tioned is entirely of modern origin. Petronius, indeed, as Dr Beattie has observed, seems to have employed sapor in this figurative sense; but the use he has made of that word is so peculiar to himself, that it has been urged as a presumption in favour of the opinion of those critics who think, that the book which passes under his name is, at least in part, the composition of a later period. * 66 Although, however, in the ancient languages, the -word Taste was certainly not employed in that metaphorical acceptation which has now become so familiar to the ear, it is evident that the analogy which has led to the metaphor did not entirely escape the ancient critics. Quinctilian, in particular, speaking of this very power, observes, "That it is not to be "communicated by instruction any more than the senses of taste or of smell;" and with respect to some of its objects, he tells us, that "they are "perceived by a latent judgment of the mind, resembling the decision of the palate." " Quod "sentitur latente judicio, velut palato." After having perceived the analogy so distinctly, it is somewhat surprising, that the very convenient metaphor which it seems so naturally to suggest, should not occur in any of their writings. A passage, coinciding still more explicitly with some of the foregoing ideas, occurs in the Theatetus of Plato. "There is no question," says Socra * The passage in question is this: "Sermonem habes non pub"lici saporis."-i. e. (commentante et interprete Gesnero) non placentem vulgo, sed sapientibus. Ad sensum communem, et intelligentiam refertur. + Non magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor. tes in this Dialogue, "concerning that which is "agreeable to each person, but concerning what will, " in time to come, be agreeable, of which all men 66 are not equally judges.-You and the cook may judge of a dish on the table equally well; but, "while the dish is making, the cook can better fore"tel what will ensue from this or that manner of "composing it." * How exactly does this coincide with that remarkable expression which Lord Chatham applied to the Taste displayed in landscape-gardening, when he spoke of its prophetic eye ? The metaphorical use of the word Taste in the languages of modern Europe, is perfectly analogous to various other expressions transferred to the Mind from the external senses. Such, for example, is the word Sagacity, borrowed from the sense of smelling; the words Foresight, Intuition, and many others, borrowed from the sense of seeing; Acuteness and Penetration, borrowed from touch. The use made by the French, of the word tact, is a circumstance still more directly in point; indeed so much so, that the definition given of it by some of their best authors, may be applied very nearly to Taste in its figurative acceptation. "The word tact," says Roubaud," is now, in general, employed to express a "decision of the mind, prompt, subtle, and just; a "decision which seems to anticipate the slow pro"cesses of reflection and reasoning, and to pro"ceed from a sort of instinctive suggestion, conducting us instantaneously and unerringly to the "truth." 66 Plat. Op. Tom. i. p. 178.-Edit. Stephan. - 471 The chief difference in the meaning of these two words seems to me to consist in this, that Taste presupposes a certain degree of original susceptibility, and a certain degree of relish, stronger or weaker, for the beauties of nature; whereas the word tact is appropriated to things in which the power of judging is wholly acquired; as, in distinguishing the hands of different masters in painting, and in the other decisions concerning the merits of artists which fall under the province of the connoisseur. It is applied also to a quick perception of those delicate shades in character and manners, which are objects of study to the man of the world. * In this last sense, the English proverbial expression of feeling one's way, seems to suppose such a power as the French denote by the word tact; and has probably 爨 been suggested by some similar association. In these metaphorical applications of the word tact, the allusion is plainly made to the more delicate perceptions of touch; such, for instance, as those which, to a blind man, supply the place of sightin a manner somewhat analogous to that in which a nice tact supersedes, upon the subjects with which it is conversant, the exercise of reasoning. Perhaps, too, the analogy may have been strengthened by the astonishing perceptions which, in some of the insect tribes, seem to enlarge the sphere of this sense, far beyond its ordinary limits. "The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine, "Feels at each thread, and lives along the line," Note (P p.) The two circumstances which I have chiefly enlarged upon, in the foregoing observations on the principle of Taste, are, First, its power of analytical discrimination or discernment in the examination of its appropriate objects; and Secondly, the promptitude with which its decisions are commonly pronounced. The process by which these characteristical qualities of taste are gradually formed, may be easily conceived from some remarks which I have stated in the Philosophy of the Human Mind, when treating of the influence of casual associations on our spe"culative conclusions." 66 "As the connections among physical events," I have there observed, "are discovered by experience alone, it is evident that, when we see a phenomenon preceded by a number of circumstances, it " is impossible for us to determine, by any reasoning "à priori, which of these circumstances are to be re"garded as the constant, and which as the accidental "antecedents of the effect. If, in the course of our "experience, the same combination of circumstances "be always exhibited to us without any alteration, " and be invariably followed by the same result, we "must for ever remain ignorant, whether this result "be connected with the whole combination, or with one or more of the circumstances combined; and, "therefore, if we are anxious, upon any occasion, to produce a similar effect, the only rule that we can "follow, with perfect security, is to imitate, in every 'particular circumstance, the combination which "we have seen. It is only where we have an op portunity of separating such circumstances from "each other; of combining them variously toge “ther, and of observing the effects which result from "these different experiments, that we can ascertain, "with precision, the general laws of nature, and 66 strip physical causes of their accidental and unes. "sential concomitants." This view of the process by which the general laws of the material world are investigated, I have endeavoured to illustrate, in the same Section of that Work, by comparing it with the natural progress of the healing art, from the superstitious ceremonies employed among savage tribes, to that simplicity of practice which distinguishes an enlightened and philosophical physician. In the Section which immediately follows, I have observed, that the substance of the foregoing quotation is strictly applicable to the process, by which the principle of Taste is formed in the mind of an individual. "That certain objects are fitted to give "pleasure, and others disgust, to the mind, we know "from experience alone; and it is impossible for us, by any reasoning a priori, to explain how the plea"sure or the pain is produced. In the works of "Nature, we find, in many instances, the elements "of Beauty involved among circumstances, which "are either indifferent, or which obstruct the gene"ral effect and it is only by a train of experiments "that we can separate these circumstances from the "rest, and ascertain with what particular qualities "the pleasing effect is connected. Accordingly, "the inexperienced artist, when he copies Nature, : |