adopted by Hartley.—" With a view to some other inquiries, I will conclude with the following observations: That as almost all sorts of substances are perpetually subject to very minute vibratory motions, and all our senses and faculties seem chiefly to depend upon such motions excited in the proper organs, either by outward objects, or the powers of the will, there is reason to expect that the theory of vibrations here given will not prove useless in promoting the philosophy of other things besides musical sounds."1 Among modern philosophers, however, I am acquainted with none to whom Bacon's aphorism applies with nearly so great force, as to the ingenious physician whose hypothesis, concerning the materiality of ideas, has led me insensibly into these reflections. The influence of his medical and obstetric occupations on his habits of thinking, may be traced in almost every page of his works, both philosophical and poetical;-not only in the physiological language in which he uniformly describes our mental operations, but even in his detached theories upon the various incidental questions which he has started. It is sufficient to mention, as instances, his account of the mechanical process by which the human countenance is first moulded into a smile;—and his theory of beautiful forms, deduced from the pleasurable sensations, associated by an infant with the bosom of its nurse. The enthusiastic praise which he bestows on a conjecture of Mr. Huine's, that "the world may possibly have been generated rather than created," is perhaps explicable, in part, on the same principle. 1 See Harmonics, printed at Cambridge in 1749. The preface is dated in 1748. [This quotation from the learned author of the Harmonics, recalls to memory what Cicero has said of Aristoxenus, the musician and philosopher, who attempted to explain the nature of the soul by comparing it to a Harmony. "Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur. ... Proxime autem Aristoxenus Musicus, idemque Philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu et fidibus, quæ Harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tanquam in "Musicians think our souls are harmonies; But the general observation, of the pro- 2 See Zoonomia, vol. ii. p. 247, The propensity which all men have to explain the intellectual phenomena, by analogies borrowed from the Material World, has its origin in an error, differing from that which misled Hooke and Darwin, only in this, that the latter being the natural result of the favourite, or of the professional habits of the individual, assumes as many different shapes as the pursuits of mankind; whereas the former having its root in the common principles and common circumstances of the human race, may be expected to exert its influence on the theories of philosophers, in every country and in every age. The one prejudice would have been classed by Bacon with the idola specus, the other with the idola tribus. But I must not enlarge farther on systems which, whatever may have been the views of their authors, have obviously no logical connexion with the problem relating to the sources of our ideas; a problem which (as I have repeatedly observed) is to be solved, not by any hypothesis concerning the nature of Mind, but by an appeal to the phenomena of thought, and by an accurate analysis of the objects of our knowledge. On these grounds our attention is naturally attracted to a new and very interesting class of facts, which have been accumulated of late with extraordinary industry, as an inductive demonstration of the justness of those principles which I have been endeavouring to controvert; and which have been recommended to public notice (in one instance at least) by a much more splendid display of learning and genius, than has been yet exhibited by any of our metaphysical physiologists. I allude to the philological researches of Mr. Horne Tooke. Before, however, I enter upon any discussions concerning the inferences which these researches have been supposed to authorize, it is necessary for me to take a pretty wide compass, by premising some general observations, the scope of which, I am afraid, it may be difficult for my readers, at first view, to connect with the inquiries in which we have been hitherto engaged. I shall state, therefore, the whole of my argument at once, as clearly and fully as I can, in a separate Essay. is to be found in Dr. Henry More's Divine Dialogues:-" The primordials of the world are not mechanical, but spermatical or vital."] ESSAY FIFTH ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. CHAPTER I. IN carrying back our thoughts to the infancy of a cultivated language, a difficulty occurs, which, however obviously it may seem to present itself, I do not recollect to have seen taken notice of by any writer on the Human Mind; and which, as it leads the attention to various questions closely connected with the main design of this volume, as well as with the particular discussion which has been last under our review, I shall point out and illustrate at some length. In the case of objects which fall under the cognizance of any of our external senses, it is easy to conceive the origin of the different classes of words composing a conventional dialect; to conceive, for example, that two savages should agree to call this animal a Horse, and that tree an Oak. But, in words relating to things intellectual and moral, in what manner was the conventional connexion at first established between the sign and the thing signified? In what manner (to take one of the simplest instances) was it settled, that the name of imagination should be given to one operation of the mind; that of recollection to a second; that of deliberation to a third; that of sagacity, or foresight, to a fourth? Or, supposing the use of these words to be once introduced, how was their meaning to be explained to a novice, altogether unaccustomed to think upon such subjects. 