy commenced operations: his army, reduced by detachments to 28,000 effective men, was divided into six columns: of these, one advanced on the left bank of the Adige; a second, with which was all the cavalry and artillery, followed the high road leading along the right bank of the river; with the other four the marshal ascended the huge, steep, and gloomy masses of Monte-Baldo, which, covered with snow, now presented to the eye a trackless and seemingly impassable Alpine barrier. The difficulties of the road were found far greater than had even been anticipated: the narrow paths and mountain-ladders were covered with snow,

the breaks and openings between the rocks through which the best of them passed, were completely filled up, and hundreds of the heavily laden soldiers, who, besides their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, had to carry several days' provisions in traversing these dreary and inhospitable regions, already failed and dropped down before they came in sight of the enemy. The French were found posted about the Corona, on the most commanding part of the mountain; and here it was intended that they should have been attacked on the 12th January, but the first Austrian division, which under Count Lusignan formed the flanking corps, had been unable to proceed along the upper ridges of the mountain, was forced to seek a more sheltered path, and did not arrive in time to take its proper share in the action. The consequence was, that the other corps delayed the onset: night came on,

and Joubert, learning that a large force was turning his left flank, retired before day-break, and took post at Rivoli. The Austrians followed slowly, they had lost a day, and had to fight their battle a day's march nearer the French reserves; but success was still fairly within their reach.

The position of Rivoli is one of great strength, owing less to the features of the ground than to the circumstance of its being only assailable by infantry, which can alone cross Monte-Baldo, whereas cavalry, infantry, and artillery can all be brought from the south to act in its defence.

The succession of gently elevated hill-terraces which lean on the Adige near Rivoli, and constitute the socalled plateau of that name, are separated from the lofty range of Monte-Baldo by the broad valley of Caprino, which, ascending from the

Lake of Garda, penetrates so far into the mountains as to leave the higher branch no commanding influence over the lower, which it only joins by a narrow ridge called Monte-Magnone, that runs nearly parallel to the Adige, and presents an almost perpendicular wall of rock to the river,

and to the high road which runs along its banks. This ridge joins the plateau of Rivoli at a point where stands a chapel dedicated to St. Mark, and which is of consequence, as commanding the road just mentioned, the only one leading from the north to Rivoli that is practicable for cavalry

and artillery.

This road ascends the hill or terrace, behind the right of the actual position, at the hamlet of Osteria, above which the French had thrown up redoubts to defend the opening. It was necessary, therefore, that the assailants should carry the hill of St. Mark, drive back the defenders beyond the opening of the road above Österia, and capture the redoubts raised there: gain a half victory, in fact, before they could bring their cavalry and artillery into action. The right of the French rested on the Adige, but the front of their position offered no particular obstacles to attack; the left, following the bend of the hill, was rather thrown back it had no appui, and could easily be turned by a superior force, the isthmus from the river near Rivoli, to the nearest point on the Lake of Garda, being at least six miles in breadth, and the French position hardly extended three miles from the Adige.

Napoleon was at Bologna when he learned, on the 10th January, that the Austrians were advancing towards Legnano. He immediately hurried into Verona, the central post of his army, where he arrived on the 12th, just after Bayalish had fought a sharp action with Massena's advanced corps. Anxious to discover the movements of the enemy, he sent out a strong reconnoissance under General Clarke, who was, however, defeated with loss, and brought no satisfactory tidings. The reports from Legnano spoke of three strong corps as moving on that point: so far, at least, the assailants had well concealed their object. But Provera had been five days inactive, or only skirmishing, in front of a vigilant and observant foe; and on the evening of the 13th, Augereau reported that the enemy were only making a feint and trying to deceive him. At the same time when this despatch reached Verona, came a letter from General Joubert, saying, that he had been attacked by a large force at the Corona, and obliged to fall back on Rivoli, which he should also evacuate unless he received orders to the contrary. The Austrian plan of operation was now clear, but had to be quickly met, for danger was pressing, and Napoleon was certainly not slow in his measures for counteracting it.

Leaving a garrison in Verona, and directing Augereau to watch the banks of the Adige, he instantly set out for Rivoli, followed by Massena's division, the whole of the cavalry and the reserve under General Rey; in all about 22,000 men.

