bers at home, not only of the Catholic but of the Protestant religion; and that he was received and supported by the greatest Catholic power on the Continent. Queen Anne, the last of the family, was strongly suspected, and not without reason, of a desire to restore her exiled father. This suspicion and the sinful nature of the Catholic religion, as viewed in that age, formed the cause of laws so inconsistent with the spirit of the Revolution. It was to represent the Revolution in black and odious colours, if he might use a parliamentary expression, to impute to its spirit what was only occasional. Those dangers were now past, and could no longer justify measures which depended on them. There had been another act against the Catholics, which he had neglected to mention, whose provisions were the severest of all. It was the act 1699, now happily repealed; but it illustrated how our ancestors had legislated upon this subject. This act precluded Catholics from devising property, and imposed a penalty for every performance of mass. Their Lordships could now see with what deliberative wisdom this law had been passed. Bishop Burnet said, that those who brought in the bill had hoped that the Court would oppose it; and finding that the Court did not, they added severer penalties, with the hope that the Lords would reject it. But the bill passed without any amendment, and loaded, as Burke said to his constituents at Bristol, with the injustice of both parties, who played at cups and balls to the danger of the lives of their fellow-subjects. The reasons of those measures then were, 1st, that there was a Catholic family pretending to the throne, who were hostile to liberty and next, that the principles of the Catholic reli

gion were thought hostile, not only to religion, but to the existence of society. Both these causes having ceased to exist, they could not continue the laws which had arisen from them without injustice. It remained that he should reply to the assertion that it was impossible for the King to distinguish between spiritual and temporal obedience. If the common law of the country, previously to the reign of Henry VIII., required obedience to the King, this common law was the growth of Catholic times. But in the oath prescribed to Roman Catholics, by the act of 1793, there was the distinction clearly made between spiritual and temporal obedience. But this argument applied, with equal force, to a Catholic Government. History recorded many attempts by Popes to increase their power, and many contentions between the Pope and the Emperor of Germany, the King of France and the King of England. On those occasions no such effects had arisen as were now represented to be the consequences of recognising the authority of the Pope. Had the Pope at this moment, either in Austria or in France, any civil power that could endanger the safety of these states? It would be ridiculous to say he had. Even in former times, when arbitrary mandates had been issued by the Pope, there were instances in which neither the sovereign nor the subjects had shown any disposition to obey them. Edward I., when called on by the Pope to desist from attacking Scotland, had spurned the remonstrance; he answered, that he would repel every attempt to deprive him of the right of managing his own kingdom, and that he would not admit the interference of his Holiness, as it would tend to lessen the dignity of the English throne, and might ultimate

ly lead to the subversion of the English constitution, both of which he was determined to defend with all his strength. But the spirit of opposition to the civil power of the Pope was not confined to the reign of Edward I. In the reigns of Edward III. and Richard II. statutes of præmunire were enacted, tending directly to abridge the power of the Pope; and in all subsequent times, down to the Reformation, numerous instances occurred of sovereigns opposing the will of the Pope. And yet a noble Lord had asserted, that in history there was no example of such opposition, and had maintained that a Roman Catholic could not acknowledge the power of the Pope in matters of faith, without weakening his allegiance to his King. Allusion had been made by the Noble Lord to the conduct of the Catholics at a subsequent period, during the attempts of the Pretender, It ought, however, to be borne in mind, that the particular circumstances of the times, which had been the cause of that misconduct, no longer existed, and consequently the danger was no longer to be apprehended. The Noble Lord had next alluded to the articles of the union, in support of the doctrine of exclusion; and certainly when the Noble Lord cited the union with Ireland for that purpose, he (Lord Grey) could not help expressing his surprise. Was there one word in that act which sanctioned the permanent exclusion of the Roman Catholics? He took it upon him to say, that it did not contain one word to justify such an exclusion. Indeed, if he read the act rightly, it furnished grounds for a contrary inference. It appeared as if Ministers at that time not only had not made up their minds as to the final exclusion of

the Roman Catholics, but actually contemplated the restoration of that liberty which the Catholics, after a lapse of so many years, were still contending for. The object of the motion was to make Catholics eligible to offices of trust: and he maintained, that eligibility being a civil right and the distinction of a free government, if necessity did not oblige them to be excluded, Parliament did them an injustice by excluding them.

He admitted, that

this civil right was subject to the safety of the State; but what he contended for was, that Parliament could not curtail or abridge the right of any subject, unless the necessity of such a measure could be shown. While their Lordships continued to abridge the civil rights of any class of subjects, toleration was not complete; and if the public necessity of the measure could not be proved, the measure was injurious and unjust.. He remembered well, that on a former occasion, a Noble Lord stated, that although the Catholics believed in transubstantiation, in the invocation of saints, and in the sacrifice of mass, these articles of belief could constitute no objection to their enjoying the same civil rights as their Protestant fellow-subjects. If, then, these doctrines were no proof of allegiance to a foreign supremacy, why continue the declaration act? The question as to the Catholics was now much narrowed, and their Lordships ought to relieve themselves from the impropriety of the declaration oath. Had their Lordships so far examined the doctrine of transubstantiation, as to be prepared to call it superstitious? Had they so closely investigated the doctrine of invocation and the celebration of mass as to be able to pronounce them idolatrous? If these

questions could not be answered in the affirmative, then he contended the argument was irrefutable for going into a committee.

