"ence of bodies falling, as we account it, down"wards.” *

In the Disquisitions on matter and spirit, by the same author (the second edition of which appeared in 1782), the above passage is quoted at length; † but it is somewhat remarkable, that, as the aim of the latter work is to inculcate the materiality of Mind, Dr Priestley has prudently suppressed the clause which I have distinguished in the first sentence of the foregoing extract, by printing it in capitals.

In one opinion, however, this ingenious writer seems to have uniformly persevered since he first republished Hartley's Theory, that "man does not "consist of two principles so essentially different "from one another as matter and spirit; but that "the whole man is of some uniform composition; ‡ "and that either the material or the immaterial

part of the universal system is superfluous." § To this opinion (erroneous as I conceive it to be) I have no inclination to state any metaphysical objections at present; as it does not interfere, in the slightest degree, with what I consider as the appropriate business of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. I object to it merely as it may have a tendency to mislead our logical conclusions, concerning the origin and certainty of human knowledge.

* Pages 392, 393.

+ Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, 2d edit. p. 26. Preface to Disquisitions, p. 7.

§ Ibid. p. 6.

Highly important as the question concerning the nature of Mind may be supposed to be, when considered in connection with its future prospects, it is evidently altogether foreign to the speculations in which we are now engaged. The only proposition I insist upon is, that our knowledge of its phenomena, and of the laws which regulate them, is to be obtained, not by looking without, but by looking within. This rule of philosophising (the most essential of all in this branch of science) is, as I formerly observed, not founded upon any particular theory, but is the obvious and irresistible suggestion of those powers of Consciousness and Reflection, which are the exclusive sources of our information with respect to that class of facts, which forms the appropriate object of our study.

It has become customary, of late, for Materialists to object to those who profess to study the mind in the way of reflection, that they suffer themselves to be misled, by assuming rashly the existence of a principle in man, essentially distinct from anything which is perceived by our senses. The truth is, that while we adhere to the method of reflection, we never can be misled by any hypothesis. The moment we abandon it, what absurdities are we apt to fall into!-Dr Priestley himself furnishes me with an instance in point ;-after quoting which, I shall leave my readers to judge which of the two parties in this dispute is most justly chargeable with the error, of arguing rashly from a gratuitous assumption concerning the nature of Mind, to esta

blish a general conclusion with respect to its principles and laws.

"If man," says Priestley, "be wholly a material "being, and the power of thinking the result of a " certain organization of the brain, does it not fol

low, that all his functions must be regulated by "the laws of mechanism, and that, of consequence, "all his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity ?"

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In another passage he observes, that "the doc"trine of necessity is the immediate result of the "doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism "is the undoubted consequence of materialism."

According to this argument, the scheme of materialism leads, by one short and demonstrative step, to the denial of man's free agency; that is, a mere hypothesis (for what Materialist can pretend to of fer a shadow of proof in its support ?) is employed to subvert the authority of Consciousness, the only tribunal competent to pass any judgment whatever on the question at issue.

It is remarkable, that the argument here proposed by Dr Priestley, with so much gravity, or, at least, one extremely similar to it, was long ago introduced ironically by Dr Berkeley, in his ingenious dialogues, entitled the Minute Philosopher. "Cor

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poreal objects strike on the organs of sense; "whence issues a vibration in the nerves, which,

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being communicated to the soul, or animal spirit in "the brain, or root of the nerves, produceth there

Disquisitions, &c. Introd. p. 5.

"in that motion called volition: and this produceth "a new determination in the spirits, causing them "to flow in such nerves, as must necessarily, by the "laws of mechanism, produce such certain actions. "This being the case, it follows, that those things "which vulgarly pass for human actions are to be "esteemed mechanical, and that they are falsely as"cribed to a free principle. There is, therefore, "no foundation for praise or blame, fear or hope, "reward or punishment, nor consequently for religion, which is built upon, and supposeth those things."

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It will not, I trust, be supposed by any of my readers, that I mean to ascribe to Dr Priestley any partiality for the dangerous conclusions which Berkeley conceived to be deducible from the scheme of Necessity. How widely soever I may dissent from most of his philosophical tenets, nobody can be disposed to judge more favourably than myself of the motives from which he wrote. In the present case, at the same time, truth forces me to add to what I have already said, that the alteration which he has made on Berkeley's statement is far from being an improvement, in point of sound logic; for his peculiar notions about the nature of matter (from which he conceives himself to have "wiped off "the reproach of being necessarily inert, and absolutely incapable of intelligence, thought, or ac“tion") render the argument altogether nugatory, his own principles, even if it were admitted to

upon

*

Disquisitions, &c. Vol. I. p. 144, 2d edit.

hold good upon those which are generally received. It plainly proceeds on the supposition, that the common notions concerning matter are well-founded; and falls at once to the ground, if we suppose matter to combine, with the qualities usually ascribed to itself, all those which consciousness teaches us to belong to mind.

On the question concerning the origin of our knowledge, Priestley has nowhere explained his opinion fully, so far as I am able to recollect; but from his reverence for Hartley, I take for granted, that, on this point, he did not dissent from the conclusions of his master. In one particular, I think it probable that he went a little farther; the general train of his speculations concerning the human Mind leading me to suspect, that he conceived our ideas themselves to be material substances. In this conjecture I am confirmed by the following remark, which he makes on a very puerile argument of Wollaston, "that the mind cannot be material, because it is "influenced by reasons:" In reply to which, Priestley observes, "that to say that reasons and “ideas are not things material, or the affections of "a material substance, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved."

But whatever were Priestley's notions upon this question, there can be no doubt of those entertained by his successor, Dr Darwin, who assumes, as an ascertained fact, that "ideas are material things,"

* Disquisitions, &c. Vol. I. pp. 114, 115.

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