It was late at night and raining hard when the troops were put in motion, but they were expected to reach the plateau by day-break. Napoleon himself arrived on the ground at two o'clock in the morning, and just in time to prevent Joubert's further retreat. The night had cleared; and from the highest point of the position he saw the whole of the surrounding valleys filled with hostile watchfires. While the French commander was collecting his troops on one side, Alvinzy on the other was giving out the dispositions for next day's battle. The attack was to be made in five columns. The first, under Count Lusignan, was to march completely round the left of the French, and take possession of the hills exactly in rear of Rivoli: the second, third, and fourth divisions were to attack the front of the position, carry the hill of St. Mark, the redoubts above the Osteria, and enable the fifth division, the cavalry and artillery, to ascend from the valley of the Adige, and join in the action: the sixth division was to aid these efforts by opening a fire of artillery on the French from the left, and rather commanding bank of the river. We shall see presently what were the errors of this disposition.

The skirmishing along the front had commenced long before daybreak, and at the first dawn of morning the columns advanced to begin the work of death. The French defended the ground with their usual gallantry, but were gradually forced back at all points, except near Trombalero, where Massena was still holding part of his ground. On the right, the hill and chapel of Saint Mark were carried after a severe struggle: on the left, Lusignan was seen moving round the French position: troops were sent against him, but were defeated, and unable to check his progress. The redoubts above the Osteria were taken by storm, and the road thrown open to the march of the fifth division; while from the left bank of the river the shot of the

Austrian guns were already striking among the French masses that were crowding back in confusion upon Rivoli. The imperialists thought themselves victorious, infantry alone had fought and gained these advantages, and now 1700 cavalry were to bring their lightning speed and strength, seventy pieces of artillery their tower-shaking force, to complete the ruin of those whose fate appeared sealed; for Lusignan was already in rear of their army. A battalion of infantry, and three squadrons of cavalry of the fifth division, had already ascended the hill, and were drawn up to cover the opening of the road and the formation of their comrades; one half-hour more and 10,000 additional men would strike in against the foe. But Fortune forbade; she had often baffled the efforts of the brave, and was now to shew that it was easier still to mar the combinations of the wise.

Napoleon seeing Vial's brigade retire in great confusion from before the assailants, sent General Lasalles with 200 horsemen to take up and cover the retreat of the fugitives. The unexpected appearance of this body of cavalry surprised the Austrian skirmishers, who were hurrying after the French in disordered and unconnected bands. Some halted, sorte retired; the causeless panic augmented, then spread like wild-fire from one end of the line to the other, till, without being attacked, or even threatened, the whole swarm rushed back upon the columns of the third and fourth divisions, who were still advancing in good order. Madness ruled the hour; and these troops seeing French cavalry in their front, the infantry of Massena's division that still held the ground near Trombalero far in the rear of their right flank, thought themselves turned and doomed to destruction, and instantly joined the wild and disgraceful flight. No stop, no stay; vain were the efforts of their officers, vain the exertions and despair of their time-honoured commander, nothing could arrest the career of this insane multitude. The troops of the fifth division that had ascended the hill were hurled down again by their own countrymen, the captured redoubts were forsaken, the post of St. Mark abandoned, and it was only in the

valley of Caprino, and behind the Tasso rivulet, that the fugitives were halted and reformed. The French, unprepared for such a turn of fortune, pursued feebly and briefly; and having regained their former ground halted, and allowed the Austrians to collect their battalions behind the streamlet.

It was while thus engaged that Alvinzy had the deep mortification to hear the signals, which told that Lusignan's corps had completed its march, and carried the hills exactly in rear of the French army. A brief space sooner and these glad sounds would have announced the certainty of a splendid victory, and now they boded only additional disaster.

The second Austrian division perceiving the flight of their countrymen, desisted from the attack on Massena, and retired into the valley; and Napoleon finding his front clear of foes, turned his attention towards Lusignan's corps, which was now completely cut off. Fifteen pieces of artillery were brought to bear upon these troops, who, assailed also by cavalry and infantry, naturally fought to great disadvantage. As the count expected, however, that the attack on Rivoli would be renewed next day, he thought it his duty to hold his ground till Alvinzy should return to the onset; and tried, therefore, to find some strong position in which he could maintain himself. But modern infantry can hold no position against the combined power of cavalry, artillery, and infantry; and the count was driven successively from one post to another. He then determined to retire, and directed his march on Garda; it was already in possession of some French troops, who had arrived in boats from the opposite side of the lake. The Austrian commander disappointed here, turned to the right, and again ascended Monte-Baldo, where for the fourth night he encamped upon the snow with his half-famished soldiers, who had been almost forty-eight hours without food. Exhausted by famine and fatigue, numbers had already fallen to the rear. A band of these stragglers arriving at Rocca di Garda, finding it occupied by the French, and having no longer the strength to fight their way through, laid down their arms, and gave rise