Hath and has, &c., in regard to their
use, 436.

Height, see Elevation.

Helvetius, his interpretation of Locke,
123; his theory of the Sublime, that
it involves the Terrible, 277.
Hill, (Aaron,) quoted in illustration of
the false sublime, 328.
Hindoo Idealism, 107, 108.

Hobbes, quoted as to the Peripatetic
doctrine of Species, 424; first to start
the idea of an etymological metaphy-
sic, 434.

Hogarth, referred to in regard to the

theory of Beauty, 208; his waving

line or line of beauty referred to, 225.
Home, (Henry, Lord Kames,) see Kames.
Homer, quoted as to female Beauty,

246, 247; in illustration of the Sub-
lime, 297, 301, quater, 311, 312;
again, 313; quoted for a sublime pas-
sage, (Note FF,) 447.

Hooke, (Dr.) on the nature of Ideas,
145, 146, 426.

Horace, quoted, 160; in illustration of

the Beautiful, 250; of the Sublime,
282, 328; uses the word palate in our
metaphorical meaning of Taste, 345;
quoted as to critical envy, 379; quot-
ed, 404.

Hughes, praised as holding correct
opinions in regard to the nature of
Taste, 355.

Hume, on the limitation of the term
Association, 17, 18; his Idealism
founded on the ideal hypothesis touch-
ing Perception, 48; his acceptance of
the Ideal theory, 71, 72; on Locke's
vague usage of the word Idea, 79;
pushed the consequences of the reduc-
tion of Vice and Virtue to Perceptions
to its ultimate conclusion, 82, seq.;
his Scepticism, its good and evil con-
sequences, 85, 86; relation to Ber-
keley as an Idealist, 89, 90; founds
our expectation of the Stability of
Nature on Association, 101; objection
to and solution of this, both given by
Hume, 102, see 104; does not go so
far as Diderot in Sensationalism, 125;
quoted as to Experience, 136; adduced,
147; quoted as to Idea, 413, 423; his
employment of the term Sentiment,
416; his use of the word Instinct,
429; his view in regard to Taste gen-
erally approved of, 343: observes that
a great genius is prone to admiration,
374; quoted on the pleasure we re-
ceive from an eloquent portraiture of

painful objects, 441; in his theory of
the Sublime partly anticipates the
Author, (Note A A,) 442, 443; how
he accounts for the association of an-
tiquity with elevation, 445.
Hutcheson, how he accepted Locke's
doctrine touching the Origin of our
ideas, 73; really only follows Aris-
totle in making Extension, Figure,
Motion, Rest, to be more properly the
concomitants of sight and touch, than
sensations of either of these senses,
73, 74; admits, in uniformity with
Locke, that all our Fundamental ideas
(ie., not relations) must be derived
from a Sense, 74, 81; this doctrine
criticised, 74; opposed to Locke's
conclusions against Innate practical
principles, otherwise coincides with
him, 81; apprehensive of the conse-
quences of his reduction of Vice and
Virtue to Perceptions, 81, 82; had
however a plausible defence in his
doctrine of the suggested qualities of
Extension, Figure, and Motion, (but
which was only borrowed from Aris-
totle,) 83, see also in regard to his
doctrine of Primary Qualities, 420;
quoted on the word Beauty, 191.
Hutton, (Dr. James,) his Idealism, 96-
99, 114.

IDEA, historical notices of the word,
(Notes C, D,) 411, 415.
Ideal Theory, as held by Locke, 66-69,

72; by Leibnitz, 69; by Berkeley,
70; by Hume, 71.
Idealism:-that of Berkeley, on, in gen-
eral, 87-119, (Note F,) 417, 418; mis-
takes in regard to this theory, 87-100;
tendency to Idealism by Plato, 88;
by Malebranche, 106; by Leibnitz,
107; Hume's Idealism, and compared
with Berkeley's, 89, 90; this theory
according to Boscovich, 93-96; to
Hutton, 96-99; the Idealism of Ber-
keley, Hutton, Boscovich, compared,
98-100; the Hindoo Idealism, 107,
108; strictures on the various opin-
ions touching the existence and non-
existence of matter, 108-110; accord-
ing to D'Alembert, our belief in the
existence of the material world, a
species of Instinct, 111.
Ideas, Locke varies in placing those of
material things sometimes in the
Brain, sometimes in the Mind, 66;
latent or innate in the Mind, 77; how

the word idea may be properly under-
stood, ib.; how the sources of, to be
traced, 148; common prejudices which
influence our explanations of, ib.
Identity, (personal,) 59; obtained by
Consciousness and Memory, 59, 60.
Ideology, a term adopted in France for

