for the moral lesson they may convey to the guardians of youth, and to the rulers of nations.

It must indeed be granted, that, in the best works which have yet appeared on the science of Mind, the mere refutation of scholastic errors occupies a large and melancholy space. Accordingly, it has been mentioned, with an air of triumph, as a fact which, since the time of Reid, "seems now to be admitted "with regard to perception, and some of the other

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primary functions of mind, that philosophy can "be of no use to us, and that the profoundest reasonings lead us back to the creed, and to the ig"norance of the vulgar." The reflection is undoubtedly just, if by philosophy be here meant the theory of Perception which prevailed universally before the time of Reid. But I must be allowed to refuse my assent to the statement, if it is to be understood as calling in question the utility of that philosophy by which this theory was exploded, after having reigned in the schools for more than two thousand years, and bewildered, not more than a century ago, the speculations of Locke, of Clarke, and of Newton. In order to prepare the way for the mechanical inquiries of the moderns, it was necessary to begin with exposing the futility of the scholastic explanations of phenomena, by occult qualities, and Nature's horror of a void. After the darkness in which every theory relating to the study of Mind has been so long involved, by means of hypotheses consecrated by time, and interwoven with the inmost texture of language, some preliminary labour, in like manner, may be expected to be

Chap. II. necessarily employed in clearing away the metaphy sical rubbish of the ancients, and of the middle ages; and it is a circumstance highly honourable to the sagacity and zeal, both of Locke and of Reid, that they have devoted to this ungrateful, but indispensable task, so large a portion of their writings. What the latter of these philosophers has said concerning the doctrine of his illustrious predecessor on the subject of definitions, may be applied to various other parts of the Essay on Human Understanding, as well as to many discussions which occur in his own publications; that "it is valuable, not "so much because it enlarges our knowledge, as "because it makes us sensible of our ignorance; and "shews that a great part of what speculative men "have admired as profound philosophy, is only a "darkening of knowledge by words without un"derstanding."

Nor must it be forgotten, that it is on this very hypothesis concerning Perception, which has been successfully exploded by Reid, that the scepticism of Hume, concerning the existence both of Matter and of Mind, rests fundamentally. Has this scepticism had no effect in unsettling the opinions of mankind? or, granting (as I believe will not be disputed) that the effect has been great and extensive, shall we deny the practical utility of disentangling human reason from such a labyrinth ?

After all, it is not on this or similar articles of the science of Mind, that I am inclined to lay any great stress in this part of my argument. The points to which I wish chiefly to draw the reader's

attention, are the intimate connection between this science and the general conduct of the understanding; and its obvious tendency, by facilitating the analysis of whatever casual combinations the fancy may have formed, to dissolve the charm of those associations, against which the most conclusive arguments spend their force in vain.

I have always been convinced, that it was a fundamental error of Aristotle (in which he has been followed by almost every logical writer since his time) to confine his views entirely to Reasoning or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at the improvement of our nature in all its various parts.Granting, however, for a moment, that this very limited idea of the object of their study was to be adopted, a more comprehensive survey of our faculties and powers was necessary than they appear to have suspected; for it is in corners of our frame which seem, on a superficial view, to have the least connection with our speculative opinions, that the sources of our most dangerous errors will be found to lurk. It is sufficient for me to mention here, the Association of Ideas; Imagination; Imitation; the use of Language as the great Instrument of Thought; and the Artificial Habits of Judging, imposed by the principles and manners in which we have been educated.

If this remark be well founded, it obviously follows, that, in order to prepare the way for a just and comprehensive system of Logic, a previous survey of our nature, considered as one great whole, is indispensably-requisite. To establish this fundamental

principle, and to exemplify it in some of its practical applications, was one of the main objects I had in view, when I first entered upon my inquiries into the Human Mind; and I am not without hopes, that, if my original design shall ever be completed, the imperfect. sketch I have presumed to attempt will be regarded, by competent judges, as no inconsiderable step towards the accomplishment of this great undertaking by some abler hand.

If health and leisure allow me to put in writing some speculations which have long been familiar to my own thoughts, I shall endeavour to place the defects of our common logical systems in a still stronger light, by considering them in their application to the fundamental doctrines of Ethics; and more particularly, by examining how far, in researches of this sort, our moral feelings or emotions are entitled to consideration; checking, on the one hand, our speculative reasonings, when they lead to conclusions at which our nature revolts; and, on the other, sanctioning those decisions of the understanding, in favour of which the head and the heart unite their suffrages.

According to the prevailing maxims of modern philosophy, so little regard is paid to feeling and sentiment in matters of reasoning, that, instead of being understood to sanction or confirm the intellectual judgments with which they accord, they are very generally supposed to cast a shade of suspicion on every conclusion with which they blend the slightest tincture of sensibility or enthusiasm.

The prosecution of this idea will, if I do not

much deceive myself, open some new views with respect to the Logic of Morals; and I am induced to suggest it here, in the hopes of directing the curiosity of some of my readers to an inquiry, which, I am persuaded, will lead them to conclusions deeply interesting to their own happiness.

As to Logic in general, according to my idea of it, it is an art yet in its infancy, and to the future advancement of which it is no more possible to fix a limit, than to the future progress of human knowledge. The aphorism of Lord Bacon applies, in this instance, with peculiar force. "Certo sciant "homines, artes inveniendi solidas et veras adoles"cere et incrementa sumere cum ipsis inventis." In the meantime, it is the duty of all who devote themselves to scientific pursuits, to treasure up carefully, as materials to be collected and arranged afterwards by others, whatever general rules or methods may have occurred to them in the course of their studies. Even at present, numberless scattered lights might be gathered from the labours of our predecessors, both ancient and modern; nor would it perhaps be possible to supply a desideratum of greater value to philosophy, than to concentrate these dispersed rays, and to throw them on the regions which are yet to be explored. From such a concentration much aid might be expected, both in directing the

*

To those who may turn their attention to the Logic of Mathematical Science, many invaluable hints may be collected from the works of D'Alembert, and from the preliminary Dis courses prefixed by some, of his countrymen to their Mathematical Works.