born, leaving the mind blank as a mirror that retains no trace of what it reflects, were it not instantaneously photographed and fixed by Memory; which, therefore, for practical purposes, we identify with Consciousness. The one abiding element of consciousness is the sense of permanent Self, which has no relation to time, to space, or to any phenomena in particular; though without consciousness of some phenomena it is inconceivable that it should ever have been awakened. I perceive myself to be a widely different person from what I remember myself to have been at three years old, and at twenty-one; yet I am conscious of being the same Self. Phenomena come and go. If I gaze on a landscape and close my eyes, the phenomena of memory take the place of the phenomena of vision. When I re-open my eyes, the fresh phenomena are so indistinguishably like those which I remember that I call them the same, though, in fact, they are as distinct as if ten years had intervened. But SELF does not come and go : it abides. Self, therefore, is not a phenomenon, nor yet a bundle of phenomena. It is a Reality underlying all the phenomena of consciousness; and whatever knowledge or certain and correct judgment I have of Myself (as that I have been in existence for so many years, or that at such a time and place I was conscious of such and such phenomena) is a knowledge not concerning phenomena, but concerning reality. The same is true with regard to other Selves. If other Selves exist, and that they do is, as we have seen, not one of the problems but one of the foundations of our knowledge, then they also are not phenomena, but permanent realities. Phenomena are not knowledge; but they become objects of knowledge as soon as any true and certain judgment is passed concerning them. 'What, then, is the relation of our knowledge of Phenomena to our knowledge of the underlying Realities? Much like that of our knowledge of the alphabet to our knowledge of literature. Phenomena are related to Realities as words to thoughts, letters or hieroglyphics to speech, symbols to sense. Such is the relation of a smile to joy, a blush to modesty, tears to sorrow, a frowning brow and flashing eye to anger, a tender look and warm clasp to love. Phenomena are the universal language in which Nature speaks to Man, and in which she responds to his rightly-directed will. Were that language capricious it would be unintelligible. If phenomena succeeded one another at random and combined without rule, knowledge would be impossible. Action and life would be impossible also. The steadfast regularity of phenomena tells with no doubtful significance of a corresponding permanence of the causes on which they depend............. Behind the screen of ever-shifting yet invariably regulated phenomena, stands the abiding reality of Force not vaguely pervading space, but gathered in those centres of force which we know as particular bodies-solid, liquid, gaseous; or in their elementary form as atoms-presumed absolutely unchangeable and indestructible. Knowledge of phenomena is the ladder by which we climb to the point where we leave phenomena behind. Those who most urgently insist that our knowledge is confined to phenomena are compelled to add, "and their laws." But laws are not phenomena. Our highest cognitions, or acts of thought, with reference to Nature, deal with conceptscondensed or crystallized clusters of judgments,-which do not refer to phenomena, but to the causes at the back of them; and are true or false according as they correspond with the actual course of things. Our concepts of atoms and of light-waves may be taken as examples. A thought cannot indeed correspond with external reality in the sense of being like it. There is no more unmeaning question about which metaphysicians have done battle than the question whether our ideas of things resemble the things themselves. Accuracy of thought, truth of judgment, validity of knowledge concerning any fact or substance, consists not in resemblance (which is nonsense), but in our judgment being such as that nature will avouch it; such that if we act upon it, nature will respond to our thought.' Students of philosophy are familiar with the webs of fallacious word-play that have been spun around 'the Absolute,' regarded as an abstraction. German idealism has done wonders in this way. Nor will the feats of verbal sleight-of-hand performed with this counter by Dean Mansel be forgotten by those who have tried to follow their gyrations. The following observations on this subject appear to us to be very sound English sense : 'Metaphysicians, it seems, have always been trying to get at the back of knowledge; and this impossible quest has distracted them from their proper enquiry: What is knowledge;-what its nature; and what its worth? After all, what real meaning is there in the high-sounding phrase, so often repeated, "Knowledge of things in themselves"? There are no things in themselves; that is, things without relation to other things, to the universe, to God. That which has no properties is nothing. But properties are all relative; as of oxygen to form various compounds by uniting in fixed proportions with almost every other element; or of iron to melt at a definite heat. What (for want of a more significant name) we call Ether may have a thousand properties besides that of transmitting the undulations of light, warmth, and chemical action; that is, undulations having certain relations to particular nerves, or to particular chemical states of atoms. It may, for aught we know, be the basis of matter. The more of its properties we actually know, the truer and more useful our knowledge of it will be. The more properties it actually possesses (whether knowable by us or not), the more fully and mightily does it exist as a part of the universe. But if ALL its properties could be destroyed, what would remain ? Nothing. "EXISTENCE" is not a vague mysterious Somewhat, which could remain if all properties-all relations, active, passive, or latent, to things or to mind-were annihilated. It is simply our highest intellectual abstraction, drawn from the generalization of all possible states, qualities, potencies, and reactions. Existence without relation, substance without qualities,like a magnet without poles, a line without length, a circle with no area and no circumference, a number that is neither fractional nor integral, neither odd nor even, -is as impossible in reality as in thought. 