the left was effected that the blaze of their leader's genius and the sublime conception of which we have now to speak, flashed fully upon their benighted minds.

"Then it was," says the imperial historian himself," that officers and soldiers who had traversed these districts when in pursuit of Wurmser, began to perceive the intentions of their general. 'He intends,' they said, 'to turn Caldiero, which cannot be stormed, by a front attack; unable to contend in open plain with only 13,000 men against 40,000, he is transferring his battle-field to causeways surrounded by vast marshes, where numbers will not avail, and where every thing will be decided by the bravery of the heads of columns."".

If the reader will have the kindness to divest his mind of the recollection, that the strategical monologue here ascribed by Napoleon to his army has been seriously repeated, not merely by the crowd of ordinary writers, but by men of high talents and the greatest and best deserved literary fame, then will his own smile furnish the only comment which it can require. Of some of the assertions, however, we must say a word.

to pass over altogether the frightful enfilading lines that causeways must often present to the fire of artillery, there is not a cultivated marsh land on the face of the globe, from the Delta of the Ganges to the fens of Holland and Lincolnshire, in which a single causeway could be found that would not by branch causeways, roads, outlets, and adjoining patches of dry ground, offer ample opportunities for the defenders to extend their front and fire in a manner ruinous to the advance of any column, however brave: as indeed Napoleon was about to experience. We are bound to add, however, even for his own credit, that the whole of this pretended project which he ascribes to himself was, by his own shewing, a mere after-thought, resulting from the events that accidentally took place.

Ilis intention was to turn the position of Caldiero and to attack the Austrians in their left flank. The causeways led into the open plains round the position where he intended to fight, and therefore he followed them; and he tells us himself that he was greatly chagrined when it was discovered, from the steeple of Ronco, that the Austrians were leaving their ground and making a counter movement, so as to present a front instead of a flank to the advancing foe.

Unless we suppose Napoleon to have lost nine or ten thousand men in the actions of Bassano and Caldiero, which would be out of all question, the divisions of Massena, Augereau, Macguire, Guyeux, the reserve and the cavalry must still, by his own previous shewing, have amounted to at least 20,000 men; nor was it possible for Alvinzy, from the number with which he took the field, to have above 2000 or 3000 more. But, leaving this exaggeration of numbers entirely untouched, as the practice is much too frequent with all modern generals, it certainly required the assurance of Napoleon Buonaparte to assert in the face of the world, that an advance upon narrow causeways afforded the assailants an advantage over the defenders, and that to contract the opening by which an enemy was to be struck at was a benefit to the attacking instead of the attacked party. head of a column composed of forty or fifty modern infantry soldiers could, of course, effect absolutely nothing against masses; and,

The

The French army having crossed the Adige on the morning of the 15th, advanced in two columns along the two causeways leading in the direction of Caldiero. Massena's division took the left and followed the causeway that opens into the plains at Porcil, and ended their easy day's work by driving out the few Austrian light troops that occupied the village; but at Arcole sterner doings were in progress.

The right column, with which was Napoleon himself, moved along the causeway leading up the right bank of the Alpon, a small river which falls into the Adige at Ronco. This river is rarely fordable late in autumn, but is crossed by a bridge at the village of Arcole, where the causeway leading out of the marshes leaves the right bank and ascends along the left. It therefore became necessary to obtain the command of this bridge if the movement was to be proceeded with, and it was for the

It was

of the columns through the marshes; but there is a causeway along the left of the Alpon as well as upon the right; and for about a mile below Arcole, this left dyke runs close to the river and parallel to the one by which the French were advancing. It was lined with infantry; two light battalions, with some field-pieces, defended the village; and no sooner did the French attempt to cross the bridge and force an entrance, than so murderous a fire was opened on their front and flank, that they were instantly forced to give way. clearly apparent to all that nothing could be effected except by force of sacrifices and by excess of daring; nor were gallant efforts wanting Augereau seized a standard and planted it with his own hand upon the bridge, but in vain; the column was broken, scattered, and driven back. Onset followed onset in sauguinary succession; General Lannes, Verdier, Bon, and Verne, were wounded in fruitless efforts to gain the fatal pass. Napoleon himself dismounted, rallied the troops, reminded them of Lodi, and seizing a standard, again led them forward; but in vain;

within thirty yards of the enemy the column is again arrested by the terrible fire of musketry, and the Austrians rushing upon the foe, drove the broken and confused mass in headlong rout into the morass, extricated by the exertions of some whence Napoleon himself was only of the grenadiers.

The baffled commander, convinced at last that nothing was to be effected by these repeated and sanguinary front attacks, ordered General Guyeux to cross the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, and to ascend the left bank of the Alpon and dislodge the Austrian infantry from behind the against the village. This movement causeway that flanked the advance succeeded completely; the Imperialists no sooner saw their position turned than they fell back, allowing the long-contested pass to be carried at the first renewed onset. Arcole was now gained; but it had lost its value, and was no longer the object for which so much gallant blood had been shed during the previous com

bats.

