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<fore, though in a duller and fainter manner. So, when the "nightingale warbles, the sound reaches our ears, and, passing ❝ through the auditory nerves, exhibits an idea, affecting us with "the discernment of her music: and after she has given over 66 singing, the same idea may recur to our remembrance, or be "raised again by us at pleasure. In like manner, our other 66 senses convey ideas of their respective kinds, which recur 66 again to our view long after the objects first exciting them have been removed.

"These ideas having entered the mind, intermingle, unite, separate, throw themselves into various combinations and pos ❝tures, and thereby generate new ideas of reflection, strictly so "called, such as those of comparing, dividing, distinguishing, of "abstraction, relation, with many others: all which remain with us as stock for our further use on future occasions.".

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"What those substances are whereof our ideas are the mo"difications, whether parts of the mind as the members are of << our body, or contained in it like wafers in a box, or enveloped "by it like fish in water; whether of a spiritual, corporeal, or "middle nature between both, I need not now ascertain. All I 66 mean at present to lay down is this: That, in every exercise "of the understanding, that which discerns is numerically and "substantially distinct from that which is discerned; and that an "act of the understanding is not so much our own proper act, as "the act of something else operating upon us.”—Vol. I. p. 15, et seq. (edit. of 1768.)

On this and on some other points touched upon in these Essays, I am sorry to differ from an author, for whose talents, learning, and taste, I entertain a high respect. I have purposely avoided any reference to his book through the whole of this voJume, as his reasonings did not appear to myself to invalidate the conclusions which I was chiefly anxious to establish. See Academical Questions by the Right Honourable Sir William Drummond (London, 1805): particularly Chapter X., which contains his defence of the Ideal Theory. It is directed chiefly against some arguments and expressions of Dr Reid; and must be acknowledged, even by those who dissent the most widely from its doctrines, to be written with equal ability and candour.

Note (D.) p. 102.

"Those things which are inferior and secondary, are by no 66 means the principles or causes of the more excellent; and, "though we admit the common interpretations, and allow sense "to bea principle of science, we must, however, call it a prin46 ciple, not as if it was the efficient cause, but as it rouses our "soul to the recollection of general ideas. According to the 66 same way of thinking, is it said in the Timaeus, that through "the sight and hearing we acquire to ourselves philosophy, be

cause we pass from objects of sense to Reminiscence or Recol "lection."- "For, in as much as the soul, by containing "the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representa❝tion or exemplar: when it is roused by objects of sense, it re"collects those principles which it contains within, and brings "them forth."

The foregoing passages (which I give in the version of Mr Harris) are taken from a manuscript commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus upon the Phædo of Plato.-See Harris's Works, Vol. I. p. 426.

The following lines are from Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the Mind or Intellect, wholly distinct from Sensation, and independent of it, thus concludes:

"Hæc est efficiens magis
"Longè caussa potentior,
"Quam quæ materiæ modo
"Impressas patitur notas.
"Præcedit tamen excitans,
"Ac vires animi movens,
"Vivo in corpore passio.
"Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
"Vel vox auribus instrepit;
"Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitu
"QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
"Ad motus simileis vocans,
"Notis applicat exteris,

"INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
"FORMIS miscet imagines."

De Consol. Phil. I. v.'

To these quotations I shall only add a short extract from Dr Price.

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"According to Cudworth, abstract ideas are implied in the cognoscitive power of the mind; which contains in itself virtual"ly (as the future plant or tree is contained in the seed) general "notions or exemplars of all things, which are exerted by it, or un"fold and discover themselves as occasions invite, and proper cir"cumstances occur. This, no doubt, many will very freely con"demn, as whimsical and extravagant. I have, I own, a differ"ent opinion of it; but yet I should not care to be obliged to "defend it.”—Price's Review, &c. (London, 1769,) p. 39.

Note (E.) p. 111.

The word sentiment, agreeably to the use made of it by our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very happily, those complex determinations of the mind, which result from the cooperation of our rational powers and of our moral feelings.—We do not speak of a man's sentiments concerning a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, or concerning any speculative question whatever, by which the feelings are not liable to be roused, or the heart affected. ·

This account of the meaning of the word sentiment corresponds,

I think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr Smith, in the title of his Theory. It agrees also nearly with the following explanation of its import, in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric: "What " is addressed solely to the moral powers of the mind, is not so "properly denominated the pathetic, as the sentimental. The ❝ term, I own, is rather modern, but is nevertheless convenient, " as it fills a vacant room, and does not, like most of our new. "fangled words, justle out older and worthier occupants, to the 66 no small detriment of the language. It occupies, so to speak, "the middle place between the pathetic and that which is ad"dressed to the imagination, and partakes of both, adding to the " warmth of the former the grace and attractions of the latter.”

Would not Campbell have stated this philological fact still more accurately, if he had substituted the word understanding instead of imagination, in the last sentence?-making such al terations on the subsequent clause, as this change would have rendered necessary. In proposing the following, I wish only to convey my idea more clearly :-" and partakes of both, adding "to the interest of the former the sober and deliberate convic"tion of the latter."

Dr Beattie has said, "that the true and the old English sense "of the word sentiment is a formed opinion, notion, or prin. "ciple ;" and he is certainly supported in this remark by the explanation of that word in Johnson's Dictionary. It is remark. able, however, that the very first authority quoted by Johnson is strongly in favour of what I have stated concerning the shade of difference between the words sentiment and opinion. The "consideration of the reason, why they are annexed to so many "other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and 66 goodness of the sovereign Disposer of all things, may not be "unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries."-Locke.