'Are we, then, to deny not only the conceivableness but the existence of the Absolute? Certainly. The term absolute simply stands for an intellectual generalization. It expresses an attribute, and is therefore a relative term, standing for a thought (whether we are pleased to call that thought positive or negative), and nothing but a thought. We may say that God exists absolutely, or is the Absolute Being, if we are careful to explain that we oppose "absolute " to "dependent." God alone has being in Himself. But "absolute existence," if we do not explain what kind of existence we are speaking of, is a phrase absolutely without meaning. And if we take "absolute" to mean "without relation," then it is not simply unmeaning, but untrue, to say that God exists absolutely. For since all other being whatever exists in the relation of dependence on God (not to speak of other relations, such as those of moral beings to His will, His authority, His love), it is manifest that God sustains infinitely numerous relations to His crea tures. And even if we strain our intellect to think of God as existing in Himself when as yet other beings had not begun to exist; even if we do not raise the question of His relation to eternal duration and infinite space; we must think of Him as sustaining the greatest and most intimate of all relations to the whole as yet nonexistent universe: that of comprehending it with all its undeveloped possibilities in His foresight, power, and will. 'It is true, then, that knowledge is relative; that is, that it is conversant with things or persons in relation to self, to other minds, to one another, and to God. It is so because it is knowledge. All knowledge is composed of judgments, and every judgment implies the relation of two terms as necessarily as every magnet implies the relation between two poles. But it is not true that this relativity of knowledge is any imperfection, circumscription, or disability; or that there is any conceivable or possible knowledge of things in themselves, as opposed to the knowledge of their proper ties and relations, which, if attainable, would be a higher kind of knowledge, and in comparison with which our actual knowledge is illusory.' The students of Sir William Hamilton's writings must always have been in perplexity to understand what his doctrine was as to the difference between belief and knowledge, so uncertainly does he use these words; now indeed making them to be contrasted and mutually exclusive in their meanings, and then again speaking of belief as the highest form of knowledge. Mr. Conder's discrimination between the two is acute and valuable : 'Belief and knowledge resemble two circles of different sizes partly overlapping Belief agrees with knowledge in that it consists in judgments expressible in propo sitions. It differs in admitting doubt and error. Our beliefs may be certain yet false or doubtful yet true; or both false and doubtful. True and certain belief is knowledge. Such, for example, is our knowledge of countries we have never visited, and of events outside our own experience; or the knowledge which even a scientific man has of experiments, observations, and calcula tions which he has not verified, but securely takes on trust. The largest, though not the most vital, part of every one's knowledge is of this kind; and the proportion augments as our knowledge grows. Yet we do not call all knowledge "belief." Primary judgments (such as that every change must have a cause) are often called beliefs, though "intuitions" would be better term. But a geometer does not say that he believes the angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. This distinction, however, is perhaps rather objective, that is, depending on the nature of the proof, than truly subjective. It is more important to remark (though the fact belongs rather to Psychology than to Metaphysics) that while Belief regarded as mere assent is intellectual, it extends likewise into the other two great regions of our spiritual nature. As an emotion or affection, and as a voluntary act, we name it Trust, Confidence, or Faith. Faith in the fullest sense-voluntary, affectionate, trustful credence-is the highest because the most comprehensive exercise of our nature.' Our space will not allow us to quote any more from the fourth lecture. Of the other eight we may perhaps be allowed to say that the last three, although very able, and sometimes exceedingly beautiful and powerful, are less characteristic, and possess less specific value than the other five. No man could, in a brief compass, say much that is new; no one, dealing with subjects so vast and various and surpassingly great, in two or three lectures, could do more than give a compressed general summary-when in one lecture he had to sum up the general argument from the Scripture Revelation, in another to present the argument founded on the character and testimony of Jesus, and in a third to epitomize the utterances and pleadings of our human heart and conscience on behalf of the Christian faith. These lectures were necessary to complete the argument of Mr. Conder; were necessary also, perhaps, to furnish a popular element to the course. No doubt they would be followed with greater ease, and would find a readier and more general appreciation than the lectures preceding. They contain passages also-as we have already intimated-of great value, sometimes acute and suggestive in no ordinary degree; at other times, most eloquent and impressive. But, on the whole, it would have been better if the lectures could have been delivered in two series, the first series VOL. II.