Sensationalism, 127, 128.
Imagination, in what sense used by the
Author, to wit, as creative represen-
tation, 264, seq.; what sense ministers
more especially to Imagination, 264;
how this faculty conduces to the
Beautiful, 266, seq.; things pleasing
in imagination (imitation) displeasing
in reality, 271; relish for the plea-
sures of, supposed in the faculty of
Taste, 386, seq.; what does it sup-
pose? 387, seq.; is it more vigorous
in the earlier periods of society? 399-
406; when productive of more plea-
sure, is productive of less pain, 404.
Imitation, things pleasing as imitated
may be displeasing as real, 271.
Immensity, (in Space,) how Sublime,
(Note E E,) 445.

Impulse, according to Locke, the only
way in which bodies can operate or
produce ideas in us, 66.
Indian, see Hindoo.

Innate:-Innate Idea, on the word, 79,
seq.; Locke has quibbled on it, ib.;
Shaftesbury's strictures on his per-
version, ib.; they were, however, in
this respect, nearly at one, 80; on In-
nate Ideas, 130.
Instinct, on,

in general, (Note K,) 429,
430; frequently employed too vaguely,
429, see 111.

Intellect, (see Understanding, Reason;)
is it an original source of our know-
ledge? See Knowledge.

JEFFREY, (Francis,) difficulties in re-
gard to the study of Mind, 24, seq.
Job, quoted in illustration of the Sub-
lime, 325.

Johnson, (Dr.) on the term Sentiment,
416; on his philology in general,
(Note R,) 435, 436; on his etymolo-
gies, ib.; adduced as to the meaning
of picturesque, 230; quoted as to a
certain modification of Taste, 361; as
to the effect of association in making
even faults agreeable, 365; his criti-
cal decisions often perverse, 377, 378 ¦
quoted, 388; on the association of
antiquity with elevation, 445.

Jones, (Sir William,) quoted on the
Hindoo Idealism, 107, 108; his evi-
dence adduced in regard to Indian
opinion touching the Sublime, 291,

292.

Juvenal, quoted in illustration of the
Sublime, 319.

KAMES, (Henry Home, Lord,) his use
of the verb to handle, 183; his theory
of the Sublime, that it involves a
beautiful object placed high, 278; of
the sublimity of the quotation, "Let
there be light," &c. (Note D D,) 444.
Kant, on Space and Time, 116-118,
420; contrasted with Reid, 422.
Knight, (Mr. Payne,) quoted in regard
to the transitive extensions of the
term Beautiful, 196; referred to on
Burke's theory of the Sublime, 275;
his own theory of the Sublime, that it
involves great mental energy, 278.
Knowledge, (human,) sources of, ac-
cording to Locke, 55; on, in general,
55-86; classification by our Author
of the principal opinions in regard to
the origin of our knowledge, 130-136.
"Knowledge is power," a saying of
Bacon, authentic, 26; importance of
the precept, 47.

LA HARPE, see Harpe.
Language, very imperfect as an organ
of mental intercourse, 153, seq.; in
what sense it can be called the ex-
press image of thought," 154; the
mind, with astonishing quickness,
takes and supplies the hints given to
it by language, 153-156; transposi-
tions in the arrangement of words,
155; language, in its etymology, does
not show the intellectual process of
thought, as Mr. Tooke supposes, 159;
the Author does not proscribe, like
Du Marsais, Figurative terms in phi-
losophy, but proposes to vary the
metaphors, 173; to understand the
present import of a word, it is not ne-
cessary to trace the historical progress
of its past meanings, 178, seq.; a
word, in passing from one language
to another, frequently changes alto-
gether its original meaning, 180.
Leibnitz, on the resemblance of our
ideas to their archetypes, 68, 69; his
criticism of Locke, 76; his metaphy-
sical reveries referred to, 106; ten-