Alvinzy no sooner saw that the French were advancing in force from Ronco, than he withdrew the

greater part of his army behind the Alpon, took up a new position at Villa Nova, placed Arcole, which had been on his left, immediately in his front, and now stood in battle-line ready for the fray. Napoleon, however, shrunk not only from the contest, but withdrew altogether behind the Adige, forsaking his dearly purchased conquest as soon as it was gained.

We should certainly praise this proceeding, if it could be reconciled with the battle of the next day; but the two measures following each other, seem altogether incomprehensible. The stern combats which had just been fought for the mere opening of a road, were no very promising preliminaries to a general action, and Massena's division was separated from the main body by a broad arm of the morass, which, in case of a night alarm, it might be dangerous to pass. All these were good grounds for a change of position; but not for giving up a blood-stained battle-field, to be repurchased if possible by an equal waste of blood next morning.

Before proceeding, however, we must again ask where was Wurmser, and where Davidowitch? Napoleon was at a distance, engaged in stern combats amid the marshes of Ronco; General Kilinain had been called in

bloody and bootless effort followed another; repulse succeeded repulse; an attempt to cross the Alpon by the aid of fascines met with no better success; and after a day passed in these fruitless and sanguinary efforts, Napoleon again fell back behind the Adige, not having obtained even momentary possession of the loncontested village. On this day no flank movement was even attempted; and the conduct of the French, coupled with their retreat of the night before, is incomprehensible in its way, as the continued inactivity of Wurmser and Davidowitch are in theirs. None of the parties have explained the motives of their conduct, though it would hardly have been concealed had it promised to cast any very radiant lustre on the fame of the mighty actors in this deep and deadly drama.

If we can discover no comprehensible motive for Napoleon's conduct in resigning the advantages gained on the evening of the 15th, to fight for them again on the morning of the 16th-for his own statement will not bear the test of examinationwe can well understand that circumstances might now induce him to continue his attacks upon Alvinzy. His position, which was difficult at the best, had been rendered critical

with 2000 men of the blockading by these unsuccessful combats. Ile

corps; General Guyeux had brought an equal number from General Vaubois' division to aid the main army; the French had not above 14,000 men between the Adige and the Mincio; and from the ramparts of Mantau and from Molare's mountainrange, double that number of Austrians are ready to burst upon the foe; their sabres gleam, their hearts are stout, but fatality has paralysed the arms of the brave!

On the morning of the 16th Napoleon again crossed the Adige and moved on as before, in two columns, against Porcil and Arcole. On the causeways he encountered and threw back the Austrian advanced guards, and Massena again carried Porcil after a sharp encounter with Provera's corps, and here his second day's work ended even as the first had done; but at Arcole every effort to carry the bridge and village by a front attack failed exactly as they had failed the day before. One

had not, perhaps, lost many more men than the Austrians; but to relinquish the contest would be to confess himself vanquished, to sacrifice a part of that moral courage and confidence from which his army derived so great a portion of its strength and efficiency.

He was, therefore, obliged to fight; and it was evident that these continued blows, however unskilfully dealt, would in the end, if no decisive result or great disproportion of loss took place, tell most in favour of the party which had the largest fund of confidence and stamina to draw upon, and here the balance was entirely on the side of the French. Besides, they were forced to stand at bay; for as long as Mantua held out, the fate of all their previous conquests depended on the result of every battle fought for its relief; if they sustained a single defeat in the field and allowed Wurmser to join the other Austrian armies, nothing could

save them from being driven back behind the Apennines, to the very point whence they started at the opening of the campaign.

All these circumstances led naturally to a renewal of the action on the 17th; and the altered dispositions shew at once how anxious Napoleon was to extend his front and not to fight on the causeways by mere heads of columns. On this occasion Augereau, followed by the reserve cavalry, was to cross the Alpon on bridges prepared during the night near Ronco; a corps was to march from Legnano to turn the extreme left of the Austrians; a single brigade only of Massena's division was to move on Porcil, with the rest the general was to attack Arcole. An accident had nearly frustrated all these dispositions at the very moment they were about to be acted upon. One of the bridges over the Adige gave way at the very time when the Austrians, informed that the French were in full retreat, were advancing to overthrow what they thought a mere rearguard left at Ronco. Fortunately for Napoleon the French artillery, on the right bank of the Adige, enfiladed both causeways so completely, that its fire was alone sufficient to drive back the assailants; the bridge being repaired, the Republicans proceeded with their movement. The Austrians attacked the advanced guard as they moved along the causeway; but following some trifling success too far, were taken in both flanks and repulsed with loss. The manoeuvring also of entire brigades and battalions in these marshes shews how completely the ground was at variance with the principle on which Napoleon pretends to have acted.

Whilst these advanced-guard combats were fought along the causeways, Augereau had reached the left wing of the Austrians, drawn up between the village of Arcole, which was now the centre of their position, and an extensive morass that covered their extreme left. The French at

tacked with their usual gallantry,

but met with so resolute an opposi

tion that they were obliged to give

way at all points and at every onset. Napoleon seeing the ill success of these efforts, fell, as he tells us, upon the idea of sending a troop of fifty guides, accompanied by several trumpeters, round the morass, with orders to sound the charge as soon as they should have turned the Austrian position; and this measure, he assures us, decided the fate of the day and induced the enemy to retire, thinking they were assailed by the whole French cavalry. Those who know how much better such stratagems tell in books than in the field, will have little hesitation in placing this brilliant device on the level with so many other puerilities already exposed in this memoir; and Berthier, in a private letter to Clerke, makes no mention of this pretended stratagem.