-SIXTH SERIES. treating of the fundamental principles of philosophy and of evidence necessary to be cleared and settled in order to a complete argumentative dealing with the questions involved; the second, presenting the course and connection of evidence in its clear consecutiveness and completeness. The lecturer would then have been able to develop more fully, and therefore more impressively, the compressed argumentation which makes up the substance of his later lectures. The first lecture-on Religion-is chiefly occupied chiefly occupied with verbal and logical definitions and discriminations. This work-needful in all formal argument-is peculiarly needful in discussing the evidences of Christian theism. Mr. Conder's work of definition and discrimination explodes beforehand some current fallacies which are often authoritatively set forth as argument, and suggests at the same time-or, at least, prepares the way for-important counterarguments of Christian defence. After showing that although 'the distinction between natural and re vealed theology may be accepted as convenient for certain purposes, no sharp boundary-line can justly, or with scientific accuracy, be drawn between the two,' he proceeds to give a caution against using words with vague meaning, or with no meaning; and, in particular, urges this caution in regard to the use, in relation to each other and by way of contrast, of the words natural and supernatural : Supernatural signifies above or beyond nature. To connect any definite meaning with this term, therefore, we must first know what nature (or whose nature) is in question. What is natural to one human being is not natural to another. What is natural to man would be supernatural in the lower animals. What is perfectly natural in one set of circumstances may, by a very slight change in the conditions, become altogether contrary to nature....... All the works of man...consist in the production of effects entirely out of the range of all that could happen if the course of 2 E nature were allowed to proceed undisturbed by human agency. Nature means one thing if man be included, but quite another if he be left out. Some writers, therefore, have proposed to confine the term "natural" to the material universe; intellect, will, and the whole world of mind being included within the limits of the "supernatural.".. But a mode of speech which regards the tossing of a tennis-ball into the air and catching it as a combination of supernatural events, is not likely to meet with general acceptance....... If there exist beings superior to man, living under wholly different conditions, the powers natural to them would be supernatural in reference to man, just as man's powers would be supernatural, if exercised by the lower animals. If such beings were in any way to manifest themselves to mortals, and to take part in human affairs, such an occurrence, from our point of view, would be supernatural, while, from their point of view, it would be perfectly natural. Against the existence of such beings, or their manifestation within the range of human observation, there can be no à priori presumption beyond the general unlikelihood of anything very unusual; which goes for nothing when the event is proved to have actually occurred. 'Further, if God exist,...nothing can be supernatural in relation to Him, unless we say that everything is ; for He is above all nature except His own, and yet in closest relation with it, and cannot act but in accordance with His own nature. And if the Divine be deemed synonymous with the supernatural, then, so far as nature reveals and depends upon God, the superJust natural element pervades nature. as wherever man comes, nature suffers a change, not merely of surface, but of character and purpose; ... so, in like manner, what we call Nature ... becomes what it is, a cosmos of embodied ideas, by being the material vehicle of Divine will and thought; the garment in which the Divine Nature is thus purpose clothes itself. everywhere pervaded and animated by the Supernatural, that is, by the Divine.' Nothing can be more luminous than the demonstration, contained in the same lecture, that Comte's pretended law of religious development for the race through Fetishism, Polytheism and Monotheism, to the Positivist religion of Humanity, has not even an aspect of plausibility, when it is really looked into, and has nothing besides its novelty and its audacity to commend it to men's acceptance. Nothing can be truerand we regret that our limits do not allow us to quote the demonstration -than that the development of Monotheism from Polytheism, or of Polytheism from Fetishism, is rationally inconceivable.' As Mr. Conder says and shows, the beliefs in question are not so related that the one can have begotten the other.' The largest part of this first lecture is occupied with the analysis of religion. It is impossible for us to condense or to analyze this disquisition. Mr. Conder, however, gives as his definition of religion in the broad sense, ''the sum total of man's belief, emotion and conduct with respect to God.' As a briefer and, at the same time, more accurate' definition, he states the essence of religion to be He passes in 'the sense of God.' brief review the teachings of Spencer and Mill respecting religion: and he closes the lecture with the following passage in relation to the final religious attainment of Positivism, the worship of Humanity : 'Worship, as we have seen, is of the essence of Religion. The worship of the Unknowable must