dency to Idealism,-considers Matter
as a mere well regulated Phænomenon,
107; quoted as to Truth, 133; his cri-
ticism of Locke in regard to Necessary
truths, 135; Leibnitz and the Suffi-
cient Reason referred to in explana-
tion of our love of regular forms and
uniform arrangements, 209, seq.
Lille, (Abbé de,) quoted on the phæno-

mena of Memory, (Note Q,) 434, 435;
on the beauty of a lake, 224; on
beauty through Association, 244;
quoted, 439, 445.

Livy, quoted in illustration of the Sub-
lime in Depth, 285, 308; as to Philo-
pomen, 335, 336.

Locke, aware that no light was to be
obtained in psychology from physio-
logy, 7, 8; his limitation of the prin-
ciple of Association, 16, 17; on the
divisions of Philosophy, 19; his spe-
culations valuable, not so much as
enlarging our knowledge as in making
us conscious of our ignorance, 48;
his account of the sources of human
knowledge, on, in general, 55-86,
(Note O,) 432, 433; Reid's criticism
of this, 432; how his philosophy was
understood by Hume, 63; quotations
from himself in statement of, 63, seq.;
how far his philosophy may be ad-
mitted, 65; may, however, be inter-
preted to mean much that is repre-
hensible, 65, seq.; the import of the
Ideal theory as held by him, 69;
against Innate Ideas, 79, 80; his con-
troversy, however, merely verbal, 80,
81; theory of Matter, 94; his autho-
rity in France, 120-136; but his doc-
trines there very variously interpreted
by the different philosophers, 120,
seq.; our Author's enumeration of
these various interpretations, 130,
seq.; his philosophy understood by
the ladies of Paris, 131; never men-
tions Bacon, 133; in what meaning
his maxim should be understood, that
all our knowledge originates in Ex-
perience, 133, seq.; as to Definition,
410; as to his import of the word
Idea, 412; on the term Sentiment,
416; on the creation of Matter, 429;
anticipated Mr. Tooke in his etymo-
logical metaphysics, 433.

Logic, conditions of a just and compre-
hensive system of, 49, seq.; logic of
morals, 50.

Longinus, his description of the Sub-
lime, that it fills the reader with a

glorying and sense of inward great-
ness, 278, see also 318, 381; on his
phraseology in regard to the Sublime,
288; on his quoting, "Let there be
light," &c., as an instance of the Sub-
lime, 294; on the false sublime, 328;
translation by Akenside of a passage
from, (Note LL.) 451; on his com-
parison of the Sublime to a flash of
lightning, (Note M M,) 451.

Lowth, on the use of hath and doth for
has and does, 436.

Lucan, quoted in illustration of the Sub-
lime, 305.

Lucretius, quoted as holding a theory
of beauty corresponding to Burke's,
215; in illustration of the Sublime,
295, 297; referred to in illustration
of the Sublime, 305.

Mathematical Affections of Matter es-
tablished and characterized, 115-
119.

Mathematics, (both Geometry and Arith-
metic,) our technical language in, is
borrowed from the physical proper-
ties of matter, 170.

Matter, Creation of, (Note 1,) 429.
Matter and Mind, our notions of both
merely relative-merely phænomenal,
5, seq.; our present life may be only
a Dream, held by Plato, Maximus
Tyrius, Shakspeare, Voltaire, &c., 88;
Matter a mere phænomenon, impli
citly the doctrine of Malebranche and
Boscovich, explicitly avowed by Leib-
nitz, Robison, and others, 106, 107:
strictures on the various opinions
touching the existence and non-exist-

