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guilty and heart-broken woman may have felt, when these words of mercy and of a parent's love fell upon her ears! She did not promise to forget, that she could never undertake to do; but she pledged her word to make no inquiry after the child; and frightful as the struggle often was to keep it, she made it triumphantly, and the promise was kept.

From that time forth all the members of the Horne family, the father alone excepted, hated one another with a deadly hatred. The feeling of Martha towards her brothers was, to be sure, loathing and terror rather than hatred; but William hated her, and took every opportunity of shewing it, whilst Charles, treating her with neglect, but seldom with unkindness, turned all his rancour against William. And so, for a space of three-and-twenty years, their days were passed, in a sort of companionship which we can liken to nothing more nearly than that of doomed spirits in the place of their torment; for they either could not or did not fall upon the obvious expedient of a separation, but dwelt together under the same roof, perpetual blisters and thorns one to another. At last, the patriarch, after far passing the age of man, died; and Martha, who had nursed him through a long illness, and was ever ready to lick the dust from his shoes, was thrown, through the imbecile deceit of a three-fold will, penniless upon the world.

inquirer will never fail of tracing
back the particular act to some habit
of self-indulgence, which, though
overlooked by the world, has long
existed, and given a bias to the whole
character of the criminal. Among
these, moreover, there is none which
so surely extinguishes, in the end, all
perception of moral right as the sur-
render of the will to the impulses of
one, not unnatural, propensity. And
if this debasing passion be suffered in
early life to gain the ascendancy,
there is an end to both the power
and the will in its victim to cultivate
either the intellectual or the moral
faculties which Nature may have be-
stowed upon him. William Horne,
for example, appears to have been a
child of slow parts, coarse tastes, and of
a disposition, contradictory and wilful.
A weak, though learned father, in-
stead of observing this, and adapting
the manner of the boy's culture to
the soil on which he had to work,
devoted a great deal of time and at-
tention to the calling into existence
of tastes which had neither seed nor
germ in his son's constitution.
task was, of course, difficult, and the
labour to both parties great, which
the injudicious father endeavoured
to lighten by over-indulgence out of
the school-room; and the conse-
quence was, that his pleasures be-
came the business of the youth's life,
his studies a penance, from which he
seized every opportunity of escaping.
Suppose, however, that a different
course had been pursued, and that
the father, seeing whither the na-
tural temperament of the son tended,
had encouraged him to devote his
mind to out-of-door pursuits; the
young man would have probably
been what is called wild, in any
event, but the good farmer and keen
sportsman never could have com-
mitted such crimes as those for
which, on his seventy-fourth birth-
day, William Horne suffered. For
libertinism, though it vitiate the
tastes and unfit its victim for the ap-

The history of the progress of this man in guilt seems to bear out in a very remarkable degree the theory which, in the opening of the present paper, we ventured to propound, namely, that though crime be something quite distinct from moral evil, and in itself not unfrequently less deserving of reprobation, it is the sure result, in every instance, of the absence of those powers of self-control, which are not to be acquired except from long practice, and the negation by the individual to himself of many an object, in itself harmless, of which he may experience the desire to become possessed. Crimes -and great crimes, too-are sometimes committed without premeditation; and when they so befal, we pity the criminals-who, indeed, are just objects of our compassion-to the full as much as we blame them. Yet, even in such cases, the careful

The

preciation of the good and the beau-
tiful, rarely, till it outruns all bounds,
associates itself with cruelty and a
disregard of human life. When it
becomes the great master-passion in
the man, however, there is no telling
into what atrocities it will lead him,
and this the case of William Horne
has, we conceive, very sufficiently
attested.

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PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGNS IN THE RISE OF NAPOLEON.

No. I.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS.