1. In answer to this question, it is to be observed, in the first place, that the meaning of many words, of which it is impossible to exhibit any sensible prototypes, is gradually collected by a species of induction, which is more or less successfully conducted by different individuals, according to the degree of their attention and judgment. The connexion in which an unknown term stands in relation to the other words combined with it in the same sentence, often affords a key for its explanation in that particular instance; and in proportion as such instances are multiplied in the writings and conversation of men well acquainted with propriety of speech, the means are afforded of a progressive approximation towards its precise import. A familiar illustration of this process presents itself in the expedient which a reader naturally employs for decyphering the meaning of an unknown word in a foreign language, when he happens not to have a dictionary at hand. The first sentence where the word occurs affords, it is probable, sufficient foundation for a vague conjecture concerning the notion annexed to it by the author; some idea or other being necessarily substituted in its place, in order to make the passage at all intelligible. The next sentence where it is involved renders this conjecture a little more definite; a third sentence contracts the field of doubt within still narrower limits; till, at length, a more extensive induction fixes completely the signification we are in quest of. There cannot be a doubt, I apprehend, that it is in some such way as this, that children slowly and imperceptibly enter into the abstract and complex notions annexed to numberless words in their mother tongue, of which we should find it difficult or impossible to convey the sense by formal definitions.1 2. The strong tendency of the mind to express itself metaphorically, or analogically, on all abstract subjects, supplies another help to facilitate the acquisition of language. The prevalence of this tendency among rude nations has been often 1 Hence the logical utility of metaphysical pursuits in training the mind to these inductive processes, so essentially connected with precision in the use of language, and, of consequence, with accuracy of reasoning, in all the various employments of the intellectual powers. remarked; and has been commonly accounted for, partly from the warmth of imagination supposed to be peculiarly characteristical of savages, and partly from the imperfections of their scanty vocabularies. The truth, however, is, that the same disposition is exhibited by man in every stage of his progress; prompting him uniformly, whenever the enlargement of his knowledge requires the use of a new word for the communication of his meaning, instead of coining at once a sound altogether arbitrary, to assist, as far as possible, the apprehension of his hearers, either by the happy employment of some old word in a metaphorical sense, or by grafting etymologically on some well-known stock, a new derivative, significant to his own fancy of the thought he wishes to impart. To this bias of the mind to enrich language, rather by a modification of old materials, than by the creation of new ones, it is owing that the number of primitive or radical words, in a cultivated tongue, bears so small a proportion to the whole amount of its vocabulary. In an original language, such as the Greek, the truth of this remark may be easily verified; and, accordingly, it is asserted by Mr. Smith, that the number of its primitives does not exceed three hundred.1 In the compound languages now spoken in Europe, it is a much more difficult task to establish the fact; but an irresistible presumption in its favour arises from this circumstance,-That all who have turned their attention of late, in this island, to the study of etymology, are impressed with a deep and increasing conviction, founded on the discoveries which have been already made, that this branch of learning is still in its infancy; and that the roots of an immense variety of words, commonly supposed to be genuine radicals, may be traced, in a satisfactory manner, to the Saxon or to the Icelandic. The delight which all men, however unlettered, take in indulging their crude conjectures on the etymological questions which are occasionally started in conversation, is founded on the same circumstance; —their experimental knowledge of the difficulty of introducing into popular speech a new sound, entirely arbitrary in its 1 See the Dissertation on Language annexed to the Theory of Moral Sentiments. |