After some very pointed and judicious remarks by the Earl of Liverpool, and a few words from several other Noble Lords, the House divided, when the motion was negatived by 147 to 106.

The smallness of the majorities, both in the Lords and Commons, appears to have inspired the friends of Catholic Emancipation with the hope that some qualified measure might yet be carried; and that Parliament would agree to remove the most obnoxious of those disabilities

under which the Catholics still conceived themselves to labour. With this view, a bill was introduced into the Lords for the purpose of abrogating the declarations enacted by the 25th and 30th of Charles II., the former of which, commonly called the Test Act, was required on admission to office, the latter to a seat in Parliament. The second reading was moved on the 10th of June by Earl Grey; but after a keen discussion, enlivened by a splendid display of argumentative eloquence on the part of Lord Grenville, the bill was thrown out by a majority of 141 to 82.

SUCH portions of the proceedings of this Session of Parliament as may not be conveniently arranged under separate heads, we have resolved to group together in one chapter; but to prevent confusion, and to facilitate reference to the different subjects here introduced, we shall carefully distinguish each branch from the others, and endeavour to condense all the information we have been able to obtain under the department to which it properly belongs.

The remarkable case of Abraham Thornton, who had been tried at Warwick Assizes, in 1817, on the charge of murdering a young woman, named Mary Ashford, and acquitted, but had afterwards been prosecuted by appeal at the instance of William Ashford, brother of the deceased, and had a vailed himself of the plea of Wager of Battle, (See Edinburgh Annual Register for 1817, Part II. p. 174,) excited great interest at the time, and forcibly fixed the public attention on this relic of the laws and usages of

a barbarous age; no trial by battle having been awarded since the time of Charles I., when, however, the commission was revoked. In order to expunge from the statute-book such a preposterous mode of determining innocence or guilt, the Attorney-General, on the 9th of February, moved for leave to bring in a bill to abolish the proceeding of appeal of death, felony, or mayhem, and all wager of battle, joining issue by battle, and trial of battle in writs of right. The bill was accordingly introduced, read a second time on the 12th, committed on the 15th of February, and read a third time and passed on the 22d of March. In its progress through the Lords, the Chancellor expressed his entire approbation of the bill, remarking that the appeal by wager of battle was "a proceeding founded in a spirit of vengeance, and that it was difficult to know by what management a man's life might be exposed a second time after having been fairly tried and ac

quitted, were the claims of appeal to be allowed. On these grounds," said his Lordship, "such a proceeding ought not to be suffered to take place, unless their Lordships were prepared to say, that their fellowsubjects should not be benefited by an acquittal in all the forms of the law; that after having been committed by a magistrate, indicted by a grand jury, and, finally, declared innocent by a petty jury, they should still be liable to a renewal of the charge; and that they should be deprived of the advantage of that important maxim of the law, which says, That no man is to be tried twice for the same offence." After passing through the usual forms, the bill finally became law, and this barbarous and unchristian method of ascertaining guilt or innocence was happily abolished.

The proposed renewal of the insolvent Debtors' Act was opposed by petitions from various quarters, representing it as injurious in its operation to the fair trader, and prejudicial to commercial confidence. That such is the case, to a certain extent, is undeniable; but there can be as little doubt, that the excessive Beverity of the English law against unfortunate debtors requires mitigation; and that, in Scotland, where the law has guarded against the wanton cruelty of capricious creditors, fair trade and commercial confidence are as firmly secured as in any country upon earth. The number and weight of the petitions presented, however, rendered inquiry necessary; and, accordingly, on the 16th of March, the Attorney-General moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to consider the state of the law relative to the discharge of insolvent debtors, the act of the 53d and 56th of the King, and to report to the House their opinions as to the means of rendering those acts more

effectual. The motion was agreed to, and a committee appointed. The committee gave in their report early in June, on the 22d day of which, the bill, which had undergone considerable modifications, was read a third time and passed.

A bill was also introduced this session for the amendment of the bankruptcy laws, read a second time on the 2d of April, and committed on the 19th of May. The object of this bill was to remedy the inefficiency of the existing law, and to provide some check on fraudulent bankruptcy, which, as will be seen by the evidence of Mr Basil Montague before the Committee on the Criminal Law, had increased to an extent perfectly unprecedented, notwithstanding, or rather in consequence of the nominal, but never enforced, severity of the law.

On the 9th of March, Mr Brand brought forward a motion for leave to bring in a bill to amend the laws for the preservation of game. In support of his motion, the honourable gentleman went at considerable length into the game laws, pointing out their inconsistencies and absurdities, their oppressive and unjust operation, the mischiefs with which the enforcement of them is attended, their total inefficiency in restraining poachers from destroying game, their tendency to corrupt the morals of the lower classes, and the impossibility of their attaining the object they had in view, while the punishment inflicted was so severe, and so radically at variance with the sentiments of the community. These remarks led to a pretty lengthened discussion; but leave was ultimately granted, and the bill introduced, read a second time on the 19th of March, and recommitted on the 14th of May, when the bill was thrown out by a majority of 119 to 59.

On the 9th of February, Mr