ence of Matter, 108-110; according to
D'Alembert, our belief in the exist-
ence of the Material world a species of
Instinct, 111; Primary and Secondary
Qualities of, 113, seq.
Maupertuis, the first in France to avow
himself a Newtonian, 127.
Maximus Tyrius, admits that our pre-
sent existence may be only a Dream,
88.
Memory, how far necessary to our no-
tions of Identity, 60, 62; of Time,
62; of Motion, ib.; the metaphorical
expressions in relation to, 168, 169.
Metaphors, mixed, on their use, 185.
Metaphysics, how this word came to de-
nominate a part or the whole of the
philosophy of the human mind, 20;
on the vagueness of the term, 32, 39.
Milton, quoted for the word grotesque,
corresponding to picturesque, 238;
in illustration of the Sublime, ter, 292,
293; in the same relation, 294, 318,
324, 326; in regard to the proneness
of good taste to admiration, 375; to
shew that High may be in science
correspondent with Profound, (Note
H H,) 449.

Mind, (philosophy of,) prevalent errors
regarding, in general, 5, seq.; of
Mind, as of Matter, our notions mere-
ly relative or phænomenal, ib.; our
knowledge of, founded altogether on
Observation and Induction, 6, seq.,
32, seq.; how far to the exclusion of
Experiment, 31, seq.; all Physiolo-
gical theories inept, 6, seq.; on this
the opinion of Locke, 7, seq.; Bel-
sham's hypothesis of cerebral and
nervous Vibrations, particularly no-
ticed as thus incompetent, 8, seq.; par-
ticularly noticed also is the Hartleian
theory of Association, 11, seq.; this,
likewise, incompetent, 12, seq.; how
this philosophy came to be connected
with Metaphysics, 20; some objec-
tions to it obviated, 23-54; Anatomy
of the Mind compared with the Ana-
tomy of the Body, 35, seq.; modern
scepticism in regard to the philosophy
of the Mind contrasted with that of
antiquity, 37; paramount influence
of, 39, seq., 43; improvement of, the
great object of Bacon, 39, seq., 42;
influence of, on the happiness of so-
ciety, 41, seq.; why the philosophers
of Mind are less vulgarly renowned
than the philosophers of matter, 53;
intellectual and moral operations, how

did they obtain a name? 149, seq.;
answer, 10. by a species of Induction,
150; 2° by metaphorical or analogi-
cal Extension, 151, seq.; names of
abstract notions taken originally from
Sensible objects, but not therefore
themselves sensible in their subse-
quent applications, 152, seq., 159-
188; Mind appears a sorry me-
chanism in the writings of Hartley,
Priestley, Darwin, or Tooke, 175; its
study useful in correcting an undue
ascendency of Imagination or Taste,
392, seq.

Mitchell precedes Priestley in his doc-
trine of Matter, 140.

Monro, (Dr. Alex., Primus,) on the uni-
versality of the hypothesis of Animal
Spirits, 11.

Montaigne, quoted as to rapidity of
thought in chess, 334.

Montesquieu, quoted as to Beauty, 234.
Moral distinctions, not from Sense but
from Reason, 83.

More, (Dr. Henry,) that the world was

generated, not created, 148.

Motion, idea of, involves those of Exten-
sion and Time, 119; how obtained,
419, 420.

NAPOLEON, (Bonaparte,) in confirmation
of Bacon's Aphorism that "Know-
ledge is Power," 38.
Natural signs, see Signs.
Nature, Constancy of, our Expectation of

this, on what founded, 106, 135.
Necessary truths, there are such, 135.
Newton, (Sir Isaac,) his conclusions
contrasted with his queries, 10; his
conjecture touching the Creation of
Matter, 429; as to his quasi-intuitive
apprehension of truth, 332, seq.
Nihil est in Intellectu quod non prius
fuerit in Sensu, 123, et alibi.
Novels, see Fictitious narratives.

OBSERVATION, philosophy of, 28, seq.;
as opposed to strictly experimental
philosophy, 29, seq.
Ocean, how a sublime object, 309, 310,
seq.

Olympiodorus, on the Platonic Ideas, 414.
Ontology, 21.

Origin of human knowledge, see Know-
ledge.

Outness, on the word, 116.

Ovid, quoted as to the spear of Achilles,

86; as to moral duty, 254; as to
Sublimity, in relation to Astronomy,
281; as to Sublimity (elevation) in
the human countenance, 318; quoted,
394, 446.

