On the same principle, I would vindicate such phrases as the following;-to dwell, or to enlarge on a particular point; or on a particular head of a discourse; or on a particular branch of an argument. Nor do I see any criticism to which they are liable, which would not justify the vulgar cavil against golden candlestick, and glass inkhorn ;-expressions which it is impossible to dispense with, but by means of absurd circumlocutions. In these last cases, indeed, the etymology of the words leads the attention back to the history of the arts, rather than to that of the metaphorical uses of speech; but in both instances the same remark holds, that when a writer, or a speaker, wishes to express himself plainly and perspicuously, it is childish in him to reject phrases which custom has consecrated, on account of the inconsistencies which a philological analysis may point out between their primitive import and their popular acceptations.

In the practical application, I acknowledge, of this general conclusion, it requires a nice tact, aided by a familiar acquaintance with the best models, to be able to decide, when a metaphorical word comes to have the effect of a literal and specific term;-or (what amounts to the same thing) when it ceases to present its primitive along with its figurative meaning: And whenever the point is at all doubtful, it is unquestionably safer to pay too much, than too little respect, to the common canons of verbal criticism. All that I wish to establish is, that these canons, if adopted without limitations and exceptions, would produce a style of composition different from what has been exemplified by the classical authors, either of ancient or of modern times; and which no writer or speaker could attempt to sustain, without feeling himself perpetually cramped by fetters, inconsistent with the freedom, the variety, and the grace of his expression.1

been long sanctioned by the highest authorities.

It is necessary for me to observe here, that I introduce this, and other examples of the same kind, merely as

illustrations of my meaning; and that it is of no consequence to the argument, whether my decisions, in particular cases, be right or wrong.

The following maxim does honour

If these remarks have any foundation in truth, when applied to questions which fall under the cognizance of illiterate judges, they conclude with infinitely greater force in favour of established practice, when opposed merely by such arcana as have been brought to light by the researches of the scholar or the antiquary. Considering, indeed, the metaphorical origin of by far the greater proportion of words in every cultivated language, (a fact which Mr. Tooke's ingenious speculations have now placed in a point of view so peculiarly luminous,) etymology, if systematically adopted as a test of propriety, would lead to the rejection of all our ordinary modes of speaking; without leaving us the possibility of communicating to each other our thoughts and feelings in a manner not equally liable to the same objections.

to the good sense and good taste of Vaugelas :--"Lorsqu'une façon de parler est usitée des bons auteurs, il ne faut pas s'amuser à en faire l'anatomie, ni à pointiller dessus, comme font une

infinité de gens; mais il faut se laisser emporter au torrent, et parler comme les autres, sans daigner écouter ces éplucheurs de phrases."

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

PART II.-[ESSAYS RELATIVE TO MATTERS OF TASTE.]

ESSAY FIRST.

ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

INTRODUCTION.

In the volume which I have already published on the Philosophy of the Human Mind,* when I have had occasion to speak of the Pleasures of Imagination, I have employed that phrase to denote the pleasures which arise from ideal creations or combinations, in contradistinction to those derived from the realities which human life presents to our senses. Mr. Addison, in his well-known and justly admired papers on this subject, uses the same words in a more extensive acceptation; to express the pleasures which Beauty, Greatness, or Novelty, excite in the mind, when presented to it, either by the powers of Perception, or by the faculty of Imagination, distinguishing these two classes of agreeable effects, by calling the one primary, and the other secondary pleasures. As I propose to confine myself, in this Essay, to Beauty, the first of the three qualities mentioned by Addison, it is unnecessary for me to inquire how far his enumeration is complete, or how far his classification is logical. But as I shall have frequently occasion in the sequel, to speak of the Pleasures of Imagination, I must take the liberty of remarking, in vindication of my own phraseo* [To wit, Elements, &c. vol. i.-Ed.]

logy, that philosophical precision indispensably requires an exclusive limitation of that title to what Mr. Addison calls secondary pleasures; because, although ultimately founded on pleasures derived from our perceptive powers, they are yet (as will afterwards appear) characterized by some very remarkable circumstances, peculiar to themselves. It is true, that when we enjoy the beauties of a certain class of external objects, (for example, those of a landscape,) Imagination is often, perhaps always, more or less busy; but the case is the same with various other intellectual principles, which must operate, in a greater or less degree, wherever men are to be found; such principles, for instance, as the association of ideas;-sympathy with the enjoyments of animated beings;-or a speculative curiosity concerning the uses and fitness, and systematical relations which are everywhere conspicuous in Nature; and, therefore, to refer to Imagination alone, our perception of these beauties, together with all the various enjoyments, both intellectual and moral, which accompany it, is to sanction, by our very definitions, a partial and erroneous theory. I shall, accordingly, in this, and in the following Essays, continue to use the same language as formerly; separating, wherever the phenomena in question will admit of such a separation, the pleasures we receive immediately by our senses from those which depend on ideal combinations formed by the Intellect.2

Agreeably to this distinction, I propose, in treating of Beauty, to begin with considering the more simple and general principles on which depend the pleasures that we experience in the case of actual perception; and after which, I shall proceed to investigate the sources of those specific and characteristical charms which Imagination lends to her own productions.

1 To these principles must be added, in such a state of society as ours, the numberless acquired habits of observation and of thought, which diversify the effects of the same perceptions in the minds of the painter, of the poet, of the landscape-gardener, of the farmer, of the civil or the military engineer, of the geological theorist, &c. &c. &c.

What Mr. Addison has called the Pleasures of Imagination, might be denominated, more correctly, the pleasures received from the objects of Taste; a power of the mind which is equally conversant with the pleasures arising from sensible things, and with such as result from the creations of human genius.

ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

PART FIRST-ON THE BEAUTIFUL, WHEN PRESENTED
IMMEDIATELY TO OUR SENSES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY, AND ON THE PLAN UPON WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO EXAMINE IT.

THE word Beauty, and, I believe, the corresponding term in all languages whatever, is employed in a great variety of acceptations, which seem, on a superficial view, to have very little connexion with each other; and among which it is not easy to trace the slightest shade of common or coincident meaning. It always, indeed, denotes something which gives not merely pleasure to the mind, but a certain refined species of pleasure, remote from those grosser indulgences which are common to us with the brutes; but it is not applicable universally in every case where such refined pleasures are received, being confined to those exclusively which form the proper objects of intellectual Taste. We speak of beautiful colours, beautiful forms, beautiful pieces of music:1 We speak also of the beauty of virtue; of the beauty of poetical composition; of the beauty of style in prose; of the beauty of a mathematical theorem; of the beauty of a philosophical discovery. On the other hand, we do not speak of beautiful tastes, or of beautiful smells; nor do

1 "There is nothing singular in applying the word beauty to sounds. The ancients observe the peculiar dignity of the senses of seeing and hearing; that

in their objects we discern the Kadov which we don't ascribe to the objects of the other senses."-Hutcheson's Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, sect. 2. § 14.