We believe that public attention in England is gradually turning to military affairs. Time is wearing away the fatal prejudices which led to so many disasters, and made even unconquered soldiers purchase ultimate triumphs at so vast an expense of blood and treasure. We are beginning to perceive the folly of terming ourselves a naval and commercial people independent of military forces; and are, by degrees, rather ashamed of the fantastic apprehension, which even in modern times made us jealous of a British army, and made us look upon sons, brothers, countrymen, as constitutionally dangerous the moment they were arrayed in their sovereign's uniform: a reputation for exalted patriotism and enlightened philanthropy is no longer acquired by simply libelling the army. The progress of science has narrowed the Channel, reduced mighty oceans to comparatively small dimensions, brought our shores within the reach of hostile arms, and exposed our colonies, scattered over the wide surface of the globe, to attacks, against which naval forces can prove no permanent security. And though the power of steam, which is effecting these great changes, augments the naval advantages we already possess, by adding to our superiority as soldiers and seamen, the superior skill and energy our people have evinced as engineers; yet it seems now admitted, that no coast can be protected against armaments conveyed by steam-vessels, unless by land forces ready to meet the assailants on shore. This important truth is gradually making its way in public conviction, and calling attention to military affairs.

The perfect working of the government machinery, which in civilised states permits the rulers of nations to bring the whole force of empires into the field, together with the improved system of military discipline and organisation, which renders armies more compact and more movable than in former times, have ren

dered the operations of offensive warfare infinitely more formidable than the mere unsupported inroads of former periods could be considered. Against the dangers resulting from such a state of things we are naturally bound to be prepared; we owe this to our own security, and to the high station we hold at the head of civilisation. We entertain no hostile feelings against other nations, we seek for no additional possession. The sun never sets upon our empire; a hundred and fifty millions of people live beneath our sway; and what acquisition made by war could possibly equal the additional power, glory, and force, certain to be gained by every step of progress and improvement made in peaceful times by an empire of such boundless

extent and resources? Our conduct in peace and in war—and it cannot be too often repeated in opposition to so many libels foreign and domestic -has ever been fair, frank, generous, and upright, an example to the nations of the earth. The enlightened and the dispassionate in both hemispheres will, we have no doubt, give us full credit for such conduct, but nations are not always ruled by absolute wisdom; and great as the sacrifices we have made, to live upon friendly terms with France and America, it would be utter folly to disguise from ourselves the enmity entertained against us by the low democracy of both countries; and which can hardly fail to break into open hostility the moment those parties acquire ascendancy either at Washington or in Paris.

As the zealous advocates of peace, we recommend readiness for war; for the most violent aggressors will pause before they assail the bold and the well prepared. On the other hand, nothing so much encourages an enemy as the efforts of domestic parties striving to crush the martial spirit of a people, and weaken the military efforts of the state under the plea of economy; at the same time that they vilify the conduct of

government towards other nations; thus giving hostile powers, though treated with the greatest fairness and generosity, a plea to excite animosity against us even on the strength of our own words. History has sufficiently shewn how greatly the efforts of domestic factions aided the cause of rancorous foes in our late French and American wars.

the great war against republican and
imperial France was only purchased
by fifteen years of mismanagement
and disaster. Reasons enough it may
be supposed for now devoting some
attention to military affairs.

Feebly as the following sketches
may be drawn, we can safely say,
that we believe them-the Italian
campaign more especially-to be
founded on the best and most au-
thentic documents on which military
history was ever composed; and we
shall, in due time, lay our authori-
ties at length before the reader. It
will no doubt be said, as it has been
said already, that the views taken in
these papers are highly unjust to
Napoleon, that they are
"crotchets" in fact.

We have at present no intention
of lecturing on patriotism or on tac-
tics, though we may occasionally
introduce some of our future papers
with a few remarks on the latter
subject. Our only object here is to
avail ourselves of what we believe to
be the augmenting taste of the pub-
lic for military reading, in order to
sketch some of the sanguinary
campaigns which placed Napoleon
on a throne of never equalled power.
As military history, when the causes
of success and defeat are properly
developed, tends not only to interest
the reader, but to enlarge and clear
the views, enrich the ideas he may
already have formed on the subject,
it cannot be too much recommended
to nations liable at all hours to be
called into the field; for it is only
a wide-spread national knowledge of
the theory of war, which can ensure
the most efficient training and suc-
cessful employment of the forces.
We use the word theory here, in
its just and real meaning the bright
source of every great improvement
made in human knowledge: the dull
martinet tactician believes it to be
some monster of darkness, that ought
to be consigned to the flames with all
possible speed. Brave soldiers and
gallant officers we can always com-
mand, for they are the produce of
our soil; but these alone cannot