needs be an inscrutable mystery. But the Religion of Humanity has its fully developed scheme of worship; its ritual, priest, church, even sacraments. Were it not that when it shall have become the universal Religion of the future, no profane or sceptical spectators will be left, it cannot be denied that the full growth of Pananthropism would present to such observers some temptation to levity. The adoration of mankind by mankind; the invocation of an incomprehensible and impossible ideal; the worship of a Supreme Being of which only a small part can exist at once; which is partly dead, partly being born, and mostly awaiting development in a future which may destroy instead of developing It; by those who are engaged in making It wiser, better and happier; certainly presents a broad mark for satire. Perhaps some uneasy consciousness of this weak side of a system which, when confronted with Christian worship, cannot help looking like stage mimicry, explains the bitterness with which its adherents assail Christianity. Such worship as the Christian believes due to GOD, they profess to regard as immoral: a servile and grovelling adulation, degrading to the offerer and to the receiver. Adulation, to confess truth! Baseness, to do that for which moral excellence is the one essential qualification; namely, to perceive the beauty and glory of a supreme love, purity and righteousness, of which our own can be but the faint shadow! Humiliation, to take delight in contemplating at once the immeasurable distance and the essential likeness between the spark of pure and noble life in our own bosoms and the uncreated, undecaying light which feeds the fire of goodness wherever it glows! Degradation, to look up to what is infinitely above us, and to rejoice that neither goodness nor power, neither wisdom nor love, is finite and fragmentary; or to love with boundless love all that ought to be loved, when it is manifested on an infinite scale ! What is baseness, what is degradation, what deserves disdain, if it be not this: to be incapable of reverence, admiration and self-annihilating love? Let it be forgiven me if, for a moment, I lose the passionless calm of untroubled logic; because we are here on moral ground, where it is shameful to be insensible, and because I am dealing with arguments which appeal to a righteous sense of moral indignation, and seek to surround with contempt the very idea of Divine worship. Their object is, to enlist the religious emotions themselves on the side of the denial of God. Worship is morally degrading when offered to a base object. It is intellectually degrading when offered to a fictitions object. But if Christian Theism is truth; if God is, and is what Christ taught men that He is; then we cannot assert too boldly that worship is the most elevating and loftiest exercise of which human beings are capable. To revere what deserves reverence, to obey what rightly claims obedience, to trust what is worthy to be trusted, to admire enthusiastically what is surpassingly admirable, as well as to love with all our heart what is infinitely love-worthy, is the very highway of moral elevation and ennoblement.' as in the recluse world of metaphysical thought, and is as great a master of style as of speculation. He is every way a most accomplished man; his apophthegms are polished crystals, and pregnant with meaning, his illustrations are apt and affluent in the highest degree. Of the close texture of this magnificent lecture we can attempt no analysis. We must content ourselves with culling an extract here and there. The extract which follows relates to Atoms and Force, their 'promise and potency,' their nature and capabilities. It is the first word on a subject to which the lecturer has often to recur in the course of following lectures : 'Atoms and Force, then,-atoms, possibly but a manifestation of force,-do these furnish wherewithal to construct or explain the universe as we find it? Are we at liberty, as intelligent and honest thinkers, to believe that force, being supposed constant in quantity, and atoms, supposed immutable and indestructible, may be eternal and uncaused? Or do forces in their correlation and balanced action, and atoms in their total inertness and uselessness if any one kind of them be isolated, their boundless activity and usefulness in combination, bear as distinctly as a steamengine, a painting, a lighthouse, or any other human work, those marks of ideal unity and voluntary design which are the very autograph of mind? And, further, supposing atoms eternal and uncaused, can any possible quantity, quality, and relation of atoms and atomic forces account for the most important part (to us) of the universe -OURSELVES? Granting mind, we can, in a certain sense, explain the material universe; because all the phenomena of sensation, which are the sole channel through which the news of an outside universe The second lecture grapples close reaches us, and on which all our reasonings about it rest, are in the last analysis purely home with agnosticism. Its scope is mental modifications of our own consciousto question and overthrow the attempt, ness. But, granting atoms and forces, we made by the scientific Positivists of cannot advance a step towards the explanation of self-conscious thought, feeling to-day, to forbid, as scientifically and will. A fathomless chasm, which no 'illegitimate, the conception of a Suimaginable apparatus of molecular vibrapreme Mind distinct from the universe, tion can bridge, yawns between the airas well as of human minds capable of waves impinging on the nerves of hearing surviving the wreck of their fleshly and the delicious sensations of melody and harmony; between the light-waves affectorganisms.' Mr. Conder is as much ing the optic nerve and the radiant glory at home in the bright realms of science of colour and delicate beauty of form. |