One thing at least must be granted, that, if this term be considered as exactly synonymous with opinion or principle, it is altogether superfluous in our language; whereas, in the restricted sense in which I am inclined to employ it, it forms a real and most convenient accession to our philosophical vocabulary.

If these remarks be just, Dr Reid has made use of the word somewhat improperly (at least according to present usage), when he speaks, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, of the sentiments of Mr Locke concerning perception; and of the sentiments of Arnauld, of Berkeley, and of Hume, concerning ideas.―tte seems, himself, to have been sensible of this; for in his Essays on the Active Powers, published three years after the former, he observes, that "sentiment was wont to signify opinion or judg "ment of any kind; but, of late, is appropriated to signify an

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"opinion or judgment, that strikes, and produces some agreeable or uneasy emotion." (P. 479, 4to edit.)

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Mr Hume, on the other hand, sometimes employs (after the example of the French metaphysicians) sentiment as synonymous with feeling; an use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue. In ascertaining the propriety of our vernacular expressions, it is a rule with me never to appeal from the practice of our own standard authors to etymological considerations, or to the use which is made, in other languages, either ancient or modern, of the corresponding derivatives from the same root. In the present instance, accordingly, I pay no regard to the definitions given of the word sentiment in French dictionaries; although I readily acknowledge, that it was from that country we originally borrowed it: And I am much fortified in my doubts with respect to the competency of foreign tribunals to decide any such questions, by the variety of senses attached to this very word, in the differ. ent languages of modern Europe. On this point I willingly borrow a few remarks from a very ingenious and judicious critic.

“Le mot sentiment, dérivé du primitif Latin sentire, a passé "dans les langues modernes, mais avec des nuances d'acception 66 particulières à chacune d'elles. En Italien, sentimento exprime "deux idées différentes; 1. l'opinion qu'on a sur un objet, ou

sur une question; 2. la faculté de sentir. En Anglois, sentiment "n'a que le premier de ces deux sens. En Espagnol, sentimiento "signifie souffrance, acception que le mot primitif a quelquefois en Latin.

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"En François, sentiment a les deux acceptions de l'Italien, "mais avec cette différence, que dans la dernière il a beaucoup "d'extension. Non seulement il designe généralement en François toutes les affections de l'âme, mais il exprime plus parti"culièrement la passion de l'amour. En voici un example; son SENTIMENT est si profond que rien au monde ne peut la distraire "des objets qui servent à le nourrir. Si Pon traduit cette phrase "dans toute autre langue, en conservant le mot sentiment, on fera

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un Gallicisme. On en fera également un, en employant ce mot "dans la traduction des phrases suivantes : c'est un homme à SEN66 TIMENT; voilà du SENTIMENT; il y a du SENTIMENT dans cette 66 piece; il est tout âme, tout SENTIMENT;-parce qu'il y est pris "dans une acception vague, pour tout ce qui tient à la faculté de "sentir. Aussi STERNE en a-t-il fait un en donnant à son voyage "le titre de sentimental; mot que les François n'ont pas manqué "de réclamer, et de fairè passer dans leur langue, parce qu'il est "parfaitement analogue à l'acception qu'ils ont donnée au mot "sentiment."-Dissertation sur les Gallicismes, par M. Suard. It does not appear to me that Sterne can be justly charged with a Gallicism, in the title which he has given to his book; the adjective sentimental, although little used before his time, being

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strictly conformable in its meaning to the true English import of the substantive on which it is formed. On the contrary, I think,. that, in adopting the adjective sentimental, as well as the phrase homme à sentiment, the French have imitated the English idiom.. In applying, indeed, the word sentiment to the passion of love, they must be allowed to have led the way: Nor do I know that their example has been yet followed by any good writer in this country.-M. Suard was probably misled, in this criticism on Sterne, by Johnson's Dictionary.

They who are aware of the frequent use of this word, which has been lately made by our moral writers, will not blame me for the length of this note; more especially, when they consider what a source of misapprehension it has been between English and French philosophers. How oddly does the following sentence sound in our ears! "Les nouveaux philosophes veulent que la "couleur soit un sentiment de l'ame."

Note (F.) p. 117.

The principal steps of Berkeley's reasoning, in support of his scheme of idealism, are expressed in the following propositions, which are stated nearly in his own words:

"We are percipient of nothing but our own perceptions and "ideas."—" It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the "objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually "imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by at"tending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, "ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either com66 pounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally per❝ceived in the foresaid ways.". "Light and colours, heat "and cold, extension and figure; in a word, the things we see "and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even "in thought, any of these from perception? For my own part, "I might as easily divide a thing from itself. As for our

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66 senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by 66 sense, call them what you will: But they do not inform us, "that things exist without a mind, or unperceived-like to those "which are perceived.As there can be no notion or thought "but in a thinking being, so there can be no sensation, but in a "sentient being: it is the act or feeling of a sentient being; its very essence consists in being felt. Nothing can resemble a "sensation, but a similar sensation in the same, or in some other "mind. To think that any quality in a thing inanimate can re"semble a sensation is absurd, and a contradiction in terms." This argument of Berkeley is very clearly and concisely put by Reid.

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"If we have any knowledge of a material world, it must

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