command success.
We had brave
troops at the commencement of the
Seven Years' War, and were yet un-
successful in all our early undertak-

ings;
the gallantry of our men could
not avert the failures of the American
contest, and the ultimate success of

mere The reader need not be told, that every novel doctrine advanced against widely spread and deeply rooted opinion is invariably so termed; every new idea in science, philosophy, history, has been assailed; and the practice will probably continue as long as human knowledge shall continue to advance. We may, no doubt, be mistaken, as well as our critics, in the views taken in these sketches; but we have, owing to our authorities, the advantage of stating the facts more accurately, we believe, than they have yet been stated; and having done so, we leave it to the reader to follow us

in our inferences, or to draw his own, if it must be so, more logical conclusions. But military critics, it is said, differ so widely on these points as to render it doubtful who is to be believed. This should not, we suspect, offer any real difficulty; for the reader who comes with an unbiassed mind to the investigation of any subject will necessarily follow the writer who brings the points whence truth is to be derived, in the clearest and most intelligible manner home to his understanding. No person of ordinary ability is likely to be imposed upon by mere terms of extravagant praise or censure.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon appointed to the Command of the Army of Italy.-Situation of the Country at the period.-French and Austrian Armies and their Commanders.--Combats of Montenotte, Dego, Millessimo, and Mondovi.-Armistice of Cherasco and Termination of the war with Sardinia. Napoleon Buonaparte commenced his extraordinary career under circumstances the most favourable to

an adventurous rise. The tempest of the Revolution had levelled the barriers that in ordinary times ex

clude all but nobles and the possessors of high rank from the direction of public affairs; lawyers, adventurers, and renegado priests, ruled the republic by aid of the terror which the guillotine inspired. Armies were often commanded by individuals who before the commencement of the troubles had followed the most peaceful occupations; and many of those who had been non-commissioned officers in the royal regiments, were already colonels and generals of division in the second year of the "Republic One and Indivisible."

Napoleon had received a good military education at the best seminaries in France. The revolution found him a lieutenant of artillery, and the emigration of the superior officer raised him to the rank of colonel; and this was already standing very high at such a time, and when his country was at war with the principal powers of Europe.

But though circumstances thus placed him in a favourable position, he was not at first very successful. By the indisposition of his superior, the command of the artillery at the siege of Toulon had devolved upon him; but his conduct seems to have attracted no particular notice; for his name is not mentioned in the despatches announcing the capture of the fortress; he received no immediate promotion; and his next service was of very secondary importance. In the summer of 1794, we find him, however, commanding the artillery of the army of Italy; but he did not long continue to hold the appointment, for in the following year we already see him at Paris, soliciting employment from the minister-at-war, and actually placed for a time on the retired list.

His fortunes appear, at this period, to have been very low indeed: he seems to have been in pecuniary difficulties, and actually sought the hand of Mademoiselle de Montansier, a lady of great wealth, but far advanced in years. Failing in this pursuit, he projected a voyage to Constantinople for the purpose of seeking service in Turkey, when the revolution of the 13th Vendémiaire opened brighter prospects to him.

When on that occasion, Barras, the victor of the 9th Thermidore, was placed at the head of the troops

destined to oppose the insurgents, he gave the command of the artillery to Napoleon, whom he had known at the siege of Toulon. The result is well known; the National Guard fled at the first fire; but it is a mistake, as generally asserted, that any particular merit was ascribed to Napoleon all the honour, such as it was, devolved upon Barras, who really commanded the troops. This officer, having on the formation of the new government been named one of the Directors, resigned the command of the army of the interior, which was given to Napoleon, whose star now rose rapidly above the

horizon.