PARR, (Rev. Dr. Samuel,) on the deriva-
tion of the word sublimis,-quod supra
limum, 455-462; on the authorship of
the treatise On the Sublime attributed
to Longinus, 462, 463; in this follows
Amati and Weiske, ib.; in favour of
Tonstal's emendation, 464, 465; his
oversights or inadvertencies, 460, 464.
Paterculus, quoted in regard to the
transitive extension of words, 199.
Pathos, Pathetic, what, (Note CC,)
444; pathetic in relation to the Sub-
lime, (Note K K,) 449, 450; its con-
nexion with Humour, 450.

Pearce, adduced as to a reading of Lon-
ginus, 288.

Perception, Reid's philosophy of, 47; as
opposed to Sensation, 418, 419.
Peripatetics, as to the import of Species,
Phantasm, Idea, 412.

Petronius, uses sapor in our sense of
Taste, 344, 345.

Philopomen, adduced as having the
military coup d'œil, 335.

Philosophy, ancient Greek, how divided,
19, seq.

Picturesque, as contrasted with the
Beautiful, 224, seq., 230, seq.; what,
(Note U,) 438.

Pindar, quoted in illustration of the Sub-
lime, 298.

Plato, makes Reason (Intelligence) not
Sense, the criterion of our moral judg-
ments, 84, 85; his tendency to a doubt
in regard to the external world, 88-
108; Sir William Jones contradicted
in regard to, 108; adduced as thinking
that Beauty literally denotes a quality
not of Matter but of Mind, 247; how
his philosophy is called sublime, 293,
325; quoted as to acquired dexteri-
ties, 333; as to the cook's judgment
of the agreeable in a dish, 346; as to
Taste, 370.

Platonic Ideas, (Note D,) 414, 415.
Pliny, (the elder), quoted as to the
Beautiful in painting, 235, 241.
Pliny, (the younger,) uses the term
stomachus in our metaphorical sense
of the word Taste, 345.
Plutarch, his evidence adduced as to the

effect of Association in making de-
formities agreeable, 365.
Pneumatology, 20, 21.

Polybius, quoted as to acquired Percep-
tions, 331.

Pope, quoted in illustration of the Sub-
lime, 288, 328; in illustration of Tact,
347; that a critic should be himself a
model, 378.
Prejudice-error; the correction of one
is frequently more important than the
acquisition of many truths, 51, 52.
Prévost, Dedication to him, 1; on the
want in the French language of a
word for Consciousness, 56; referred
to with relation to Kant, 118; as a
critic of Condillac, 122.

Price, (Mr. Uvedale,) quoted in regard
to Burke's theory of Beauty, 221;
in regard to the Picturesque, 224,
seq., 230, 236-240; objects to the
latitude in the use of the word Beauty,
228, seq., criticised, 235; referred to
on Burke's theory of the Sublime,
275; quoted on the discrimination of
the Beautiful and the Picturesque,
(Note X,) 439, seq.

Price, (Rev. Dr. Richard,) on Innate

Ideas, 77; that moral distinctions are
not apprehended by Sense but by
Reason, 84; quoted on abstract ideas,

415.

Priestley, noticed as a metaphysical
romancer, 7; his hypothetical as-
sumptions, and assault upon Reid, 11,
12; that Reid criticised the Ideal
theory seriously, albeit the expres-
sions of philosophers were only meant
metaphorically, 68, 88, 422; this
opinion of Priestley refuted, (Note
H,) 422-428; quoted in refutation of
himself, 423; on his metaphysical
theory in general, 139, seq.; an am-
biguous kind of Materialist, 139, 140;
his earlier scheme makes Matter in a
manner immaterial, 140; in his sub-
sequent writings a more determined
Materialist, 141; but always a psy-
chological Unitarian, ib.; his doctrine
of moral Necessity founded on his
psychological Materialism, 142; this
ironically advanced by Berkeley pre-
viously, 143; he has not improved
Berkeley's conception of Materialism,
ib.; in regard to the Origin of our
knowledge he probably regarded Ideas
as themselves material, 144; treated
as metaphorical the language of those
philosophers who describe Ideas or