The Austrians tell us that they resolved to retire as soon as they perceived that Augereau had crossed the Alpon, and that a corps was on its march from Legnano, and that they only made front with their left wing to give the troops still before Verona time to fall back on Villa Nova. This being effected, they withdrew to the same place about two o'clock in the day. Their retreat was not molested. From the position which they occupied, it is evident enough that they had no intention to fight on the left bank of the Alpon. Their right wing fronted that river above Arcole where their centre was posted, and whence the left fell back to the morass already mentioned in an angle of about 90° this was no formation in which a French army could be encountered. The Austrians lost about 6000 men in these three actions; the French, perhaps, a few more. Little was gained by either party in the field; but what arms left undecided, the superior moral force of the French troops here achieved for their commander.

The reader will recollect that on the 17th November, at the very time when Alvinzy was falling back from Arcole, abandoning the cause as hopeless, forgetting, it would almost prise, Davidowitch was defeating seem, the very object of the enter

*In the St. Helena Memoirs the loss of the Austrians is estimated in one place at 18,000, and in another at 20,000, and in a third at 25,000 men; that is, in the last instance, at 2000 or 3000 more than they brought into field.

The

Vaubois at Rivoli, and gaining a battle which, if achieved one day sooner, would probably have turned the scale in favour of Austria; but standing by itself, a victory gained over a single division could not retrieve what an army had abandoned; and Napoleon no sooner found that Alvinzy was in full retreat towards Montebello, than he immediately turned against Davidowitch. latter, however, was apprised of his danger, and fell back rapidly into the mountains; and as Álvinzy also countermarched and made a new demonstration against Verona, Napoleon was obliged to return to the Adige. On the part of the fieldmarshal this was only a feint in order to gain time for his lieutenant, who, thus relieved, retired quietly to Trent, while the marshal himself established army at Bassano.

his

had happened. The field-marshal again withdrew to his fastnesses, and a gallant army, which, if properly employed for one hour, while the combats were waging round Arcole, might have averted from its country twenty years of humiliation and sorrow, was doomed to perish by famine and sickness amidst the pestilential marshes of the Mincio.

The Austrians had recovered Trent and the line of the Brenta by this expedition, and could, probably, shew a few guns and standards as trophies gained in the various combats; but, however much these advantages might be put forward, the undertaking had, nevertheless, proved a complete failure, and one which, added to so many previous disasters, was certain to produce the most unfavourable effects on the minds of the soldiers, for they had often been victorious, whereas their leaders had been constantly foiled. A complete want of confidence in the skill and fortune of their superiors was the natural consequence; and the next act will shew what may be expected even from brave troops once impressed with so fatal a sentiment.

Wurmser had, of course, been apprised that an army was in march for the relief of Mantua. The thunder of artillery was distinctly heard in the direction of the Adige; and, from the steeple that served as an observatory, the combats round Arcole were plainly discernible; but no movement was made to aid the relieving force, as the field - marshal waited for a signal which circumstances never permitted Alvinzy to make. Three salvoes, fired at five minutes' interval, from eight 12pounders, were to tell Wurmser that his friends were preparing to pass the Adige, and to call upon him to sally from the fortress and join in the general onset. But Alvinzy, attacked at Arcole, was never in position to give the signal; and the hundred of guns fired on the banks of the Alpon, the stern combat in which, for three days, he saw the adverse hosts engaged, were unfortunately not deemed enough to convince Marshal Wurmser that the hour to strke home had arrived!

It was in vain that victory seemed to court these unhappy commanders, even with open arms. the 23d of November, and when all At last, on the blockading corps had returned to their posts, a sally was made from the fortress. It proved singularly successful: the Favorita, St. An

To enter into any serious examination of the movements already described, would, of course, be worse than useless; for it is sufficiently evident that neither of the parties had any clear idea of what their respective manœuvres were to produce. From the moment that Alvinzy placed himself, with an army that had gained little advantage over the French in open field, close before Verona-a fortified town, if not a fortress-and the Adige, from that moment his career was run. And this he seems to have felt himself, for, there arrived, he stood motionless, and like a conscious malefactor, over whom the sword of vengeance was suspended, waited, in crouching inactivity, till the oft-repeated blows fairly to the ground. of an unskilful adversary struck him

The French, on their part, were victorious, notwithstanding the reverses they had experienced in most of the combats, for they had maintained their point-the blockade of Mantua; and the buoyant and elastic

tonio, and Montado, were taken; but spirits of the soldiers were naturally

with them, also, a number of prisoners, who informed Wurmser of what

VOL. XXXIII. NO. CXCV.

elevated by this additional proof of their own prowess and of the skill of

U