Among the ladies most distinguished at this time in the Parisian circles of fashion for figure and elegance of manners, was Josephine Beauharnois, widow of the Marquis de Beauharnois, guillotined during the revolution. She had great influence with the Director Barras, some say more than legitimate influence; and when Napoleon sought her hand, she obtained for her future husband the promise of the command of the army of Italy. Capefigue, who has seen manuscript Memoirs of Barras, relates, on their authority, that the future empress attended constantly as a petitioner in his antechamber, till she secured the fulfilment of the promise. The parties were married on the 9th of March, and on the 27th of the same month, we already find Napoleon at the head of the troops destined to place him on the highest pinnacle of power and fortune.

The youthful commander found head-quarters at Nice, where for three years they seemed to have taken root; his five predecessors in command having always fallen back to that station after every successful campaign. Like the other French armies of the period, the army of Italy had fought with success against the enemy; they had closed the previous campaign by the victories of Loano and St. Bernardo, but they had not hitherto derived from their triumphs any advantage that could place them on a level with the conquerors of Holland, Belgium, and the Rhenish provinces: they had only subdued Savoy, the county of Nice, and the Riviera. They were

now about to enter upon a more brilliant career; the description of which obliges us to say a few words of the situation of the country in which the war was to be carried on. Though the French troops occupied the territory of Genoa, the city still maintained a precarious neutrality, supported only by aid of its strong fortifications.

The governments of Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, and Venice, were all well affected towards Austria; but they took no part in the contest; fancied themselves neutral, though certain, as the result proved, that the French, if victorious, would not respect their independence.

The sovereign pontiff was at peace with the republic; but there existed an unsettled cause of quarrel between them. The French agent Baseville had been murdered by the Roman populace in 1793, and no sufficient reparation had yet been made. At one time the French] government intended to send an army by sea from Toulon to the mouth of the Tiber; but the presence of the English fleet rendered this expedition rather too precarious. The attack on Rome was therefore delayed till it could be made by land.

The king of Naples was openly at war with France, and had a corps of 1500 cavalry in the Austrian army: enough to draw down upon himself

the

citizens of towns were in their favour;
or rather in favour of the doctrines
which they preached. Books of
liberal import had been circulated
with singular freedom in Italy; and
the works of Filangieri and Beccaria
Iwere in the hands of all well-edu-
cated persons during the years that
preceded
the revolution. New
ideas, aspirations for liberty and
natural independence, had spread
among the educated classes, and in
some cases the nobles and the clergy
also were advocates for change, and
now the liberators were at hand.
These sentiments, the existence of
which was well known, helped no
doubt to paralyse instead of redoub-
ling the efforts of the governments,
and were so far of great advantage
to the French; but in the field the
invaders derived little direct aid from
their new allies, who soon tired of
the pressure of the war-taxes and of
the mean and grasping avarice for
which the republican authorities
were so generally distinguished.

vengeance of the enemy, but not enough to arrest their progress. All the Italian governments dreaded the republicans, but none, except the king of Sardinia, had the courage to face them in the field; the others trusted to foreign arms and efforts which they dared not even aid, and when that trust failed, they bent before the storm, hoping to escape by mean subserviency the well-deserved fate which they had not ventured to oppose sword in hand.

In

iron times, the only times, perhaps, that history has made us acquainted with, it is on the sword alone that nations can rest with safety,—a truth that every page of the world's annals proves to demonstration; for justice and forbearance never yet arrested the progress of the spoiler.

But though the Italian govern

The marked division existing between the different classes of Italian society, also favoured the republican arms by weakening the means of combined resistance. The nobles, without any attachment to the middle classes, feel their depressed and powerless situation, and entertain no affection for governments that hold them in such subjection. All the middle classes, the citizens of towns, and the lawyers, as a body, are liberals, we may almost say republicans; and many dream, even now, of the re-establishment of a Roman repub

lic.

The peasantry and the lower orders, in general, have but little respect for their superiors, unless, perhaps, for the clergy. They dislike all those who possess or exercise authority over them; all governors, magistrates, and provincial authorities, and very generally look upon the nobles and landlords as strangers and intruders in the country. Against their governments they entertain no hostility, as they live "remote from power," and feel its pressure only through the means of intermediate agents, on whom all their indignation is vented: their princes they generally regard with

ments were all, and the nobles and loyal attachment, and this feeling

the clergy generally, hostile to the French, the middle classes and the

was much stronger at the period of which we are speaking, than at pre

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